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Abstract 
 
The criminalization of children commercially-sexually exploited through prostitution persists 
despite trafficking laws recognizing this as one of the worst forms of exploitation committed 
against the most vulnerable social group. This thesis examines the re/production of 
inequalities in American legal discourse on child trafficking, and why child criminalization 
persists in this context. Employing a child-centered framework built from multi-conscious 
feminism and the sociologies of law and childhood, it examines mechanisms of othering and 
criminalization in key legislative debates, statutes and cases of the United States generally as 
well as two states exemplifying the retributive and child-protective modes of handling child 
trafficking. It identifies three themes or issues often presented as binaries that structure child 
trafficking discourse—adult/child, victim/offender and consent/non-consent—and examines 
how these are deployed to penalize children in general, and minority and immigrant children 
in particular. First, processes of marginalization related to race, class, gender and 
immigration have been vital to the construction of childhood (as normative/deviant) in and 
through trafficking and prostitution laws, which are reproduced through different types of 
discourses in both states. Second, both retributive and child-protective modes of response 
preserve child criminalization by maintaining the tension between prostitution and trafficking, 
and the female culpability associated with prostitution, including through the denial of the 
victimization of “repeat offenders.” Finally, despite its prohibition, prostitution is 
conceptualized in contractual terms, which imputes consent to identities constructed through 
this discourse and renders commercial-sexual exploitation as merely or primarily involving 
acts of sale, purchase and consumption. 
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CHAPTER 1: The Sociological Significance of What is Legislated 
1.1 Introduction 
This dissertation is about how and why the penalization of children who are 
commercially-sexually exploited through prostitution persists in the United States. It 
examines the role of American legal discourse on child sex trafficking in re/producing 
inequalities that enable the othering and criminalization of impacted children. The motivating 
concern behind this research is that various means of penalization continue to be deployed 
against impacted children despite trafficking laws recognizing child prostitution as one of the 
worst forms of exploitation committed against the most vulnerable social group in society. 
The central query of this research is: How has American legal discourse on child sex 
trafficking re/produced social inequalities, and why does the criminalization of impacted 
children persist? Contending with this question reveals how law and society respond to 
extreme inequalities and those identified as the most vulnerable and exploited among us. 
Hybridized discourses of retributivism and rehabilitation and contractual discourse of 
individualistic market relations, as part of broader neoliberal ideology, are used to justify 
various forms and degrees of criminalization and carceral management, which jeopardize, 
erode and often overpower discourses of childhood and child protection. The core argument 
of the thesis is that at least three dualisms structure American legal discourse regarding child 
sex trafficking—adult/child, victim/offender, and consent/non-consent—and these are 
deployed in ways that penalize children generally and minority and immigrant children in 
particular. 
This chapter introduces the problem and its various dimensions, clarifies my research 
query and aims, discusses the contributions and limits of key literatures regarding child sex 
trafficking and processes of marginalization around race, class, gender, childhood and 
punishment to shaping this research, and concludes with summaries of subsequent chapters. 
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1.1.1 Dimensions of the Problem:  
Urgency, challenges and multidimensionality  
The issue of child sex trafficking is sociologically profound, politically urgent and 
proliferating in legislation, yet sociologically undertheorized. The institution and practice of 
child sex trafficking is global in scope and disparately impacts children the world over, 
positioning girls who are socio-economically marginalized as most vulnerable to its 
conditions, “risk factors” and harms (Javidan 2012; O'Connell-Davidson 2005: 34). Miriam 
(2005: 1) states that, “Given the magnitude of the problem, namely the vast numbers of 
women and children whose lives have been devastated by sex-trafficking under globalization, 
such questions reemerge with a new political urgency.” Current feminist debates over 
trafficking raise important sociological, legal and philosophical questions about agency, 
power, consent and victimization. However, efforts to theorize child prostitution specifically 
challenge existing scholarly and legal frameworks. The sociology of “sex work” is currently 
the predominant framework and discourse available for sociologists to draw from, and 
despite the agentic adult woman as its central subject, social science researchers are 
increasingly extending it to encompass children and child sex trafficking (e.g., O'Connell-
Davidson 2005; Orchard 2007; Lutnick 2016). Alternatively, the issue of child prostitution is 
ignored or exempted from analysis specific to children. Legal frameworks have rendered 
minors in prostitution simultaneously hyper-visible and invisible; emblematic of systemic 
failures, yet politically sidelined; pitied, yet scorned; victims, yet offenders; children, yet un-
childlike; legally incapable of consenting to sex, yet legally culpable for selling sex. These 
contradictions result from and reinforce the uncertainties impacted children face before the 
law with regard to how they will be treated. Legal constructions of the issue used to 
formulate responses to it often lead to the criminalization of impacted children (Javidan 2003;  
Schwartz 2008).  
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Noticing, theorizing and transcending these contradictions has required 
interdisciplinary research and approaching the topic as a locus for intra-disciplinary 
convergence—of the sociologies of gender, sex work, globalization, migration and 
criminology, as well as those with which it is less often associated—the sociologies of race, 
ethnicity, postcoloniality, childhood, and juvenile justice, including punishment and law. 
Child prostitution implicates processes of globalization, the reproduction of race, class, 
gender and age-based inequalities, criminalization and mass incarceration (e.g. Javidan 2012; 
Grahn-Farley 2003; O'Connell-Davidson 2005; Hughes 2005). I have also found critical 
jurisprudence that imbricates social theories of race, class, gender, childhood and 
criminalization or punishment theory helpful to thinking through this issue, particularly to 
critique its legal construction (e.g. Grahn-Farley 2002, 2003; Pether 1999; Farley 1997; 
Douzinas and Gearey 2005). Minors in prostitution embody the resultant contradictions of 
these processes, which render them quintessential “bad subjects” of theory, law, political 
subjectivity and citizenship (Harris 2003 and Roithmayr 2003). The bad subject is a 
complicated feminine (or feminized) subject in conflict with the law, who is not only 
penalized for violating the law, but also for breaching social norms, often many at once (Id.).  
Discussing a previous study that I conducted of legislative debates, laws and cases 
regarding child prostitution in California (Javidan 2003), Angela Harris (2003: 521), a 
founding scholar of Critical Race Theory and its feminist outgrowth of Critical Race 
Feminism, commented that minors in prostitution and their social location exemplify the bad 
subject “because in becoming prostitutes, they cease to be understood as children.” In that 
study I pointed out that this is the result of a contradiction when prostitution law is 
wrongfully applied to minors to label them sex offenders rather than applying age of 
consent/statutory rape law to protect them from criminalization because these laws specify 
that minors are legally incapable of consenting to sex and therefore cannot be legally liable 
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for selling sex. I was primarily concerned with the dualism of minors as victims and 
offenders and how this led to their criminalization. Building from and expanding upon those 
earlier insights, using sociological theory and critical jurisprudence, I delve more deeply into 
the roots of that problem here but additionally into the significance of child status and 
consent. This study is similarly concerned with how “prostitution” negates “child” status (and 
its assumed protections), but with an added awareness of how normative childhood in Anglo-
American culture has been constructed in raced, classed and gendered terms, such that minors 
who deviate from White middle class standards are often viewed as “non-children” or are 
“adultified” in law and society (Bush 2010; Bernstein 2011). In this research I pursue the 
deeper sociological story of the role of legal discourse related to child prostitution in 
constructing normative and deviant childhoods via race, class, gender and immigration or 
citizenship status, perpetuating the penalization of impacted children through criminalization, 
and reading “consent” into their exploitation. The aim is to investigate ways in which this 
lays the foundation for disparate impact on children through mutually constitutive processes 
of marginalization embedded in or performed by legal texts—racialization (including 
racialized immigration), classing, gendering, infantilization/adultification (as two sides of the 
same coin) and penalization. I combine theorizing multiplicities (Ali 2003a, 2003b) and 
critical legal discourse analysis as methodologies of multi-conscious feminism for the 
investigation of complex social phenomena applicable to legal archival research. 
I examine key legal texts related to child prostitution in two states, Utah and Illinois, 
which ostensibly exemplify the two primary modalities of treating minors in prostitution 
across the US—child criminalization and child protection—while considering the ways in 
which these overlap or diverge.1 This is designed to show how distinct versions of the legal 
conceptualization of child prostitution emerge from various discursive contexts but in “hybrid” 
                                                
1 Chapter 2 contains a more in-depth discussion regarding my choice of focus on Utah and Illinois as exemplary 
of the respective punitive and child-protective approaches in the US. 
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forms that combine retributive and rehabilitative tendencies, which allow penalization to 
continue, even under auspices of child protection. Utilizing archival and documentary 
primary sources, I highlight relevant contemporary texts—transcribed legislative debates, 
statutory language, and judicial opinions (cases)—and consider continuities with and 
departures from their antecedents in the historical present. 
The thesis identifies three themes or issues often presented as binaries in related law 
that structure the legal discourse but which also operate as polarized ends of continua and 
fulcrums upon which the fate of minors are determined—adult/child, victim/offender, and 
consent/non-consent—and examines the ways in which these are deployed to penalize 
children in general, and minority and immigrant children in particular.  Each of the three 
empirical chapters focuses, respectively, on one of these three themes or issues that form the 
foundation for criminalization or protection of children in this context. They trace the career 
of the conceptualization of child prostitution from a violation of patriarchal sex right to the 
origins of “trafficking” in racialized immigration law targeting “alien prostitution,” and then 
from White female victimization to feminized culpability in criminal law that is facially 
gender-neutral but which preserves racialized feminine culpability. Charting these shifts from 
each of the three thematic angles, the empirical chapters narrate the contemporary 
reconceptualization of child prostitution, which is marked by tensions between a legal regime 
of child protection based on age of consent and a punitive legal regime based on prostitution. 
The emergent concepts of “child sex trafficking” and “domestic minor sex trafficking” 
attempt to reconcile the two regimes, but preserve the possibility of retributive measures, 
leaving impacted minors at a crossroads between protection and punishment. Economically 
marginalized children, particularly girls of color, who are disproportionately impacted by 
child prostitution and criminalization, are in greatest jeopardy for being positioned on the 
punitive end of these binaries and continua, and thereby at greatest risk of penalization. The 
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law generates polarities of “non-consenting child victim” as the ideal subject of protection 
and the “consenting adult offender” as the intended subject of punishment. The proximity of 
children to the subjects of punishment is over-determined by a multiplicity of processes of 
marginalization that have deeper historical roots than most related research contends with.  
The contribution of this thesis is to provide greater insight into the mutual 
re/production of social inequalities and criminalization by examining the construction of a 
specific issue and its subjects—child prostitution and minors in prostitution—as they 
epitomize and embody a multiplicity of processes of othering and marginalization involving 
race/ethnicity/nationality, class, gender, childhood and punishment. The potential impact of 
this research, as a sociologically informed approach to an issue predominantly defined by law, 
is to draw attention to the deeper sociological and historical issues behind the law and the 
impediments these create to justice for impacted children by moving toward a child-centered 
approach that theorizes the issue from a multi-dimensional and historical perspective, which 
allows us to recognize these inequalities and injustices. To center the “bad subject” that 
epitomizes and embodies the multiplicity of processes of marginalization, particularly 
through interdisciplinary effort, enables intervention in multiple spheres of systemic, 
structural and institutional “isms” that corroborate to re/produce inequalities generally, and in 
particular for those most impacted by them. 
1.1.2 Terminology 
Terminology related to child prostitution has discursive, legal and political 
significance, and is highly contested. Contemporary human trafficking discourse uses a 
plurality of terms to signify the same or similar referents, hence lacks a single, unified term to 
refer to child prostitution. Trafficking is a heterogeneous phenomenon with multiple usages. 
Human trafficking can be for labor or sexual exploitation, the latter referred to as sex 
trafficking. The UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
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especially Women and Children (2000) defines child trafficking as “the recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of any person under the age of eighteen for the 
purposes of sexual or labor exploitation, forced labor, or slavery” (Gozdziak 2008: 904). Sex 
trafficking is the broader umbrella term under which falls the commercial-sexual exploitation 
of children (CSEC), also referred to as child sex trafficking. International law recognizes 
child prostitution as one of three forms of CSEC, along with child pornography and child 
sexual abuse (UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989). US 
federal law and the UN Protocol employ the same definition of “child” as in the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC): “every human being below the age of 18, 
unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier”2 (Id.: 904), I use the 
term “minors” and “children” interchangeably in accord with sociology of childhood and 
critical child rights theory to convey “child” status as a social and legal construct, defined by 
age. Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking (DMST), a term originating in the US, refers 
specifically to interstate or intrastate child sex trafficking, which includes child prostitution 
(Smith, Healy Vardaman et al. 2009; Lutnick 2016).  
In this framework, CSEC and child sex trafficking identify children as their subjects, 
but clarity and correspondence with other research necessitate specifying the prostitution 
form of these. The term child prostitution is heavily criticized for camouflaging or 
euphemizing what is actually commercialized child rape (Goddard, De Bortoli et al. 2005). 
Unlike other terms, however, it specifies subject and form—the exchange of something of 
market value for sexual acts with minors. Usage of the term in this study, along with “minors 
in prostitution” is not meant to impute consent or criminality on minors nor to minimize their 
                                                
2 Though the US is a signatory of the CRC, it is the only States Party not to have ratified, accepted, acceded or 
succeeded to it (United Nations Treaty Collection 2016). Long cited as the only other States Party not to have 
adopted the CRC, Somalia ratified on 1 October 2015, and South Sudan has not signed but acceded on 23 
January 2015 (Id.). The US has, however, adopted the UN Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child 
Pornography, and Child Prostitution (United States Congress 2016). 
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exploitation, per critique of the term “prostitution,” but to specify the form of commercial-
sexual exploitation and convey the indeterminate status of minors in prostitution who are in 
conflict with the law. There are multiple issues regarding the discourse and genealogy of 
these terms, a full exploration of which is beyond the scope of this research, but which could 
be written about extensively (see e.g. Ollus 2015; Meshkovska, Siegel et al. 2015; Brayley 
and Cockbain 2014). I discuss a sociological understanding of human trafficking for sexual 
and labor exploitation further below. 
1.2 Literature Review 
I reviewed a broad range of literature for this research, including regarding human 
trafficking for labor exploitation, sex trafficking, prostitution, commercial-sexual exploitation 
of children (CSEC), and child prostitution in global, national and local contexts. Although 
my knowledge of these subject matters informs this research throughout, it is only possible to 
provide what is essentially a summary of the most relevant aspects possible to convey here. I 
provide background and discuss available statistical information that highlights the race, class, 
gender and child-related aspects of the problem to help produce a picture of child sex 
trafficking in the US in global context, and the issue of punishment. I discuss some issues 
related to terminology, then develop a sociologically grounded understanding of human 
trafficking. I identify a tension between the dominant sociological framework for interpreting 
prostitution—the sociology of sex work—and the more marginalized sociology of childhood, 
which disrupts and challenges sex work theory, particularly its extension to children, in 
fundamental ways. In chapter 2, I discuss theorizing multiplicities and its salient dimensions 
for this research. 
Law, social policy and anti-trafficking NGOs dominate topical research and shape 
official discourse and legislation on child prostitution (Gozdziak and Collett 2005: 99, 118). 
Legal discourse on child prostitution and shifts within it reflect and propel cultural 
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developments encompassing social, political, and economic life. It is an axiom of both legally 
and sociologically oriented literature regarding sex trafficking and prostitution that legislation 
is indispensable to their abolition or regulation. However, while sex trafficking laws are 
currently proliferating, their direction is at best unclear, and their outcomes contradictory and 
uneven. They are also constructed in a broader legal nexus and social context that are 
profoundly consequential for outcomes but which are largely unarticulated in legal discourse. 
Both child-protective and punitive tendencies exist in American law governing child 
prostitution, with more punitive measures gaining prominence in recent decades (Schwartz 
2008).  
Moreover, legislation is one of the major causes of law enforcement and justice 
systems’ targeting of non-White minors, resulting in “disproportionate minority contact” 
(DMC) (Nellis and Richardson 2010), or “disproportionate minority youth contact” (DMYC). 
The disproportionate arrest, detention, conviction and punishment of girls of color in 
prostitution mirrors the results of such policies and practices. Legal discourse related to child 
prostitution can provide insight into the rationale and operation of what postcolonial 
feminism, intersectional theories and criminology observe as the selective rendition of 
“Others” as hyper-visible or invisible as well as their exclusion from or inclusion in various 
discourses to their detriment (Alexander and Mohanty 1997; Crenshaw 1989; Young 2003; 
Javidan 2003). Child prostitution laws not only assign or deny sexual victimhood, but they do 
so by re/producing hierarchies of social stratification and victimization that reflect and 
re/produce social hierarchy generally. In observing this, one finds that the discursive 
construction of child prostitution involves the corroboration of processes of racialization, 
classing, gendering, infantilization, adultification and criminalization (or quasi-
criminalization), and that childhood/child status can be viewed as the submerged foundation 
of these stratifications.  
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Sociological studies of child prostitution that aim for policy impact and which rely on 
the current legal apparatus will come up against problematic contradictions structuring the 
law in this area. Responses to my first study (Javidan 2003) affirmed my finding that the 
criminalization of minors in prostitution exposes “shameful contradictions” and “absurdities” 
in US law3 (Aoki 2003; Covey and Myers Morrison 2011; Mir 2013). Minors in prostitution 
are criminalized despite the identification of child prostitution in national and international 
laws as one of the worst criminal abuses against the most vulnerable in society, despite 
minors’ legal incapacity to consent to sex or enter contracts, and despite the illegality of 
contracts for sex in the US. However, the common response of redrafting legislation to re-
conceptualize minors in prostitution as victims is not eradicating their criminalization. Rather, 
it results in their criminalization or quasi-criminalization through arrest, detention and 
processing in justice systems under the guise of benevolence and/or imperatives of extracting 
testimony from minors to prosecute traffickers and pimps (see, e.g. Brown 2007; Bittle 2002). 
Such processes should be closely scrutinized as new (yet old) modes of criminalization and 
incarceration often undetected by current frameworks. Minors continue to be criminalized as 
sex offenders (“prostitutes”), or quasi-criminalized through ostensibly child-protective 
measures that construe them as victims of sex crimes such as domestic minor sex trafficking 
(DMST), but that offer partial, incomplete or conditional decriminalization. Legal texts that 
construct the issue as “prostitution” express the punitive modality deployed against minors, 
whereas the “DMST” construct operates in terms of child protection. Discord between these 
                                                
3 As a law review article, Javidan (2003) is considered a secondary (non-binding) authority, meaning that 
lawmakers (judges and legislators) and practitioners may consult it to gain expertise on this particular area of 
law. It has been considered a pioneering piece for pointing out the victim/offender contradiction in American 
law related to child prostitution. Over the years governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations 
have cited it as a resource for policy-making regarding girls and juvenile justice, and drafting tribal legislation 
regarding crimes against children using a victim-centered approach (e.g.US Department of Justice: Office of 
Justice Programs 2004; Sekaquaptewa, Bubar et al. 2008), but it is also considered key literature for legal 
scholarship on the topic (e.g. Adelson 2008; Annitto 2011; Birckhead 2011). As part of a small but influential 
and growing body of scholarship, it has played a significant role in shifting American legal discourse on child 
prostitution in terms of re-conceptualizing minors in prostitution as victims of sex crimes rather than offenders.  
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competing articulations of child prostitution suggests the great logical lengths and/or strained 
rationales required to maintain this double standard.  
CSEC has been viewed and addressed varyingly across the globe as primarily an issue 
of gender, law and order, public health, morals, labor, migration, poverty and development, 
or human rights (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre 2005). The achievement of the human 
rights framework and discourse regarding sex trafficking has been to offer a conceptual and 
normative framework “for reorienting the trafficking debate towards the exploitation of 
persons, regardless of their immigration status,” and to “serve as a tool for developing 
effective policies” (Lee 2011: 33). However, deepening analysis of trafficking and its causes 
as well as holding states accountable for their responses requires “identifying which 
individuals or groups of people are disproportionately more likely to be trafficked than others” 
(Id.). The official recognition of CSEC as a social wrong in the US has so far not centered on 
economically marginalized African American girls in the domestic context, and currently 
misrecognizes its most likely international sex trafficking victims, from Central America, as 
an influx of illegal migrants (US Department of Justice 2014). Available statistical data 
points to the need to center children, particularly minority children, in analyses of CSEC. 
1.2.1 Disproportionalities and disparate impact 
The exact prevalence of sex trafficking in the US (and world) is unknown, as data and 
statistics are patchy and incomprehensive. Statistics regarding human trafficking, including 
child prostitution, and the number of criminalized minors in prostitution are scarce, often 
unreliable and even unverifiable due to the nature of the phenomenon—seemingly ubiquitous, 
yet hidden and elusive (Bales 2004: 8; O'Connell-Davidson 2005; Lehti and Aromaa 2006: 
142; Bales 2009: xiii; Birckhead 2011: 1062). The exact scope of sex trafficking may be 
unknowable due to the hidden nature of sex crimes generally, which are underreported. The 
patchwork of existing statistics and data nonetheless reveals urgency with regard to 
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prevalence and scope of the problem as well as disproportionalities that make race, ethnicity, 
nationality/immigration/citizenship, class, gender and age salient and important units of 
analysis and synthesis. Legal discourse on child prostitution is necessarily an intervention 
into these various aspects of social organization. The juxtaposition of these 
disproportionalities with the disparate impact of criminalization suggests that children are 
over-burdened with these inequitable conditions and that their penalization is over-
determined. 
Age-related data shows that children are disproportionately impacted by commercial-
sexual exploitation globally, including in the US, such that children are not merely marginal 
or aberrant in prostitution, but integral and arguably foundational to it. Children comprise 
approximately 26% of the world’s population but 40-50% of those who are in “forced 
commercial sexual exploitation” (UNICEF 2006). Approximately 32% of total human 
trafficking victims in the world are children4 (World Bank 2016; United Nations Office of 
Drugs and Crime 2014: 29-30). “Current estimates of human trafficking for sexual 
exploitation…exaggerate the role of trafficking in international prostitution of adults but 
underestimate trafficking in minors” (Lehti and Aromaa 2006: 133). Globally, compared to 
adults, minors occupy the lowest rungs of prostitution hierarchy, endure its worst conditions 
and gain the least economically (O'Connell-Davidson 2005: 34).  
40% of sex trafficking cases in the US are of minors (Bureau of Justice Statistics 
2011). Over the last two decades the most commonly cited US statistic regarding child 
prostitution in the US remains between 100,000 to 300,000 minors entering prostitution per 
year (Estes and Weiner 2001: 4; ECPAT 1996, in Halter 2008: 9, discussing the limitations of 
                                                
4 There is regional variation, however, wherein in Africa and Central Asia upwards of 68% of human trafficking 
victims are children (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 2012: 74). Of the 12.3 million people estimated 
to be in “forced labor,” 1.39 are in “forced commercial sexual exploitation” (UNICEF 2006). A widely cited 
estimate is that of all human trafficking victims annually, 1.2 million are children (ILO 2002, in UNICEF 2006), 
and that approximately 2 million children are exploited in “the commercial sex industry” at any given time 
(UNICEF 2008: 25).  
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this data). The average age of entry into prostitution in the US ranges from twelve to fourteen 
or fifteen years old5 (Annitto 2011: 9; Grace, Starck et al. 2012; Curtis, Terry et al. 2008), 
though in at least one American city non-White minors in street prostitution are found to 
enter two years earlier than their White counterparts (Kramer and Berg 2003, in Schepel 
2011: 10). Boys’ average age range is slightly lower, from 11-13 years old (ECPAT USA 
2013: 8).  
Recent research indicates that minor girls comprise the majority of the participants in 
the “commercial sex industry”6 (Butler 2015: 1481). The prevalence of minors entering 
prostitution is increasing, particularly of those between thirteen and seventeen years of age, 
with 80% of adult women in prostitution having entered as minors7 (Birckhead 2011: 1056). 
These findings, particularly when taken together, would seem to support a striking claim that 
merits further attention and investigation: that most women’s prostitution in the US most 
often begins in childhood, and that children, especially girls, are not only integral but 
arguably foundational to prostitution. Minors in prostitution, particularly street-based 
prostitution, experience disproportionately greater victimization by crime in general, 
susceptibility to coercion into unprotected sex, incidence of pregnancy and STDs including 
HIV/AIDS, and more frequent malnutrition and illness, compared to adults in prostitution 
and the general population of minors (Halter 2008: 18; Klain 1999; Flowers 2011: 78-79). 
Research also indicates that drug abuse is both an antecedent and a consequence of entering 
prostitution, and finds disproportionate rates of mental health problems and suicidality for 
minors in street prostitution (Id.). Juvenile courts are also seeing an increase in cases of 
                                                
5 There are currently efforts to discredit this finding, but I tend to agree that the issue is actionable without 
having to “wax pedantic over the absence of airtight statistics” (Truong 2015: 288). 
6 It also indicates that a significant but often less visible number of boys are amongst the population of minors in 
prostitution, with the number of minority boys in prostitution increasing (Id.). 
7 See also MacKinnon  (2011: 277, 298-99), listing several studies supporting this, explaining that entry into 
prostitution “often well below the age of majority” is a “global commonality of prostitution,” and that “most 
women enter the sex industry with previously violated childhoods,” but that it is often denied that prostitution 
continues this violation, particularly once they reach age of majority (Id.).  
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minors in prostitution (Butler 2015: 1481). There are a significant number of arrests of 
children for prostitution in the US, from which even children under 10 are not exempt (Halter 
2008; Snyder 2012: 17). The picture that develops from the aggregation of available age-
related data indicates the need for particular attention to child prostitution, and child status, 
generational order and the life course in the context of sex trafficking. 
Information regarding gender demonstrates the disparate impact of commercial-
sexual exploitation along lines of gender. Globally, approximately three-quarters of all 
victims of human trafficking are female (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 2014: 
10). In the US of those “certified” by the federal government as trafficking victims, among 
adults 69% were women and among children 82% were girls (Clawson, Dutch et al. 2009). 
Some studies report that the number of boys and girls in the US in prostitution are nearly 
equal (Curtis, Terry et al. 2008; Polaris Project 2010; Shanahan 2013). However, others find, 
both globally and nationally, that the disproportionate majority of child trafficking victims in 
general are girls.8 The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (2014) reports that two-
thirds of child trafficking victims globally are girls—whether for labor or sexual exploitation 
or organ extraction. “There exists a general consensus that a majority of female victims of 
trafficking are trafficked for prostitution” (Lehti and Aromaa 2006: 133). Three-fifths (60%) 
of human trafficking is for sexual exploitation, with females comprising 98% of victims 
(International Labour Organization 2012: 14). Street-based prostitution is much more 
common for females than males, particularly for poor women and women of color9 (Lucas 
1995: 49). White males are overrepresented among “clients,” (Truong 2015: 289) with at 
                                                
8 Percentage estimates regarding all of these types of human trafficking along lines of gender and age are as 
follows: 59 percent women, 17 percent girls, 14 percent men, and 10 percent boys (UNODC 2014: 10).  
9 Historically, males have been among persons in prostitution in the US. Men called “fairies” prior to the 1920s-
30s (later stigmatized as “homosexual”) were available in prostitution as an “option” (Schepel 2011: 11). 
Economic motivation is the common denominator of male and female prostitution, but the circumstances and 
reasons differ significantly for transgender (male-to-female) persons, the majority of whom work indoors and 
cite as primary motives the financing of gender reassignment treatments and surgeries as well as fulfilling an 
emotional need for gender affirmation as female, described as being sexually desired and acted upon in passive 
feminine roles (Sanders, O’Neill and Pitcher 2013: 38-39, 76; Id.: 5, 8). 
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least one study reporting that of all minors in prostitution surveyed, nearly all served male 
“customers,” the majority served being White adult males between ages 25-55 (Curtis, Terry 
et al. 2008: 3).  
Running away from home has remained a major risk factor for children entering 
prostitution, and a common reason has been familial rejection or mistreatment based on 
children’s gender non-conformity, so that LGBT children also comprise a significant portion 
of minors in prostitution (Lolai 2015). One of the key gender-based differences is that boys in 
prostitution often collectivize, pool resources, and act independent of pimps, whereas girls 
more often have a pimp, though they do not necessarily identify this person as such; rather, 
they may see him as a “boyfriend” or partner, who doubles as both a protector and abuser in 
dynamics very similar to domestic violence (Halter 2008: 16-17; Grace, Starck et al. 2012; 
Stark and Hodgson 2004). The deployment of gender to justify child exploitation also takes 
the form of presuming the greater resiliency of boys to withstand sexual abuse due to their 
masculinity, a position that boys themselves often adopt, which serves to deny their 
victimization (ECPAT USA 2013; Lillywhite and Skidmore 2006: 355). 
Girls are also disproportionately arrested for prostitution, as “arrest data indicates that 
girls accounted for 76% of juvenile prostitution arrests in the United States. In comparison, 
girls accounted for only 30% of juvenile arrests as a whole” (Annitto 2011: 11). Insofar as 
arrests indicate criminal culpability, the culpability attributed to girls via prostitution arrest is 
reinforced by global and US patterns of impunity for pimps, traffickers and “clients.” Such 
gender disparity between overall juvenile arrests and arrest for prostitution is a global 
pattern.10 In the US females of color comprise a relatively low percentage of persons in 
                                                
10 Even though 134 countries and territories have criminalized trafficking by designating it a specific offense in 
accord with the Trafficking in Persons Protocol, there is generally a very low conviction rate globally, including 
zero to few convictions in 40% of countries over the decade between 2004-2014, such that reports conclude 
“that impunity remains a serious problem…there has been no discernable increase in the global criminal justice 
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prostitution, but are over-concentrated in street prostitution—the most dangerous and least 
lucrative form11 (Prince 2008: 31). Street-based prostitution is also the most visible and 
targeted form, exposing participants to greater risk of arrest (Bradley and Moschella 1998: 
352). A highly disproportionate percentage of African-American women and girls, in 
particular, are arrested and/or prosecuted for prostitution (Fleharty 2014: 460-61; Halter 
2008: 129; Muslim, Labriola et al. 2009: 14-15; Flowers 1998: 21; Lucas 1995). Since 1990 
arrest rates for prostitution have declined significantly for males and females, but two-thirds 
of all prostitution arrests are of females, and disproportionately of Black females (Snyder 
2012: 4, 2).  
Further data regarding race, ethnicity, nationality and foreign and domestic trafficking 
shows that children of color, especially girls, are disparately impacted by CSEC through 
prostitution.12 International human trafficking victims into the US recorded since the last 
decade have disproportionately originated from El Salvador and Mexico (Clawson, Dutch et 
al. 2009). However, 83% of sex trafficking victims found in the US are American citizens 
(Bureau of Justice Statistics 2011). Though it is rarely noticed or highlighted, existing data 
consistently and clearly demonstrates that domestic sex trafficking is a problem 
disproportionately impacting girls of color, especially African American girls. Black children, 
especially girls, with an average age of between twelve and fourteen years old, are burdened 
with the greatest risk for sex trafficking in the US (Butler 2015: 1481). It is reported that 40% 
of sex trafficking victims in the US are Black females, (Morris 2016: 102) and that 36% of 
minors in prostitution are Black, compared to the general national population of Black 
                                                                                                                                                  
response to this crime” (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 2012; United Nations Office of Drugs and 
Crime 2014). In the US it has historically been rare for pimps, traffickers or clients to be prosecuted (Johnson 
2014). 
11 Non-street prostitutes are 92% White, compared to street prostitutes, who are 59% White (Kramer and Berg 
2003, in Schepel  2011: 10). 
12 See also MacKinnon  (2011: 278) discussing the work of Ruchira Gupta (2009) and others, for an 
international perspective on the disparate impact of trafficking and prostitution in terms of race and caste. 
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children and youth aged 10 to 19 years old comprising only 14.5 percent (Butler 2015: 1482-
83). Because laws related to child prostitution are split along lines of international and 
domestic sex trafficking, it is important to pay attention to how such laws have constructive 
effects on the identities of affected populations by dividing them in these ways, especially 
since this makes a difference to what type of legal system, law enforcement bodies and 
facilities are designated to process them, e.g. the difference between local police and jails or 
border police and immigrant detention facilities. 
Despite poverty as an oft-cited macro-situational factor precipitating child prostitution, 
some studies regarding Western countries diminish its role (e.g. Sereny 1985). However, 
others demonstrate its importance in finding that minors in prostitution are disproportionately 
poor in terms of familial background, but also that 92% of minors in prostitution outside their 
households in the US have reported being “very poor” or “just making it” (Silbert and Pines 
1982, in Monasky 2011: 2005). The term “survival sex” suggests economic constraints and 
deprivation that cause homeless and runaway children and youth in particular to exchange 
sex for money or other things of value, with related studies finding that across the US, youth 
who are African American, GLB and tested for HIV are considerably more likely to engage 
in it than their White heterosexual, non-HIV-tested counterparts (Walls and Bell 2011; 
Greene, Ennett et al. 1999). 
In these ways domestic sex trafficking in the US disproportionately impacts 
economically marginalized girls of color, especially Black girls.13 These disparities are cross 
regional within the US. Race, class, and gender disproportionalities as well as those of 
dis/ability are evident in CSEC in major US cities. Nationally, 78 percent of US child sex 
trafficking cases between 2008-2010 involved non-White children, the majority being Black 
                                                
13 I use the term “economically marginalized” to mean working class, working poor, and impoverished and/or 
underclass, in accord with sociological conceptualizations of class in the US developed in the context of 
childhood (Handel, Cahill et al. 2007: 247-263). 
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and Latino (Butler 2015: 1482). Studies report that in New York City between 50-67% of all 
minors in street prostitution—the largest subgroup—are Black, even though only 26% of the 
city’s population is Black, and that Latinos comprise another 20-25% (Id.). This means that 
up to 75% of minors in prostitution in New York City are Black and Latino girls (Id.). The 
same racial and gender pattern is replicated in the adult population.14 Similarly, on the West 
Coast, in Alameda County in the San Francisco Bay Area, Black girls comprised 66% of 
those referred to MISSSEY, a non-profit organization that exclusively serves CSEC 
survivors15 (Id.). In LA County, 92% of girls identified in the juvenile justice system as 
trafficking victims are African American, with 62% of them from the child welfare system 
and 84% from poor communities in the Southeastern part of the county16 (Id.).  
A disproportionate number of women and girls in prostitution, particularly street 
prostitution, are also persons with physical and mental disabilities (Law 2000: 604). Mental 
health and psychosomatic diagnoses can often be related to the conditions and circumstances 
of children’s lives resulting in undesirable behavioral patterns, rather than what are 
commonly thought of as mental illness. This includes those leading to CSEC, for example 
PTSD stemming from abuse or neglect, or those caused by CSEC, such as dissociative 
disorders (Grace, Starck et al. 2012: 413). A recent study reports that, “Girls who are victims 
of commercial sexual exploitation recount a profound sense of being alone, without resources” 
(Id.). These findings suggest that multidimensional inequalities undergird child prostitution in 
                                                
14 African-American females dominate samples in studies of female prostitution in the US, and also “represent 
significant disparities in drug abuse, PTSD levels, poverty and mental health” (El-Bassel 2001, Young and 
Boyd 2000, Raphael and Shapiro 2004, in Schepel 2011: 10). 
15 Out of 179 cases reviewed, 178 were girls, 76% were Black, greater than half were on juvenile probation, and 
approximately one-third were dependents of the child welfare system (National Center for Youth Law 2012). Of 
149 cases in San Francisco, greater than half were foster care youth from group homes (Id.), suggesting the 
greater prevalence of CSEC among system-involved children. 
16 Additionally, a disproportionate number of missing children in the US, who are at great risk for sexual 
exploitation, are children of color, with Black children comprising 36.8% of all missing children in 2014 (Butler 
2015: 1482). 
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the US and globally, and that many children experiencing CSEC lack social and material 
resources (Javidan 2012; Dank 2009).   
1.2.2 Punishment and Protection 
Broad police discretion to criminalize (and the criminal records produced in the 
process) lead to entanglement in justice systems and perpetuation of law enforcement’s 
disproportionate contact with minorities, not to mention distress, trauma and confinement 
related to arrest and custody for suspects, witnesses and detainees (Brown 2007). 
Reputational harm, labeling and (further) socio-economic marginalization are extra-legal 
ramifications of these processes (Id.). These occur in the broader context of mass 
incarceration (Wacquant 2009, 2002; Brown 2008; Cooper 2011; Alexander 2012), record-
high and increasing rates of arrest and incarceration for girls (Lane 2003: 1), a “global 
lockdown” of females of color and the “celling” of urban minors (Sudbury 2005 and Duncan 
2000, in Winn 2010: 425). The over-criminalization of youth may be traced to social 
spending cuts affecting children, punitive law-and-order policies, and the use of child 
prostitution for “selling ‘crime control’ and ‘individualized solutions to complex social 
issues’” (Chunn 2003: 715, quoting Martin 2002; Lee 2011: 58). Human trafficking in all its 
forms must be reframed in a sociologically informed way, meaning not simply as a criminal 
problem but as a social issue (Lee 2011: 58). This requires “bring[ing] the state back to the 
centre of the sociological gaze of human trafficking,” and expanding “our understanding of 
the gendered, raced and classed patterns of trafficking for sexual and labour exploitation” 
(Id.). 
1.2.3 Contextualizing and Understanding “Trafficking” Sociologically 
Similar to statistical data, social-historical information regarding child sex trafficking 
in the US is also sparse. However, understanding the relationship between race, class, gender, 
nation, childhood and the key role of human trafficking in constructing these helps establish 
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the context that produces the commercial-sexual exploitation of children, over-determines its 
prevalence for economically marginalized children and girls of color and over-burdens them 
with its conditions, contributing factors and legal responses.  
Human trafficking has been integral to the settlement and establishment of the US as 
a nation-state, its territorial expansion, and the construction of its geo-jurisdictional borders 
and cultural boundaries in both the antebellum and postbellum periods.  Omi and Winant 
(2015) explain: 
In early North America, race, class, and gender were deeply interlinked. Their 
amalgamation was established both by the necessity of developing a division of labor, 
and organized labor force; and by the necessity of supplying, through various forms 
of human trafficking (only some of which can be labeled as ‘voluntary immigration’) 
the steady flow of actual human bodies (and souls) that would constitute the North 
American population (p. 93). 
Along with refugee/asylum policies and reverse “voluntary” migration from ex-colonies, sex 
trafficking has been integral to trafficking for labor exploitation, primarily involves women, 
and “combines coerced and voluntary dimensions” (Id.: 93). 
While these different experiences share common levels and qualities of coercion, the 
form of exploitation has differed. If human trafficking is to be understood not simply as 
movement but as exploitation, then the type of exploitation has varied along lines of race, 
gender and childhood. For instance, in the antebellum period Africans and Irish were 
trafficked into the US, but while Africans were subject to chattel slavery as a form of 
racialized forced labor and the Irish were racialized as non-White,17 the Irish were “generally 
subject to indenture, not chattelization” (Id.: 79). Racialized labor exploitation of Mexican-
Americans and Mexican migrants in the American Southwest, and of the Chinese, Japanese 
and other immigrants of East Asian origin took the form of quasi-slavery, e.g. Chinese labor 
                                                
17 See also Ronald Takaki (1993) regarding the origins of “Black” as racial classification, finding that British 
desire to colonize Ireland led them to racialize the Irish as “Black,” a label that British colonizers of North 
America later applied to Native Americans, then to enslaved African Americans. 
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to build the Transcontinental/Pacific Railroad during US westward expansion in the post-
slavery economy (Calavita 2010; Glenn 2002; Filindra 2014).  
Thus, historically, the type or system of exploitation to which trafficked persons were 
subject has been racialized and gendered, including for children. Not only have children often 
toiled alongside their parents or other adults under conditions of labor exploitation—for 
example African American children under chattel slavery or Mexican children in field labor 
(Handel, Cahill et al. 2007: 70; Filindra 2014: 97)—but child labor has constituted its own 
distinct form of forced labor. The US was built as much on coerced child labor, including 
indentured servitude, as it was on slavery, which, of course, also ensnared children. These 
practices were Constitutionally enforced under the Fugitive Slave Acts, which normalized the 
exploitation of children as economic commodities. 
The United States was settled, in large part, by working indentured children—many 
of whom were bound out for long terms of service and separated by an ocean from 
their parents. Over half the people who settled the Colonies south of New England 
came to America under contracts of indenture…Many were poor children taken from 
the streets of English cities, often without their consent. The average age of an 
indentured servant was fourteen to sixteen and the youngest was six (Woodhouse 
2008: 63).  
Moreover, children who were chattelized18 through racialized enslavement or indenture due 
to being “illegitimate” had in common that they would be “transferred to the most 
economical use, and separated from their kin” (Id.: 5). Indenture was a means of managing 
labor, sex and the allocation of resources, as it “provided a process of redistributing labor and 
also a method of controlling unmarried and interracial sexual activity and of privatizing 
                                                
18 Chattel refers to “a form of moveable personal possession with attributes both of thing and of human being, to 
be used to satisfy the needs of his owners” (Woodhouse 2008: 64). Bales’ (2004) study of human trafficking 
finds that a major difference between old (chattel) slavery and modern day slavery is the removal of the 
“ownership” aspect, i.e. universal illegality of slavery and lack of long-term investment in the person to ensure 
his or her future utility, adding to the greater and more rapid “disposability” of enslaved persons today. Notions 
of child rights that developed during the twentieth century have attempted to move socio-legal perception of 
children away from their traditional status as chattel during modernity, i.e. as “owned” by their father or parents. 
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responsibility for the poor, who would otherwise be a drain on the community’s resources” 
(Id.: 65).  
 Chattel slavery, Native American extermination and even one of the founding pillars 
of the child welfare system were forms of child trafficking insofar as these practices involved 
forceful removal, relocation and/or exploitation of labor and sex. Historically, African 
American children who were enslaved on plantations performed the same type of difficult 
labor as European settler children on family agricultural homesteads but without their 
independence or rightful inheritance (Handel, Cahill et al. 2007: 70). The injustices of chattel 
slavery were also qualitatively different based on gender, wherein the choices available to an 
enslaved girl were “defined by her reduction as a sexual object, an object to be raped, bred, or 
abused” (Woodhouse 2008: 87). In addition to labor exploitation, sexual exploitation was 
integral to the role of enslaved females in the reproduction of the slave labor force, 
particularly through forced breeding (Roberts 1997: 27-28). Some children were forcefully 
bred for commercial-sexual exploitation, specifically “mixed race” girls to be sold into 
prostitution at the age of eleven or twelve, as “fancy houses” placed a high premium on them 
(Carter and Giobbe 1999: 42). White males’ sexual exploitation of Black girls was common 
under American chattel slavery (Id.). In a different form of child trafficking, the modern 
foster care system originates in the practice of an antebellum children’s charity that 
orchestrated the abduction of virtually any unsupervised child from American city streets to 
be transported on “orphan trains” to join rural Midwestern households in exchange for their 
servitude19 (Handel, Cahill et al. 2007: 72-73). A few decades later, missionaries began 
                                                
19 The Children’s Aid Society still exists today, and provides its own version of this largely downplayed history 
on its website, arguing that orphan trains were an “ambitious, unusual and controversial social experiment,” but 
not indenture because “older children” were to be paid for their labor (Children's Aid Society 2016). The 
invocation of “older children” to justify practices involving children is not uncommon in trafficking debates, but 
merits scrutiny because the implicit and presumed greater capacity of older children does not translate to their 
greater political power since minors are, by definition, persons formally excluded from the polity, regardless of 
whether they are younger or older minors. 
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targeting Native American girls for abduction and forceful placement into Christian- and 
government-run boarding schools in order to religiously convert and “civilize” them. This 
was animated by the belief that “if we get the girls, we get the race,” and underwritten by 
Anglo-Saxon ideology that the transmittal and reproduction of culture and values are 
achieved through the normative feminine role (Devens 1992; Smith 2004). Thus various 
forms of child trafficking undergirded the extreme wealth of the Confederate economy, the 
settlement and rural development of the American Midwest, and Manifest Destiny via Native 
cultural genocide.  
An understanding of human trafficking from the perspective of economic sociology 
can generate “critical versions of the history of the economic present” (Tonkiss 2006: 28). As 
slavery was a key component in the international division of labor and “primitive 
accumulation” of early capitalism, human trafficking or modern slavery is an entrenched and 
profitable component of the contemporary global capitalist economy, supplying the demand 
of advanced capitalism for cheap, informal and forced labor (Id.: 19, 23; Bales 2004; Kara 
2009; Javidan 2012). The role of illegal markets is undertheorized in economic sociology, but 
when human trafficking is addressed it is often characterized as “the dark side” or a “disease” 
of the global capitalist economy (Tonkiss 2008: 586; Kara 2009: 6). Yet sex trafficking has 
“stabilized” into an “industry” and fully-integrated segment of the global economy “akin to a 
mature, multinational corporation that has achieved steady-state growth and [which] produces 
immense cash flows” (Kara 2009: 17). In nations with advanced economies trafficking of 
females into forced domestic work and prostitution “is a profitable but largely hidden part of 
cross-border economic flows” (Tonkiss 2006: 24). As much as the place of sex trafficking in 
global economic structures has stabilized, sex trafficking itself acts as a destabilizing force 
for impacted persons. Among various forms of insecurity induced by the global capitalist 
economy, including economic insecurities related to poverty and inequality, sex trafficking 
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can be understood as a form of “personal insecurity, linked to crime and victimisation” (Id.: 
171-72). 
The stabilization and industrialization of sex trafficking is bound up with the 
organization of the global capitalist economy in terms of class structure defined by tiers of 
labor, the base of which is “forced labor,” in which women and children are over-
concentrated and CSEC can be located.20 Labor exploitation of women and children has been 
foundational to the latest reorganization of the global capitalist economy, in which the 
distinction between labor commodification and slavery tend to be blurred (Id.: 23-24). 
Sociological studies of globalization and child labor or exploitation conceptualize CSEC as a 
form of trafficking or a most hazardous form of labor (ILO 2002, in Id.: 24). Although the 
term “labor” is problematic as applied to child prostitution, its conceptualization as forced 
labor in this context allows theorizing its economic implications and connectivity between it 
and global economic processes. Accordingly, CSEC can be located in the tier of forced labor 
that undergirds the global capitalist economy. Thus not only have various forms of human 
trafficking, including child trafficking, been more integral to the development of the US than 
typically recognized, but they are also currently entrenched in the structure of a global system 
of advanced capitalism, whose processes shape the national economy of the US, while the US 
continues its leadership role in global economic governance. 
Lerum and Brents  (2016: 18) summarize the primary sociological critiques of human 
trafficking research as follows: “unreliable data, anti-sex work ideology, rescue industry & 
carceral state critiques, and global health & human rights.” These critiques originate largely 
                                                
20 This class structure unifies an elite global class of capitalists who operate through transnational corporations 
and organize the politics of the global economic system, while it fragments and stratifies tiers of labor into four 
general but distinct categories: specialty labor, formal wage labor, informal labor and forced labor. As a 
descending hierarchy, these represent decreasing levels of skill, pay, working conditions, bargaining power and 
elective transnational mobility (as opposed to forced or coerced migration associated with trafficking). For a 
fuller discussion of how transnational corporations and global commodity chains result in the fragmentation and 
stratification labor, see my conceptualization of class and human trafficking in global context (Javidan 2012), 
based on the work of economic sociologists including Leslie Sklair (2002) and Fran Tonkiss (2006). 
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from gender-focused research comprising “the sociology of sex work” (Sanders, O'Neill et al. 
2009). Its general aims are to contribute to the issues of consent and victimization, usually to 
argue in favor of legalization and regulation (privatized, state-regulated) prostitution. 
Sociological theorization of human trafficking from a gender perspective tends to focus on 
sex trafficking and prostitution. Conceptual issues and debates have persisted regarding the 
trafficking of women for purposes of sexual exploitation or sexual servitude (Meshkovska, 
Siegel et al. 2015: 382). These have largely revolved around the issues of victimization and 
consent (Davies 2015; Id.: 382-84), and to a lesser extent around age of minority (e.g. 
Jeffreys 2000; O'Connell-Davidson 2005).  
Current debates originate from contestations regarding the issues of consent and 
victimization raised during the drafting process of the Palermo Protocol, the international 
legal instrument that codifies the contemporary and widely accepted definition of human 
trafficking (Meshkovska, Siegel et al. 2015: 382). The debate has persisted largely along the 
lines of what is commonly dichotomized as sex workers’ rights versus abolitionism. Sex 
workers’ rights advocates specifically posited “non-coerced, adult migrant prostitution” 
against the notion of “trafficking,” to argue that not all prostitution is coerced; that it is 
possible for women to choose prostitution voluntarily (Id.). Abolitionists argued that although 
the degree, level and extent of coercion, abuse and violence that women and children 
experience individually vary, the industry of prostitution is based upon sexual violation and 
exploitation of bodies (Id.). Sex workers’ rights advocates argue for the recognition of 
consensual prostitution on the grounds that not doing so is infantilizing and disempowering to 
women, and deprives them of the option to choose prostitution (Id.: 383).  
The conceptualization of consent impacts that of victimization. Abolitionist concern 
has been regarding the way in which the finding of consent places the burden of proof for 
victimization on the victims, which requires the legal sorting of deserving/undeserving 
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victims, and which provides a defense for exploiters21 (Id.). One of the major differences 
between the two approaches is that the sex work perspective conceives of prostitution as a 
form of labor, whereas abolitionism defines it in terms of commercial-sexual exploitation 
(Id.), wary of “positive and neutralizing definitions of prostitution” as “a job like any other 
job,” since prostitution entails specific harms and dangers and is largely driven by male 
sexual demand (Carter and Giobbe 2006: 51, in Spector 2006; Leidholdt 2003: 169). 
International law reflects this unresolved conflict by leaving the issue of consent open and 
dichotomized, expressed in the requirement that “trafficking” must involve force, fraud or 
coercion (Balos 2004; Meshkovska, Siegel et al. 2015: 383; Lee 2011: 68). Thus the feminist 
contestation that informs the sociology of sex work is largely founded on a legal battle—a 
battle over legal discourse.  
The language of contracts is one of the major discursive components underwriting the 
formulation of consent in this context, yet its workings and significance are often subdued 
and elude critique. Pateman (1988) theorizes this in the context of prostitution, explaining 
that the mostly implicit language of contracts in political and legal discourse on prostitution 
serves to legitimize it as a mutual commercial exchange between free and equal individuals. 
Indeed, this is observable in legal texts reviewed for this project, in which contractual 
language of offer (solicitation) and acceptance (patronizing) is omnipresent but often 
submerged in other discourses such as criminal justice and child protection. Pateman argues 
that the discourse of individual contracts generally masks broader structural inequalities of 
the “social contract” within which individual exchanges occur—specifically, patriarchy. 
Rather than opposing patriarchy, contract is actually “the means through which modern 
patriarchy is constituted,” as it plays an important part in upholding “the law of male sex-
                                                
21 Lee  (2011: 68-71) points out the ways in which this subjects potential and actual victims of trafficking to 
standards of ideal victimhood in which all those who do not measure up to specific notions of worthiness—
defined by respectability, legitimacy, authenticity and moral character—are subject to victim-blaming as 
“culpable victims,” and disqualified from receiving state assistance and resources. 
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right” (Pateman 1988: 2). Mills  (1997: 5-6) similarly warns us about “contract talk,” which 
should be exposed for the ways in which it helps theorize, justify and rationalize social and 
political inequalities and oppression, or to argue for merely reforming these. Contractarian 
discourse is “the political lingua franca of our times,” and the dominant interpretive 
framework of social relations in modern Western democracies (Id.: 3). As a framework in 
which “contract” and “freedom” are conflated, contractarian discourse has been revived with 
the advent of neoliberalism and its emphasis on personal “choice,” which conflates private 
enterprise and privatization with “freedom” (Pateman 1988: x; see also Hall and Midgley 
2004; Harvey 2005; Brown 2015).  
Rather than presuming that society and the social contract are just—comprising of 
free and equal citizens negotiating its terms through the state as a neutral arbiter—Pateman 
and Mills insist that the in/justice of individual contracts on the micro-level is inextricably 
linked to the in/justice of the social contract on the macro-level. But as they and critical 
theorists of race, class, gender, nation and childhood have repeatedly demonstrated, the terms 
of the social contract are fundamentally unjust for minoritized and subaltern groups (non-
hegemons). In its function and genesis the social contract—which maps the societal and legal 
organization of Western liberal democracies in terms of formal egalitarianism—continually 
unifies and preserves the White adult male as the ideal humanist subject and fortifies White-
adult-male hegemony to the exclusion of the “non-ideal polity,” i.e. the bad subject (Grahn-
Farley 2003; Kearney 2009; Mills 1997: 5-6; Harris 2003; Roithmayr  2003).  
Thus whether or not individual “consent” is found, prostitution “supports and is 
supported by social, economic and political inequalities,” (Balos 2004: 162) which the 
interpretation of prostitution as a “contract” does not capture. Prostitution is an integral 
component of patriarchal capitalism, and likening it to capitalist private enterprise—a private 
contractual arrangement for purchase and sale—does not render it the expression of “freedom” 
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(Pateman 1988: 208). It simply represents the commodification of women’s bodies in the 
capitalist market, which renews “the terms of the original [sexual] contract” through the 
fulfillment of primarily male demand for the sexual use of persons22 (Id.: 189).  
The contractual understanding of prostitution interprets sexual consent through 
neoliberal market relations. Commercial consent is conflated with sexual consent, or sexual 
consent is rendered irrelevant or secondary to commercial consent. Sociological studies show 
that economic strain, particularly for women, drives their entry into prostitution, not sexual 
desire, and that cross-border movements of persons in prostitution almost always flow from 
poor nations to wealthier ones (Scott and Marshall 2009: 608). Because the sexual contract 
has been about the compromise of female sexual integrity and autonomy in particular (in 
order to ensure continual male access to and control over female sexuality), the interpretation 
of prostitution as merely “labor” or the subject of a service contract merits scrutiny. The 
specific concern with prostitution is that it not only reinforces capitalist relations of labor 
commodification and alienation, but that it also reinforces patriarchal relations through an 
embodied practice of direct sexual use that disparately impacts females and gender non-
conforming persons, and, of course, the economically imperiled. Contractarianism serves as a 
legitimizing discourse of neoliberalism, which mystifies sexual subordination and the 
extreme reification of hegemonic gender relations that prostitution represents. The rendering 
of sexual consent and desire irrelevant or secondary to other considerations is problematic 
regardless of whether it is achieved by slavery or by contract. It is in these ways that 
prostitution is linked to the broader issue of human trafficking, and this linkage survives the 
contractual turn. 
                                                
22 Historically, at the same time that “the racial contract” instituted the enslavement of Africans “based on the 
very opposite of equal rights between buyers and sellers,” (Mills 1997; Harman 2008: 249) the civil position of 
wives resembled slavery under the terms of the original sexual contract since, for example, husbands in 
nineteenth-century Britain could legally enforce their wives’ labor and obedience through violence, and be “sold 
by husbands at public auction” (Pateman 1988: 191; O'Connell-Davidson 2005: 12). 
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Contract has been touted as the key difference between feudalism or chattel slavery 
and capitalist “freedom.” It is similarly invoked in the contemporary context to mark the 
difference between modern day slavery or sexual servitude and “sex work.” However, the 
greater consideration given to the multidimensional history of human trafficking and its 
significance in the US and contemporary global capitalist economy, as well as the fraught 
boundary of non/consent, the more tenuous a notion of justice based on contract and formal 
egalitarianism becomes. 
1.3 Sociological Tensions  
Pateman  (1988: 257) explains that child prostitution is beyond the scope of her 
theory, but sex work theorists have been extending their framework to children despite its 
remaining controversial even in its application to adults. The current direction of sociological 
literature is to extend sex work theory to children (e.g. O'Connell-Davidson 2005; Orchard 
2007; Shanahan 2013). Main tenets of the now established “sex work” perspective include 
viewing prostitution as: 1) labor, specifically “sexual labor,”23 2) a product of more or less 
rational choice among less appealing alternatives, and 3) understanding “sex workers” 
primarily as sexual agents, as opposed to victims of exploitation (O'Neill 2001; Sanders, 
O’Neill and Pitcher 2009: 4, 11; Miriam 2005). Research stemming from this approach views 
child prostitution as a “resource” accessed through “the sexual labor of children,” and refers 
to minors in prostitution as “child sex workers,” (O'Connell-Davidson 2005; Orchard 2007) 
as opposed to commercially-sexually exploited children. The normative subject of sex work 
theory is the consenting adult woman as commercial and sexual agent. However, this 
framework is extended to children via arguments that tend to minimize or erase child status 
                                                
23 This has recently been referred to as “sexual labor” in an attempt to unload the term “sex work” of its political 
baggage (Boris, Gilmore et al. 2010), and with greater abstraction, as “intimate labor” (Musto, Jackson et al. 
2015) 
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and generational order to focus on other social categories, factors, and units of analysis such 
as “culture,” gender or poverty.  
O'Connell-Davidson (2005) interprets child prostitution as a commercial and sexual 
contract and argues that children may have the same capacity to enter them as similarly 
situated adults because appalling socio-economic circumstances render both more or less 
equally vulnerable. Orchard (2007) interprets child prostitution as an “embedded practice” of 
“culture” in the “third world,” specifically in India, which “works to create, inform, and give 
meaning to these girls as they grow up,” highlighting the “positive aspects of being a young 
sex worker.” Elsewhere, Orchard characterizes child prostitution as “the sexual labour of 
children” and “sex work that involves children,” arguing that victimization is too simple an 
explanation for child prostitution (Orchard 2015). Shanahan (2013) takes a market-based 
view of prostitution as a system of economic-sexual exchange, conceptualizes minors as 
commercial-sexual agents and pimps as “market facilitators.” She argues that most minors in 
prostitution are older teenagers so that there is little difference between them and adults, and 
adopts an approach of harm reduction that focuses on children’s resiliency. These researchers 
conceptualize prostitution as a “resource” for children—economic and/or socio-cultural. The 
conceptualization of prostitution as a resource for children contradicts not only child rights 
and even critical child rights literature (e.g. Grahn-Farley 2003), but also key recent works of 
the sociology of childhood, discussed below.24 
On the other hand, research that does not extend sex work theory to children often 
adopts an uncritical approach to child status, victimhood, capacity, law and law enforcement, 
and may engage in “multivariate” but not multiplicitous analysis of race, class, gender and 
childhood (e.g. Halter 2008; 2010). Both approach law and law enforcement as 
                                                
24 All of these except official child rights discourse use social constructionist approaches or deconstructionist 
methodologies toward childhood but come to vastly different conclusions and policy points. 
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unproblematic on the institutional level, if perhaps flawed in substance and implementation, 
and mostly exclude race (and/or replace it with “culture”) in largely gender- and age-focused 
analyses that exclude discussions of the global capitalist economy, class and poverty, or 
provide limited discussions of these.25 The primacy of class, gender and national origin over 
childhood (O'Connell-Davidson 2005) is unsupported by these sociological theories of 
childhood, which increasingly support the integration and centralization of child status in 
broader social theory as well as inclusion in (and consideration on par with) other “special 
sociologies” of social categorization, e.g. race, class and gender (Handel, Cahill et al. 2007; 
Bühler-Niederberger 2010; Corsaro 2015).  
My approach disrupts the current trajectory of applying and extending to children the 
problematic framework of sex work theory, which takes the consenting adult as its normative 
subject. In addition to less attention to race and law, one tendency in current sex work theory 
is that there seems to be theorized no material difference between the status and conditions of 
children/childhood and adults/adulthood. It posits its ultimate goals as legal ones—namely, 
“labor rights” and “human rights” for prostitutes—to strive for improving pay and working 
conditions, and to criminalize only that which rises to the level of abuse, (e.g. Orchard 2007; 
O'Connell-Davidson 2005) typically defined in accordance with and in reliance upon legal 
definitions. But as Mills  (1997: 26) points out, the concept of abuse presumes that the 
structural subordination itself is legitimate; that the problem with colonialism, slavery, 
corporal punishment, or child prostitution is not subordination or domination, but the 
“improper administration of these regimes.” 
Each of these positions is at odds with key recent works in the sociology of childhood 
(e.g. Handel, Cahill et al. 2007; Corsaro 2015; Bühler-Niederberger 2010). The centrality of 
                                                
25 Sex work theory’s critique of law enforcement is mostly limited to its view of police as disruptive to the 
“business” of “sex work.” It aims to change the laws to favor sex work, and thereby harness law enforcement 
for its protection and facilitation (e.g. Soothill and Sanders 2004). 
 39 
the consenting adult as the ideal subject of sex work theory and its extension and application 
to children is in direct tension with the sociological process of child-centered research related 
to children and childhood. In simple terms, this requires a worldview re-centered around 
children, who are otherwise marginalized in social theory and society writ large. Moreover, 
the idea that there is no material difference between adult versus child status and 
conditions—whether in general or in the prostitution context—is refuted by theorizations of 
childhood in “the new sociology of childhood” as well as critical jurisprudence on children 
and child rights (e.g. Grahn-Farley 2002, 2003, 2008, 2013; Woodhouse 2008). Both tend to 
employ deconstructive, anti-essentialist methodologies that understand childhood as a social 
and legal construct and children as active agents in socialization and as social contributors, 
though substantially constrained by structural power, namely the generational order. Even 
when “controlling for” race, ethnicity, national origin, class, gender, sexuality, and/or 
dis/ability, on a collective level the injustices and inequities associated with these are 
amplified for children compared to their adult counterparts due to difference in structural 
power (Handel, Cahill et al. 2007; Corsaro 2015; Grahn-Farley 2002: 302). The new 
sociology of childhood understands “childhood” and “children” as socio-historical formations, 
minoritarian social categories, and as specific social-hierarchical locations that include 
generational stratification with the qualities and similar levels of coherence and incoherence 
associated with other, interrelated categories (Id.).  
The idea that prostitution is a “resource” for children is also contrary to definitions of 
“resources” employed in sociological theories of childhood. Key works in sociology of 
childhood and critical child rights conceive of resources in material and human terms, as 
improving the standard of living and quality of life of children, and benefiting children on 
both individual and collective levels. Poverty and class are central concerns of sociology of 
childhood, and sociologists of childhood emphasize the importance of allocating sufficient 
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resources to the wellbeing of children in economic terms as well as for health care, education 
and other developmental investments (Handel, Cahill et al. 2007; Grahn-Farley 2003). 
Nowhere do sociological theories of childhood advocate or imply prostitution as a resource 
for children. Rather, where the issue arises, it is discussed as a form of abuse and as a form of 
endangerment to children that plays a significant role in the socialization of children in 
economically marginalized neighborhoods (Handel, Cahill et al. 2007: 282, 261).  
The notion that child prostitution is or could be a benign expression of culture with 
“positive aspects” for children’s development and wellbeing is also untenable through 
sociological theories of childhood, including those focused on the developing world, as well 
as emerging research on African American childhood and Black girlhood in the US.26 In the 
final analysis of her “alternative example of child prostitution” what Orchard (2007) deems 
oppressive is not the practice of child prostitution but discourse on child prostitution that 
constructs the practice in terms of cultural backwardness and crime. While critiques of 
“cultural deficiency” and “crime” are valid, the indictment of discourse over practice over-
emphasizes the discursive at the risk of minimizing or discounting the practical and material. 
What is also troubling about this line of analysis is that the “embeddedness” of child 
prostitution in “the cultural context” is offered as evidence of its non-oppressive (creative, 
informative, meaningful) character, rather than as evidence of its institutionalization, 
                                                
26 The definition of culture in sociology of childhood is the same as in other sociologies, wherein childhood and 
children’s culture are viewed as “ordinary” and a “way of life” that “makes sense to individuals in a particular 
community” (Williams 1961, 1989, in Kehily 2004: 9). Culture is defined as “the way of life developed by 
people in adaptation to the environmental and social conditions that they collectively face,” including 
“conventional understandings that guide peoples’ interpretations, actions, and interactions” (Id.: 57). Culture 
also “includes some elements that are highly valued by the people themselves and some elements that are 
accepted as necessary or ‘realistic’ adaptations but are not especially valued. A way of life includes, then, values 
and norms, but also…skills, habits, and styles of action” (Id.: 240). This may appear to allow sex work theorists 
to claim child prostitution as pragmatic adaptation under circumstances of poverty, patriarchy, and caste, and 
therefore, part of Indian culture. However, even its inclusion in “culture” does not mean that the creation or 
reproduction of said culture is multilateral, inclusive or representative of the interests of those most impacted by 
its practices and institutions. Moreover, “way of life” and “culture” have vague parameters, are unclear as to the 
unit that they represent, and imply that they can apply to “any kind of organization or group, in each case 
foucusing on the commonalities of thought, attitudes, behavior, skills, and material objects (such as houses, 
motorcycles, music players, sailboats, pickup trucks, video games, etc) (Id.).  
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systemic operation, structural violence and harm.27 This serves to reify the “cultural 
deficiency” explanation of child exploitation, even though Orchard aims to challenge it, 
wherein denouncing the “backward culture” explanation gets translated to the acceptance and 
celebration of culture as an unproblematic construct—bracketed off from racism, classism, 
sexism and other forms of subordination in their respective micro- and macro-spheres. “The 
cultural context” becomes paramount but “culture” is uncritically accepted in ways that risk 
its essentialization and presumption of its representativeness over all whom it encompasses. 
Insofar as culture and politics are integral to one another, it is particularly important to 
develop and center analyses of childhood and child status as political constructs in relation to 
“culture.”  
Thus the conceptualization of prostitution as a cultural practice of subaltern girls, and 
even integral to their development and economic wellbeing does not comport with the new 
sociology of childhood. “Culture” can too easily become a nebulous concept onto which 
vague and relativist ideas may be projected, into which structural inequalities collapse and 
through which power relations are mystified. Instead, the new sociology of childhood urges 
the need to critically examine structural inequalities themselves, in relation to children. 
Although children are viewed as societal contributors and as active agents in their own 
socialization, especially in peer cultures, modern Western history has demonstrated ways in 
which law and society severely limit children’s ability to effect structural change and be 
efficacious co-constructors of their broader cultures (“the adult world”), particularly as an 
organized collective. In many ways child prostitution exemplifies and epitomizes systemic 
inequalities that render children (and infantilized, minoritized, or feminized adults) 
                                                
27 British criminology provides perspectives on “harm” that adopt a critical approach to the construct of “crime.” 
The social harm approach moves away from focusing on harm as defined solely by criminal law, and rather 
views harm as embedded in broader systemic violence, including CSEC as part of “the social wreckage of neo-
liberal globalisation” (Hillyard and Tombs 2004: 3). See also Dorling, Gordon et al. (2008). 
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vulnerable to prostitution or sex trafficking as a Bourdieusian “forced choice” (Bourdieu 
1984, in Lutnick 2016: 120-121). 
Lutnick’s (2016) study of DMST in the US acknowledges that child prostitution is 
entrenched in many domestic communities and networks, which is partly responsible for its 
elusive ubiquity. However, in contrast to Orchard, Lutnick sees the conditions and factors 
causing child prostitution as “the failure of social and cultural systems” (Id.: 120). Childhood 
sociologists focusing on child neglect, abuse and neighborhood contexts in relation to 
socialization processes would agree with the characterization of child prostitution as such 
failure because of what they find essential to the wellbeing of children as well as families and 
communities. Where prostitution is discussed in such studies, it is considered to be among 
factors that imperil children’s wellbeing and development (Handel, Cahill et al. 2007: 260). 
Children’s “wellbeing” is defined in terms that greatly emphasize their economic wellbeing, 
mirroring international standards set and reported by NGOs such as UNICEF (Corsaro 2015: 
313-14). Healthcare, physical health, paid family leave, quality child care and early education 
are identified as contributing to children’s wellbeing (Id., 344-50). Child poverty, child abuse 
including child sexual abuse and neglect, including yelling and corporal punishment, drug 
use and obesity are identified as commonly contributing to children’s lack of wellbeing in 
industrial countries, especially in the US, which fares particularly badly by international 
measures of child wellbeing28 (Handel, Cahill et al. 2007: 259; Id.). In developing countries 
(and industrial countries to some extent), common detractors from children’s wellbeing 
include the effects of globalization such as increased child poverty, rapid urbanization, global 
debt crisis, governmental corruption, ethnic violence, the spread of infectious diseases such 
as HIV/AIDS, malnutrition and food insecurity (Corsaro 2015: 344-50; Id.: 281).  
                                                
28 For example, US infant mortality rates have consistently been the highest among industrial nations (Giroux 
2003: xviii). 
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The current sociological understanding of childhood wellbeing undermines any 
suggestion that child prostitution helps alleviate the immiseration of children, whether in 
industrial or developing, rural or urban contexts. Instead, prostitution is discussed as 
something that parents aim to protect their children from, as part of the risks of poverty, 
violence and the “constant danger” that faces them, particularly in low-income and poor US 
neighborhoods that are most impacted by it, and wherein hyper-protective socialization 
strategies of parents reflect these perils (Handel, Cahill et al. 2007: 281). Prostitution is 
considered among negative influences of the street from which families of working class and 
working poor neighborhoods attempt to protect their children, along with “gangs, peer 
pressure, violence…drugs, and alcoholism” (Id.: 261).  
Though economic wellbeing is key, it is important how this is achieved and whether 
and to what extent it extracts other tolls. Childhood sociology regarding gender 
socialization—which sensitizes gender and sexuality theory to the importance of childhood 
experiences that socialize children into binary gender roles in often banal but arguably 
coercive ways—would point to the impact of child prostitution on sexual and psychological 
development per gender role reification, if not trauma in line with child abuse during 
formative years of the life course (Corsaro 2015: 206-311; Id.: 287-334). The child-focused 
sociological literature simply does not support the notion that prostitution is developmentally 
positive. Even the idea that child prostitution at least contributes strictly to children’s 
economic wellbeing is dubious due to the finding that children occupy a particular rank in 
prostitution hierarchy that maintains them in its worst conditions and with the least to gain 
(O'Connell-Davidson 2005). In this way child prostitution represents another dimension of 
relative deprivation for minors in relation to their adult counterparts, reflecting the 
generational order of social hierarchy. 
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Thus the extension of the sociology of sex work to children is exceedingly at odds 
with key recent works in the sociology of childhood. The two are currently disparate streams 
of theory in which both adhere to a social constructionist approach to childhood but sex work 
theory seems to do so only insofar as it helps blur the boundaries of age so that older 
teenagers (Shanahan 2013) but also younger children (Orchard 2007), even as young as three 
(O'Connell-Davidson 2005) can be incorporated into it. Otherwise, in research that supports 
prostitution for adults but not children, the boundary between adult and child is to be 
maintained and literally policed. Soothill and Sanders (2004) recommend models of 
regulation that manage prostitution to “facilitate safe, consensual commercial sex,” stating, 
“we suggest that the primary mission should in the first instance be the protection of minors 
rather than a diffuse attempt to tackle prostitution in all its forms.” This is to bolster the aim 
of facilitating commercial sex above that of centering children and reorganizing the world in 
ways that render their commercial-sexual exploitation obsolete. The centering and 
prioritization of commercial sex necessarily relegates “child protection” to afterthought or 
secondary consideration. Child protection continues being necessary because the conditions 
of child endangerment remain unaltered. This begs the question of what “protection of 
minors” means when the primary aim is to facilitate commercial sex. Moreover, arguments 
favoring legalized prostitution while enforcing age boundaries fail to address how the 
prostitution harms existing for minors are neutralized upon their reaching age of majority. 
The promise of child protection, along with those of safety and consent, serve to legitimize 
commercial sex, but the promise of child protection in a highly unequal and adult supremacist 
world is illusory and routinely broken, in much the same way that noblesse oblige fails to 
protect minorities and subalterns, charity fails to protect the poor, and chivalry fails to protect 
females.  
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Black feminist theory and women of color feminism offer a critical approach toward 
prostitution, along with a highly empathetic ethos toward persons in prostitution and those 
impacted by its contributing factors.29 Recent works have begun to express concern with 
child prostitution as integral to conditions that contribute to the exploitation and 
criminalization of low-income and economically marginalized girls of color (Morris 2016; 
Butler 2015; Harper 2013). This can be seen as part of a deep, if somewhat subdued, aspect 
of women of color feminism (as an antecedent to or early expression of intersectional 
feminism). In the foundational anthology This Bridge Called My Back (Moraga and Anzaldúa 
1983) “the prostitute” does not figure as “other” in the accounts of Black, Latina and Asian 
feminists, but rather suggests a haunting self-reflection of the role of marginalized women of 
color under racist patriarchy. Audre Lorde  (1983: 99) invokes this in observing, “Poor 
women and women of color know there is a difference between the daily manifestations of 
marital slavery and prostitution because it is our daughters who line 42nd Street.” 
In discussing the school-to-prison pipeline—specifically, the criminalization of 
African American girls in schools—Morris (2016: 119) understands child prostitution as a 
major barrier to girls’ educational and socio-economic advancement, acting as both a source 
of “push” and “pull” out of schools. Morris’ concern with child prostitution is foremost about 
the expendability and blatant sexual commodification of Black female bodies. In accord with 
other Black feminist and intersectional theorists such as bell hooks and Patricia Hill-Collins, 
these works problematize prostitution and racist/sexist pornography as the extension, 
persistence and shape shifting of the commercial-sexual exploitation of Black females under 
slavery (Tong 1998: 219-224; Carter and Giobbe 2006: 40-43; Butler 2015).  
                                                
29 This is in contrast to certain rights-based strands of postcolonial feminist theory, i.e. those that view 
prostitution as primarily issues of labor and migration, e.g. Kempadoo and Doezema 1998, Agustin 2007, 
Parreñas, Cam Thai et al. 2016, etc. The two, however, share a non-stigmatizing approach toward persons in 
prostitution. 
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Given the hyper-sexualization of Black females, Morris highlights Black girls’ desire 
to transcend sexual objectification and the difficult struggle this entails considering that they 
are often “reduced to their sexuality” in mainstream media representations, portrayed as 
literal or figurative prostitutes (Morris 2016: 123, 134). The legalization of prostitution and 
its extension to children may theoretically appear to disrupt pathways to incarceration based 
on the commission of prostitution as a crime. However, it does not disrupt the over-
sexualization of racialized bodies, but rather promotes capitalizing upon it. Morris  (2016: 
114) specifically scrutinizes narratives of casting girls (especially Black girls) as “wiling 
choosers” of prostitution. She finds this the greater and more problematic characterization 
with which Black girls contend, as opposed to the ascription of “innocent victimhood”—a 
trope that is largely unavailable to them (Ocen 2015). The impossibility of Black sexual 
victimization persists in the contemporary context through “the myth of Black female 
promiscuity” or hyper-sexuality, which historically meant that regardless of their “respectable” 
reputations, Black females occupy a class “lower than the white prostitute” (Morris 2016: 
115). In contrast to the presumption of White feminine innocence and sexual purity that 
historically viewed the White prostitute as a “fallen woman” backsliding in Social Darwinian 
terms, the Black female figure, regardless of respectability, has represented the dark 
evolutionary past and true “nature” or “essence” of femininity; the retrograde, shadowy 
figure threatening White civilization, evolution and order (Dijkstra 1996). This myth has 
figured heavily in “policy responses to the victimization of Black women” (Morris 2016: 
115). This has certainly been the case in the construction of statutory rape, prostitution and 
sex trafficking law discussed throughout the empirical chapters.  
Sex work theory, its primary unit of analysis as “sex workers,” and its extension to 
children are often devoid of such historical context, particularly where children are concerned. 
They often fail to account for its disparate and disproportionate impact on women and 
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children of color, and propose policies that reflect this omission. In terms of historical 
retrospection, this has resulted in a peculiar idealization of the Gilded Age, the era prior to 
the formal criminalization of “prostitution” as such. Some accounts evoke a kind of 
romanticization of child prostitution as a form of “girl power,” and equally so across race, 
class and a broad age/developmental range, from 12 to 20 years of age (see e.g. Linehan 
2014). Others—while demonstrating depth of historical knowledge on adult prostitution—
promote states’ rights to advance its legalization without awareness or consideration of the 
ways in which the historic and contemporary use of this strategy has undermined race, class, 
gender and childhood equity (e.g. Ditmore 2011).  
The hyper-sexualization of females of color—including through the reiteration of the 
“Jezebel” trope in contemporary narratives regarding Black femininity and sexuality—has 
appeared in discourses related to child welfare and juvenile crime, whose primary measure is 
“moral decency” and behavioral performance (Morris 2016: 115). Such contextualization 
reveals that the struggle over sex trafficking and prostitution has not been merely one against 
extricating women from their ascription and confinement to White, bourgeois respectability, 
but that, like enslavement, prostitution has been carved out as the expected role of some 
females. As Morris  (2016: 115) explains, this relegation—with which criminal justice 
systems are complicit—involves a globalized culture of “steering of girls of color into sex 
work,” combined with “sexist and dismissive notions that they are choosing a life of 
prostitution rather than trafficked into it” (Morris 2016: 115).  
My research helps historicize and develop the deeper and broader contextualization 
needed to comprehend the over-determination of girls of color being rendered consenting 
sexual offenders in the prostitution context, criminalized, and excluded from child protective 
regimes. However, I also discovered that when authorities in the criminal justice system find 
it expedient to render girls into non-consenting child victims in order to fulfill legally 
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prescribed requirements for prosecuting pimps and traffickers in cases that they develop 
interest in prosecuting, they will do so, though often only for the limited purpose and duration 
of successful prosecution, rather than throughout criminal procedure and its aftermath. Legal-
authoritative discourse will also include and exclude other children from childhood when 
politically expedient to do so, in order, for example, to render parents blameworthy for the 
mass migration of their children despite the purpose of their migration being to escape 
criminal violence, including forced recruitment for trafficking.  
It is important to recognize these tensions going forward, and to interrogate “sex 
worker”/“child sex worker” as units of analysis as well as the constructs of “sex work”/“child 
sexual labor” to describe, extend to and normalize child prostitution, or alternatively, to argue 
for merely policing the boundaries between adult/child, victim/offender and consent/non-
consent—with an aim to uphold the practice and institution of prostitution.30 To reiterate, this 
project aims to investigate ways in which legal discourse regarding child prostitution lays the 
foundation for disparate impact on children through mutually constitutive processes of 
marginalization—racialization (including racialized im/migration), classing, gendering, 
infantilization/adultification (as two sides of the same coin) and penalization. These place 
economically marginalized girls of color at greatest risk of commercial-sexual exploitation, 
result in greater prevalence of sex trafficking among them, and disparately impact them 
through de facto and de jure forms of penalization in legal contexts and through systems’ 
responses. Thus here, moving away from sex workers’ rights to focus on girls at greatest risk 
for prostitution signifies centering the marginalized yet disproportionately impacted subjects 
of DMST within the US and/or child sex trafficking into the US. Because the ideal subject of 
American sex trafficking laws has been constructed as a White, middle class suburban girl, it 
is important to reframe the issue to reflect that—proportionally speaking—economically 
                                                
30 The critique of rights is also a disruptive force in the extension of sex work theory to children, which I explore 
throughout the following chapters. 
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marginalized Black girls are the most likely victims of DMST.31 At the same time, the most 
likely victims of child sex trafficking across borders into the US are Central American, yet 
these children are constructed in ways that dehumanize and exclude them from normative 
childhood as well.  
Going forward, it will be important to make historical and contemporary connections 
between colonialism, slavery, migration and human trafficking. It will also be important to 
propose more critical means of addressing sex trafficking and prostitution than legalistic 
models and the promotion of legalization, or a general reliance on law and rights as solutions 
to inequities. The empirical chapters will discuss how legal discourse regarding child 
prostitution in the United States from the antebellum period to the present reveals that 
discursive processes of marginalization along lines of race, immigration, class and gender 
have been vital to how childhood has been constructed and contested in and through 
prostitution and trafficking laws. They will show how American legal discourse on child 
prostitution is structured by at least three dichotomies—adult/child, victim/offender, and 
consent/non-consent—which are deployed in ways that result in the penalization of children 
in general and minority and immigrant children in particular. 
1.4 Chapter Summaries 
Chapter 3, on the construction of the child in and through laws related to child sex 
trafficking, examines the issue first through key contemporary legal texts in the states of Utah 
and Illinois, showing the ways in which discourse in recent years has shifted and constructed 
the issue and its subjects differently and similarly in each state. It then connects the 
contemporary to historical legal texts that have contributed to rendering childhood 
                                                
31 There is a rather exceptional pattern in the US in which White, middle class (and most often suburban) girls 
comprise the majority of girls in prostitution in terms of numbers (Lamb 2001), but that Black girls are 
disproportionately represented, discussed further below. 
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provisional in legal discourse related to child sex trafficking, laying the foundation for this 
continuity in the present. 
Chapter 4 examines the dichotomized construction of child prostitution as prostitution or sex 
trafficking, which is to examine the boundaries between punishment and protection. The 
same basic set of legal texts outlined in Chapter 2 are examined but with a shift in focus 
toward how they establish the structure of culpability for prostitution and sex trafficking, and 
how the victim/offender binary it generates contributes to the making of minors in 
prostitution as bad subjects marked by the condition of criminalized multiplicity. It 
investigates prevarication regarding victimhood in child prostitution as rooted in ambivalence 
regarding child prostitution itself, which manifests in the contradictory characterization of 
minors in prostitution as both criminal offenders of prostitution and crime victims of sex 
trafficking. The two primary responses to child prostitution are constructed through the 
bifurcation of prostitution and sex trafficking, resulting in an oppositional dynamic in which 
prostitution imputes culpability on the person who sells her sex, and sex trafficking 
exculpates the person whose body is sold. Respectively, they each represent the conceptual 
core of the punitive regime and protective regime to which impacted minors may be 
subjected. 
Chapter 5 discusses the ways in which “consent” is understood in contractual terms, and 
how this imputes consent and therefore criminal culpability upon children in ways that render 
them rather indistinguishable from “consenting adult offenders.” The three binaries are 
mutually shaping and interdependent in these ways—the determination of non/consent 
interlocks with that of victim/offender, which in turn depends on perceptions of adult/child. 
The construction of prostitution as a contract for goods or services and the subjection of 
minors to such a definition works against the notion that child prostitution is commercial-
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sexual exploitation, that minors are victimized by it, and, ultimately, that minors are children 
requiring child protection. 
Chapter 6 concludes by discussing observations and some recommendations related to the 
dimensions highlighted in this research—race, class, gender, childhood and punishment—
through notions of feminist multiplicity as well as race- and class-conscious child-centrism in 
the context of child sex trafficking. 
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CHAPTER 2: Deconstructing the Bad Subject 
2.1 Methodological Overview 
Every legal text, law and rationale has underlying theories and an epistemological base 
that requires scrutiny, particularly when used to criminalize those whom both international 
and national law define as commercially-sexually exploited children. The approach of this 
research is to use theorizing multiplicities to analyze the discursive construction of child 
prostitution and minors in prostitution as “bad subjects”—subaltern feminine or feminized 
subjects in conflict with the law—through processes of racialization, classing and gendering, 
while incorporating processes of infantilization or adultification in the criminal context. By 
theorizing multiplicities I mean to understand the issue of child prostitution and its subjects 
(and their treatment) as involving the convergence of social-discursive processes, and which 
requires unpacking. The special focus on criminalization and quasi-criminalization led me to 
select legal discourse as the object of analysis. The selection of legal discourse required legal-
archival research and an interdisciplinary search to define “legal discourse” and grasp its 
significance, which I understand to involve the combination of a sociological definition of 
“law” and “discourse.” I explored deconstructive methodologies broadly, beginning with 
more established theoretical foundations of social constructionism and discourse analysis, to 
recent configurations in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which views discourse as social 
practice (Fairclough 1992). This led me to Critical Legal Discourse Analysis (CLDA) as a 
specific form of CDA that uses a feminist sociological lens to critically analyze legal texts, 
particularly those regarding sex crimes. CDA provides a means of systematically extracting 
“data” relevant to one’s enquiry, guided by key concepts and without prescriptive theoretical 
parameters within which to analyze findings. However, the theory it is conjoined with should 
generally be compatible with its main deconstructive aim of “enabling a critical view of 
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how…texts fit into a larger contextual setting,” as well as how those texts shape the larger 
contextual setting (Huckin, Andrus et al. 2012: 119).  
Theorizing multiplicities is a deconstructive methodology—of organizing an 
investigation into how complex social, political, historical and discursive processes can 
marginalize subjects, particularly (though not only) subaltern or “minority” feminine subjects. 
It is focused on discursive deconstruction of interconnected social processes involving race, 
class and gender, developed around child subjects32 (Ali 2003a). Various, interrelated social 
processes co-construct issues and subjects. Thus we can discuss race, ethnicity, nationality, 
class, gender and childhood not necessarily as the overlap of otherwise distinct dimensions of 
identity, but as involving the interconnectivity of processes associated with these, which are 
continually being re/produced and which often extend problematic historical trajectories into 
contemporary discursive formations. Because theorizing multiplicities understands these 
processes as part of social construction—in the sense that power dynamics construct, destroy, 
and reconstruct social categories, and shift meanings across temporal and spatial terrains—it 
lends itself to deconstructive methodology specifically designed for textual analysis, such as 
discourse analysis (Id.). Ali  (2003a) provides a methodical structure for organizing a 
multiplicitous examination by breaking down the typically compartmentalized categories in 
question, but highlighting their interrelatedness for the specific issue at hand. 
The theoretical anchor of my analysis can be described as criminalized multiplicity. I 
invoke the word “multiplicity” as a double-entendre. I use it to signify a sociologically 
processual understanding of discursive construction sensitive to racialized gender stereotypes 
and oversexualization of females of color, as part of multi-conscious feminism or feminist 
multiplicities, and to invoke but nuance the concept of “multiple jeopardy” from 
                                                
32 Ali utilized ethnography and interviews as discursive sources (texts) of subaltern subjects within institutional 
settings (children in schools), whereas I use archival data to focus on the discourse of the institution (law) and 
its authorities (lawmakers). Theorizing multiplicities is useful to both research forms. 
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intersectional criminology. Feminists have used the legal concept of double jeopardy to 
indicate how interlocking oppressions of race and gender imperil Black women (Beal 1970, 
2008). Feminist criminologists have used it to counteract the “chivalry thesis,” which claims 
that women receive greater leniency in the criminal justice system by virtue of their gender 
(e.g. Sarri and Hasenfeld 1976). The legal doctrine of double jeopardy holds that it is a 
violation of a person’s rights to be tried and punished twice for the same crime (Garner 2006: 
225). Combining these, feminist criminologists have demonstrated that females in conflict 
with the law are punished more harshly than their male counterparts for the same crimes—
once for violating the law, and again for violating the gender norm of feminine innocence and 
purity, which extends to girls in the juvenile justice system (Guevara, Herz et al. 2006: 263). 
Black feminist sociologists have shown that women of color are placed in multiple jeopardy, 
as they must contend with compounded oppressions (King 1988; Hill-Collins 2000; Wing 
1997, 2003; Tong 1998: 216-17). Multiple jeopardy—the compounding of structural sexism 
and racism—conveys the greater probabilities for females of color of subjection to judgment 
against normative femininity and Whiteness, including in juvenile justice (Selo 1976). In 
criminal procedure, multiplicity means to charge the same defendant with the same offense 
multiple times, in violation of her rights against being punished several times for a single 
offense33 (Garner 2006: 471). Multiplicity in this research implies the perilous terrain that 
economically marginalized girls of color in conflict with the law must tread due to the 
interplay of multiple normativities—of race, class, gender, childhood and punishment—
against which they can be judged. 
In this chapter I map the expansive and enriching methodological journey that has 
produced the insights expounded in the empirical chapters. The overarching theme is 
                                                
33 This epistemological development exemplifies the importance of sociological interventions into law, whereby 
feminist criminologists put a legal concept into sociological perspective to the benefit of decades of research and 
as an invitation to cross disciplinary borders. 
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deconstructive methodologies. I discuss discourse, genealogy, social constructionism and 
CDA, tapering into CLDA as the most precise methodology for systematizing the extraction 
of legal-archival data and the most compatible for a theoretical orientation of criminalized 
multiplicity.  
Davis and Dent (2001) argue that engraved guidelines for what are broadly termed 
intersectional studies are unnecessary; rather, the aim is to “[stimulate] our creativity in 
looking for new and often unorthodox ways of doing feminist analysis”34 (quoted in Potter 
2013: 309). An approach of theorizing multiplicities structures my enquiry into processes of 
marginalization, which I argue blur the distinction between protective and punitive 
boundaries in the criminal context of child prostitution. I integrate the various dimensions of 
theorizing multiplicities for the issue and subjects of child prostitution with their counterparts 
in sociology of law and critical jurisprudence throughout the discussion in order to forge a 
more comprehensive framework for analyzing this complex problem so strongly connected to 
law.  
2.1.1 Discourse, Genealogy and Social Construction 
 Discourse is notoriously difficult to define,35 but remains a useful concept for social 
research (Fairclough 1992: 3; Scott and Marshall 2009: 181-82), particularly when defined to 
include “all forms of talk and text” (Gill 1996). The definition of discourse may vary 
depending on the type of discourse analysis employed, but analyses typically share the 
common Foucauldian denominator that discourse conjoins power and knowledge, and that 
                                                
34 Carbin and Edenheim (2013) caution against vague or overbroad contours, and Alexander-Floyd (2012) 
argues for maintaining the centrality of Black feminism to intersectional research. My hope is that the specific 
topic, dimensions, and the Black, postcolonial and transnational feminist orientation of this research adequately 
address these critiques. 
35 “Foucauldian methodology” in particular is critiqued for being difficult to implement and replicate (Dreyfus 
and Rabinow 1983, in Allsopp 2009), but I have found “Foucauldian” concepts such as genealogy, in a more 
generic sense, to be useful for a succinct, pointed and instrumental mapping of predecessors and progeny of 
child prostitution law, as well as examining what social, historical, political and economic forces prompted their 
coming into being.  
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knowledge—of a particular field, subject area, institution, discipline—is constructed through 
strategic deployment of various “discursive elements” and their interaction with broader 
contexts (Foucault 1978: 100-102; Fairclough 1992: 5; Wodak and Meyer 2009).  
Discourse analyses highlight knowledge as socially constructed and constructive. 
Discourse is the textual materialization of social meanings, the realization of social structures 
of thought/knowledge and power documented in texts (Halliday 1973; 1985; Fowler, et al. 
1979, in Figueiredo 1998). However, discourses both reflect and produce “knowledge” in 
specific historical contexts, and thus “texts” are the materialization of discourse, but also a 
means of knowledge production (Hall 1997: 44). “Discourses do not just reflect or represent 
social entities and relations, they construct or ‘constitute’ them,” so that understanding the 
“social effects of discourse” is the aim of discourse analysis—how “different discourses 
construct key entities in different ways, and position people…in different ways as social 
subjects” (Fairclough 1992: 3-4). Discourse analyses observe social-discursive processes, and 
are used to understand knowledge as “situated” in social and institutional contexts, shaped by 
various speakers who occupy particular positions of power, the degree and efficacy of which 
varies (Fairclough 2010; Wodak 2009).  
 Genealogy is a methodology for documenting socio-historical development of a 
concept and related discourse, often employed alongside various forms of discourse analysis, 
including in multi-conscious feminist research. Though genealogy derives from Foucauldian 
(and Nietzschean) theory, as a means of tracing the history of a discourse, it is often and 
fruitfully used in a more generic sense to connote any systematic endeavor to reconstruct 
(trace back and track) specific histories regarding a specific practice or production of 
“knowledge,” often focusing on a concept, key word or phrase. The common aim of studies 
that use genealogy to describe their approach to social history is to trace the 
conceptualization of a commonly used term or idea that is often taken for granted or 
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naturalized, and thus has a kind of covert power, in order to deconstruct the concept as part 
and parcel of social transformations (Fraser and Gordon 1994; Ali 2003a; Sye 2008; Carbin 
and Edenheim 2013; Casas-Cortés 2015). Though the objective is not necessarily to produce 
a linear (chronological or reverse-chronological) reconstruction, genealogies often attempt to 
return to the “first” known or relevant utterance of the word, phrase or idea, and recount its 
development in more or less linear sequence, to demonstrate patterns over time. If social 
constructionism, discussed below, “is the assertion that how individuals organize and view 
the world is specific to the historical time period and culture within which the individual is 
living…that knowledge varies by culture and historical period, [as] a social product of 
[these],” then genealogy enhances social constructionist efforts by helping to trace that 
historicity and develop the socio-historical context as it relates to the discursive construction 
of an object (or subject). Chapter 3 contains a genealogical recounting of child prostitution 
laws in order to locate current laws and explore their significance in historical context. Using 
law review articles (Carter and Giobbe 1999; Brown 2007; Monasky 2011; Annitto 2011), I 
piece together important aspects of this history to trace changes or similarities in terminology 
and to demonstrate the significance of modifications in language, for example the shift from 
the phrase “white slave traffic” at the start of the twentieth century to race- and gender-
neutral “sex trafficking” in US law at the beginning of the twenty-first. 
 I had originally conceived of this project as a social constructionist one due to my 
description of it as involving “legal construction.” This is still an accurate description, but my 
use of the word “construction” prompts the need for clarification. In this research I invoke the 
term to convey the discursive construction of an issue and its subjects. Below, I explain my 
choice of CLDA as a more precise methodology for this research. However, social 
constructionism is instructive, enriching, and an underlying foundation for an approach to 
discourse, particularly for defining legal discourse and legal construction. Thus, social 
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constructionism in this study is used not to invoke a schematic methodology, but rather as 
foundational and necessary to reiterate in the study of “new” concepts such as DMST. Like 
discourse studies, social constructionism is a theory of knowledge production and a 
deconstructive method. Both view knowledge as “situated, perspectival and discursive” 
(Sayer 1997: 466). The basic social constructionist thesis is that social forces produce social 
meanings (Obasogie 2014: 16). Its deconstructive methodology involves “the process of 
disaggregating subjective social meanings (i.e., that which is constructed by social forces and 
human choices) from the objects and bodies that they attach to” (Id.: 25). Contemporary 
social theorization of race, ethnicity, nationality, class, gender and childhood share a common 
foundation of social constructionism, which lends them to discursive analysis, to examine the 
socially constructive effects of discourse (Fairclough 1992; van Dijk 2004; Wodak and 
Meyer 2009).  
Discussing child abuse and child protectionism, Munro (2008) explains social 
constructionism as a means of making the knowledge and value base of policies explicit so 
that they can be justified or critiqued as untenable, rather than presuming consensus, which 
often masks the standardization of White middle class values and marginalization of 
impoverished minority communities. Moreover, the “feedback loop” conception of naming 
and classification as discursively constructed and constructive36 (Hacking 1999; Haslanger 
2013: 88) is a shared foundation of theories of subject formation ranging from labeling theory 
to Bourdieu to postcolonial feminism, all of which inform CLDA, discussed below.  
2.1.2 Critical Legal Discourse Analysis 
Legal discourse is the communicative, textual means by which law, as a cultural 
institution and regulatory social force, re/produces social meaning. In the criminal context it 
                                                
36 The feedback loop theory holds that classificatory schemes “have the power to both establish and reinforce 
groupings, which may eventually come to ‘fit’ the classifications,” i.e. to influence the classified to conform to 
the classifications (Haslanger 2013: 88).  
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is the discursive locus of legal approval, condemnation and authority of the state to carry out 
actions that “would otherwise be prima facie morally wrongful,” (Lacey 1998, in Carrabine, 
Cox et al. 2009: 293) such as shackling, confinement and/or execution. Legal discourse is a 
particularly powerful form of elite discourse that conveys the justificatory and legitimizing 
powers of law through public, communicative discourse. My theorization of legal discourse 
derives ultimately from combining a sociologically defined conception of law and a CDA-
based conception of discourse. In accord with sociology of law, the aim is to “offer…a 
conceptualization of law that differs from and transcends its juridical understanding” (Deflem 
2008: 275), and to provide the most compatible conception of law for the Black, postcolonial, 
transnational feminist and child-centered orientation of theorizing multiplicities.  
Newman  (2012: 30-31) provides a basic sociological definition of law, which views 
law as a social institution, explaining that law is oriented toward the general aim of societies 
to  
preserve order, avoid chaos and make important social decisions…[t]he legal system 
provides explicit laws or rules of conduct and mechanisms for enforcing those laws, 
settling disputes, and changing outdated laws or creating new ones. These activities 
take place within a larger system of governance that allocates and acknowledges 
power, authority, and leadership.  
Such a major force of social organization, law is also a cultural force through which culture is 
produced and reproduced, similar to mass media37 (Sarat and Simon 2003; Harris 2003: 518).  
Sociologically informed approaches to legal discourse share at least three qualities 
salient for this research: (1) a social constructionist foundation of knowledge production—
that law and legal discourse produce and are constituted by “knowledge”; (2) the objective of 
illuminating legal-discursive processes of marginalization (involving race, ethnicity, 
nationality, class, gender and age); and (3) the critique of “legal liberalism.” These qualities 
                                                
37 The ubiquity of mass media should not be mistaken for being necessarily more constructive of the issue of 
child prostitution since the authoritative reach of the law and its legitimizing effects can produce an even more 
potent (elite) discourse that is encoded in terms of race, class, gender and childhood (van Dijk 2008: 55). 
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strengthen the ability to detect discursive processes of marginalization in legal texts that are 
facially neutral or egalitarian for the ways in which they are contingent on race, ethnicity, 
nationality, class, gender and age.  
Sociological approaches to law coalesce around deconstructive methodology as a 
primary means of unpacking and interrogating “the legal text/story…and its structure and 
logic” (Treviño 1998: 117). Critical jurisprudence can refer to theorization of law informed 
by sociology and critical social theory, including social constructionist and deconstructive 
theories38 (Correa 2011: 84; Douzinas and Gearey 2005). Like discursive-constructionist 
theories, critical jurisprudence also focuses on demonstrating the historical contingency of 
social reality and hierarchical social relations that re/produce injustice and inequalities 
through legal means (Obasogie 2014: 186; Douzinas and Gearey 2005). This is a particularly 
important task because legal constructions of race, class, gender and childhood become 
actionable through law (Id.: 282). The dynamics that critical jurisprudence seeks to uncover 
are ones in which “othering” is achieved in and through law, using lenses informed by post-
structuralism, critical approaches to rights, critical jurisprudence of race, postcolonial 
jurisprudence, and/or feminist jurisprudence (Id.). The latter in particular aims to reveal “the 
gendered nature of law’s power,” particularly through critique of legal liberalism and its 
pretense of objectivity (Id.: 237). Critical jurisprudence recognizes that often where “critique 
has to define itself against the tradition…the feminist critic must define herself against both 
the established tradition, and a critical tradition that is as inhospitable as the mainstream” 
(Id.).  
                                                
38 This refers to a range of jurisprudential theories from the earlier Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement to 
Critical Race Theory (CRT), Feminist Legal Theory, intersectionality (Crenshaw 1989), co-synthesis (Kwan 
1997), multi-dimensionality (Hutchinson 2001), Critical Race Feminism (Wing 1997, 2000, 2003), Critical 
Child Rights (Grahn-Farley 2003), Critical Class Theory (McCluskey 2008), and efforts to unify jurisprudential 
critiques of normativity in Outsider Theory (Valdes 2002) and Critical Minority Theory (Grahn-Farley 2003). 
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To define “legal discourse” from a multiplicitous perspective I integrate insights 
gleaned from a survey of sociology of law and critical jurisprudence literature, which yielded 
several important commonalities among streams of research that focus on race, class, gender, 
childhood and/or their intersections. First, law does not simply reflect racist, classist, sexist, 
adultist preferences or represent such consensus, but is constructive and constitutive of the 
very ideas of “race,” “class,” “gender” and “childhood”/“adulthood” (Obasogie 2014; 
Treviño 1998; Minda 1995; Grahn-Farley 2003). Second, American law re/produces race, 
class, gender and age normativities by standardizing Whiteness, masculinity, capitalist values 
and adulthood (Id.). Third, the re/production of inequalities along these lines in and through 
law are institutional and systemic in character (Id.). Grahn-Farley (2003) additionally points 
out that critiques of normativity are regarding subjects who each have their own unique 
individual and collective experiences of discrimination, but which share the common 
experience of being infantilized or viewed as “immature” for political subjecthood. Obasogie  
(2014: 201) advocates greater attention to “the robust yet subtle process” of racialization in 
lawmaking, which is applicable to processes related to class, gender and childhood. 
Intersectionality can be shifted from a focus on the subjects of and reasons for discrimination 
toward “the more process-oriented and deeply sociological questions of ‘how’ these 
particular realities are rendered” (Obasogie 2006: 484). Harris ’ (1990) critique of feminist 
legal theory has called for an anti-essentialist and multi-conscious feminism, and Kwan  
(1997: 1278) argues that responses to legal-discursive marginalization require a “theoretical 
tool to provide an adequate account of the intertextuality of categories.” I now turn to Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) and its application to legal texts through Critical Legal Discourse 
Analysis (CLDA) to move toward such a methodology.  
CDA provides background for CLDA, refines the definition of discourse, and 
delineates guiding themes of CDA generally, while also providing some specific linguistic 
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tools. CDA was pioneered by British sociolinguist Norman Fairclough, who adopted the 
critical linguistics of Halliday (1973), using an approach to discourse based in social theory 
to emphasize the social and political context of texts and their socially constructive properties 
(Huckin, Andrus et al. 2012). Pioneered by Fairclough and other founders such as Wodak, 
van Dijk and van Leeuwen, CDA developed based on greater interest in the social, political 
and rhetorical aspects of discourse (Id.: 108). CDA and CDLA understand “language as 
social practice determined by social structures” (Pether 1999: 57, quoting Fairclough 1989). 
Discourse is a “piece of text” instantiating discursive and social practice and positioning 
“social subjects” (Fairclough 1992: 4). A text is the product of any writing or speech act 
(“discursive event” or “instance of discourse”), encompassing any “symbolic form,” (Id.: 6) 
for example the transcript of a legislative debate in a state Senate.  
Fairclough and Wodak, founders of CDA, outline its distinctive principles and aims, 
to: (1) address social problems, (2) analyze power relations as discursive, and (3) analyze 
discourse as historical social action that constitutes culture and social relations, and performs 
“ideological work” (Fairclough 1992; Huckin, Andrus et al. 2012). One of the most important 
contributions of CDA that I carry over to CLDA is that although CDA detracts from 
linguistic focus, it retains useful tools for a descriptive and critical vocabulary regarding 
discourse, increasingly attending to “textual silences, omissions, and absences, which have 
enormously manipulative potential” (Huckin, Andrus et al. 2012: 121). This is crucial for 
analyzing legal discourse, particularly for its racializing and gendering effects, in the post-
civil rights era of facially neutral legal language wherein direct references, and not 
necessarily even recognizable “code,” are employed in racializing and gendering ways. 
Moreover, silences and omissions often point to areas of neglect, i.e. matters for which the 
state is responsible for remedying, but which it fails to do. Absences also indicate the 
inclusion and exclusion of persons from various discourses.  
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I initially had my reservations about any type of discourse analysis for this research 
based on worries of diluting rich multiplicitous analysis of race, class, gender and childhood 
with overly schematic linguistic analysis, but CDA has specifically responded to critiques 
that it is “too language centered” (Id.: 121; Blommaert 2005). Without being too 
linguistically focused, CDA provides tools with which social researchers can more precisely 
describe, communicate and critique language in texts. Particularly useful for legal texts are 
rhetorical concepts of CDA: textual silences, insinuation, suggestion, connotation, 
foregrounding/back-grounding, etc., and the sort of work that these do, such as manipulate or 
rationalize (Huckin, Andrus et al. 2012: 113, 121). 
As exemplified by the development of CLDA, delineated below, CDA is particularly 
apt for examining public and institutional, including elite-institutional discourse regarding 
race, class, gender and sexuality, as well as for archival research such as that involving legal 
texts (Id.: 110-113, 120, 123). As a public discourse, legal discourse is communicative and 
imbued with explanatory power regarding social life, and has substantial justificatory and 
legitimizing powers (Reeves 1983; Huckin, Andrus et al. 2012; Fairclough 2011; Gill 1996). 
The concentration of power abuses in institutional settings means that CDA “routinely 
engages in institutional analysis,” especially of “powerful institutions such as…the law,” 
which it considers as producing the type of public discourse that is ideal for CDA (Huckin, 
Andrus et al. 2012: 123). As a critical investigation of social inequalities, CDA is concerned 
with language in which power, hegemony,39 values, ideology,40 social justice, political 
interests, authority, control and discrimination are “expressed, constituted and legitimized” 
(Id.: 108, 123).  
                                                
39 Along with intertextuality and ideology, hegemony is a central concept in CDA, particularly important for 
understanding how “consent” is generated and how power manages to make allies of subordinate groups. 
40 CDA understands ideology as embedded in texts, and as constituting subjects through interpellation. 
Discourse does ideological work when it “contributes to sustaining or restructuring power relations” (Fairclough 
1992: 91).  
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CDA is amenable to various discursive genres or conventions, including law, and 
CLDA is the application of CDA to legal texts from a multi-conscious feminist perspective 
(Fairclough 1992: 5; Wodak 2007; Pether 1999; Varzari 2001). The newness and openness of 
CDA in general are viewed as promising and an invitation to its expansion and application in 
nascent scholarship (Huckin, Andrus et al. 2012; Varzari 2001). The theoretical orientation of 
CLDA and its accord with criminalized multiplicity make it well suited for this research. In 
summary, CLDA combined with theorizing multiplicities can be understood as a 
methodology for identifying the re/production of hegemonic notions and inequalities 
regarding race, class, gender and childhood in facially neutral but culturally contingent legal 
texts. 
CLDA conceives of law as language and culture, and thus demonstrates the cultural 
contingency of legal discourse through interdisciplinary, multi-conscious feminism. I use the 
work of feminist legal scholar Penelope Pether (1999) as a guiding example of the 
application of CDA to legal discourse, upon which I build. Pether developed CLDA through 
an interrogation of American legal discourse regarding rape and the issue of consent, to 
identify the limitations of criminal law on sexual victimization, using a sociological 
definition of “legal discourse” based on Bourdieu’s concepts of subject formation and habitus 
in conjunction with Foucault’s conception of law as power.41 The critical-race feminist 
scholarship of Angela Harris  (1990; 2003), which critiques formal egalitarianism from a race 
and gender perspective, can be incorporated to augment the multi-consciousness of the 
feminism in CLDA. Pether understands legal discourse as discourse that is often rhetorical 
                                                
41 Pether also draws from Derridean deconstructionism and feminist legal theory (Pether 1999: 55). Feminist 
legal theory calls out the standardization of masculine values in law as patriarchal language that renders women 
misfits in the law, as “other,” “different,” “deviant,” “exceptional” or “baffling” (Minow 1987; Minda 1995: 
140). This includes “legal rhetoric of free choice and autonomy” and the generic “contractarian” discourse of 
the social contract that is actually gendered (Minda 1995: 140; Pateman 1988). Feminist legal theory requires 
looking at legal language and scrutinizing its assumptions about gender and sexuality because “legal discourse 
should be recognized as a site of political struggle over sex differences” (Frug 1992: 1045-46). 
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and guided by lawmakers’ habitus, and she specifies mechanics for analyzing it. The 
principal theme of CLDA is foregrounding the cultural contingency of legal discourse. Its 
key mechanics are: (1) de-emphasizing technical modifications of statutory language as 
solutions and focusing efforts on problematic “cultural stories” or “cultural fantasies” 
undergirding law, (2) a critical view of legal liberalism and the “social contract,” (3) a 
sociological approach to reading legal texts, (4) intertextuality, and (5) synthesis (Pether 
1999: 54-55, 59-60, 87; Harris 1990, 2003).  
“From the work of Foucault we draw the understanding that law is made in its 
institutions and discourses; also of relevance is his conception of power as everywhere and 
capable of different investments” (Pether 1999: 55). Foucault’s archaelogy  
focuses on subject formation—how we are made in culture, our bodies ‘disciplined’ 
and ‘punished’ by discourse—on ‘power as it functions within institutions and to 
create knowledges and truths…the constitution of the subject…the way the body is 
formed, shaped and branded in disciplinary practices42 (Id.: 60).  
The discourse of focus in CLDA and my own research is criminal legal discourse—a 
particularly powerful form of discourse that is explicit in its purpose to discipline and punish. 
Pether also draws from Bourdieu’s theory of subject formation, “how we become who we 
are,” and habitus, “the embodied experiences that produce both our perception of the world 
and the world that is fashioned in the image of what the habitus identifies as normal,” or how 
our personal experiences and norms shape our perception of the world (Id.: 59, 55).  
Whereas the focus of legalistic solutions to sex crimes is on technical modifications of 
statutory language, Pether understands this as an exercise in futility. Instead, the focus should 
be on “cultural stories” that circulate in popular and legal discourse, which yield problematic 
interpretations and applications of the statutes (Id.: 53-54). Conflicts, inconsistencies and 
                                                
42 Various types of CDA are based on Foucauldian concepts. Discourse analysis involves examining discourse, 
narratives, texts and language from the perspective that they are imbued with ideology (of a particular institution, 
such as law). 
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contradictions (embodied by bad subjects) are often resolved in favor of commonplace, 
dominant understandings even when the language of legal-authoritative texts such as jury 
instructions attempt to counter them. Quotidian, hegemonic understandings of gender, 
sexuality and moral culpability “may not be subordinate even in the discursively authoritative 
space of the courtroom: they may be naturalized there” (Id.). My approach goes further 
because it is less concerned with evaluating whether statutes are applied or interpreted 
properly, and centrally concerned with the constructive effects and work of re/producing 
inequalities that legal discourse does, including that which is codified in statutes.  
Foregrounding the cultural contingency of legal discourse involves examining how 
legal culture constitutes identities, including ways in which it imputes to subaltern identities 
the responsibilities of citizenship while, simultaneously, denying their capacity for it (Harris 
2003: 522). Based on Spivak (1988) and hooks (2000), Harris ’ (2003: 524-25) approach to 
legal discourse seeks to expose and critique techniques of othering that construct “bad 
subjects.” CLDA views legal texts as sites of political struggle, and is critical of legal 
liberalism (legal-formal egalitarianism) because despite the formal equality promised by 
liberal legal systems, lawmakers often espouse the same problematic views of feminine (and 
subaltern) subjects purveyed in the larger society (Pether 1999: 87). Legal liberalism often 
conceals the law’s contingency on gender (and race/ethnicity, class and childhood) as well as 
the habitus of lawmakers via discourse that is declaratively egalitarian regarding citizenship 
and the class and socio-economic position of men (Id.), i.e. through the discourse of social 
contract (Pateman 1988; Mills 1997; Pateman and Mills 2007). CLDA critiques liberalist 
reliance on the binary thinking of modern Western thought, similarly critiqued in Derridean, 
feminist, postcolonial and critical-jurisprudential works as attempts to efface contradictions 
between, for example, public versus private or free will versus determinism, and thereby 
stabilize their meanings (Kennedy 1979 and Oetken 1991, in Obasogie 2014: 185; Moallem 
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2005: 160). The law dichotomizes phenomena through such cognitive polarizations. In these 
ways CLDA renders suspect the hegemonic liberal notion of social contract—“that set of 
legal concepts meant to safeguard from political interference an individual’s personal 
freedom to engage in contractual agreements in order to promote his or her self-interest” 
(Treviño 1998: 97).  
Specific themes and techniques in legal discourse that mystify the law’s cultural 
contingency and distract from the social processes of marginalization at work include the 
individualization of social problems, pathologization, criminalization, medicalization and 
privatization, (Brockman and Chunn 1993; Fudge and Cossman 2002; Martin 2002). 
Connecting critical-race and postcolonial theory, Farley  (1997: 517-529) explains how legal 
discourse constructs subaltern identities through racial appeals. “Becoming the subaltern,” 
through legal discourse is achieved through pathologization and the general “thematization of 
our urban bantustans as areas of anti-civilization,” including association of communities of 
color and “the black inner-city” as “Neocolony” with “the spectacle of violence, narcotics, 
illiteracy, illegitimacy, and disease” (Id.: 517-518). This justifies the deployment of law-and-
order responses to social problems, connoting that “savagery [is] kept at bay only by spiraling 
investment in the prison-industrial complex” (Id.: 519). Critical analysis of legal discourse 
requires scrutinizing racialized appeals embedded in these imageries, associations and themes 
of law-and-order, punishment and control through incarceration. Lazar (2005) also alerts the 
analyst to the ways in which feminist discourse is often appropriated for anti-feminist 
purposes, such as when the language of “choice” and women’s empowerment in campaigns 
for the legal right to abortion are deployed to promote women’s purchase of guns and 
inscription into gun culture. In general, analyses should scrutinize political fictions offered in 
lieu of empirical evidence for purposes of persuasion as well as the habitus of the speaker 
(lawmaker) circulating them (Pether 1999: 55). 
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The concept of intertextuality is based largely on the works of Bakhtin  (1981, 1986) 
and Kristeva (1986), that “texts are constructed through other texts” (Fairclough 1992: 9, 84-
85, and Chapter 4). Intertextuality recognizes the ways in which a single text may draw from 
several, even potentially contradictory, discourses and assumptions thereof to construct its 
objects, such that texts should be understood “in relation to webs of other text and to the 
social context” (Lehtonen 2007: 6-6; Lazar 2005: 14; Fairclough 1992). Intertextuality is 
interested in the effect of old texts on new ones, how the rhetorical force of texts changes in 
new contexts, and the ways in which texts can reconfigure contexts, including their 
recontextualization over the course of time (Huckin, Andrus et al. 2012: 120-21). The aim of 
an intertextual reading is to make and reveal connections between “discursive, social and 
cultural change,” which are often hidden (Fairclough 1992: 9). Legal texts involving a 
particular crime such as sex trafficking are quintessentially intertextual since relevant 
legislative debates, statutes, and cases are interrelated and reference one another. 
Although gathering the corpus of legal texts requires conventional legal research, to 
transcend the “legally-sanctioned meaning” of texts requires the application of (preferably) 
sociological theory that synthesizes multiple levels of consciousness to reflect the multi-
dimensionality of the issue and subjects being constructed (Goodrich 1986 and Matsuda 1989, 
in Pether 1999: 55, 85). In accord with CLDA techniques of rendering visible, foregrounding, 
and subjecting to critique the discursive processes of marginalization in legal texts related to 
child sex trafficking, my empirical analysis focuses on how problematic cultural assumptions 
and narratives in legal discourse lay the foundation for the criminalization or penalization of 
commercially-sexually exploited minors, specifically minors in prostitution. I read texts 
through the sociological lens of theorizing multiplicities for an integrative view of how these 
construct the issue and its subjects in ways that place minors in multiple jeopardy of being 
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criminalized, or subject them to criminalized multiplicity. I turn to theorizing multiplicities to 
break down and operationalize each of the concepts and dimensions I am working with. 
2.1.3 Theorizing Multiplicities 
The aim of theorizing multiplicities is to help complicate and nuance the key binaries 
or dualisms structuring the legal discourse of child trafficking—adult/child, victim/offender 
and consent/non-consent—and to gain insight into their construction, reproduction and 
operation. This helps to understand what is being re/produced, and how. It also incorporates 
multiple dimensions that are mutually constitutive or mutually shaping into a single 
framework, which achieves integration and synthesis. Each of the dimensions of 
race/ethnicity, class, gender and childhood outlined has a contemporary sociological 
definition and explanation that understands each as socially constructed categories of 
stratification and social organization, a process of reproduction or marginalization associated 
with it, an institutional dimension and relationship to justice, justice systems and crime 
control. Law regulates and continually re/constructs each category of identity. They each also 
play a key role in the socialization of American children, and in turn, re/constructions of 
American childhood shape their contours and substance. I contribute to intersectional or 
multiplicity approaches to race, class and gender by incorporating childhood as an important 
and salient dimension of inequality. 
Contemporary sociology understands race as a socio-historical, legal and political 
construct that remains tenacious and powerful for shaping social order (Ali 2003a, 2003b; 
Omi and Winant 2015: 3, 12-13; Obasogie 2014: 16-17). Its social meaning derives 
politically and transforms through political struggle (Id.). Traditional definitions constructed 
race as a concept and category of persons labeled and treated similarly based on biological 
and inborn traits perceived as common among its members, usually including phenotypical 
qualities—color of hair and skin, hair texture and other physiological characteristics such as 
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body shape and build—while also ascribing “sexual characteristics” (Ali 2003a; Newman 
2012: 360-65). As social categorization, race is based on prevailing cultural definitions that 
“shape social rankings and determine access to important resources” (Newman 2012: 361). It 
has been variably understood through the lenses of ethnicity, class and nation, which 
respectively emphasize culture, economic class and modern projects of “nation building” as 
primary constructors of race (Omi and Winant 2015). Additionally, race has played a key role 
in the socialization of all American children (Handel, Cahill et al. 2007: 267-283; Corsaro 
2015: 77-82).  
Racialization is the social, political and ideological process whereby a group is 
categorized as a “race” (Ali 2003; 2003b). Racialization ascribes, extends and continually 
reconstructs race in new contexts and across time, conveying the tenacity of notions of or 
pertaining to race through social and discursive processes (Ali 2003a: 2), which social 
institutions such as the law re/produce (Haney-Lopez 2010). Institutionalized racism is 
“[racial] injustice built into the system” through “routine workings” of legal and customary 
practices, including through politics, legislation and policing, which systematically reproduce 
racial inequalities, regardless of individual intentionality (Jones 1986, in Newman 2012: 389; 
Omi and Winant 1986: 14). The criminal and juvenile justice systems and criminal law, 
generally, are key sites in which race is re/produced and ethnicity and nationality are 
racialized (Bush 2010; Haney-Lopez 2010). The process of racialization, practice of 
institutional racism, and their causes and consequences can be examined using what can be 
understood as deconstructive methodologies (e.g. Ali 2003a; 2003b).  
Class is “an economic category” of stratification “reproduced through cultural 
practices” (Bourdieu 1987, 1997, in Tonkiss 2006: 135, 139). Class stratification and social 
class are important determinants of social inequality involving issues of commodification, 
exploitation and domination (Newman 2012: 360-61; Id.: 131), though culture mediates class 
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position and notions of class belonging (Burawoy 1979). As discussed above, globalization 
theory rooted in economic sociology helps locate class in globalizing economic structures 
and processes guided by neoliberal tenets. In the US national context, there is relative 
sociological consensus that the American population can be divided into six social classes—
upper class (or capitalist class), upper-middle class, middle class, working class, working 
poor, and the underclass43 (Handel, Cahill et al. 2007: 247-263). Each of these creates 
different conditions and experiences of childhood and selfhood across the life course, and 
“develops a more or less varied class culture, “each a distinctive version of the general 
American culture,” through the transmittal and regeneration of values and practices shaped 
by and adaptive to class conditions such as competitiveness, entitlement, cooperativeness and 
different extremities of individualism (Id.; Corsaro 2015: 306-314). The criteria for class 
membership can be inconsistent, and there is some social mobility—upward mobility, though 
arguably greater downward mobility—between these strata, “but generally classes reproduce 
themselves” (Farkas 1996, in Id.: 255). 
Class interrelates and interacts with race, ethnicity, nationality, gender and childhood. 
Tonkiss  (2006: 158-59) explains, “inequality is still reproduced economically, and a focus on 
divisions other than class in fact can show up more severe economic disparities...[and] can 
direct attention to other forms of economic power and injustice.” For at least the last two 
decades, approximately 40% of American children have been “low-income,” meaning that 
approximately 20% have lived in poverty, with another 20% “near-poor” (household incomes 
between $12,000-22,000/year) (Handel, Cahill et al. 2007: 259; National Center for Children 
in Poverty 2016). A multidimensional focus on children reveals the greater economic 
inequalities that they bear in the US and globally (Javidan 2012). US child poverty has been 
                                                
43 In sociology of childhood literature, researchers who do not subscribe to the notion of an underclass instead 
focus on child poverty, but their research is nonetheless regarding those whom others would include in the 
underclass (Handel, Cahill et al. 2007: 259). 
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“growing greater in both magnitude and intensity, and those trends are most pronounced for 
young children of color” (Cicchino 1996: 24, 29). US Census data shows the disproportionate 
number of children, particularly Black children, who are poor compared to adults (Javidan 
2012; Cicchino 1996). Poverty and class are feminized and racialized globally and in the US 
(Ali 2003b; Tonkiss 2006, 2008; Mies 1998). Race and ethnicity in the US are historically 
intertwined with class (Takaki 1993). Class polarization is increasingly racially polarized, 
particularly since the Great Recession (Harper 2013: 33). The socio-economic mobility of 
girls suffers most with such developments (Cicchino 1996: 24, 29). The works of Alexander 
(2012) and Wacquant (2009) demonstrate that criminal laws and justice systems disparately 
impact and ensnare the working class, working poor and underclass, including low-income 
minors in the juvenile justice and child welfare systems Birckhead (2012), due to institutional 
and structural classism. Townsend’s (1993; 2002; 2004) conceptualization of relative 
deprivation informs my understanding of class and child poverty as well, for its emphasis on 
children’s lived conditions and immediate circumstances, rather than solely their parental 
household income and/or assets. Townsend’s work provides nuanced understanding of social 
exclusion—measured relative to the material conditions of others within a particular societal 
and economic context (e.g. advanced capitalism)—rather than based on absolute measures of 
poverty.  
Gender is also a key component of the ordering of social life. Gender is a social 
construct that defines and attributes social roles of masculinity and femininity, particularly 
along lines of biological sex and reproductive function. Unlike “sex,” which is associated 
with biological characteristics, “gender” involves physical aesthetics and behavioral 
characteristics that are socially defined and which vary across culture and time (Lindsey 
2010: 4). Though there are and have been multiple forms of gender in human societies, in 
modern Western societies, normative gender identities have been constructed as binary, 
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dichotomized as masculine and feminine (Id.; Handel, Cahill et al. 2007: 307). Gender 
identity is not always consistent with biological sex, but normative gender identity requires 
that the person’s “sex” (biological characteristics) match his or her “gender”—a conformity 
is known as “cisgender”—and that sexual relationships be “heteronormative” (Franklin 2014). 
Childhood is a gendered experience marked by the inculcation of gender differences as part 
of socialization, which children themselves often resist, yet gender is often treated as natural 
and inevitable (Thorne 1993; Handel, Cahill et al. 2007: 287; Corsaro 2015: 206-208). 
Gendered and gendering processes important for analyzing child prostitution include 
feminization, sexualization, and over-sexualization. Feminization can refer to the greater risks 
of females to certain conditions such as poverty, the over-concentration of females in certain 
roles, statuses or type of work, or the ascription of stereotypically “feminine” characteristics 
such as dependency and subservience (Bianchi 1999; Roos 1997; Grahn-Farley 2002). 
Sexualization refers to the attribution of sexual qualities to persons, groups or abstract 
notions, including sexual objectification (Geldens, Lincoln et al. 2011). Over-sexualization is 
the gendered and racialized ascription of sexual nature and/or proclivity above “normal” or 
accepted standards (Ali 2003b: 278). Like the feminization and sexualization of children, the 
over-sexualization of women of color and working class White women ascribes sexual 
deviance and works to deny their sexual exploitation and victimization (Burman and Stacey 
2010; Id.). Institutional sexism is female subordination in the routine workings of “economics, 
law, politics and other social institutions,” which are often gendered, for example through the 
adoption of masculine values in legislation and policing practices (Newman 2012: 437). It is 
under these conditions that girls’ sexualities are negotiated, including in and through law.  
Butler (1990) observes that rather than “being” male or female as an essentialized 
identity, gender is performed, and de Beauvoir argues that prostitution epitomizes 
performance of the dominant functional role of “Woman,” (Tong 1998: 208) such that we 
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cannot take for granted the gender-re/productive function of prostitution and related laws. 
Transnational, postcolonial and Black feminisms are concerned with how women are treated 
as passive, docile and vulnerable victims (Kempadoo and Doezema 1998; Agustin 2007), but 
also concerned with the commission and denial of their sexual victimization, including their 
treatment in public space as commercial-sexual targets and exclusion from normative 
victimhood (Hill-Collins 2000, in Tong 1998: 218; Grahn-Farley 2000; Harper 2013: 35-36). 
Childhood victimization from both adults and peers—psychological, physical and sexual—is 
also very often structured by gender, and disproportionately impacts girls Corsaro 2015: 334). 
Justice and justice systems are of central importance to intersectional feminism, particularly 
for their disparate impact on women of color (Wing 1997; Davis and Dent 2001; Wing 2003; 
Moallem 2006; Crenshaw, Ocen et al. 2015). In the prostitution and sex trafficking contexts, 
we are alerted to the perils and consequences of “carceral feminism”—the reliance of 
feminist goals on criminalization and law enforcement (Bernstein 2012).  
The sociology of childhood establishes child as an identity and children as a distinct 
social group, cultural category and unit of analysis similar to race, class and gender (Jenks 
1996; Corsaro 1997, 2015; Wyness 2006, in Mayall 2013). “Child” can refer to progeny or 
“someone who has not yet reached full economic and jural status as an adult in society,” who 
is transitioning through the age-related phase of childhood (Scott and Marshall 2009: 77). 
Despite contrary empirical evidence, the subordinate status accorded children as well as child 
protectionism are typically justified based on presumed incapacities—political, intellectual, 
economic and sexual (Id.: 78). Sociology of childhood moves away from the focus of early 
anthropology and developmental psychology of children as “pre-social objects of 
socialization” or as adult “socialization projects,” toward the view of children as important, 
agentic and competent social actors (Mayall 2013: 2, 11; Hutchby and Moran-Ellis 1998; 
Qvortrup 2009; Burman and Stacey 2010: 230). Its basic premise is that childhood is socially 
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constructed (James and Prout 1997), with emphasis on macro-structural construction through 
history, gender, politics and economics (Wyness 2013; Qvortrup, Bardy et al. 1994; Mayall 
2013: 2). A broad range of global forces and processes shape plural childhoods across 
societies: globalization and its neoliberal imperatives, the state, free market, national 
reconstruction, law and rights, risk, and the cultural identity of children (Stephens 1995; 
Wagg and Pilcher 1996; Corsaro 2015: 289; Kehily 2004: 13).  
The figure of the child has also served as “a powerful symbol in the construction of 
modern Western society,” and the ambiguity of its contours enhances its “symbolic 
functioning” (Scott and Marshall 2009: 78). However, children are not merely idealized nor 
the beneficiaries of chivalry as often emphasized in sex work theory (e.g. O'Connell-
Davidson 2005; Gozdziak 2016). Three overarching and competing views of children have 
tensely undergirded modern Western notions of childhood. The romantic view is the sole 
view that associates children with innocence, purity and malleability, requiring care and 
protection Kehily 2004: 5, Corsaro 2015: 72, Handel, Cahill et al. 2007: 69). The tabula 
rossa view sees children as a “blank slate” to be trained, controlled, educated and guided into 
mature, responsible citizens (Kehily 2004: 5). Though originally reserved for the “lower 
classes,” the puritanical view of childhood came to be applied to the majority of children, 
with its presumption of an evil lurking within all children, who are innately sinful and require 
having their will broken as part of training and socialization (Handel, Cahill et al. 2007: 68, 
Kehily 2004: 5). The puritanical view is particularly salient in popular representations of 
minors in conflict with the law, including those in prostitution. The child rights paradigm, 
which constructs children as capable rights-bearers in the human rights context, has only 
recently challenged dominant ideologies regarding children and childhood (Scott and 
Marshall 2009: 78). Thus Western conceptualization of children cannot be reduced to 
romanticism, particularly given the exclusion of poor, working class and non-White children 
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from its remit, and is better understood as an assemblage comprising of discordant and 
contradictory co-articulations unevenly applied to different groups of children. At the same 
time the category “children” has coherence as a distinct category through socially and legally 
constructed structural disadvantage in the generational order, which should not simply be 
subsumed under other sociological categories of race, class and gender (Alanen 1988, 
Qvortrup 1993, 2007, in Bühler-Niederberger 2010: 378). Moreover, the subordination of 
children is socially normalized and legally formalized in ways that the subordination of adults 
and minorities is not (Grahn-Farley 2002; 2003).  
Social processes of re/production associated with children and childhood include 
childism and infantilization, or adultism and adultification. These processes are strongly 
associated with the deteriorating conditions of childhood under neoliberal regimes, 
particularly among the poor and abused (Young-Bruehl 2012: 16; Bousfield and Ragusa 
2014). Childism is a heuristic, synthesizing term capturing anti-child attitudes or policies of 
societies that help justify or legitimize the subordination or mistreatment of children (Young-
Bruehl 2012: 1-2). Infantilization is the ascription of “child-like” qualities to others, 
including persons, places, cultures, and even ideas, implying their underdevelopment, 
incapability and/or dependency (Marson and Powell 2014; Nii-Amoo Dodoo 2005: 594). 
Bianchi (1999) also refers to the “juvenilization” of poverty to denote the dramatic increase 
in US child poverty after 1970. Adultism invokes the normative power of adults over children, 
discrimination against children, or adult supremacy (Ribeiro and de Fátima Dias 2009: 463-4; 
Flasher 1978). Adultification “is a sociological process…of ‘role corruption’” whereby 
attributes, responsibilities and capacities normatively associated with adults are extended to 
children (Bousfield and Ragusa 2014: 172-73). Outcomes of these processes include 
increasingly waiving minors, particularly Black and Latino youth, into the adult justice 
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system (Haney-Lopez 2010; Giroux 2003: 118), and the US having the highest rates of child 
abuse and child incarceration in the world (Young-Bruehl 2012: 2, 16).  
Each of these processes interacts with notions of crime, punishment and justice for 
minors in conflict with the law, including those at the crossroads of being subjected to laws 
related to prostitution or sex trafficking. Criminalization is the process of rendering certain 
behaviors punishable under criminal law. It is also a process of othering, strongly indicating 
the out-group status of those whom states perceive to be most threatening at a given time 
(Ellis 2012: 2). Police arrest and custody, detention and being adjudicated delinquent are 
considered criminalizing practices. The process of criminalization works against the view of 
children in normative childhood that presumes their innocence and attends to their protection. 
Along with prior criminal record and the gravity of current offense(s), pre-adjudication 
detention is considered among the best predictors of criminalization in models that account 
for demographics and other extralegal factors (Guevara, Herz et al. 2006: 262).  
2.2 Methods 
I have defined “legal discourse” as possessing the qualities of being public, 
communicative, authoritative, elite and institutional, with legitimizing and justificatory 
powers. This part of the chapter details the specific methods of my strategy of enquiry into 
the legal-discursive construction of child prostitution. In this section I circumscribe the legal 
texts that comprise “legal discourse” for purposes of this research and explain their utility and 
significance as well as how I researched them. 
2.2.1 Selection of Laws 
The empirical chapters explore the genesis of child prostitution law, how and why they 
came to be, and analyze their significance. But suffice it for methods that the key conceptual 
and legal distinction in criminal law determining whether minors in prostitution are to be 
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treated as non-consenting child victims or as offenders are, respectively, the crime of DMST 
or the crime of prostitution.44 DMST laws view minors in prostitution as victims of sex 
offenses committed against them. DMST laws are those passed since federal legislation 
(TVPA 2000), pertaining to the domestic sex trafficking of minors (including exploitation 
through prostitution) within US borders. Prostitution laws, by default, typically apply to both 
adults and minors, including in Utah and Illinois. Therefore, I focused on researching statutes 
falling under these two headings in the criminal code of each jurisdiction. In the legal 
research database WestLaw, the statutes link links to the cases adjudicated under them. 
Legislative debates that led to the passage of these laws are available on the website of the 
Utah Legislature (in audio format) and the Illinois General Assembly (electronic 
transcriptions). I center my empirical analysis around this important division in the law—
between prostitution and DM/ST—which provides my two key sets of legal texts.  
Based on the principle of intertextuality, I webbed my research out further, to other 
crimes—that at least theoretically, if not often in practice—inform whether minors in 
prostitution are viewed as victims or offenders of sex crimes. These include statutes 
governing the crimes of rape and child rape (including child sex abuse), statutory rape 
(including age of consent regulation), and statutes pertaining to the criminal exposure or 
transmission of HIV, which provide tougher penalties for prostitution while knowingly HIV-
positive. These statutes are points on the “continuum of abuse” (and criminality) to which 
Halter (2008) refers in her research as governing the cases and treatment of minors in 
prostitution. These heterogeneous texts are interconnected through reference to minors as a 
class and to sexual crimes committed by or against them. They compose a set of laws 
                                                
44 In my research I have not come across statutes that refer to “child prostitution,” but rather to DMST or “Safe 
Harbor” statutes. Though these are the immediate places that a practitioner might look to the law, the 
criminalization of minors for prostitution creates an indeterminacy regarding their status as victim or offender 
that requires examining child prostitution as embedded in a continuum of protective or punitive laws that may or 
not be applied to them. Thus legal discourse on child prostitution is not limited to the terms or discourse of 
DMST or Safe Harbor. 
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aggregating “the associated field” of related statements that structure the legal discourse and 
form the nexus of laws applicable to minors in prostitution.  
Texts that fall on this continuum of laws fulfill both the legal criteria of what constitutes 
prostitution as a crime (Bourdeau 2010), and the sociological/CLDA criteria of what 
constitutes legal discourse on prostitution from a feminist perspective. However, limited time 
and space require that legal texts other than those related directly to DMST and prostitution, 
i.e. other than ones explicitly categorized in the criminal code as such—child sex abuse, rape 
and HIV provisions—will be approached mostly as supplementary to my more central 
analysis of the key crimes of DMST and prostitution. CLDA demonstrates that despite 
compartmentalization of statutes, lawmakers are aware of the broader matrix of law, and 
other laws related to sexual victimization evidence the juridico-political mindset and its 
reliance on similar cultural narratives (Pether 1999).  
2.2.2 Textual Research and Process 
Constructing the research “corpus”—the entire body of discursive materials (texts)—for 
this research required archival research of legal texts (Bauer and Aarts 2000). The broad body 
of texts that I researched included legislative debates, statutes, cases, law review articles and 
other secondary sources related to federal law and the two states, Utah and Illinois. These are 
listed in order of reference in the text in Appendix A. Legal research involves finding, 
assembling and “effective marshaling of authorities…that bear on a question of law” (Garner 
2006: 420). It is a technical skill learned during the initial year of instruction in American law 
schools. I received my Juris Doctor degree in 2003 from an ABA (American Bar 
Association) accredited law school in California and practiced law for five years in the state 
prior to embarking on this research. However, I updated and refined my legal research skills 
in WestLaw—one of two primary legal research databases—in 2009 through the 
Methodology Institute at London School of Economics, which I used to search for statutes 
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and cases related to child prostitution in US federal and state law. I also consulted reference 
sources to help explain the research process and concepts that became second nature to me as 
a practitioner.45  
Legal research requires selecting appropriate legal “authorities” (statutes and cases) using 
generative search terms that yield controlling (“binding”) authorities for the type of case at 
hand. Kunz, Schmedemann et al. (2012) outline a popular and straightforward method of 
legal research. First, identify the legal problem and legal issues that need to be researched, 
then identify search terms that will yield the most “on-point” results. Determine the 
jurisdiction and time frame of the authorities needed. Review relevant secondary authority 
and then primary authority, explained below. This is a relatively straightforward process. 
2.2.3 The Problem and Search Terms 
 For researching Utah and Illinois state laws, I simply began by doing a “natural 
language” search in WestLaw for law review articles (explained below) related to “child 
prostitution.” A natural language search simply means a search that does not use terms and 
connectors that narrow the search. Thus a natural language search is a broad search, as one 
might do in the search field in Google, online. I applied no time limit to the search parameters 
in order to see the full history of available documents, from the earliest to most recent. Once 
the search yielded several articles, I vetted them for relevance and categorized them by 
relevance to either of the two states (Utah or Illinois). I then further classified them as 
relating to laws of the state that fall on the child-protective end of the spectrum (protective 
provisions for child victims, criminalization of DMST, victim services, other child protective 
laws), or those that fall on the punitive end of the spectrum, i.e. that can be used to 
                                                
45 These included Cohen, Berring and Olson’s How to Find the Law (1989); Jacobstein and Mersky’s 
Fundamentals of Legal Research (1990); Cohen and Olson’s Legal Research in a Nutshell (2013); Garner’s 
Black’s Law Dictionary (2006); and Kunz, Schmedemann et al. (2012)’s The Process of Legal Research: 
Authorities and Options. 
 81 
criminalize minors in prostitution (prostitution, solicitation, disorderly conduct, criminal 
exposure of HIV laws).  
 I used both primary and secondary legal authorities to seek definitive texts regarding 
child sex trafficking. Primary authorities are binding and must be followed, such as statutes 
and cases, which directly issue from a law-making body (Garner 2006: 56). Secondary 
authorities are non-binding, and describe, explain and help understand the law, such as 
treatises, annotations, and law review articles. Secondary sources help to familiarize 
researchers with an area of law as well as identify the primary sources relevant to it. The 
object of my research is criminal law, which “defines, classifies, and sets forth punishment 
for one or more specific crimes” (Id.: 675). Through the legislative and adjudicative 
processes, lawmakers (legislators and judges) create authoritative legal texts that construct 
the issue of child sex trafficking and determine the fate of its subjects. By “enacting positive 
law in written form,” legislation brings something into or takes it out of existence, and 
attempts to control it (Id.: 421). Terminology and concepts in criminal statutes such as sexual 
exploitation, power, control, injury and imminent danger directly impact and are reflected in 
the interpretations, reports and treatment of minors in prostitution by police, who act as the 
front-line contact persons between the state and potential victims of trafficking (Halter 2008: 
133). 
Cases are primary, mandatory authorities in a jurisdiction to which judges must defer 
in rendering decisions, but which they can also modify. Since cases are decided in courts—
the apparatus of the state in which culture is produced—cases produce culture and identity 
(Goldberg and Solomos 2002). Judicial opinions represent texts which re/produce these 
through elite-institutional discourse. Courts and legislatures construct specific narratives and 
legal identities—“the social constructions that courts apply to recognize the role of the 
litigants,” such as “victim” (Bumiller 1988: 60-61). After identifying key statutes, I reviewed 
 82 
cases adjudicated under them for examples of how the particular law is interpreted, practiced 
and/or modified. Cases can help track cultural shifts, as they document decisions and judicial 
rationale, and determine future decisions by establishing precedent (Garner 2006: 672). 
WestLaw utilizes a color-coding system that tags “good cases” as green, meaning that the 
case is still binding, i.e. has not been overturned (red) or partly overturned (yellow). I chose 
only “green” cases, and reviewed “yellow” cases for any relevant, binding portions.  
Including cases as part of the corpus of texts to examine public discourse on a topic 
that involves juvenile justice has its difficulties. Juvenile cases are not usually publicly 
available since they are heard in courts that are closed to the public, and their cases are sealed 
to maintain minors’ anonymity, under the juvenile justice theory that youthful indiscretions 
should not carry over to prejudice one’s adult life (Etten and Petrone 1994). However, cases 
of higher courts, which also have greater precedential value, are available with juveniles’ 
names abbreviated for anonymity. The difficulty is that unless the case of a minor adjudicated 
for prostitution has reached a higher court in Utah or Illinois, it will not be publicly available 
or accessible, and therefore cannot be considered part of “public discourse” on the issue, 
which is the object of this research. Over several years of searching and monitoring, this 
never materialized in either of these states. However, I identified juvenile cases originating 
from other jurisdictions that have national relevance or application. On the other hand, 
DMST cases are publicly available and often highly publicized, including in Utah and Illinois, 
since they almost always involve the prosecution of adult pimps or traffickers. DMST cases 
often refer to and discuss juveniles involved, usually as victims. 
Legislative debates involve formal rhetorical exchanges among legislators on the 
merits of a proposed bill before a chamber (Garner 2006: 293). They form part of legislative 
history, which includes the “background and events leading to the enactment of a statute” 
(Id.: 422). These debates determine the provisions that make up statutes, and reveal which 
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arguments and the positions that they represent prevailed over others. Some influential legal 
scholars and practitioners believe that legislative history and debates should be buried and 
forgotten once legislation is passed because it can render the law contradictory and 
undermine legal authority (e.g. Kozinski 1998). However, legislative history and debates are 
useful for assessing the socially constructive effects of legal discourse. Spector and Kitsuse 
(1977, in Best 2002) specifically mention that tracing legislative history is an ideal method of 
analyzing the social construction of a “social problem” such as child prostitution, i.e. 
demonstrating how it comes to be defined and known as such. Tracing legislative history, 
including debates, also serves the CDA objective of tracking changes in language for their 
cultural significance (Fairclough 1992). This is useful for genealogical approaches, which are 
concerned “with developing the buried history of thought…with the specific objective of 
revealing a link between knowledge and power” (Cuff 1998: 268). As demonstrated in prior 
research on sex trafficking and prostitution laws (Javidan 2003; Chapkis 2003; Kantola and 
Squires 2004; Babb 2012), examining legislative debates provides insight into the thoughts, 
arguments and knowledge base informing legislation. Government press releases and 
journalistic media can also serve as useful supplementary sources. 
2.2.4 Selection of States 
The above outlines the key texts for the production of legal discourse regarding child 
prostitution. I now turn to selection of states through which to examine this process as it 
unfolds in terms of the paradigmatic framework of punishment and child protection. I had 
originally approached the selection of states to exemplify and interrogate the 
punitive/protective binary constructed in influential literature of anti-trafficking NGOs 
focused on modifications of statutory language, and who dominate topical research and often 
shape official discourse and legislation on child prostitution (Gozdziak and Collett 2005: 99, 
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118).46 In these reports, the legislative performance of Utah was consistently ranking at the 
lowest end of the spectrum, while Illinois was at its highest (e.g. Snow 2008; Shared Hope 
International 2012; Polaris Project 2010). The reports measure the level of protection for 
minors in prostitution and degree of punishment meted out to pimps and traffickers for each 
state in the US. They organize this information year by year, and based on specific criteria, 
including eliminating demand for child prostitution, prosecuting traffickers, identifying 
victims and providing protection and rehabilitation for victims (Smith 2011, in Babb 2012: 
296). States that fulfill these policy requirements receive the highest rankings from these 
organizations (Id.). This is still very useful for understanding the discursive construction of 
child prostitution, especially the punitive/protective bifurcation that informs so much of the 
rapidly proliferating legislation and statutory modifications on the issue. Juxtaposing two 
states polarized in this literature has provided an opportunity to more deeply examine the 
social, historical and legal dynamics at work in each. It has helped work out the mechanisms 
that the less protective state deploys which promote child criminalization, or the more 
protective state adopts that discourage or diminish it. I also wanted to look for what may 
allow child criminalization to persist in both, regardless of their reputed protectionism or 
retributivism. 
Over the course of this research, the ranking of the two states has changed to where they 
are now about even. In these reports Utah, at the lowest end of the scale, has caught up to 
Illinois, which has consistently been ranked at the highest end (Shared Hope International 
                                                
46 I had also conceived of selecting the two states as involving “comparative” analysis, but that implies the use 
of a specific methodology of cross-national comparison, for example, between the criminal justice systems of 
two countries. Since mine is an intra-national study involving primarily two jurisdictions (states) unified within 
the same federal system as exemplifying opposite sides of the same pole, it involves at most “comparative 
observations about the similarities and differences [I] notice within Anglo-American culture” (Nelken 2005: 246, 
in Banakar and Travers 2005). This contrasts with comparative research, which may be interested in, for 
example, globalization and “legal unification” of different types of legal systems (Id.). However, even 
comparing and contrasting two entities within the same system is helped by “address[ing] what lies behind ]the 
scholar’s] descriptions and interpretations” (Nelken 2005: 246-47, in Id.). This is what I set out to do in this 
section.  
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2016a; Shared Hope International 2016b). However, this raises the issue of whether and to 
what extent states are actually progressing toward greater protectionism of minors in 
prostitution (and what this may actually mean). Notwithstanding reports of influential 
American anti-trafficking NGOs (e.g. Shared Hope International 2012), Schwartz (2008) 
finds a revival of retributivism. Schwartz demonstrates that even after eight years of model, 
pioneering legislation in New York, nearly half of all minors in prostitution are prosecuted as 
offenders. This raises concerns regarding the extent and severity of retributivist 
criminalization in states such as Utah, whose legislative performance ranks lowly in NGO 
reports, at the opposite end of the scale to ostensibly leading states such as New York, Illinois 
and Washington.  
Using Utah and Illinois to exemplify the punitive and protective modes of labeling and 
processing minors in prostitution in accord with NGOs’ assessments of these states has the 
additional benefit of exploring and challenging the punitive/protective dualism being 
constructed in the NGO literature and its tendency toward primarily legalistic thinking on 
child prostitution, which can foster complacency on the issue when it appears that 
satisfactory legal solutions are in place. This proves necessary because, as discussed in the 
empirical chapters, Utah still serves as a viable example for child penalization despite 
modifying its statutory language to the satisfaction of leading NGOs. The rationale behind 
such moves and their significance within the broader social and historical context of the state 
and nation (or globe), and material conditions are not considered in such reports, but remain 
important.  
The selection of Utah and Illinois as jurisdictions of focus that represent different 
orientations relevant to the construction of child sex trafficking can also be defended on 
historical, cultural and political grounds. The capital cities of each state, Salt Lake City 
(Utah) and Chicago (Illinois), have each gained national and federal-governmental attention 
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or been identified by NGOs as child sex trafficking “hot spots,” signifying the 
overconcentration of child prostitution in these cities (Shared Hope International 2008; Babb 
2012; Gozdziak and Collett 2005: 111-12). However, the historical, cultural and political 
conditions of each state within which laws are made differ significantly.  
Utah is a socially and politically conservative state, and the most religiously 
homogenous in the US, with approximately 62% of residents belonging to the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (“LDS,” or Mormon Church) (Canham 2012). It is also a 
racially homogenous state, with 91.8% White residents (compared to 77% average in the US), 
and a particularly low percentage of Black residents compared to other minorities in the state, 
and especially compared to the US average (1.3% Black residents in Utah, compared to 
13.1% average across the US) (United States Census Bureau--Utah 2010b). Tyler’s (2005) 
sociological study of race, class and gender in Utah found that problems facing marginalized 
communities in the US are prevalent but magnified in Utah, particularly for African 
American women. She reports the strong presence of a White-masculinist culture and 
institutionalization of a particularly conservative Christian religion that dominates most 
aspects of social, economic and professional life. The frequency and fatal outcomes of 
domestic violence in Utah are alarming, with a birthrate over 40% higher than the national 
average, and Utah women have “the largest percentage of anti-depressant drug usage” in the 
US (Id.: 178). African American women in Utah enjoy an unusual level of professional and 
economic success but only relative to their White women counterparts, and apparently at the 
cost of greater social marginalization than reported in other parts of the country (Id.: 19, 21, 
174-76). Many African Americans in Utah express a need for taking refuge from everyday 
racism through spiritual means (Haight 2002: 78). 
Utah also has “some of the poorest people in the country,” who are numerically White, 
but disproportionately Black (Tyler 2005: 151; Utah Intergenerational Welfare Reform 
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Commission 2014). Utah has played a significant, if understated, role in the construction of 
modern childhood in the US and internationally. Its state political apparatus is well connected 
to its dominant religious institution, the Mormon Church, which is influential in the sphere of 
national politics and international governance on issues of child rights, “family values,” 
gender and sexuality from an American neoconservative perspective. Utah is a central site of 
“Christian Right” political activity promoting the globalization of its values through its main 
institute of higher education, Brigham Young University (BYU) (Buss and Herman 2003). 
The strong presence of a particular church or sect of Christianity may make Utah appear an 
outlier state for purposes of this research, but it may have the advantage of highlighting the 
role of religious politics in the discursive construction of child prostitution along lines of race, 
class, gender and childhood. In the sex trafficking context, the Christian Right is one of the 
key players in constructing the issue in the US and its international policy on the matter 
(Berman 2006). Since Utah is a center for Christian Right political and intellectual activism 
influencing relevant law, it seems an ideal candidate for examining these aspects of influence 
over the legal-discursive construction of child prostitution. Social, ideological and political 
conditions of Utah life and lawmaking such as religiosity and social conservatism remain 
despite shifting ranks on NGO scales, and presumably make a difference for their hostility or 
amenability to, for example, discourses of civil rights, human rights and child rights. 
In stark contrast to Utah, Illinois is much more ethnically and religiously diverse, with 
a higher percentage of racial and ethnic minorities across categories than the national average 
for states (United States Census Bureau--Illinois 2010a). In recent decades, Illinois has been 
characterized as a “blue state,” meaning that the majority of the state’s voters tend to support 
Democrat Party candidates, associated with “liberal” politics (Glanton 2012). Illinois has 
played a direct role in national and international politics, including in the areas of childhood 
and child prostitution, in many ways antithetical to Utah. Along with New York City, the 
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roots of US child protectionism are in Chicago, as prominent figures such as sociologist Jane 
Addams introduced the central tenets of social justice and reform, the foundations of the 
rehabilitative model of juvenile justice, and established the first settlement house (Murrin, 
Johnson et al. 2008; Naveh 1992). The Settlement House movement led the campaign against 
child labor in the US (Novkov 2000), thus playing a key role in defining modern childhood 
and the relationship of the state to the child. The “applied sociology” of Jane Addams’ 
settlement work with immigrants established and professionalized the field of social work 
and influenced development of the post-War sociology of Chicago School symbolic 
interactionism. Illinois is the birthplace of the US juvenile justice system. The first juvenile 
justice court was established in 1899 in Cook County, which seats Chicago (American Bar 
Association (ABA) 2012). Modern sex trafficking law and its historical precursor, the Mann 
Act, are rooted in Chicago as well, discussed further in Chapter 3. Moreover, the first court 
specifically designed for handling prostitution cases was also established in Chicago, in 1932 
(Jabour 2013). These are historical precursors to Illinois’ current Safe Harbor Act for minors 
in prostitution, which has received much positive media attention and even some academic 
accolade (e.g. Lutnick 2016: 84-85) for leadership in taking steps that appear to decriminalize 
minors in prostitution. It was the first state to comply with the generally more protective 
federal standards for sex trafficking victims (Fernandez 2013).  
At the same time, Chicago is also a bellwether for the effects of racialized class 
polarization stemming from Recession-era privatization and gentrification (Lipman and 
Haines 2007). It is home to the University of Chicago, noted for its engineering of aggressive 
neoliberalism (Hall and Midgley 2004), and the city continues to struggle with corruption and 
police violence against marginalized communities (Rogers 2015). The capitals of both Utah 
and Illinois are “hot spot” cities, but the two states are exemplary of what can be deemed the 
oppositional tendencies of “punitive” and “protective” in Anglo-American punishment theory 
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as well as “conservative” and “liberal” tendencies that mark the American political system. 
However, as discussed above, each has a continuum of laws on which minors in prostitution 
can fall, and neither excludes the possibility of their criminalization. Chapter 3 will elaborate 
the implications of these findings and their social and legal contexts. 
Historical Periodization 
Discussions throughout the chapters often draw from and refer to various points in 
history. The historical range of this research includes the Antebellum Era, Gilded Age, 
Progressive Era, Interwar Years/World War II/ Post-War Era, and Late Modern or Neoliberal 
Era. I justify this range and focus on these time periods for several reasons. In my research, 
the earliest case found regarding child prostitution with national impact occurred during the 
antebellum period. Several works identify the Gilded Age as key for establishing a major 
cornerstone regarding modern American childhood, which is the nation-wide elevation of age 
of consent and the establishment of statutory rape law. I particularly rely on the periodization 
offered by Odem (1995), which identifies two influential waves of “White purity reform” that 
occurred during this era, which shifted the blame for child prostitution from adult men toward 
minor girls. Marten’s (2014) Children and Youth during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 
also provides a good resource for periodizing American childhood, demarcating the Gilded 
Age as approximately the decades of 1870-1900, and the Progressive Era from approximately 
1900-1920s, but with the Progressive Era really “percolating” beginning in the late 1880s. 
González (2015) also provides a deeper and more thorough periodization of the Gilded Age, 
with a focus on class inequalities and poverty. Jabour (2013) specifies the interwar period as 
that which spanned between the end of the First World War in 1918 and beginning of World 
War II in 1939, which is under-explored in the prostitution context and deserves far greater 
attention as an interesting period for developments related to the treatment of women and 
girls. Bush (2010) outlines the treatment of American children during World War II and the 
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post-war era, particularly with regard to juvenile delinquency, its racialization and the 
targeting of African American girls for prostitution and STD quarantine. Harvey (2005) and 
Brown (2015) both identify the dawn of neoliberalism as congealing around the Reagan-
Thatcher era, from the 1970s forward, while economic sociologists locate the beginnings of 
late capitalist globalization around the same time (Sklair 2002; Tonkiss 2006). Bay-Cheng 
(2015) identifies a shift in this period regarding cultural perception of girls’ sexuality that 
emphasizes and presumes free choice and personal responsibility, while continuing to subject 
girls to hegemonic sexual mores. 
Legislative debates provide temporally expansive insight into lawmakers’ un/changing 
rationale for passing statutes pertaining to prostitution and sex trafficking, which codify the 
arguments considered successful for the regulation of child prostitution. While legislative 
debates and statutes establish the structure of child prostitution law, cases demonstrate 
particular ways that these are applied to individual minors in prostitution, while also 
changing or reinforcing this structure. In addition to discussing Utah and Illinois, I review 
these developments in the broader US context, for example, through federal legal texts as 
well as cases that originate from particular jurisdictions but become considered national in 
character and legal applicability. 
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CHAPTER 3: Provisional Childhood 
3.1 The Contingencies of Child Protection  
This chapter, on the construction of the child in and through laws related to child sex 
trafficking, examines the issue first through key contemporary legal texts in the states of Utah 
and Illinois, showing the ways in which discourse in recent years has shifted and constructed 
the issue and its subjects differently and similarly in each state. It then connects the 
contemporary to historical legal texts that have contributed to rendering childhood 
provisional in legal discourse related to child sex trafficking, laying the foundation for this 
continuity in the present. Historical texts range from the antebellum period to the present, 
following the basic periodization outlined in Chapter 2.  
I find that while early efforts seemed motivated by child protection against 
commercial-sexual exploitation, these efforts have consistently been compromised through 
racialization, classing and gendering children in ways that adultify those who do not conform 
to normative childhood. The “women and girls” conflation that has been a hallmark of 
prostitution and sex trafficking law is not merely a problem of infantilizing adult women, 
under the pretext of expanding the scope of its “protection,” which has been the focus of 
many feminist theorists, but in many ways a function of adultifying girls, which diminishes 
or denies their victimization by narrowing the class of victims. Yet, by naming them, the law 
brought girls under the same moralistic scrutiny of the state, without offering them any 
unique or heightened protections. This is important to highlight since many feminist analyses 
of sex trafficking take for granted or at face value that the law provides greater (if not its 
greatest) protection to girls, and that society idealizes children. This represents a presumption 
of “chivalry” for girls and children generally that does not bear out in the historical or legal 
record, and which may foster complacency on the issue of child sex trafficking. 
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The adult/child binary is one of at least three key binaries or dualisms structuring 
legal discourse on child trafficking. The legal construction of childhood in general has relied 
on this oppositional dynamic (Grahn-Farley 2003). Though adult and child are commonly 
understood as constructed along lines of age, they have also been constructed as the opposite 
of “citizens” and “political subjects.” Minors are constructed by infantilizing a class of 
persons defined by the age of minority as “children,” and conversely, ascribing “maturity” 
and full citizenship to those of the age of majority, as “adults.” As discussed earlier, the 
associated social-discursive process constructing identities of “child” and “adult” are, 
respectively, infantilization47 and adultifcation.48 These processes have also historically acted 
as more diffuse discursive mechanisms of subordinate and superordinate classification. 
“Subaltern,” “minority,” or “other” groups have been subalternized, minoritized and othered 
through the essentializing attribution of “infantile” or “childish” qualities, requiring 
intervention often constructed as benevolent care. However, where normative childhood is 
marked by infantilization and the need for care and protection, deviant childhood is marked 
by adultification and punishment. The unfolding of these processes in the contexts of 
criminal or juvenile justice, child welfare and punishment complicates these dynamics 
because of the possibility of “adultification” of persons otherwise classified as “children,” 
and the greater probability of this ascription to children of color, including girls, and 
especially for girls in the prostitution context. 
When one looks up the two main types of law constructing the issue of child 
prostitution in the states of Utah and Illinois, what is found is a greater difference in the 
                                                
47 I refer to infantilization as the denial of full citizenship based on lacking the capacity for full political 
subjectivity, which also has ontological implications since it is integral to liberal definitions of “humanness.” It 
also involves the vertical segregation of such a class of persons as in need of protection, but protection that is 
conditional and often fails to materialize. 
48 By adultification I mean the ascription of criminal capacity to minors despite having denied their citizenship 
capacity on the basis of “immaturity.” This condition marks the status of minors in conflict with the law, against 
whom adultification is deployed in order to criminalize them. In the child prostitution context, it can be 
extended to the ascription of sexual, commercial or commercial-sexual capacity to minors in order to achieve 
their criminalization. 
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conceptualization of the child within each state rather than between the two states. Each of 
the state’s criminal codes now has domestic minor sex trafficking (DMST) statutes and has 
retained its prostitution statutes. The concept of DMST emerged on the national level in 
response to criticisms that federal anti-trafficking law was too internationally focused. 
Despite the advent of DMST in legal discourse to deal with children, specifically in the 
domestic context, the more adultifying state-level discourse of prostitution remains available 
and deployable against minors. The child as conceived in the discourse of DMST differs 
markedly from the one produced through prostitution discourse. Yet the two are never 
entirely decoupled from one another. This creates a dynamic in which lawmakers often 
equivocate regarding child prostitution and minors in prostitution and whether they comprise 
distinct categories triggering special protections from the state. This renders childhood 
provisional and child protections conditional in ways that re/produce inequalities and subject 
minors to a condition of criminalized multiplicity. 
3.1.1 Traditionalism and retributivism in Utah 
Utah’s law titled “Human Trafficking of a Child” (UCA 76-5-308.5) and Illinois’ law 
titled “Involuntary Sexual Servitude of a Minor” (720 ILCS 5/10-9(2)(c)) both conceive of 
the child or minor in the context of human trafficking as any person under 18 years of age. 
Illinois, however, more emphatically repeats that “there is no overt force or threat” required 
for the offense—that the child status of the victim alone is enough to amount to this crime. 
This is in line with Illinois’ reputation for pioneering decriminalizing law for commercially-
sexually exploited minors on the state level, and the first to comply with federal child sex 
trafficking requirements to view all minors as victims. Utah only very recently, in 2016, 
seems to have more clearly taken the “force” requirement out of this particular law, to where 
prostitution of a child without overt force is enough to be considered child sex trafficking.  
 94 
However, neither Utah nor Illinois—despite their respective reputations—have been so 
certain about the child in prostitution. While it appears that both are moving toward more 
absolute protections by more clearly defining their beneficiaries as persons under 18, even 
their recent histories have been marked by prevarication. Currently, Utah’s DMST law 
reflects that there is no “force” required for the prostitution of a child to be counted as child 
sex trafficking, which is considered a first-degree felony (UCA 76-10-1313). Yet in its 
prostitution statute, soliciting or patronizing a prostituted child is considered only a third 
degree felony (UCA 76-10-1313; UCA 76-10-1303). In the case of soliciting a child it 
specifies, “…if the solicitation does not amount to human trafficking,” it is only a third 
degree felony.  
The state appears to be drawing a distinction between prostitution and human 
trafficking where the child is concerned. Yet this undermines its own definition. Utah defines 
child sex trafficking as “commercial sexual activity with a child, mean[ing] any sexual act 
with a child, on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person,” 
including patronizing or soliciting a child “for sexual exploitation,” which in turn means “all 
forms of commercial sexual activity with a child, including…prostitution” (UCA 76-5-308.5). 
If all child prostitution is child sex trafficking, like its DMST statute suggests, then why 
contradict this with a higher threshold to reach when it comes to solicitation, which involves 
the same prohibited conduct? These may appear to be technical glitches (or even mistakes). 
On the linguistic level, they do appear easily modifiable and correctable to create greater 
accord across Utah’s penal code and achieve fuller child protection. However, if one 
examines the record, they seem to reflect lawmakers’ equivocation on the issue.  
In Utah’s prostitution statute, “child” is defined in the same way as in its DMST law, as 
a person under 18 (UCA 76-10-1301(1)). Illinois leaves children out of its prostitution law 
entirely (720 ILCS 5/11-14), and while this may appear to be a child-protective move that 
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would avoid the pitfall of Utah’s code, throughout recent history it has simply meant that the 
law applies to children and adults alike (Birckhead 2011; Annitto 2011; Javidan 2003). 
Expanding out to examine other relevant legal texts that provide insight into these laws 
demonstrates that Illinois also equivocates regarding the child in prostitution in similar ways 
to Utah, but that the two states at times differ greatly in the discourses they draw from to 
advance their laws. 
Based on the above, it would seem that Utah is “catching up” to the model state of 
Illinois, and that children are safest from criminalization in Illinois. However, the picture is 
more complicated, particularly the broader one looks across the nexus of laws that comprise 
what can be considered “child prostitution law,” and the debates over them prior to their 
passage. When one goes further to examine them in social and historical context, ever more 
aspects of the issue come to light. Overall, it becomes apparent that child status is provisional. 
On the one hand child status is bestowed; on the other, it is eroded and contingent, and the 
child identity is subject to varying means of infantilization, adultification and childism. 
Whether constructing the child through DMST or prostitution discourse, hegemonic notions 
of children and childhood remain intact, and are re/produced in new ways and contexts. 
Approximately two years preceding Utah’s DMST law, a relatively high profile child 
sex trafficking case was initiated in the state, brought against a relatively young man with a 
Persian name, Arash Alexander Zarif (2006). I elaborate upon this case in the following 
chapter, but it is noteworthy here for the way in which the two teenage girl victims were 
unequivocally referred to in ways that maintained their age, in non-adultifying (and 
remarkably non-infantilizing) terms. They were referred to as “girls” and “minors” 
throughout the judge’s opinion recounting the facts of the case, and because they were treated 
as witnesses rather than criminal wrongdoers, the association of childhood with their young 
age was maintained. This is in contrast to cases in which girls are tried as “delinquents” 
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before a juvenile court for prostitution, where little, if any, difference is accorded between 
them and adult women in prostitution. Thus, although their actions could have theoretically 
amounted to their complicity in the crime of prostitution, its reconceptualization as DMST 
(and the court’s interpretation of Zarif’s recordings of the girls as “child pornography”) 
helped recover their child status.  
Shortly after Zarif received a lengthy sentence in federal prison, and approximately 
eight years after Congress passed comprehensive trafficking law, the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act 2000 (TVPA), Utah passed its own law that made human trafficking a felony 
(UCA 76-5-308). As in many states, Utah’s prostitution and anti-trafficking laws were 
compartmentalized in ways that made them seem unconnected despite their intricacies, 
though Utah recently connected the idea of child prostitution with those of child sex abuse 
and human trafficking.  
However, in 2011 as the state seemed to be making efforts toward adopting its first 
DMST law, the legislature clarified its law-and-order priorities over that of child welfare in 
its prostitution law. In that debate Utah state legislators proposed for this bill to amend the 
state’s sexual solicitation statutes in order to render them gender-neutral. Yet at the same time 
they focused on the removal of prostitutes (including minors) “off the streets,” and the 
protection of police officers to facilitate such arrests (HB 121). The bill’s sponsor, 
Representative Jennifer Seelig (Democrat), made it clear that this was the purpose of the bill, 
acknowledged that many of those whom the law would impact are “underage girls,” and that 
this would be for their own protection.  
Legal analysis of the impact of this law found that it set minors up for arbitrary arrest 
and enforcement, would do nothing to help them since Utah allocates very little resources for 
victims, and would simply help police to make prostitution arrests (see Babb 2012: 286-87, 
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292-93). Based on this alone, it would seem that Utah is at best ambivalent about the status of 
minors in prostitution, using criminalizing language that gives the veneer of protection to the 
(primarily) women and girls targeted. Under these circumstances, the child becomes an 
empty signifier in terms of child protection, and instead, its symbolic function and power are 
harnessed for passing retributivist laws. 
In response to criminalized social problems, law and order discourse and Broken 
Windows theory have consistently emphasized what are tantamount to cosmetic measures of 
removal and “clean up,” on the presumption that increasingly criminalizing measures, 
incarceration and the signaling effect of these are the most efficacious means of deterring 
crime (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999; Javidan 2003). Despite the child protective language 
of laws passed under the banner of “human trafficking,” law-and-order discourse of removing 
minors in prostitution “off the streets,” prioritizing “officer safety” (from the likes of minors 
in prostitution), and applying a punitive framework on a socio-economic problem of 
exploitation subsumes the subjects and their circumstances in tough-on-crime logic.  
The child is swept up and captured in the general criminalizing treatment of 
prostitution. Here, law and society interlock to reinforce their disposability. Two traditional 
ideologies embedded in the subdued criminological theories justifying this law are at work—
the view of prostitution as waste management, and the neoliberal revival of retributivism that 
law-and-order rhetoric represents. Early sociological and criminological theories primarily 
viewed prostitution as biologically determined sexual deviance, and the prostitute as an 
“atavistic” female offender whose “propensity for evil…far surpasses that of criminal men,” 
with a “cranial capacity” below that of “lunatics” (Lombroso and Ferrero 1893, in Sanders, 
O'Neill et al. 2009: 3). Institutional-functionalism, rooted in the Durkheimian notion of crime 
serving a useful function of generating “social solidarity,” viewed prostitution as a necessary 
evil—essentially as waste management for male sexual desire (Davis 1937, in Id.; O'Neill 
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2001: 130-31). This, combined with presumptions of the moral depravity of prostitutes (but 
not male “customers”), has represented the traditional, patriarchal view of persons in 
prostitution. In debating the matter, Utah’s lawmakers made no distinction between adults 
and children, such that any person fitting this profile would be subject to the streamlined 
arrest procedures with which they were primarily concerned. Haney-Lopez (2010) traces the 
political genesis of law-and-order rhetoric as a racial appeal deployed in American political 
discourse, beginning with the civil rights backlash of the late 1960s and popularized in the 
Reagan-Thatcher era. Its modus operandi has been the revival of traditional retributivism, 
encoding “crime” as a racialized buzzword to associate African Americans in particular with 
street crime (see also Woodward 1974). Thus it is noteworthy that this was primarily a bill 
geared toward managing street prostitution.  
Street prostitution in the US has historically (and purposely) been concentrated in poor 
and minority neighborhoods, including in Utah and Illinois, creating particularly strong 
associations with economically marginalized females of color (Nichols 2008; Blair 2010). 
Although sociology of childhood literature points out the desire and hard work of parents in 
these locales to protect their children from prostitution, from a law-and-order enforcement 
perspective, it is a space of child deviance, particularly where minors in prostitution are 
concerned. Given that police officers typically evaluate the age of children of color, 
particularly African American children, to be approximately four years older than their actual 
age (Goff, Jackson et al. 2014: 532), the adultification and presumed non-innocence of girls 
of color in this space would seem an imminent risk.49 “The street” has served as a powerful 
trope linking race, class and urban decay, reified in the “broken windows” imagery of Broken 
                                                
49 The findings of this study were primarily regarding African American boys, and the authors note that the 
race-and-gender intersection pertaining to African American girls might complicate their findings, but also note 
that African American girls represent a growing share of children in the US criminal justice system, (Id.: 540) 
indicating that they are just as much subject to the dynamics of disproportionate minority youth contact 
(DMYC) and its processes of adultification, compounded by the paternalism bias of juvenile justice and 
“delinquency by reason of poverty” (Birckhead 2012). 
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Windows theory (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999). The street overpowers the otherwise 
compelling trope of childhood innocence, such that the child gets lost among “the rabble” 
that such policies target for banishment from public view in the management and control of 
urban space (Stuart 2014). In this compounded framework of waste management, the child is 
not idealized, precious or innocent; rather s/he is the deviant subject burdening the state with 
clean up. The “waste management” functionaries whom persons in prostitution are 
traditionally and historically meant to be, are, in turn, waste-managed by the state and subject 
to legal confinement.  
Since the mid-2000s Utah has created and continually revised its human trafficking law. 
By 2013 it had amended several provisions to add in and more clearly define “child” as 
indicating a distinct category of crimes (UCA 76-5-307(1)). Bringing children into 
increasingly sharper focus, that year the Chief Sponsor of the “Aggravated Human 
Trafficking” bill, Representative Jennifer Seelig, repeatedly referred to “children,” to clarify 
that the law bestows special protections to them by “distinguish[ing] acts involving children 
and [through] additional protection for those victims who, at the time of being trafficked, also 
have sexual offenses committed against them” (HB 163). She explained, “This specific bill 
was brought to me by the Attorney General’s Office. Specific conditions surrounding the 
need for this bill were brought to me by law enforcement.” To convey its authority, Seelig 
explained that she “saw some of this stuff” on a police ride-along, and cited several law 
enforcement and prosecutorial bodies that support the bill. Presumably to authenticate the 
child-centrism of the proposal, Seelig also added that, “these issues have been brought 
forward by a group of young people,” characterized as a “youth-driven organization called 
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Backyard Broadcast,” an “advocacy group to raise awareness and fight against child sex 
trafficking, with presence in 6 Utah high schools.”50  
Seelig reiterated the bill’s intent to distinguish children by discerning child victimhood, 
and to argue that this bestows special protections for them. Yet the child identity in this law is 
distinguished from adults in a rather superficial way in which there appears no difference 
between children and adults other than their physical segregation in the text. The provisions 
of the statute list a series of crimes of physical and sexual violence to denote what makes 
human trafficking “aggravated,” then simply reproduce this list but insert “child” in front of 
each. Looking at the law itself, there appears no reason for this separation, especially since 
the penalties that the law specifies for offenders are the same regardless of whether they are 
perpetrated against adults or children. This suggests the largely symbolic function that the 
placement of “child” serves, in lending the legitimacy of child protective efforts to a law that 
does not readily appear to provide “special” protections to children. It does, however, further 
retributivism through increased penalties overall and the carceral politics that this implies.  
Seelig’s speech also allies law enforcement interests with those of “youth,” by 
identifying youth as those informing her interest in this problem, and suggesting that they 
would advocate for this policy. The “voices of youth” provide strong justification for the 
passage of seemingly child protective policies, yet whether and to what extent this law is 
child protective is unclear. As the following chapter demonstrates further, per retributivism, 
child protection is very often conflated with increased penalization of offenders, and assumed 
to be mutually reinforcing. Utah lawmakers have consistently equated the increase of 
penalties for such crimes as “aggravated human trafficking” with greater or “special” 
protections of children. 
                                                
50 This organization describes itself as an “abolitionist training academy” [http://www.backyardbroadcast.org]. 
The site’s main page states: “We see a future where child sex trafficking is abolished.” Sometime between 2014 
and 2016 this was changed to drop the “child.” 
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At the same time childhood and victimhood also become synonymous. Though the 
criminal context leaves little alternative to this, and is therefore arguably necessary as a 
matter of practicality, it nonetheless has detrimental constructive effects for children. 
Children have routinely exhibited capabilities for maturity, responsibility, wisdom and 
“criminality” far beyond that which is typically associated with them, but they nonetheless 
remain disadvantaged and uniquely constrained by their child status and lack of standing 
(Handel, Cahill et al. 2007: 75; Grahn-Farley 2003). Minors in prostitution may not fit the 
“victim” profile, as many studies have shown that they neither often identify themselves as 
such, nor behave in ways that are normally expected of a stereotypical “victim” (Lutnick 
2016).  
All potential victims of sex trafficking are subject to notions of ideal victimhood (Lee 
2011), of which normative childhood is a key part in the child sex trafficking context. As 
Halter’s (2008; 2010) study shows, children who perform certain behaviors associated with 
victimhood (and childhood, particularly girlhood) are more likely to be categorized as victims, 
but those whose behavior and attitudes do not conform to this are more likely to be treated as 
offenders. A minor in prostitution who is trying to “get by,” may appear economically or 
sexually “agentic” compared to most other children, and particularly “bad” considering the 
multiple violations of law and normativity s/he is likely to be associated with. Although 
DMST law appears to unburden children by rendering them victims, the compounded 
jeopardy of performing normative victimhood strongly linked to normative 
childhood/girlhood are problematic for minors in prostitution whose looks, behavior and 
“attitudes” are likely to disqualify them from the status of “child,” and therefore “victim.” 
The combination of conflating “victim” and “child” status, deterrence-oriented retributivism, 
and lack of resources for children, particularly commercially-sexually exploited children, in 
Utah suggests that child protection is understood as more of a negative concept—deterring 
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pathological adults from preying on children—rather than a positive one of child 
empowerment through strengthening the social, economic, civil and political standing of 
children in society. 
In 2015 Utah lawmakers turned to child migrants. It addressed the issue of 
“aggravated human smuggling” in its recently enacted human trafficking statute, wherein the 
person smuggled is “a child not accompanied by a family member who is 18 years of age or 
older” (UCA 76-5-310). This relates specifically to those who “are not…citizens of the 
United States; permanent resident aliens; or otherwise lawfully in this state or entitled to be in 
this state.” The timing of its passage coincides with heightened public consciousness in the 
US regarding the “influx” of child migrants from Central America across the southwest 
border (Kennedy 2014), which is somewhat proximal to Utah. The punishment for the crime 
of child smuggling, a second-degree felony, is one degree less than that reserved for 
aggravated human trafficking (UCA 76-5-310). “Smuggling” and “trafficking” can serve as 
racial, ethnic and nationality-based demarcations in the law without directly invoking these 
terms or ideas. Smuggling is typically distinguished from trafficking by pointing out that 
smuggling is done voluntarily. This law appears to negate the voluntariness of smuggling 
where child migrants are concerned. However, the current wave of child migrants primarily 
comprises those escaping impossible circumstances of violence in their countries of origin 
(Id.).  
Although “voluntary” does not capture the dire conditions prompting such perilous 
journeys, the will to cross international borders toward relative safety, even illegally, is 
arguably purposeful, such that the punishment of smugglers for assisting unaccompanied 
children attempting such a feat does not directly translate to child protection. Based on the 
law alone, the primary way in which Utah statutes related to DMST distinguish child from 
adult are by designating “aggravated” status to crimes involving children, and thereby 
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increasing penalties for [adult] offenders. Relatedly, the legislature does not discuss child 
trafficking for forced labor at all anywhere in its debates, even though it is included in the 
definition of child trafficking—“for sexual exploitation or forced labor” (UCA 76-5-308.5(2), 
emphasis added). If the Utah legislature were interested in child protection for migrant 
children, they might address this issue since, among children, migrant (and runaway) children 
are the most likely victims of forced labor in the US (Buckley 2016: 116). 
At the same time, and perhaps more positively, Utah also eliminated the defense of 
“mistake of age” when a child is the subject of human trafficking, including for “exploiting 
prostitution” (HB 163). This means that the law holds adults “strictly liable” regardless of 
whether they claim to have mistaken the child for being an adult. It reifies the importance of 
child status to child protection more so than levels of punishment for offenders. One 
amendment also incorporated child sexual abuse and child prostitution into the definitions of 
human trafficking. Making connections among these crimes against children is a fairly recent 
development in legal discourse, for which second wave feminists had previously advocated, 
but which only very recently have made it into legal and scholarly/professional definitions 
(Beckett 1996: 59).  
A year later, a distinct concept of DMST emerged in Utah. A new crime of “human 
trafficking of a child” went into effect in 2016, making it a first-degree felony (UCA 76-5-
308.5). Since the development of Utah’s own human trafficking laws and their refinement 
over the last decade or so, and the emergence of its own state-level codification of child sex 
trafficking, it appears that “child” is becoming a code for justifying greater retributivism in 
the law. Again, this does not necessarily translate to greater protection of minors, particularly 
given the continuation of law-and-order techniques of arrest and detention, to which children 
remain subject. Even though the Legislature makes every effort to compartmentalize children 
from adults in puzzling ways, it sweeps them up alongside adults off the streets without the 
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resources necessary to “rehabilitate” them. It is in these ways that the adult/child dualism is 
selectively deployed in the law, to lay the foundation for the criminalization of children who 
are otherwise clearly marked as victims of exploitation—if we accept empirical juvenile 
justice research that arrest and detention are criminalizing rather than “for their own good.” 
A distinguishing feature of Utahn discourse is that, unlike in Illinois, below, the 
discourse of human rights is largely absent from Utah’s debates. Where civil rights are 
brought up in the prostitution context, they are referred to in profoundly hostile terms. Utah’s 
leadership in the conservative Christian “pro-family” and anti-child-rights movement helps 
explain this opposition. As discussed in Chapter 2, Utah has been a central site of institutional 
activity promoting the globalization of neoconservative “American family values.” In its 
main institute of higher education, the Mormon school Brigham Young University (BYU), 
this activity conducts through in-house institutes such as the World Family Policy Center 
(WFPC), and increasingly through the UN system, particularly with regard to the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).  
Richard G. Wilkins—the late professor of law at BYU’s Reuben Clark School of Law, 
and former missionary and managing director of WFPC at the school—consolidated the 
neoconservative, Christian Right position on the CRC in a law review article titled “Why the 
United States Should Not Ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child.” This article was 
drafted and presented as part of a symposium on the protection of children’s rights in 
international law and US participation in the CRC (Wilkins 2003; see Appendix: Primary 
Sources). It is perhaps one of the most telling legal texts regarding the construction of 
children in Utah’s influential institutions for legal pedagogy, but with broader national and 
American-cultural significance. Since habitus of the speaker is important to the critical 
analysis of legal discourse, foregrounding this political background helps understand Utah’s 
dominant views regarding children and childhood. The profiles of most legislators during the 
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course of transcribing debates for this research showed that they attended Brigham Young, 
usually the law school, prior to their lawmaking/political careers, overlapping in time with 
Wilkins’ influence.51 Brigham Young is unique from typical American universities since it 
requires missionary work as part of its curriculum, which represents its religious character. 
Wilkins’ article provides a strong and far-reaching example of the cultural stories that 
circulate in legal circles of the state, and nationally. In a particularly comical twist regarding 
speaker habitus, Wilkins played the role of Ebenezer Scrooge—a miserly curmudgeon with 
no sympathy for suffering children—in Charles Dickens’ A Christmas Carol for 27 
consecutive years up until his death, and for this was dubbed “the steadfast scrooge” in the 
Salt Lake Tribune (Fulton 2012). 
Wilkins, et al. claim that child rights “comes squarely into conflict with traditional 
American notions of family and family law” (Wilkins 2003, in Grahn-Farley 2011: 314). The 
veracity of this statement is at best dubious because many of the notions undergirding the 
CRC originated in the US over several decades of the twentieth century (Grahn-Farley 2013; 
Grahn-Farley 2011). However, since the US has refused to ratify the CRC, Wilkins’ claim 
does represent the politically dominant American position on the otherwise near-universally 
ratified treaty. Although George W. Bush took up anti-sex trafficking as one of his most 
vociferous platforms (Berman 2006), his administration adopted Wilkins’ position on 
children (Grahn-Farley 2011: 314).  
Reading the article itself, the authors include an entire section dedicated to persuading 
Americans of “the dangers of the autonomous child,” in which they state, “Children are not 
autonomous. They are, by definition, ‘immature’—socially, mentally, emotionally, and 
physically” (p. 417). They argue that preventing children from activities such as voting and 
                                                
51 The website of the Utah Legislature has undergone some changes over the years, with diminishing link 
integrity for many of the sites previously available. Profiles of legislators could generally be found (up to about 
2014) on the state Legislature’s official website [http://le.utah.gov/Documents/find.htm]. 
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entering contracts (along with viewing pornography, driving, smoking, drinking and shooting 
guns) are to protect children and others “from the consequences of their immaturity,” and that 
adults do not impose these “deprivations” out of “arrogance or cruelty, but from wisdom” 
(Id.). The arguments laid out in the article read as a treatise of politically and socially 
conservative US views regarding children. Interestingly, they invoke the immaturity of 
children, and imply the same of the rest of the world’s nation-states that ratified the CRC 
(which were all but Somalia), by arguing that the speed and near universality of its 
ratification should be interpreted as the importance of children to the world, but not “careful 
consideration of probable consequences of implementing” it (p. 418).  
The arguments of Wilkins, et al. mirror legal discourse on state and federal levels 
regarding CSEC. They “applaud” the provisions that “protect children from those who would 
exploit their vulnerability.” Though this reasserts the traditional, chivalrous adult/child 
relation, it renders child protection conditional on deprivation of child rights. “We cannot 
admire those treaty provisions—notably the ‘civil rights’ provisions, articles 13-16, that 
appear to move away from protecting children and toward granting children greater ability to 
make decisions traditionally reserved for adults” (Id.). Fundamentally, the authors claim that 
civil rights provisions related to children in the US oppose “a tradition of legal jurisprudence 
that severely limits the state’s ability to intrude upon the family” (Id.). This is based on 
parent-child relations that are said to predate the state “just as natural individual rights 
antedate the state in the Constitution’s political theory” (Id.). The authors argue that 
protecting children from “exploitation of their inexperience and incapacity” accords with the 
US legal tradition, and civil rights for children would alter US legal tradition (Id.). They 
characterize this as “ensuring that children have an enforceable ‘right to be left alone,’ free 
from parental interference in their choices” (Id.). Further, the authors advance the 
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paternalistic argument that American legal tradition underwrites not only the need to protect 
children from abuse and neglect but “to protect children from themselves” (Id.: 419). 
Here, child autonomy is considered more dangerous than the conditions that children 
endure as a result of their child status. Of course “the danger of child autonomy” does not 
explain rampant child abuse by adults in the US, which has the highest rate of child abuse of 
any country (Young-Bruehl 2012: 2). Underlying Wilkins’ traditionalism is the revival of a 
puritanical view of the child in recent decades that both describes children as having too 
much power as it is, as well as prescribes curbing the dangerous powers that they might 
otherwise usurp (Giroux 2003: xiv). These ideas survive in the childrearing ideologies and 
broader visions of society espoused by the Evangelical Christian voting bloc (Blumenthal 
2009). 
What has marked the neoconservative “pro-family” position is a political commitment 
to anti-feminism and anti-LGBT-ism. This position emerged from conservative alarm at civil 
rights movements in the 1960s-70s and the discursive (“semantic”) transformations that these 
movements entailed, particularly gay rights and feminism. They argued that these movements 
were “anti-family” for their alleged role in dissolving the heteronormative nuclear family and 
putting “normalcy on the defensive” (Buss and Herman 2003: 4). The anti-family argument 
has most recently indicted the CRC for its perceived threat to traditional American family 
values.  
Given that the same political forces brought law-and-order ideology into being, it is 
unsurprising that Utahn legislators conflate child protection with offender punishment. 
Blumenthal (2009) explains that harsh childrearing techniques espoused by leading figures of 
the Moral Majority—popular among Evangelicals across the US—are directly linked to the 
law-and-order vision of society that they espouse politically, which represents the 
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retrenchment of minority subordination generally. The child in need of harsh discipline to 
break his or her obstinate will is both figurative and literal in these political positions. The 
CRC specifically attempts to break with the traditional view of children as paternal chattel or 
parental property, and this renders the idea of child rights a threat of Social Darwinian (“Lord 
of the Flies”) magnitude (Grahn-Farley 2003; Giroux 2003). Indeed, childrearing ideology is 
strongly related to broader political vision, connecting the private and public spheres. 
Parenting values that can be described as “disciplinarian” (emphasizing child obedience and 
competition) or “nurturant” (prioritizing empathy, responsibility and cooperation), are 
respectively, fairly reliable indicators of “conservative” (even authoritarian) or “liberal” 
political affiliation in the US (Barker and Tinnick 2006).  
Despite the intricacies of the legislative process and the unprecedented popularity of 
the CRC, Wilkins, et al.’s line of argument infantilizes nations who favor child rights, as not 
having carefully considered the implications of officiating children as rights-bearing subjects. 
They are discredited through the misconstruction that child rights means giving children “the 
right to be left alone,” i.e. sidelining parents, when the child’s family is actually an integral 
part of the child rights regime (Grahn-Farley 2011). This effectively elevates the US in its 
level of maturity and good counsel above the rest, except its only co-rejecter, Somalia.  
In accord with the dominant American political position on the matters of child rights 
and commercial-sexual exploitation, neo-conservatism does not support human rights or civil 
rights for children, but acclaims protecting children from predators, premised upon their 
innate vulnerability. This preserves the traditional adult-child relationship of the original 
social/sexual contract in which the status of women and children is marked by dependency 
and chattelization, justifying the paternalism of benevolent discipline (“for your own good”). 
Hence Wilkins invokes relationships that “antedate the state” (parent-child relations and 
“natural individual rights”) in the political theory of the US Constitution, referring to social 
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contract theory. As Pateman (1988) would argue, this reasserts the original terms of the 
sexual contract as well.  
It also adopts an essentialized notion of children and vulnerability. Like the status of 
the child and dominant ideologies projected onto children, “vulnerability” is socially and 
legally constructed. The word “child” has come to imply and signify vulnerability (Moore 
2006: 77) as well as victimhood, based on a social identity defined through certain presumed 
“lacks,” but which are not the result of “nature”; rather, they are the result of “harmful 
exclusion from human, organizational, or economic resources” (Grahn-Farley 2003: 867). In 
such thinking vulnerability is used in both a descriptive and normative sense toward children, 
i.e. to describe how children are and how they ought to be, based on essentialist social and 
legal presumptions that children are immature and lack capacity. They are presumed 
incapable of handling freedom and responsibility until reaching the age of majority, which 
can vary greatly from state to state, demonstrating concretely the legal contingency of what is 
supposedly “natural.” In contrast, adults are presumed “capable” simply by virtue of reaching 
the age of majority.  
The burden of proof (of maturity) is what marks the difference between adult and 
child status in their hegemonic formulation. Children are presumed immature unless they 
prove otherwise, through the process of “emancipation,” a term that invokes being freed from 
the condition of enslavement.52 Adults are presumed mature unless courts and/or medical 
professionals determine otherwise. The vulnerability associated with children as a group 
stems from relative disparity in power between children and adults—measured by 
proportionality of resources—rather than “nature.” Hegemonic relations—of which 
                                                
52 Both Utah and Illinois provide for the emancipation of “mature minors,” which allows them to enter contracts, 
sue or be sued, be held liable for torts, and so on, but which maintains their juvenile status for purposes of 
criminal justice. Utah’s code specifies, however, that they cannot vote, smoke, drink alcohol, or possess tobacco 
or firearms until reaching age of majority (750 ILCS 30, “Emancipation of Minors Act”; UCA 78A-6-803, 
“Petition for emancipation”). 
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childhood/adulthood is an important, foundational dimension—construct the social and legal 
identity of the child as vulnerable and bring about this vulnerability (Grahn-Farley 2002, 
2003). The “reality” of children’s vulnerability is reified precisely through practices and 
policies based, for instance, on a fear of child rights and the ways in which this might elevate 
the social conditions or status of children.  
Moreover, a sociological view of childhood demonstrates its historical contingency—
the ways in which children’s roles and status have changed dramatically over the centuries 
and have been contingent upon race, class, gender and nation. As Woodhouse (2008) 
effectively demonstrates, child labor has historically built the US, including the rural 
homesteads that Christian evangelicals in particular have romanticized since the advent of 
urban industrialization. Wilkins’ position illustrates Harris’ (1990; 2003) observation that 
subaltern identities are “responsibilized” and liable but denied political subjectivity, even 
though, as Wilkins’ own article demonstrates, childhood is a political category and politically 
embattled construct, demonstrably in the US. Thus the adult/child binary is maintained 
through “traditional roles,” which readily promise to protect children from exploitation, but 
which stop short of allowing a fundamental alteration of normative social roles dictating adult 
supremacy and child subordination. 
Wilkins’ treatise against child rights is an authoritative and culturally productive legal 
text that reproduces the inequities and vulnerabilities marking childhood, while applauding 
child protectionism from exploitation. It not only reproduces childhood inequities, but race, 
class, gender and childhood are mutually implicated, as child rights and civil rights are both 
the targets of neo-conservative politics. Arguments that conservatives have historically made 
with regard to “states’ rights” to prevent federal interference in local practices, including 
lynching and child labor (Novkov 2000), are analogous and closely related to the denial of 
civil rights to children on grounds of state interference in the family. As a representation of 
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Utahn neo-conservatism in an international legal forum, Wilkins’ treatise against child rights 
is a text with local and global reach to reinforce a traditionalist ideology of childhood.  
The issue of children’s “voice” becomes salient again when Wilkins invokes the 
paternalism of his anti-child-rights argument for the need “to protect children from 
themselves.” Recalling Seelig’s speech to persuade the Legislature to enhance penalties for 
aggravated human trafficking, the supportive “voice” of the abolitionist youth group was 
apparently authoritative enough on an important issue pertaining to children, and received 
recognition because it was useful in passing the law. It is difficult to reconcile the general 
distrust of children’s political ability in the conservative view against child rights with the 
presence and vocalization of, for instance, an authoritative youth group meant to authenticate 
and legitimize child protective legislation in Wilkins’ state Legislature. This could only 
suggest that so long as children articulate a viewpoint bolstering adult political objectives, 
their voices are validated, which relegates them to a utilitarian role in service of adults, and 
hence reifies their traditional place.  
This utilitarianism translates into the reality of “aggravated human trafficking” cases 
in the state and the treatment of minors implicated in them. In various cases developing out of 
Utah over the course of this research, despite the development of a DMST discourse there at 
the same time, it became clear that the criminalization of minors continues. For example, in 
the case of Haley (2013) a 17 year-old African American girl was arrested in St. George, 
Utah during a prostitution sting involving the US Department of Homeland Security. She was 
reported as “being investigated for sexual solicitation and violating business and professional 
licensing requirements in connection with allegations adult men are patronizing prostitutes in 
the area” (The Associated Press 2014; Flynn 2013; Demasters 2013). Haley demonstrates that 
although the case is brought for “aggravated human trafficking” and police reported that they 
determined her to be a victim, the minor in prostitution was nonetheless criminalized in the 
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process. She was arrested and used to bait others, namely an African American man and 
woman, respectively 30 and 20 years old, for child endangerment charges, among others. The 
20 year-old woman, Uhrhan, had herself been groomed into prostitution as a minor, (Website 
of St. George News) but this was rendered irrelevant because she had passed the age of 
minority. The 17 year-old girl was rendered a child for purposes of bringing “aggravated” 
charges, but a “prostitute” for the purposes of arrest, demonstrating the pliability of the child 
identity in service of prosecutorial imperatives. It is also remarkable that in a state with such 
an outstandingly low percentage of African Americans and people of color generally, the 
most publicized cases of sex trafficking in the state so often involve persons of color (see 
Reavy and Yi 2014, Scott 2015, Gardiner 2015, Ortiz, Winslow 2015, in Appendix A).  
3.1.2 Human rights versus “the oldest form of work” in Illinois  
In 2005, preceding Illinois’ much celebrated Safe Children Act (2010), a legislative 
debate took place regarding civil damages for forcing persons into prostitution (the “Predator 
Accountability Act,” HB 1299). The debate demonstrates a profound difference in the 
conceptualization of the problem between Illinois and Utah. The Representative from Illinois 
(Rep. Howard) introduced the bill by invoking human rights law, and explained that it 
disproportionately “affects women and children, particularly women of color.”  
The United Nations Convention of December 2, 1949, proclaimed that prostitution 
and sex trafficking are incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human person 
and endanger the welfare of the individual, the family, and the community. Sex trade 
activities and sex trafficking are supported by inequality and oppression based on 
gender, race, socio-economic status, sexual orientation, and age. 
Rep. Howard even acknowledged that “Men are also trafficked and exploited in the sex trade,” 
which is an issue not often addressed in legislatures. Children are referenced in conjunction 
with women, or as “women and girls,” but Howard also mentions conditions specific to 
children. “Often, individuals enter sex trade-related activities prior to age 18, are homeless or 
runaways, victims of childhood sexual, physical, and emotional abuse or have mental health 
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or substance abuse issues.” Adults are also included in this explanation, as victims of 
violence and abuse through the sex trade.  
Howard continues to cite research and its findings on the topic related to trauma and 
personal histories of victims. The citation of empirical research—as opposed to citing the 
support of law enforcement and Christian youth groups—is another profound difference 
between Illinois and Utah legislative debates on child prostitution, with the exception of 
Representative Seelig citing the commonly circulated (often critiqued as outdated) Estes 
(2001) study, that “up to 100,000 children [are] being exploited every year in America.” 
Howard also mentions the fact that pimps and traffickers are rarely held accountable, that 
“less than 1 percent of all prostitution-related arrests are for pimps or panderers,” which has 
long been a cause of disproportionate arrests of persons in prostitution, primarily females.  
After all this, one of her peers, Representative Bailey, retorts with, “I’m gonna try to 
phrase this as nicely as I can. Prostitution is the oldest form of work since the beginning of 
time.” Bailey states this as a preface to argue that prostitutes choose their “work,” and that 
pimps are those who retrieve prostitutes from jail when they are arrested and take care of 
them when they are sick. Although Representative Howard counters this by pointing out that 
the legislation is intended to assist persons forced into prostitution, the rest of the debate 
completely disregards child prostitution by presuming the [consenting] adult woman, 
addressing only the issue of coercion and choice, and sidelining the legal impossibility of 
minors’ consent to prostitution, which is codified in Illinois’ own criminal code. Though 
Bailey’s argument was ultimately defeated, this demonstrates the circulation of traditionalist 
arguments in the Illinois Legislature.  
Illinois’ construction of the issue of child sex trafficking differs markedly from Utah 
by virtue of its framing in human rights language. The words inequality, oppression, gender, 
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race, socio-economic status and sexual orientation are remarkably absent from the legal 
discourse of Utah, perhaps par for the course in its general hostility toward the ideas of civil 
and child rights. It is noteworthy, however, that Howard cited the 1949 Convention, but not 
the UNCRC. Even though “women and children” are the topic of her speech, child rights 
never figures into it. This is likely because the language of child rights is unavailable to her 
because the US has rejected the UNCRC as the law of the land—as a result of the 
consolidated neoconservative attack against it that Wilkins’ article encapsulates. In these 
ways the discourse of other states and their spheres of influence are not confined to the 
borders of their own jurisdiction, but like laws and cases that are (or become) nationally 
applicable, they become nationally authoritative and sometimes have international impact.  
It is perhaps more surprising that Howard also chose not to invoke the Optional 
Protocol regarding CSEC, which the US has adopted, and which most directly pertains to 
child sex trafficking in the context of international law. This provides child-specific, 
international-legal language for argumentation regarding CSEC. On the other hand, 
Howard’s citation of empirical studies that are specific to the commercially-sexually 
exploited child re-center the focus on the particularities of child sex trafficking. The facts she 
cites accord with current social-scientific and other studies of child prostitution across 
disciplines. Empirical research supports her statement that in the US persons in prostitution 
often enter under the age of 18, are homeless or runaways, victims of childhood abuse, 
struggle with mental health or substance abuse issues and/or personal histories of trauma 
(Grace, Starck et al. 2012; Curtis, Terry et al. 2008; Schepel 2011; Butler 2015; Birckhead 
2011; Halter 2008, 2010; Klain 1999; Lolai 2015). This is important for a critical analysis of 
legal discourse because Howard’s reliance on empirically verifiable data avoids the use of 
“political fictions” or problematic cultural stories to persuade the Legislature, such as the 
innate vulnerabilities of children or the perils of child autonomy.  
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At the same time this line of argument avoids going further, to a more structural 
understanding of the problem of child sex trafficking. The disparate impact that 
Representative Howard refers to can be seen as the patterned symptoms of deeper underlying 
inequities in American society, which, if unaddressed, leave the impression that these 
children are simply the victims of dysfunctional or pathological families. Poverty, 
particularly child poverty, is critical to discussions of child prostitution even if in the US the 
household or familial background of many or most girls who enter prostitution is considered 
“middle class” (Lamb 2001). Even when this is the case, the immediate circumstances in 
which children live in the street or illicit economy likely qualify as child poverty, broadly 
defined as children living in poverty. Poverty is a contested concept due to ongoing efforts to 
devise a universal, globally applicable standard for measuring it. There is no internationally 
accepted definition of poverty as of yet. In addition to “absolute poverty”—insufficient 
income for subsistence and essential services—a “relative deprivation” approach to child 
poverty includes insufficient income for social participation, to reflect the historically 
specific but increasingly globalized conditions, standards and expectations of consumerist 
societies such as the US and UK (Townsend 1993, 2004).  
In the US, “underclass” status or child poverty are measured as falling below the 
“low-income” or “near-poor” thresholds, which means that a person has at his or her disposal 
less than approximately $12,000 income per year (Handel, Cahill et al. 2007: 259; National 
Center for Children in Poverty 2016). Since the vast majority of minors in prostitution have 
reported being “very poor” or “just making it”—having broken away from their households, 
taken up temporary residence in shelters or with someone potentially or actually exploitive, 
and/or engaging in “survival sex” (Silbert and Pines 1982)—the material conditions 
associated with their immediate circumstances would seem paramount.  
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Recognition of the economic class structure of the problem would point to the status 
and conditions specific to American children and childhood, which are particularly dire 
compared to other Western democracies, and which imperil American children to various 
types of exploitation. The largest and fastest-growing portion of the US homeless population 
is children—an astounding 40% (1.4 million) are children—with an average age of just 9 
years (Giroux 2003: xviii; 117). In 2003 greater than 13.3 million children lived in poverty 
(about 1 in 6 children), with 20% of children being poor during the first 3 years of life (Id.: 
xviii). After the economic crisis beginning 2008, this rose to 1 in 5 children (Javidan 2012: 
368). 9.2 million children lacked health insurance, 90% of whom were in families with 
working parents, and millions lack affordable child care and decent early childhood education 
(Giroux 2003: 117). Among OECD nations, US child poverty rates are on par with Mexico 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2016), and, globally, the US 
ranks twelfth on this scale (Giroux 2003: xviii). In many states, there is greater investment in 
prison construction than education (Id.). 
The American market-oriented society and its disdain for resource reallocation 
uniquely impacts children, including aversion to social welfare programs, which are largely 
means-tested, and cover only “the truly impoverished” (Corsaro 2015: 311). Overall, among 
industrial nations, countries such as the US that have high levels of overall inequality have 
higher child poverty rates (Id.: 311-12). Increased child poverty is to be expected with deep 
cuts to social spending and austerity regimes (Id.: 312). This is a trend duly noticed in the 
previous decade and understood as conditions known to exacerbate child prostitution (Martin 
2002, in Fudge and Cossman 2002). The US is unlikely to face its increasing child poverty 
rate, given “growing concern about the budget deficit, opposition to higher taxes, skepticism 
about welfare policy, and the political power of the elderly,” who enjoy more than double the 
amount of resources allocated to them for social welfare than children do (Corsaro 2015: 
 117 
314). Research on the economic well-being of children reveals that the US is uniquely 
difficult for poor families and children, and is simply not as commited to their well-being 
(Id.). The US has ranked first in military expenditures, the number of millionaires and 
billionaires (indicating concentration of wealth), and eighteenth globally in the gap between 
rich and poor children (indicating class polarization of childhood) (Giroux 2003: xviii).  
Representative Howard specifically mentioned women and girls, and commendably 
pointed out the disproportionality of the impact of commercial-sexual exploitation on women 
of color, as the statistics in Chapter 1 confirm. I say that this is commendable because at the 
beginning of this research project a few years ago, it was very difficult to verify the 
demographics of CSEC in the US, particularly with regard to race, and it has taken years of 
monitoring and compiling statistics to be able to say with certainty that it is a problem 
disproportionately impacting females of color. Howard’s bringing this matter in relief and to 
the attention of the Legislature should be recognized as an important point of progress on 
understanding the matter. At the same time, it also points to the need to understand that the 
processes of economic marginalization discussed above interact with 
race/ethnicity/nationality, gender and childhood, that class polarization is increasingly 
racially polarized in the US, particularly since the Great Recession, and that child poverty 
and immobility are amplified for children of color, particularly girls (Harper 2013; Cicchino 
1996).  
These are points of political discourse around which socio-economic and civil, 
political and criminal justice for children must bear out, they merit attention in legal 
discourse related to children that appears concerned with the conditions exposing them to 
commercial-sexual exploitation and criminalization. The articulation of concern regarding 
underlying conditions of child sex trafficking—notwithstanding its in/adequacy—is a point 
of major distinction between the discourse of Illinois and Utah. However, discussion of the 
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problematic role of criminal justice and law enforcement is largely omitted from the debates 
of Utah as well as Illinois. In the lawmaking process, these are treated as unproblematic and 
taken for granted with regard to the management of CSEC, whereas the next chapter 
discusses their role in the reproduction of inequalities and criminalization of children in the 
child sex trafficking context.  
Rep. Howard importantly raised the problem of impunity for pimps and panderers 
(though not “customers”), but did not mention that this contributes to disproportionate female 
criminalization. This would have provided support for her argument in favor of a law aimed 
at restitution for persons forced into prostitution, since it would show that not only do the 
perpetrators enjoy impunity, but the victims are bearing its greatest costs. It should also be 
noted that the UNCRC and child rights discourse regarding CSEC generally cover many of 
these issues, and would provide a more robust framework with international legitimacy which 
to discuss the issue and its conditions or contributing factors.   
In stark contrast to Rep. Howard’s presentation of the issue and its subjects, Rep. 
Bailey’s interjection into her discussion of sex trafficking—specifically forced prostitution—
its detrimental impact, and disparate impact on females of color, has a leveling effect over 
these issues by rendering “prostitution” a matter of choice and inevitability. Bailey derailed 
Howard’s argument by making it about voluntary prostitution, using neoliberal notions of 
“choice” as well as a peculiar claim about the benevolent care of pimps for prostitutes. Since 
the debate is regarding a law allowing for persons forced into prostitution to sue perpetrators 
for civil damages caused by this harm, Bailey’s is a disconcerting objection. Though this 
derailment has the effect of eradicating children from the discussion, Howard made girls as 
much the subjects of this law as women by invoking “women and girls.” Bailey’s interjection 
of prostitution-by-choice adultifies the “girls” by subsuming them in the discourse of 
voluntary prostitution. The conflation of adult/child, woman/girl serves to collapse any 
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distinction for purposes of denying the child status of children and the need for restitution. 
Moreover, as mentioned above, the law of  “emancipation” of minors defines the status of 
children through their exclusion from entering contracts. When prostitution is understood in 
its traditional sense—as a chosen “profession”—per Bailey’s speech, it implicitly becomes a 
matter of freedom of contract—selling sex willingly to further one’s own self interest. By 
including girls in the discourse of adult prostitution, Bailey at once denies the victimization 
of women, while denying the victimization and childhood of girls. Thus, Bailey’s interjection 
is derailment rather than a genuine enquiry, evidenced further in his claiming “choice” when 
Howard specifically meant to address “forced prostitution.” 
Bailey’s statement that “Prostitution is the oldest form of work from the beginning of 
time” conveys the inevitability of women and girls selling sex, and implicitly the “naturalness” 
of this condition for females. It has the effect of rendering efforts to address prostitution futile. 
This follows precisely the same reifying logic of claiming that children are naturally 
vulnerable, while arguing against child rights that aim to empower them out of a permanent 
state of vulnerability. If prostitution is “inevitable,” then objection to efforts of eradicating its 
harms serves as a self-fulfilling prophecy that only ensures the continuation of those harms. 
Bailey’s objection was made to a proposal drawing from a social justice and human rights 
perspective on the issue. Apart from the benevolent characterization of pimps, the idea that 
prostitution is the world’s oldest “profession” can be viewed as a myth and particularly 
tenacious “problematic cultural story” circulated in legal culture to further similar other 
problematic myths. For instance, there is a more compelling but far less articulated claim 
rooted in feminist epistemology and practice that midwifery is actually “the world’s oldest 
profession” (Ulrich 2004). In this dynamic Bailey deemed Howard’s empirically based 
argument unpersuasive yet he offered the political fiction of inevitability as a means of 
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overpowering it based on gendered “common sense” that has become part of Western (and 
globalized) folk wisdom (Shifman 2003: 131).  
Attending to the habitus of the speakers, their gender, as well as the interests that the 
two representatives in dialogue represent becomes important. Howard is a woman arguing for 
the restitution of women and girls, particularly of females of color, for being forced into 
prostitution. Given the casualness of Bailey’s interjection in an otherwise carefully crafted 
speech based upon principles of international law, contemporary American vernacular may 
help identify the dynamics at work here. The word “mansplaining” is a portmanteau of “man” 
and “explaining,” which means disruption and derailment in speech that is specifically a 
patronizing, gendered act whereby a male intends to “school” a female who is implicitly 
naïve. This term has been extended beyond the gender context into race relations and politics 
generally such that the actual gender of the speaker does not necessarily need to comport with 
the male-to-female speech dynamic, but a person representing a hegemonic or dominant 
value position may “mansplain” to another person whom they view in such a way (Reagle 
2016; Carson 2013). The foundational process of this dynamic can be explained as involving 
the infantilization of another.  
Overall the interest that Bailey serves is to reinforce traditionalism regarding 
prostitution—which had little regard for the “promiscuous” or “unchaste” woman or child—
by echoing the voices of theorists past who argued that prostitution was a “safety valve” for 
sexual waste management to help uphold marital respectability. Put differently, prostitution 
upholds the sexual contract so foundational to the inequities of the social contract, and which 
subsumes women and children alike in the private sphere of masculine control (Pateman 
1988). The argument of benevolent paternalism has been deployed to not only uphold notions 
of the sexual contract, but the racial contract as well (Mills 1997). The defense of pimps as 
rescuers of prostitutes from jails and their caretakers during illness is not only unsupported by 
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empirical studies, but bears remarkable resemblance to defenses of chattel slavery, 
justifications for which were based on similar notions of protectionism by a male figure with 
far greater power, but one who uses his power to advance the interests of the child-like 
beneficiary (Woodhouse 2008: 69-70). Studies show that although the behavior of pimps may 
appear “benevolent,” such as in the role of “boyfriend” or “daddy,” their role is largely 
manipulative, “managerial,” and most often abusive (Brannigan and Van Brunschot 1997: 
348; Carter and Giobbe 1999: 44-47, 50-56). As one illustrative example, in a US case of a 
girl in prostitution infected with HIV, her pimp forced her back on the street relentlessly 
despite her horribly deteriorating health (Bales 2009: 89). In this way, Bailey’s speech 
represents the re-contextualization of one of the key machinations of pro-slavery apologia (or 
anti-abolitionist ones) in the contemporary defense of prostitution.  
Though Bailey’s speech was ultimately unpersuasive to his peers, what it 
demonstrates is that traditionalism and its particular means of reproducing inequalities and 
penalizing commercially-sexually exploited children circulate beyond more reputedly 
conservative geographies in the American South or Southwest to form the larger rubric of 
public and official discourse on the matter. In the dialogue between Howard and Bailey we 
see the adultifying discourse of prostitution hedging strongly (and in a relatively crass way) 
into the discourse of child sex trafficking and the discussion of legal remedies, threatening 
minors in prostitution with the denial of restitution.  
Adultification serves as one major means of rendering childhood provisional and 
child protection conditional. Another is childism. In 2008 the Illinois criminal code titled 
“Soliciting for a Juvenile Prostitute” designated the crime as a Class 1 felony, and was 
amended to raise the age of the minor in prostitution from “under 16 years of age” to “under 
17 years of age.” This pertains to when a defendant is “soliciting for a juvenile prostitute 
where the prostitute for whom such person is soliciting is under 17 years of age or is a 
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severely or profoundly mentally retarded person” (720 ILCS 5/11-15.1(a)). However, while 
raising the age from 16 to 17, the law also provides a mistake-of-age defense to this crime. “It 
is an affirmative defense to a charge of soliciting for a juvenile prostitute that the accused 
reasonably believed the person was of the age of 17 years or over or was not a severely or 
profoundly mentally retarded person at the time of the act giving rise to the charge” (720 
ILCS 5/11-15.1(b)). This is an erosion of the statutory rape principle, which is a strict 
liability crime, meaning that the subjective belief of the offender is irrelevant. The statute 
provides the same affirmative defense for offenders charged with pimping a juvenile (720 
ILCS 5/11-19.1(c)). It also differentiates by age of the minor, designating “aggravated 
juvenile pimping” when “the prostitute was under the age of 13” (720 ILCS 5/11-19.1(b)). 
Strikingly, while Illinois has pioneered the concept of DMST on the state level, here, it also 
manages to codify the notion that a child under the age of 13 can be a “prostitute,” when 
elsewhere in its code this is considered child rape or child sex abuse. It raises questions about 
at which low age would lawmakers pause in applying the phrase “the prostitute” to a child. 
At the same time, the legislature raised the age of prostituted minors, ostensibly in 
order to expand the scope of the law’s protection of children. However, they simultaneously 
and implicitly equated the incapacity of sixteen-year-olds with “severe mental retardation.” 
They then provided a “mistake of age” defense for “johns,” meaning that they can be 
exculpated by claiming that they believed a child in prostitution looked like or seemed to be 
an adult. The subjective mindset of the adult becomes prioritized over the objective reality of 
the minor’s child status. On the one hand, the law views children as so naturally vulnerable as 
to classify them alongside those with severe mental retardation, implying a connection 
between the two. On the other hand, the objective, material reality of child status can be 
negated through adult mental subjectivity in pursuit of de facto adult/child sexual relations, 
including for commercial-sexual purchase thereof. Regardless of its moral substance, the 
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constructive effect that this has on “the child”—who is otherwise deemed to embody a 
“natural” identity—is that this status can very easily be rendered meaningless depending on 
the adult subjective mindset. In other words the child identity is made available to adults for 
multiple, contradictory readings and usages. In turn, these readings and usages can be 
projected onto children’s bodies.  
Despite what would otherwise be the accretion of pioneering efforts, in order to 
provide child protection, it seems the law must extract the toll of diminishing the mental 
capacity of teenagers by implicitly placing it on the level of a neurological disorder, and 
immediately begin to erode child protections in order to allow for adults’ indiscretions. The 
omission of “customers” in Rep. Howard’s critique of impunity for pimps and panderers in 
the 2005 debate interlocks here with the impunity that “mistake-of-age” has traditionally 
provided. As mentioned above, this “mistake” is one easily made with regard to minors in 
prostitution who are perceived in generally adultifying ways, particularly when they are 
children of color. In these ways, the law gives the appearance of increased child protection, 
but subtly yet profoundly undermines them, rendering these protections highly conditional, if 
not illusory.  
In 2010 Illinois’ legislative debate on the nationally celebrated Safe Children Act (HB 
6462 and 6129) officiated the term “child sex trafficking” in its legal discourse, and brought 
the legal concept of DMST into being in the state. The law defined all persons under the age 
of 18 as children. Discussing the bill, its sponsor, Rep. Burns, explains that it “decriminalizes 
the…crime of juvenile prostitution,” with an aim “to link these young people with the 
appropriate child protective services.” The terms “child,” “young people” and “juvenile” are 
used interchangeably. The exploiters are clearly defined as adults. The reason offered for 
decriminalization is “that these young people have been exploited by pimps and adults and 
forced into a life of prostitution.”  
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The lawmakers clearly set minors as victims in need of “child protective services,” 
and adults as the pimps and exploiters. The adult/child relationship is defined in terms of 
victims/offenders. Yet the interjection of “force” erodes the distinction between adult/child 
because the decriminalization of children for prostitution is supposed to remove the 
requirement that there was “force” involved; their child status alone is supposed to be 
sufficient for special protection. This signals the conditionality of their protection based on 
the harsh quality of the actions perpetrated against them by adults rather than the simple fact 
that they were committed against a child. One of the objectives of child decriminalization is 
to take away the “mistake of age” defense traditionally used to deny that child exploitation 
took place—to strictly protect minors on the basis of their child status alone—regardless of 
whether they were “forced” into prostitution or not (Law 2000). In this way, child status 
becomes paramount to this type of protection. Although the word “force” used in this debate 
does not end up being codified in the actual law, it shows equivocation in the mindset of the 
lawmaker toward child victims in an important and generative discursive event.  
Rep. Reboletti also referred to “juvenile prostitutes”—a term that works against 
constructing minors in prostitution as children—compared to, for instance, “sexually 
exploited child.” The sponsor then emphasized “the age of the prostitutes,” adding “they’ve 
been confused, they’ve been manipulated, they’ve been pimped.” Although likely meant to 
evoke empathy, when spoken in a legal arena, this suggests that childhood in itself may not 
be sufficient to merit special protection; that specific harms that negate children’s consent 
such as confusion, manipulation and pimping are necessary to emphasize harm to them, not 
the fact of child status. Reboletti then addressed what happens “if the kids went back into that 
lifestyle,” and if they were to be re-arrested. Even though “kids” has a different connotation 
to “juveniles,” the reference to prostitution as “lifestyle” implies “choice” as associated with 
neoliberal discourse that privileges understandings of socio-economic conditions and 
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adaptations as “lifestyles” and the product of personal choices for which even minors have 
personal responsibility, and which can be changed primarily through self-help and self-will 
(McRobbie 2011: 181; Giroux 2003: 123). The re-contextualization of such words that 
function as placeholders for “choice” into the conceptualization of DMST, a new construct, 
can overpower the objective of child protectionism for which the law is being written. Given 
that “choice” was invoked in problematic ways in the 2005 debate, it would seem that by 
2010 Illinois lawmakers were not ready to purge the discourse of child sex trafficking from 
the adultifying effects of personal responsibilization implied in “lifestyle” and “choice.”  
Referred to only in passing, Reboletti mentioned the arrest and “re-arrest” of minors 
in prostitution. Even though the Representative states the objective of the law as 
decriminalizing minors, arrest is implicitly unproblematic to the project of decriminalization. 
Again, this belies juvenile justice literature, which demonstrates that arrest and pre-trial 
detention are criminalizing techniques because they prejudice criminal justice outcomes for 
minors who are subjected to these practices. What we seem to witness over the course of 
years leading up to the passage of this pioneering “safe harbor” law is that legislatures set up 
child protection and the construct of childhood/child status undergirding it. They then 
systematically whittle these down to the point of being barely recognizable as child-
protective, to fit into prescribed frameworks such as law-and-order policing, which has 
traditionally involved the practice of arresting minors in prostitution. The power of “force,” 
“choice” and “arrest” each endure despite the attempts to decouple them from children and 
child status in the context of decriminalization. 
Lawmakers’ understandings of children were tested again shortly after this debate. In 
May of 2010, Rep. Burns proposed amending the same law (HB 6462) by addressing the 
punishment of offenders of child prostitution—organized crime, pimps and solicitors. This 
time, throughout the debate, the term “juvenile” was consistently used to refer to both minors 
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in prostitution and minors who commit “juvenile pimping,” referred to as “juvenile pimps” 
against “juvenile prostitutes.” The lawmakers struggled with how pimps who are minors 
should be treated—whether they would be tried as adults or minors—and ultimately 
concluded that “it depends on the age of the juvenile pimp…the court would have the 
discretion to adjudicate them in juvenile court or charge them as an adult in adult court.” The 
initial confusion suggests that the concept of pimps as minors can be as vexing for lawmakers 
as the concept of minors in prostitution has been. For a moment their basic knowledge of 
juvenile justice procedure was challenged. Moreover, casual references to “juvenile pimps” 
and “juvenile prostitutes” in the same breath have the effect of not only equating them but 
also adultifying both, which helps the adultification of the victimized party to go unnoticed. 
By 2010 Illinois was one of the few states to have adopted statutes recognizing 
minors in prostitution through the decriminalizing term of “victims.” The Illinois Safe 
Children Act of 2012 (HB 6362) amended several provisions of its criminal code to 
decriminalize and divert impacted minors from criminal justice or delinquency (720 ILCS 
5/11-14(d) (2012)). It immunized minors from prosecution for prostitution (720 ILCS 5/11-
14(d) (2012)), and barred defendants from raising as a defense the fact that the minor 
“consented” to engaging in prostitution (740 ILCS 128/25 (“Non-defenses”) (2012)). It also 
incorporated definitions of “child abuse” and “neglect” into the child prostitution context and 
required detaining officers to report minors in prostitution to the child welfare system, who 
would then have to commence an initial investigation into child abuse or neglect within a day 
(705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(vi); 325 ILCS 5/3(h)). However, it also specifies “temporary protective 
custody” of minors in prostitution for the stated purpose of protecting the minor from pimps, 
traffickers and even herself (720 ILCS 5/11-149d); 704 ILCS 405/2-7 and 2-5). Arrest and 
pretrial detention not only have adultifying effects on minors for purposes of criminalization, 
but as many studies have now pointed out, the difference in treatment of minors in the 
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juvenile justice system and adults in the criminal justice system are increasingly minute, even 
if the stated aim is to divert minors into social services (Gardner 1987; Brown 2007). This 
same critique is made of the difference between the juvenile justice and child welfare systems 
(Lutnick 2016) such that these practices are untenable for children who have been 
commercially-sexually exploited. 
In comparison to the 2005 debate that preceded the safe harbor law, in 2012 Illinois’ 
amendment to its trafficking law was noticeably non-contentious. HB 5278 passed 
unanimously and without argument, allowing adults to sue perpetrators of trafficking crimes 
against them that occurred during their childhoods. By 2013 Illinois’ law regarding 
“trafficking in persons, involuntary servitude, and related offenses” sectioned minors into a 
separate provision after the statute defined various words used in it, and the elements of 
“involuntary servitude.” Minors were still defined as persons under 18, but Illinois took the 
added step of clarifying that older teenagers are still minors by specifying that there is “no 
overt force or threat” required whether “the minor is between the ages of 17 and 18 years” or 
“under the age of 17 years” (720 ILCS 5/10-9(c)(1)-(3)). The clarification that no force or 
threat is required for minors regardless of where they fall on the age range is an additional 
child-protective step that Utah does not take. Overall Utah and states with similar policies 
have treated the more child-protective federal standard as the “ceiling” (the maximum 
amount of child protection from criminalization that it is willing to provide), while Illinois 
has treated it as the “floor” (the minimum amount of protection the state should provide).  
The case of Sawyer (2011, 2015), involving a former rapper and notorious pimp from 
the Southside of Chicago (discussed further in Chapter 4), originated under Illinois’ safe 
harbor statute. In Sawyer the judge explained that the defendant met one of the girls, Tatianna, 
when she was 13 years old, describing her as, “often carrying a teddy bear.” By reference to 
an iconic artifact of Western children’s material culture, the judge evoked imagery of 
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normative youthful innocence, helping to maintain Tatianna’s child status. According to the 
US brief presented upon appeal, in 2011 the district court sentenced Sawyer to fifty years in 
prison after a jury found that he “knew or recklessly disregarded that the victims were 
minors.” Sawyer raised the mistake of age defense and claimed not to know that any of the 
girls were minors, and argued that they chose to be in prostitution.  
The statement of the case in this brief, which ultimately won against Sawyer, 
meticulously listed each of the victims’ names, ages, background information, and developed 
the narrative of their lives and interactions with him. It paid most attention to the ways in 
which Sawyer victimized these girls, but there was emphasis on each of their ages, 
particularly that “His youngest victim was twelve years old.” Nonetheless if one looks up 
federal and state-level statistics on juvenile arrests, it is not uncommon to find that minors 
continue to be routinely arrested for prostitution, though the terminology of crimes under 
which these are listed may vary. Over the years I have noticed children as young as 9 on 
these statistical tables. 
The judges’ opinion in Sawyer explains that Sawyer required the girls to call him 
“Daddy,” referred to them as “family” and “wives,” to himself as an “uncle,” and branded the 
girls with tattoos of names he gave them beginning with the letter “P” because his nickname 
and rapper name was “P-Child.” It explains ways that Sawyer forced the girls to adopt 
behaviors and routines of the age he “gave” them rather than the age they were. For example, 
he required them to learn how to wear makeup and high heels, and how to give oral sex. 
These practices demonstrate the great extent to which the “mistake of age” defense works 
against minors in prostitution, particularly when their identities are manipulated to suit the 
demands of commercial sex. It reinforces ways in which the child identity is “open for 
interpretation” by adults (Grahn-Farley 2003). The requirement to appear sexually appealing 
in prostitution and commit acts that are constructed as antithetical to normative childhood 
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also bolsters the adultification of girls, similar to the way presumptions of masculinity and 
the hyper-resilience it implies adultifies boys in prostitution (Lillywhite and Skidmore 2006). 
Yet the choicelessness of their child status remains intact. The prosecution in Sawyer 
provided testimony of one of the girls, “Where else was [there] for me to go? I was only a 
child.”  
Much of the girls’ documented testimony against Sawyer suggests a combination of 
their infantilization, adultification and chattelization mirroring the dynamics of domestic 
violence. Most testimonies reveal graphic details of the beatings, torture and death threats 
they received from Sawyer and his adult male co-defendant. However, two girls are also on 
the record as minimizing or denying these incidents, implying that assaults upon them were 
deserved—that they were beaten only because of their “smart mouths.” One of the girls stated 
that Sawyer told her he “only hits us to make us better,” suggesting the kind of disciplinarian 
patriarchal violence traditionally reserved for children and wives, as well as the mimicry of 
slavery.  
Use of the term slavery—particularly in reference to chattel slavery in the sex 
trafficking context—is typically met with skepticism in the sociology of sex work 
(O'Connell-Davidson 2006; Kempadoo and Doezema 1998). However, sociological 
perspectives and the intersection of critical theories of race, class, gender and childhood as 
they bear on the historical presence of human trafficking in its various forms—chattel slavery, 
indenture, quasi-slavery, orchestrated child abductions—demonstrate their intimate 
connection with commercial/sexual exploitation in its various forms. These connections merit 
closer inspection, particularly with a child-centered approach.  
Child centrism requires more than solely a focus on children’s subjective voice. 
Greater respect for children’s thinking and behavior as well as good faith efforts to 
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understand matters affecting children on their own terms are crucial. However, just as with 
any discourse, the purpose for which these voices are offered is paramount. There is also an 
objective component to child-centrism that does not presume authenticity or authority, but 
rather assesses the interests served. For instance, since we have come to understand the 
dynamics of the disciplinarianism Sawyer meted out against the girls as domestic violence, 
child abuse or aggravated assault and battery in any other context, we are not inclined to 
accept at face value the statement of the girls who implied that they deserved this treatment 
because Sawyer did not like what they had to say. In Sawyer’s court case, the girls’ voices 
were effectively framed to maintain their childhood, as children with little recourse in their 
lives. Had the girls been tried for prostitution in delinquency proceedings, however, they 
would have been constructed in very different terms, as the next chapter discusses. 
3.2 Historical Presence 
3.2.1 The Age of Consent 
The antebellum era (prior to the Civil War) and the Gilded Age (approximately 1870-
1900) saw many major transformations to American society, including the establishment of 
what we now understand as modern childhood beginning in the 1880s. During Colonial 
times53 prostitution was not a distinct crime and vagrancy laws were used to enforce against it 
(Gilfoyle 1992, in Birckhead 2011: 1081-82). Prostitution was otherwise “grudgingly 
tolerated in urban centers,” where persons in prostitution used a combination of “fiercely 
protected” property rights and criminal law—which was privatized at the time—to “defend 
their right to sell their bodies” and prosecute “assaultive customers” (Id.). Minors in 
prostitution were mostly “orphaned or abandoned girls,” or socially marginalized in other 
ways (Id.: 1081). At this time a nationally influential case regarding child prostitution 
arose—the earliest of such cases I came across during the course of this research. Ruhl (1859) 
                                                
53 Colonial times overlap the period broadly defined as the onset of “modernity” during which the US was 
established as a sovereign nation-state. 
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represented the traditional Western view of children as chattel, making their protection from 
commercial-sexual exploitation contingent on the notion of children as the property of their 
parents. During Reconstruction (1865-1877) and the Gilded Age, what can be considered 
America’s first human trafficking law, the 1875 Alien Prostitution Importation Act (APIA) or 
“Page Law” differentiated childhood through racialized immigration fused with religiosity 
and anxieties regarding the reformation of the nation after slavery. As the first federal and 
race-based immigration law—predating the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882)—the Page Law 
racialized prostitution and showed both pity and contempt for the victims of sex trafficking, 
whether adult or child. By the Gilded Age and with increasing migration into the US, the 
dawn of modern American childhood began around issues of labor and sexual exploitation, 
compulsory public education, juvenile justice and child welfare services.  
Although the formal and directly referential exclusion of women of color from 
political subjecthood and citizenship (and worthiness of protection from sexual integrity) has 
dematerialized from legal texts particularly since the civil rights era, the law continues to 
exclude and disservice females of color through seemingly neutral principles (Harris 2003: 
517-18; Crenshaw 1989; Pether 1999). Facially neutral principles then become deployable 
against any and all females and gender non-conforming persons. Despite abolition of “the 
promiscuity defense,” which allowed men accused of statutory rape to use girls’ “bad 
character” as a defense, notions of gendered credibility persist in different forms and in new 
contexts in the law—“she lied,” “she tricked me,” “she looked 25.” Mistake of age and the 
contours of force and consent can operate in this way as a proxy for the type of “adultifying” 
bad character traditionally contrasted with normative girlhood. These notions directly 
translate to the de/valuation of some girls’ sexual integrity over others, as witnessed in 
Illinois’ own courts in the present day, and others across the US (Pether 1999: 87; Oberman 
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1994). This suggests that even when laws change, cultural ideas regarding gender, 
specifically girlhood, persist. 
The historical development of the crime of statutory rape and age of consent become 
important when attempting to understand contemporary trafficking and prostitution laws, 
particularly regarding children, and the discriminatory work of facially neutral principles. 
The development of statutory rape laws during the Gilded Age preceded White slave traffic 
laws and the prohibition of prostitution during the Progressive Era that followed to 
significantly erode the child protectionism of age-of-consent laws. It seems that the 
succession of the two regimes of age of consent and White Slave Traffic that these sets of 
laws brought about resulted in the contemporary contradiction between minors in prostitution 
as consenting, adultified offenders versus non-consenting child victims. Mistake-of-age, 
force requirements and character judgments implying good or bad girls that we witness in 
contemporary Utah and Illinois discourse and across states have been passed down through 
these historical and legal precedents. 
Examining the legal discourse surrounding passage of (and resistance to) age of 
consent laws and the crime of statutory rape that they established reveals the dimensions of 
race, class, gender and age informing these constructs, which, in turn, shaped the contours of 
modern childhood. Beginning in the Gilded Age and congealing in the Progressive Era, 
efforts to raise the age of consent were beholden to White supremacy. So as not to alienate 
the support of southern White male legislators in particular, White women reformers leading 
the charge were tepid and equivocal regarding the protection of African American girls, as 
well as the protection of Black males from lynching based on false rape allegations (Odem 
1995: 28-30). At the same time, many of the White male legislators to whom female 
reformers had to appeal during this pre-suffrage era were unequivocally hostile to the notion 
of underage girls’ victimization in sexual interactions with older males (Id.). The age of 
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consent campaign upheld White feminine purity, but male legislators made certain to inject 
their ideas of working class and African American females as its antithetical embodiments—
of the dark chaos of female sexuality and its implications for (White masculine) civilization.  
Across the states male lawmakers conveyed similar ideas regarding working class 
girls generally (Id.). However, Southern White legislators’ objections to age of consent laws 
in particular were consistent with the “Jezebel” stereotype or “controlling image” of Black 
females, which claimed their inherent promiscuity and “unrapeability.” They pointed this 
sharply at Black girls. Much of the contentious debate and conflict over age of consent 
played out in state legislatures, and were catalogued in a magazine titled Arena, which 
informed the movement for statutory modification.54 Expressing concern regarding female 
claims of sexual victimization against males, legislators argued in ways that would neutralize 
the gendered aspect of sexual victimization. For example, one legislator argued that males 
and females are equally lustful (as though the issue of rape and statutory rape are 
fundamentally about sexual desire): “the law-makers of this state were then, and are now, 
unwilling to inflict the heaviest penalty of the law on the male when there is a possibility that 
the female is also to blame” (Flower 1895a; 1895b). Exemplifying the voice of White 
southern masculine authority deployed contra to such bills (and in favor of keeping the lower 
age of consent), in 1895 Representative AC Tompkins of Owensboro, Kentucky, vocalized 
his opposition by deploying the image of a Black child prostitute, encased in the Social 
Darwinian ideology prevalent in Anglo-American culture at the time:  
There is one other objection, and that too a vital one, to any interference with the law 
as to consent in this state, as it now stands. The laws of the United States place the 
                                                
54 Stephen Robertson of University of Sydney, Australia, writing for the university’s Children & Youth in 
History project describes the magazine as such: “The Arena was an evangelical Christian periodical published in 
Boston that was known for its advocacy of social reform and women's issues…In 1895, it published a series of 
articles on age of consent reform edited by Helen Hamilton Gardener…an American feminist…lecturer and the 
author of articles and fiction, including two novels written to assist the age of consent campaign” 
[www.chnm.gmu.edu]. 
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negro female on the same plane with the white female, declaring them identical in 
every particular. Natural law, however, declares that, psychologically and functionally, 
they are widely differing individuals. (Flower 1895) 
Here, the representative’s opposition to “the laws of the United States” vocalizes the general 
southern disposition of invoking opposition to any federal law (referred to as “laws of the 
United States”) in accord with the post-slavery hostility that many southern political elites 
came to express toward the granting of formal equality to African Americans in the US 
Constitution. “Natural law,” he argues, dictates otherwise, as most compellingly evinced by 
different rates of sexual maturity between Black and White females: 
The menstrual function becomes established in the white Kentucky girl usually at 
about the fourteenth year, while in negro girls ovulation occurs about the eleventh 
year. Frequently it occurs as early as the tenth year. I am informed by Dr. Stinson 
Lambert, of Owensboro, Ky., a painstaking and accurate observer, that seventy-five 
per cent of negro girls menstruate at the eleventh year. Dr. Lambert also assures me 
that he has now under his care a negro girl who is in her twelfth year and who is 
pregnant.  
The case of the pregnant twelve-year-old Black girl is offered as evidence of sexual 
precociousness rather than sexual victimization. Next, the lack of rape prosecutions for Black 
female victims is offered as proof of their hypersexuality and, hence, unrapeability: 
Negroes, in a natural state, are not given to undue sensuality; they are like the lower 
mammalia in this respect. As soon, however, as they fall under the influence of 
civilization they become inordinately sensual. The negro is rarely accused of 
committing rape on the females of his own race. The reason for this is the natural 
complaisance of the females of his own race, the male being able to easily satisfy his 
desire without violence. 
In the Representative’s account, the passionless passivity of White feminine sexual mores, 
which statutory rape law claims to protect, stands in stark contrast to Black female sexuality 
that is on par with male sexual demand. Above all, he argues, such a law protecting “girls” 
opens the door to Black girls who would not hesitate to maliciously prosecute upstanding 
White males:  
We see at once what a terrible weapon for evil the elevating of the age of consent 
would be when placed in the hands of a lecherous, sensual negro woman, who for the 
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sake of blackmail or revenge would not hesitate to bring criminal action even though 
she had been a prostitute since her eleventh year! Anyone acquainted with the 
American negro, a semi-civilized savage, will understand at once what bearing this 
has on the question without further enlightenment on my part. Taking the facts above 
cited into consideration, it would be manifestly unjust to tamper with the law as it 
now stands. 
The precocious hypersexuality that renders bodies “unrapeable” ascribed to the Black 
female is the same as those attributed to the prostitute, coming together in the identity of the 
Black child prostitute at the core of its grown-up embodiment in the Black woman. Tompkins 
invokes the trope of the inviolable Black female to conflate it with that of the inviolable 
prostitute, which also implies that child prostitution at the age of eleven is not commercial-
sexual exploitation, but rather character evidence. The body of the Black child prostitute was 
the line demarcating where child protection ends.  
Tompkins’ oppositional rhetoric did not entirely “win,” since it was unsuccessful in 
preventing the age of consent from rising. However, his invocation of the Black child 
prostitute and the like from other legislators prompted the inclusion of the “promiscuity 
defense” in statutory rape laws that would work against child protection throughout the 
following century by exculpating perpetrators whose victims were deemed unchaste. This 
recalls the invocation of prostitutes-by-choice in the contemporary Illinois legislative debate, 
where the image of the voluntary prostitute was raised to suggest that it is probably unwise to 
allow even those forced into prostitution to have restitution. Rep. Bailey seemed quelled only 
when Rep. Howard insisted that the bill was limited solely to “forced” prostitution.  
Thus age of consent law would be compromised by a combination of the southern 
opposition to racial equalization of the protection of girls that Thompson exemplified, and 
legislators’ general opposition to the protection of working class girls. Ultimately, the desire 
to protect White patriarchal respectability rather than vulnerable females (even White 
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females) seems to have driven the opposition to raising the age of consent and their 
requirement of “chastity” for legal protection. As one Kansas legislator explained:  
The usual argument that unchaste and designing young women would take advantage 
of the law to inveigle young men into illicit relations and then use the law to extort 
blackmail from them was urged, and that in the penitentiaries of Kansas and 
Wyoming there are incarcerated several young men from highly respectable families 
who have been sent there by immoral young women…[T]he bill…was finally 
amended with a provision that it shall not apply to girls between fifteen and eighteen 
years of age, who are notoriously unchaste (Flower 1895). 
The “chastity” requirement placed in many states’ statutes in the Progressive Era survived 
until very recently as the “promiscuity defense” to statutory rape—which adult males 
routinely deployed against underage female complainants. The defense of “promiscuity” is a 
product of such raced, classed and gendered historical compromises regarding childhood, and 
girlhood specifically. Notions of childhood or girlhood and regimes of child protection 
stemming from such a confluence have a history to overcome of what Odem (1995: 33) 
explains thusly:  
Opponents of the new law clearly feared that raising the age of consent would imperil 
their sexual prerogatives with working-class and black women. In an effort to temper 
this threat, many legislators insisted that consent laws should only protect females of 
previously chaste character. 
Even if one overlooks the chastity requirement, legislators’ ultimate support for statutory rape 
laws during this era cannot be viewed as necessarily chivalrous or passed in a spirit of child 
protectionism. Looking through the descriptions and transcriptions of these debates, the 
rationale commonly offered for the protection of girls in this context was to prevent 
patriarchal heads of households from the loss of their daughters’ services toward contribution 
to the household through child labor when other men took them away for exploitation. 
Contemporary construction of the issue follows its historical corollary insofar as child 
protections are hedged and diminished just as soon as they are created, out of particular 
concern for the wrongly accused adult male. As Pether (1999) would note, other means will 
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always exist with which to invoke the idea of promiscuity in the courtroom without having it 
available as an affirmative defense. When the rhetoric of willful prostitution is invoked in 
legal discourse encompassing DMST, it can have a similar effect.  
3.2.2 “White Slavery”  
In the contemporary legal discourse of Utah and Illinois we see usage of the term 
“trafficking” as well as “involuntary servitude” or “sexual servitude,” invoking the notion of 
modern slavery (Bales 2004, 2009; Kara 2009). This accords with references to the 
Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery, in the federal anti-trafficking law titled the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA 2000), and its 2008 Reauthorization named after 
the famous British abolitionist William Wilberforce. Thus the legal discourse of modern 
slavery is national in scope. “Trafficking” is certainly a definitive concept of modern US 
child sex trafficking law. However, this term has a deeply troubled history and has been 
politically loaded in ways that have produced unequal childhoods and general inequalities 
through related discourse. Utah and Illinois have specific histories with regard to the notion 
that may underlie differences in their conceptualizations and responses in various ways. It is a 
history largely forgotten or silenced in contemporary debates among lawmakers. This may be 
an intentional avoidance given that it is a global pattern that governments evade discussing 
human trafficking in ways that trigger the issue of reparations (Lee 2011). While the 
language of slavery is used to legitimize the passage of anti-trafficking law, it is severed of its 
raced, classed, gendered and child-related histories. These histories expose deeper issues that 
legislatures must reckon with to address the concerns they express regarding the detrimental 
impact of child sex trafficking underwriting the bills that have been proliferating in American 
legislatures since the new millennium. Nearly a century exists between the TVPA and the 
first domestically focused federal anti-trafficking legislation—the White Slave Traffic Act of 
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1910, or “Mann Act,”—and so historical comparisons or measures of progress might involve 
a back-and-forth between these two time periods. 
The seemingly neutral term “trafficking” has also contributed to the re/production of 
inequalities and child criminalization in the context of CSEC. Intertwined in this are 
important but unquestioned historical reasons for why in the US we must analyze the issue of 
child sex trafficking on the state level, and cannot solely refer to a unified national 
framework such as the TVPA to address it. The notion of state sovereignty—the supreme 
authority of individual states for self-governance (Garner 2006: 674)—has traditionally been 
deployed to preserve practices claimed to be culturally specific to states or regions of the US. 
“States’ rights,” for instance, was successfully deployed to institute the segregation of White 
children from children of color, or to extend slavery, including of children, through “convict 
leasing” after the formal abolition of chattel slavery (Woodward 2002; Haney-Lopez 2014: 
38-41; Glenn 2002: 104-06). Such practices ensured the bifurcation and polarization of Black 
and White childhoods after slavery—rendering White, bourgeois childhood normative, Black 
childhood deviant, and all others as ambivalent, provisional non-childhoods (Patton 2007, 
Bernstein 2011). This polarization was institutionalized in systems of child welfare and 
juvenile justice that co-developed with the formal sanction of the Jim Crow regime from the 
Supreme Court decision of Plessy(1896) (Bush 2010). Not often considered together in the 
context of childhood, American law regarding prostitution followed suit when federal case 
law established that its regulation and criminalization fall within the domain of states’ “police 
power” over health, welfare, safety and morals, and thus the broad discretion of state 
legislatures (L’Hote v. City of New Orleans (1900)). These historical factors have made both 
national and state-level understandings of “trafficking” important for the treatment of 
impacted children.  
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The age of consent movement congealed around the notion of “White slavery,” which 
would soon undermine its aims. The history of sex work often recounts the phenomenon as 
beginning with hysteria in the 1880s over foreign men and men of color forcing women into 
prostitution, which was then used to regulate female sexuality and coerce bourgeois feminine 
conformity. However, this phrase was originally invoked against the deplorable conditions of 
child labor during emergent industrialization at the end of the eighteenth century in Anglo-
American society. As reformers campaigned for laws to limit and regulate children’s wage 
work, Romantic British poet Samuel Coleridge described children working in factories as 
“our poor little White-Slaves” (Handel, Cahill et al. 2007: 72). A century later the phrase was 
utilized to expose the existence of child prostitution in Britain and to pass legislation in 1885 
raising the age of consent to modern levels (Walkowitz 1992). Amidst this “moral panic,” the 
US contracted with Britain and other Western powers for an international anti-trafficking 
agreement (White Slave Traffic Agreement of 1904) to protect White women and girls of 
European descent.  
Illinois would pioneer its domestic counterpart through Chicago-based muckrakers, 
sociologists and government agents, whose tracts on the matter would influence passage of 
the first national anti-trafficking law in the US, the White Slave Traffic Act of 1910. In the 
postbellum US, the phrase White slavery would be invoked in contrast to Black chattel 
slavery but also as analogous to it the way it had been with child laborers. It was used to 
promote White racial purity amidst eugenicist-based fears of “race suicide” (Ross 1901) 
through White women’s sexual activities and/or miscegenation (Lucas 1995: 57-58). By the 
Progressive Era “White slavery” became synonymous with trafficking and prostitution.  
Several historical developments also made Chicago central to the conception of 
prostitution and sex trafficking as a national problem and locus in which anti-
prostitution/trafficking efforts converged perhaps most intensely. One is the muckraking 
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work of George Kibbe Turner (1907) titled “City of Chicago” in the progressive McClure’s 
magazine, which exposed and traced Chicago’s violent crime to official corruption. This 
piece greatly influenced the definition of White slavery as, in the words of one scholar, “the 
enslavement of white women or girls by means of coercion, trick, or drugs by a non-white or 
non-Anglo-Saxon man for purposes of sexual exploitation” (Nichols 2008: 186). As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, another key development is the establishment of social work and the 
settlement house movement headed by sociologist Jane Addams and exemplified by Hull 
House as its institutional component, as part of a larger national movement preceding it to 
manage children of the underclass including immigrant children.55 Turner’s 1907 exposé 
greatly influenced Addams, particularly her 1912 tract titled “New Conscience and an 
Ancient Evil,” in which she denounces the commercial-sexual exploitation of females and the 
socio-economic conditions contributing to it. As a result of these earlier movements, with the 
exception of Nevada, all states of the US have enacted statutory prohibitions against 
prostitution (Miller and Haltiwanger 2004: 208). 
Even though Illinois, especially Chicago was earning a reputation for pioneering 
progressivism on the issue of childhood and child protectionism, influential proponents of 
early child sex trafficking law circulated literature that would inform the White Slave Traffic 
Act. Some of these were abolitionist and social justice oriented, while others contained tropes 
that we have come to recognize as racist and sexist. Chicago-based tracts published 
beginning around 1909 were typical of those that greatly influenced the earliest US laws 
regarding child prostitution (and sex trafficking)—the White Slave laws—and their 
enforcement. These writings circulated among reformers and politicians in urbanizing cities 
and made their way into popular consciousness on the issue. Exemplifying the abolitionist 
                                                
55 Interestingly, because of the early sociology of Jane Addams and its influence in the sociological research of 
the Chicago School, the desire to combat the commercial-sexual exploitation of children lies at the heart of early 
sociology. 
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and social justice oriented literature, Jane Addams wrote a famous piece titled “A New 
Conscience and an Ancient Evil” in 1912, referring to prostitution as the moral but perhaps 
more tenacious equivalent of African American slavery: “…this twin of slavery,” she wrote, 
“[is] as old and outrageous as slavery itself and even more persistent.” At the same time, 
explicitly racist discourse circulated in, for example, activist Samuel Paynter Wilson’s 
“Chicago and its Cess-Pools of Infamy” (1910) and white purity reformer Turner-
Zimmermann’s “Chicago’s Black Trade in White Girls.” They refer to such characters as 
“[the] brutal Russian Jewish whoremonger” as predatory figures, and their prey as “young 
white girls, huddled in with the worst mob of negroes, whites and Chinese I have seen in 
Chicago’s slums.” 
By invoking racialized sexual peril, distinguishing and contrasting Black slavery from 
White slavery, identifying its victims as White girls and its perpetrators as men of color, 
White Slavery rhetoric mobilized “slavery” for the protection of endangered White girls in 
America’s intermixing urban cities. This blanching of the concept of slavery and of its 
victims, particularly at a time of great turmoil and political strife for newly freed African 
Americans, disconnected any notion of commercial-sexual exploitation of girls of color under 
slavery. These and other “white purity reformers,” feminists and legal authorities provided 
the epistemological base that informed early “White Slavery” laws, which synonymously 
referred to “trafficking.” The nexus of White slavery laws thus included age of consent, 
prostitution, sex trafficking, and policy on female juvenile delinquency. These endure today 
in referents of “trafficking,” “servitude,” and other terminologies related to modern slavery, 
but are largely severed from any notion of systemic, systematic commercial-sexual 
exploitation of females of color, including girls. 
Looking at Utah and Illinois as polarized opposites in the social policy literature of 
NGOs such as Shared Hope International—even if Utah appears to be raising its child-
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protective standards—there may be a deeper historical story behind this polarization and 
others that reveals both points of contention and opposition as well as commonalities and 
alliances that form the story of how childhood has been constructed through these laws. Per 
national trends and reflecting the scope of influence of urban social reformers, the age of 
consent was raised—from 14 to 18—as far out as the southwestern territory known as Utah. 
The term “white slavery” to refer to prostitution made its way to Utah, and was used 
synonymously there (Nichols 2008: 109), a fact reflected in its laws at the time. The 
equivocation between the terms “prostitution” and “trafficking” today are rooted in these 
early usages. Such White slavery cases were adjudicated throughout the twentieth century in 
the state under federal law, specifically the White Slave Traffic Act. Just as in Chicago in 
1908, Utah launched efforts that same year to rescue White females from brothels run by 
foreigners, even where both were Western European, and even though 90% of Salt Lake City 
prostitutes claimed to be US-born (Id.: 187). Such actions have historically impacted adults 
and children alike, but during this time age-segregated institutions to house and reform the 
“fallen” were developing, while maintaining the penal character of both. Federal officials 
prosecuted some cases in Utah but residents lamented that the Mann Act pertained only to 
interstate cases, demanding that local officials prosecute intrastate cases just as vigorously 
(Id.). In 1908 the Bureau of Investigation, which would be renamed the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) in 1935, was created specifically to investigate White slavery cases and to 
enforce White slavery law. 
However, Utah has its own unique historical relationship with the concept of White 
slavery and the genesis of “trafficking,” which may help explain its “lag” in adopting (or 
perhaps resistance to) federal standards on child sex trafficking. In Utah the issue of 
polygamy in particular, associated with Mormonism, reveals the conflation of Black slavery 
with White slavery practiced through polygamy in Utah. Polygamy was characterized 
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nationally, including in 1870s Chicago, as the enslavement of White Mormon women, and 
therefore worse than Black slavery, because it transgressed the normative racial role of White 
women. Here we see the origins and divergence of the concept of White slavery and 
trafficking as represented in the cultures of Utah and Illinois. Polygamy—as White slavery—
ascribed Blackness and relegated White women to the role of Black females, blurring the 
well-established boundaries between Black and White. However, abolitionists also used 
White slavery to argue for the abolition of Black slavery, by getting Northerners to “imagine 
themselves or their white relatives in bondage,” including through stories of White orphan 
girls exploited just like “racially inferior blacks” as a kind of mistaken enslavement (Reeve 
2015: 141). Mormon polygamy was subsumed in the broader national narrative of White 
slavery as an organized system in the American West. Indeed, in more contemporary mid-
century cases where federal anti-trafficking law was used to prosecute Utahns for sex 
trafficking, they have often been to prosecute Mormon polygamy, which may help explain 
Utah’s resistance to federal intervention in what are ostensibly “private affairs” (e.g. 
Cleveland (1945), 146 F.2d 730).  
The constructive effects of the development of White slavery on race, class, gender 
and childhood intertwined with those of the burgeoning juvenile justice system and its role in 
child criminalization. But such disparities were national in scope. In Illinois statutes dating to 
190956 reveal the early bifurcation of a dependency and delinquency track for juveniles in 
conflict with the law as prelude to a two-tiered juvenile justice system developing within (and 
corresponding to) a two-tiered adult/child justice system. Over the course of their 
development these systems generated the present race, class and gender disparities associated 
with each. According to the Illinois statute, a dependent child over whom a court had 
                                                
56 Hurd’s Revised Statutes of Illinois (1909), chapter 23, sections 175-176, in Vice Commission of Chicago, 
“Social Evil in Chicago: A Study of Existing Conditions with Recommendations by The Vice Commission of 
Chicago.” Chicago: Gunthorp-Warren Printing Company (1911). 
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guardianship was one who, “for any reason, is destitute, homeless or abandoned; or 
dependent on the public for support; or has not proper parental care or guardianship.” The 
statute continues by identifying children associated with prostitution as those “found living 
any house of ill-fame or with any vicious or disreputable person.” Penury, parental neglect 
and residing in a brothel triggered the attention of the juvenile court. In contrast, the 
municipal code of Chicago defined the delinquent child as violating state law, one who 
“knowingly associates with thieves, vicious or immoral persons,” or knowingly engages in 
any vice, understood as prostitution, drinking or gambling. Such developments established 
the enduring label of “delinquent” with “the child prostitute.” Though we see today that Utah 
and Illinois have made efforts to purge this association in contemporary laws, this deviant 
identity can be regenerated through other means such as dual status as victims and offenders, 
or the imputation of commercial-sexual consent. 
Like Illinois, Utah began constructing its juvenile justice and child welfare apparatus 
to handle problems such as child prostitution. The Utah state legislature established its first 
juvenile court in 1905, six years after the first in the country in Chicago, Illinois.57 The court 
adjudicated children delinquent for various offenses, including prostitution (Nichols 2008: 
182). It had broad discretion and served as a mechanism to manage the chaotic home lives of 
children, especially if his or her mother was perceived as or suspected of being a prostitute, 
or the child was exposed to such persons (Nichols 2008: 182). The purpose of Utah’s juvenile 
court was to correct such “wayward tendencies,” and restore the child to “useful citizenship” 
(Id.). Utah’s intervention in child prostitution conformed to the use of juvenile courts 
elsewhere in the country, as an effort of social control, and to coerce conformity of working 
class girls to normative gender standards, including to further the efforts of parents’ anti-
                                                
57 Website of the Utah Courts: https://www.utcourts.gov/courts/juv/intro/JuvenileBro.pdf (Last accessed 2 
January 2017). 
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miscegenation efforts in preventing the courtship of White daughters with Black men (Id.). 
Homes for “fallen” girls—as alternatives to jails—developed simultaneously, as predecessors 
to contemporary group homes and part of the modern quasi-criminalizing apparatus (Id.: 119). 
These historical developments and the unequal childhoods they produced would be 
codified in the White Slave Traffic Act (1910). Apart from the White supremacist overture of 
its title and central defining concept of “white slavery,” legislators’ arguments in favor of the 
ultimately successful bill reveal its racial and gendered dimensions. A statement from 
southern Representative Thetis W. Sims of Tennessee provides an explicit example of this 
rhetoric. Sims argued before the US House that the purpose of the Act would be, “to prevent, 
I hope forever, the taking away by fraud or violence from some doting mother or loving 
father, of some blue-eyed girl and immersing her in dens of infamy” (United States House, 45 
Congressional Record 811, 19 January 1910).  
…whenever I think of a beautiful girl taken from one State to another, from a 
Territory to a State, or from a State to a Territory by holding out to her the promise of 
improvement in her condition, then to Chicago, New York, or any other city, and 
drugged, debauched, and ruined, instead of being murdered, which would be a mercy 
after such treatment, retain her there and sell her to any brute who will pay the price, I 
can not bring myself to vote against this bill or any similar measure.... Pass this law, 
take care of the girls, the women—the defenseless—and let the courts say whether or 
not the law is constitutional. 
Another southern Congressman, Representative Gordon Russell of Texas, connected White 
femininity and nationhood, stating, “No nation can rise higher than the estimate which it 
places upon the virtue and purity of its womanhood.” He emphasized that “daughters of 
American homes” were the primary concern of the bill, contrary to popular conception that 
sex trafficking was a problem that mostly plagued foreign-born females. 
65,000 daughters of American homes each year [were] conscripted into the great 
army of prostitutes. Think of the tears and the woe and the shame and the poverty and 
the disease caused by this infamous band of pimps and procurers, who are preying 
each year upon American womanhood and girlhood.  
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Pain, stigma, poverty and disease were understood as byproducts of the practice of 
prostitution, not as causes for entry into prostitution; only the corruption of a particularly 
criminal class of purposeful, intentional men could cause White females to become 
prostitutes. Representative Oscar Gillespie of Texas portrayed these acts thusly, “The 
meanest, the blackest crime that was ever instilled into the human heart by the devil himself 
is this crime of trafficking in the virtue and chastity of women.” 
Making clear the race and gender of the victims as White females, the lawmakers also 
defined perpetrators—the most menacing among them—as Black males. Revealing the 
powerful influence of White slavery literature over the passage of the Act as well as that of 
fear of race mixing embedded in them, Rep. Russell also read to his fellow legislators from 
the publication of Georgia politician and journalist Thomas Edward Watson:  
Some weeks ago a negro who signed himself “John Frankling" wrote me from Tifton, 
Ga., a letter in which he states that he had a white wife whom he had bought out of a 
group of twenty-five that were offered for sale in Chicago, and that she was the third 
white "wife" that he had purchased. Upon making inquiry of prominent men in 
Chicago, I was told that there was reason to believe that the negro had told the 
truth…In those dens of horror [country girls, trusting city girls, and foreign girls] are 
sold to all men who can pay the price—young or old, clean or unclean, healthy and 
diseased, black or white.   
He concluded by urging the House to pass the bill, “which will be a step toward abolishing 
the slavery of white women…a tribute to every pure and good woman in this land.” 
Representative Mann, the namesake of the bill, reinforced this powerful conclusion, stating: 
Congress would be derelict in its duty if it did not exercise it, because all of the 
horrors which have ever been urged, either truthfully or fancifully, against the black-
slave trade pale into insignificance as compared to the horrors of the so-called “white-
slave traffic.”  
US Congressional debates regarding the White Slave Traffic Act were explicit in their 
intent to protect White femininity. Lawmakers deployed the trope of White ingénues in 
contrast to all manner of men, but especially Black men purchasing White girls for sexual 
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slavery, implicitly at a White-slave auction in Chicago, and emphasized that White slavery 
was worse than Black slavery. It is noteworthy that although the representatives contentiously 
argued over whether the Act would interfere with states’ rights—southern “home rule” 
against federal interference with states’ repression of civil rights—the aim of protecting 
White femininity ultimately overcame these disagreements. Remarkably, during the 
Progressive Era, including in the Congress of the Mann Act, the same pretext served 
repeatedly to obstruct federal anti-lynching legislation.  
The provisions enacted in the statute were not as clearly raced and gendered, but 
through a combination of adult/child designation (or lack thereof), immigration/citizenship 
status and punishment, the law upheld its stated aim. Provisions expressed and defined the 
protection of victims largely in terms of the punishment of offenders and assigned differential 
and uneven levels of punishment depending on whether female victims were US or foreign 
born. The law brought girls under the same moralistic scrutiny of the state without any 
unique or heightened protections for them, particularly evident in the treatment of foreign 
girls compared to their domestic counterparts. The White Slave Traffic Act represents the 
origins of conflating the punishment of offenders with the protection of children in the sex 
trafficking context. This is a feature observable in contemporary laws, representative of the 
trouble with retributivism and the ways it interacts with race, class, gender and age to 
produce inequitable treatment.  
The Act specified and repeatedly referenced “woman or girl” as its subjects. The first 
several sections specifically pertain to US citizen females (Sections 1-5). The Act covers any 
woman or girl transported across state or national borders of the US 
in interstate or foreign commerce…for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or 
for any other immoral purpose…compel[led] to become a prostitute or to give herself 
up to debauchery or to engage in any other immoral practice (Sections 2-3)…whether 
with or without her consent (Section 3).  
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This formally rendered “consent” an immaterial issue for purposes of finding an offender 
guilty of sex trafficking. Although the immateriality of consent was applied here against 
offenders of females of any age, it later became a key point of differentiation between adult 
women and girl children (notably after women’s suffrage) in the sex trafficking context, 
wherein only children have come to be legally presumed non-consenting, but adults are 
presumed consenting unless they prove otherwise (typically via force, fraud or coercion). In 
explicit reference to minors in prostitution, the Act specifies childhood by age, referring to 
“any woman or girl under the age of eighteen years” (Section 4).  
The combination of age-specificity and the negation of “consent” as a material issue 
appear to carve out minor girls as a specially and strictly protected class. However, several 
pieces of language suggest that the recognition of their victimhood and provision of legal 
protection are contingent—not upon their status or identity—but upon the purposeful intent 
of the perpetrator. For example, the Act required that the perpetrator was aware of the girl’s 
age, i.e. that he “knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce” a girl who is underage. It 
restated, “with the purpose and intent to induce or coerce her” into prostitution, debauchery, 
or immoral purpose (emphases added).58 Requiring and emphasizing the perpetrator’s 
purpose and intent was contrary to notions of “strict liability” that underpin age of consent 
and statutory rape law. Those laws intended to operate on strict age-based status regardless of 
the adult perpetrator’s actual awareness of the minor’s age. However, the 1910 Act largely 
followed the same rationale and elements for minor girls as it did for adult women.   
The Act maintained at least two major barriers to strict liability on the basis of age of 
the victim. Not only did it require the adult perpetrator’s personal knowledge of a girl’s age 
of minority and resolute determination for the girl to engage in “prostitution, debauchery or 
                                                
58 The combination of “purpose and intent” here suggests that the intent of the perpetrator alone is not enough 
to find victimization of a girl; the perpetrator must also be “purposeful.” This suggests a tougher standard for the 
prosecution of an offender. 
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other immoral” behavior, but it also used the language of “induce or coerce” to describe what 
the perpetrator must have done to cause the girl to do so. This counteracts its apparent 
recognition that victimization occurs regardless of whether a girl “consents,” i.e. “with or 
without her consent.” With this equivocation on the issue of consent, the Act suggests that a 
minor who “consents” is simply “a common prostitute” rather than a victim of sex trafficking. 
In these ways, the Act maintains a good girl/bad girl dichotomy through such stealth 
distinctions between a prostitute and trafficking victim. The only distinction made between 
women and girls is that the penalty for trafficking “underage girls” is double that of 
trafficking of-age women. Both are designated felonies, but the sentence for trafficking of 
girls is ten years in prison and a $10,000 fine, compared to five years and $5,000 for an adult 
woman, to be meted out “in the discretion of the court” (Section 4). Thus with regard to 
domestic trafficking of women and girls, the Act made the protection of a child contingent on 
the perpetrator’s knowledge, intent and purpose of specifically targeting a child and upon 
inducing or coercing her, rather than the plain fact of the victim “being a child.” While 
appearing to bestow special protections to children, namely girls, it rendered criteria virtually 
the same for child victims as for adult victims, thus specifying no substantive difference 
between adults and children (women and girls) that would give children added protection. It 
made the level of punishment of the perpetrator the most prominent marker of a victim’s 
child status. Thus the Act operated from the perspective of deterrent theory and its 
prosecutorial imperatives, rather than from the perspective of children or girls as a protected 
class.  
The White Slave Traffic Act of 1910 also addressed international sex trafficking. It 
defined “alien women and girls” as a separate class of individuals, and clarified that this 
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portion of the Act dovetails from the 1904 international Agreement.59 The 1904 Act had 
concerned itself only with women and girls of European descent—“from any country, party 
to the said arrangement for the suppression of the white-slave traffic” (Section 6)—which 
were European and North American. The law applied to females recently forced across 
international borders as well as foreign females already in prostitution in the US, regardless 
of the amount of time they have been present in the country, i.e. those who “transported in 
foreign commerce” (crossed international borders), and those “engaged in prostitution or 
debauchery in this country” (Section 6). The distinction between domestic and foreign sex 
trafficking was not merely territorial or jurisdictional. The international portion of the Act 
maintains the same problematic conflation between women and girls that its domestic 
counterparts do. However, the striking difference between international and domestic is that 
the punishment for sex-trafficking foreign women and girls is considerably less than for that 
of American women and girls. First, the crime is designated only a misdemeanor for foreign 
women and girls, compared to a felony for trafficking American females, and up to two years 
in prison and a $2,000 fine, compared to five times that amount—upwards of $10,000 and 10 
years imprisonment—for American girls, and $5,000 and 5 years imprisonment for American 
women. It is also noteworthy that there is no difference in punishment between trafficking of 
foreign women and foreign girls, but there is between American women and American girls. 
In other words, the domestic (interstate) trafficking of American girls incurs double the 
penalty of that of American women, while that of foreign women and girls incurs less than 
half that of American women.  
These findings demonstrate that the “women and girls” conflation is not merely a 
problem of infantilizing adult women, under the pretext of expanding the scope of its 
                                                
59 The Act clarifies that it is pursuant to the 1902 international agreement of the Paris Conference, which 
culminated in the international 1904 White Slave Traffic Agreement, to which the US “adhered” in 1908. 
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“protection,” which has been the focus of feminist theorists, but also a function of adultifying 
girls, which diminishes or denies their victimization by narrowing the class of victims. Yet, 
by naming them, the law brought girls under the same moralistic scrutiny of the state, without 
offering them any unique or heightened protections. In breaking with the age-based strict 
liability of age of consent and statutory rape laws to create a distinct crime of “white-slave 
traffic,” it made childhood-based protection from commercial-sexual exploitation contingent 
on equally problematic notions of victimhood and consent that have done little to distinguish 
child status and offer child protection. The deterrence effect that doubling the penalty for 
trafficking American girls supposedly creates is dubious as a form of “protection,” since 
deterrence is directly aimed at punishing perpetrators and can only, at best, hope to protect 
victims in this indirect manner. Thus the structure of victimization and punishment in White 
slavery law was racialized, gendered, and classed, and not particularly child-protective. In 
particular, its heavy reliance on punishment as the primary marker of the child status of the 
victim denied child status and childhood-based “protection” to foreign girls.  
Even though European immigrants from the signatory nations would soon be legally 
recognized as White Americans, per the story of racial formation in the US, this 
differentiation between American and non-American victims of sex trafficking nonetheless 
established an important and enduring distinction between international and domestic sex 
trafficking that would rapidly become more explicitly racialized. The Howell-Bennett Act of 
1910, which passed simultaneously, continued the trajectory of older sex trafficking and 
immigration laws, penalizing those who import aliens for immoral purposes and deported 
aliens in prostitution as well as those engaging in the business of prostitution. The demand of 
feminist jurisprudence has been that the law should “move away from merely attaching 
criminal sanctions to crimes against women,” and instead focus on remaking the terms of the 
social and sexual contracts (Douzinas and Gearey 2005: 238; Pateman 1988). The Mann Act 
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exemplifies how the focus on punishment can detract from such an aim, and reinforce the 
racial and sexual contracts, particularly in the way that both subsume child subjects.  
Whether current legal discourse on the issue of child sex trafficking is progressing 
depends largely on transcending this history and overcoming the mechanisms that have 
historically structured the law to re/produce inequalities. Though the law has been neutralized 
for reference to race and gender in recent decades, it remains severed from the history of 
slavery, class strife and struggles over childhood that initially brought these terms into being 
but which were appropriated for hegemonic ends. Laws may appear child-protective while 
taking steps to limit their own effectiveness. When the TVPA was first enacted in 2000, its 
focus on international trafficking differentiated between domestic and foreign victims and 
created a dual track system. Reversing from 1910 and due to geo/political shifts, the TVPA 
which effected greater protections for the foreign victims, although these benefits have not 
often materialized (Kara 2009). Historically, the discourses of prostitution and trafficking 
have been intertwined, and both constructs have existed uneasily alongside one another, with 
“prostitution” always deployable against children to adultifying and thereby criminalizing 
effect. Contemporary constructions of minors through the discourse of prostitution and 
historically discriminatory discourse of trafficking may not be purged of their historical 
saturations, given not only statistical disproportionalities for criminalization of girls of color, 
but also encoded words such as “street” in the prostitution context in law and order discourse. 
These discourses have been mutually shaped over time with reciprocity between the state and 
national levels, such that they cannot necessarily be separated by state-based jurisdiction. 
However, punishment theories of retributivism or rehabilitation and political orientations can 
intensify or alleviate their effects.  
This chapter has discussed ways in which minors have been constructed in and 
through prostitution and trafficking laws to create provisional childhood, rendering child 
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protection conditional and child criminalization allowable. Equivocation on this issue in 
which child sex trafficking is never entirely decoupled from “prostitution” and its adultifying 
effects signifies that child status alone has never been sufficient for “child protection.” This 
tends to undermine framings of the issue operating on presumptions that children are 
idealized, benefit from special protections and chivalry, and that regulation of this issue is 
merely or primarily a matter of combating the infantilization of women and the unwanted 
interference of the state, as it becomes a more complicated matter than this when reframed to 
center children. What is needed is greater attention to historical developments and 
continuities, which politics are privileged or sidelined, and to what extent past inequalities are 
reproduced in new contexts, including through silences and omissions. The following 
chapters turn to the ways in which the victim/offender and consent/non-consent dualisms 
interplay with the foundation laid by legal discourse with regard to the adult/child. 
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CHAPTER 4: Ideal and Culpable Victims 
 
In Chapter 3 we saw the blurring of boundaries between “adult” and “child” through the 
adultification of minors in prostitution, particularly African American girls, in the broader 
context of increasingly waiving African American and Latino minors into the adult justice 
system. Similar processes are at work in the construction of victimhood and perpetration, 
victims and offenders. American legal discourse dichotomizes prostitution and sex trafficking 
as two separate phenomena, but it also blurs the boundaries between them in equally 
problematic ways. This applies to both international and domestic child sex trafficking. 
Welfare-via-criminal justice interventions to both are generated within a framework of crime 
and border control. Legal discourse on international trafficking emphasizes the control of 
immigration and international borders, while that of domestic trafficking emphasizes law 
enforcement. The quasi-criminalization of minors in prostitution exemplifies the blurring of 
boundaries between welfare and criminalization historically and in the neoliberal era—not 
only between juvenile justice and adult criminal justice, but also between the criminalizing 
aspects of juvenile justice and child protection. Insofar as child welfare and its philosophical 
foundations have contributed to notions of modern childhood, the way the law blurs 
distinctions between the child as victim and offender—combined with its obfuscation of 
where welfare and criminalization begin and end—intertwine with and accelerate the erosion 
of childhood discussed in Chapter 3. 
A review of the literature on punishment and juvenile justice (Chapter 1) shows that there 
are many structural, institutional and philosophically foundational reasons that lead to 
equivocation regarding the difference between victim and offender generally, which similarly 
impacts the distinction between adult and child and consent and non-consent as well. In the 
child prostitution context specifically, the construction of child prostitution as “prostitution” 
conveys criminal wrongdoing on the part of the minor, signaling the need for punishment. In 
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contrast, “sex trafficking” conveys victimization and suggests the need for protection. 
Response to prostitution under the prohibition model, which criminalizes prostitutes 
themselves, seeks retribution for a crime of morality against the public. The construction of 
minors in prostitution as victims of commercialized sex under DMST statutes relays the idea 
that they are children in need of protection and should not be criminalized. Typically, media 
reportage and scholarly and policy analyses appear satisfied that the law, at least in its intent, 
is child protective. Less scrutinized are the criminalizing means by which the ‘protection” is 
to be achieved, such as arrest and detention. Policies that recommend these techniques under 
the auspices of protecting girls from pimps, traffickers or to prevent recidivism are either not 
engaging the literature on punishment and juvenile justice, or choosing to ignore its insights. 
Studies on juvenile arrests and detention in the context of disproportionate minority youth 
contact demonstrate that these are techniques of criminalization, not de-criminalization. 
Chapter 4 examines the dichotomized construction of child prostitution as prostitution or 
sex trafficking, which is to examine the boundaries between punishment and protection. The 
same basic set of legal texts outlined in Chapter 2 are examined but with a shift in focus 
toward how they establish the structure of culpability for prostitution and sex trafficking, and 
how the victim/offender binary it generates contributes to the making of minors in 
prostitution as bad subjects marked by the condition of criminalized multiplicity. It 
investigates prevarication regarding victimhood in child prostitution as rooted in ambivalence 
regarding child prostitution itself, which manifests in the contradictory characterization of 
minors in prostitution as criminal offenders of prostitution and crime victims of sex 
trafficking. The two primary responses to child prostitution are constructed through the 
bifurcation of prostitution and sex trafficking, resulting in an oppositional dynamic in which 
prostitution imputes culpability on the person who sells her sex, and sex trafficking 
 156 
exculpates the person whose body is sold. Respectively, they each represent the conceptual 
core of the punitive regime and protective regime to which impacted minors are subjected. 
The protective construct of sex trafficking forms part of (but also competes across) a 
continuum of abuse and criminality, including age-of-consent based laws that proscribe child 
rape, child sex abuse and statutory rape. Even though DMST attempts to redefine child 
prostitution similarly, as a sex crime against children, lawmakers cannot seem to get past 
minors’ culpability as commercial sex offenders to fully conceptualize it as an economic and 
sexual crime committed against children, and provide them with unequivocal protection. 
Furthermore, although prostitution is a punitive construct and DMST a protective one, both 
are technologies of crime control used for the quasi/criminalization of child prostitution 
across all states. They coexist in the criminal codes of all states, whether the state tends 
toward retributive or rehabilitative approaches to crime. Both are technologies of punishment 
for the criminalization of child prostitution operating across all states. This complicates the 
notion that Utah represents the more retributive model overall and Illinois the more protective. 
This chapter will demonstrate that punitive and child-protective tendencies coexist in both 
states through the enduring contradiction of minors being perceived congruently as victims 
and offenders. This reflects the broader structure of Western punishment and juvenile justice 
as vacillating between retributivism and rehabilitation, but what is striking about child 
prostitution is that they are contradictorily embodied in the same subject A clearer indication 
of states’ commitment to protecting and/or preventing CSEC is whether and to what extent 
states attempt to acknowledge and resolve this contradiction in ways that benefit children. 
This chapter is structured by three main findings regarding how the victim/offender 
binary is deployed to penalize minors. First, it unpacks the bifurcation and contradictory 
construction of child prostitution as “prostitution” on the one hand, and as “child sex 
trafficking” on the other. The notion of DMST is ostensibly created to reconcile the 
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contradiction of “child” and “prostitute,” but nonetheless competes on a continuum of 
existing criminal laws that apply a range of labels to minors in prostitution, including as 
victims of various sex crimes (child rape, child sex abuse and statutory rape) on the 
protective end of the spectrum, or as sex offenders on the punitive end, the latter being the 
stronger tendency.  
Second, it interrogates how this bifurcated construction of the issue creates ambivalence 
regarding its subjects. Minors are not straightforwardly treated as victims, but rather judged 
against “ideal” and “culpable” victimhood, or as offenders of a sex crime. Although 
sociological studies have primarily focused on the type of behavior and respectability this 
entails (Halter 2008; Lee 2011), their research calls for better understanding of the race, class, 
gender and childhood dimensions resulting in what I refer to as criminalized multiplicity—the 
over-determination of criminalization based on perceived violations of law as well as 
multiple norms—to which the “child prostitute” is particularly vulnerable. The first and 
second discussions are interwoven, discussing the US generally, then the two states, Utah and 
Illinois. The US discussion establishes the broader national context for the states, while state-
level discussion demonstrates the bifurcation and mutual shaping of prostitution and 
trafficking, and the construction of victimization and perpetration. 
Third, the practice of quasi-criminalization, justified using child protective discourse, 
renders minors in prostitution, at best, prosecutorial tools, and reifies their disposability. The 
construction and utilization of victimhood and perpetration in legal discourse regarding child 
prostitution reinforces the findings of Chapter 3 regarding the racialized, gendered and 
classed construction of childhood.   
The key points and argument that these findings support are that despite the ostensible re-
conceptualization of minors in prostitution as victims of commercial-sexual exploitation and 
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the adoption of race- and gender-neutral language, both jurisdictional circumscription (state 
vs. federal) and conceptual bifurcation of prostitution and sex trafficking create geographic 
and cognitive barriers to dismantling prostitution culpability as commercialized vice that is 
gendered and racially loaded. Commercialization is the means through which the law 
differentiates between the age-of-consent based protective regime against sexual predation on 
children (child rape, child sex abuse, statutory rape and DMST), and the punitive regime of 
prostitution law. It is the dividing line between minors’ victimhood and culpability, the latter 
of which labels them as sex offenders, and places them in league with those who commit 
such violations against children. Despite interjection of the term “trafficking” to justify 
passing prostitution laws, minors’ protection is conditional upon unrealistic standards of 
innocence (ideal victimhood). Female culpability persists and female victimization is 
recognized insofar as needed to prosecute facilitators of prostitution (pimps, traffickers), but 
not to decriminalize those considered victims.  
Moreover, categorization of children does not bestow “special” or increased protections 
for them in a law and order structure. It merely provides cover of legitimacy without fully 
committing to the decriminalization of minors. It renders minors targets of quasi-
criminalizing law enforcement efforts that primarily value their role as prosecutorial 
instruments (witnesses) whose potential criminalization can be leveraged as a bargaining tool 
for the extraction of evidence and testimony. This merely continues the instrumental 
de/valuation of exploited and exploitable children, and carves out an adversarial relationship 
between adults and exploited children by rendering authoritative adults as untrustworthy as 
criminal ones. Despite important differences between Utah and Illinois that comport with 
their reputations, respectively, for retributivism and progressive utilitarianism, they each 
adopt particular means of penalizing minors and re/producing good girl/bad girl dichotomies. 
Retributivism focuses on punishing offenders rather than victim protection per se, yet this 
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does not translate to greater prosecution of pimps and traffickers, and certainly not “clients.” 
Particularly troubling are laws that commit to protecting children only upon first arrest for 
prostitution, a practice that itself belies victim status, but transmogrify them to offenders 
upon subsequent findings of prostitution. This represents the illogical escalation of penalties 
for “repeat offenders,” which change minors’ status from dependent to delinquent, and from 
misdemeanor-offender to felon.  
Criminology and juvenile delinquency/justice literature identify disproportionate 
minority contact (DMC) including of youth (DMYC) as ensnaring children of color in the 
criminal/juvenile justice systems and perpetuating the repeat-offender cycle (recidivism), 
while the urban sociology of Wacquant (2007) and legal scholarship of Alexander (2012) 
have pointed out ways in which such processes bolster racialized mass incarceration as de 
facto slavery. Examination of the quasi/criminalization of minors in prostitution pushes this 
framework further by showing that carceral politics and techniques are not only deployed as 
management of a despised, criminalized underclass, but extend even to those legally 
recognized as vulnerable, exploited and requiring protection. This requires closer attention to 
emergent modes of penalization despite discursive shifts toward victimization that appear 
chivalrous, sympathetic and decriminalizing, particularly in the age of “decarceration” as a 
response to the crisis of legitimacy for criminal justice induced by Alexander’s (2012) New 
Jim Crow critique. Legal-discursive shifts regarding child prostitution do not transcend the 
basic limitations of criminal punishment that merely reinscribe minors in the perpetual 
suspension between retributivist and rehabilitative tendencies, which is a general feature of 
modern Western crime control. Sociologists urge critical examination of justifications for 
punishment, i.e. methods of facilitating crime control, adopted in the name of collective good. 
Closer, detailed examination of the victim/offender binary as devised through prostitution 
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and sex trafficking, and as constructive of minors in prostitution, will highlight how 
quasi/criminalization of minors persists.  
4.1 The Construction of Prostitution and Sex Trafficking 
4.1.1 “Prostitution” as punitive code 
Examining the historical and contemporary construction of prostitution and sex 
trafficking reveals that whereas prostitution discourse has rendered prostitutes criminally 
culpable, its competing discourse of sex trafficking (including DMST) has seemingly 
attempted to render prostitutes criminally inculpable.60 Though seemingly eclipsed by the 
TVPA (2000), the Mann Act has endured over a century. The regulation of prostitution, 
including whether to criminalize minors for prostitution, continues to be the jurisdiction of 
the states, except where the federal government deems it may legally be found to rise to the 
level of “sex trafficking.” As the last chapter showed, federal dis/engagement has historically 
had profound consequences for minorities and children, and the distribution of rights and 
resources. The endurance of the state/federal split and its prostitution/sex trafficking corollary 
represent the codification of slavery’s afterlife or re/production of race in its contemporary 
legal legacies. Because the regulation of health, welfare, safety and morals is conceded to 
states’ “police powers,” the common practice of regulating prostitution as “morals” in state 
criminal codes is the reinforcement of jurisdictional dominion (including the idea that sex 
trafficking requires border-crossing), and retention of the power to continue viewing sex 
trafficking as prostitution and to criminalize children as prostitutes. In 2008, 44 out of 50 
states allowed minors in prostitution to be arrested, criminally charged with prostitution 
offenses, prosecuted and incarcerated (Snow 2008: 3-4), despite federal and international 
prohibition of this practice. By 2016, 36 states continued criminalizing minors (Website of 
US Congressman Ted Poe). In 2014, there were 190 arrests for prostitution in Utah, 31 of 
                                                
60 Discussed further in Chapter 5, sex trafficking laws also determine criminal culpability based on a finding of 
“consent.” 
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which were children (Website of the State of Utah 2014). In its current reports, Illinois makes 
it harder to see this rate because it has done away with the word “prostitution” as a category 
of crime, subsuming this under “human trafficking” for sex (and labor, as the other category 
of human trafficking). Strangely, this erases arrests for prostitution off its criminal statistics 
report, even though presumably such arrests continue to occur (Website of the State of 
Illinois 2015).  
Legal texts that construct the issue of “prostitution” demonstrate ways in which the 
word has come to serve as punitive code by establishing the criminal culpability of those it 
labels as “prostitutes.” Through these we start to see the drawing of boundaries between 
victim and offender, the construction of prostitution culpability, and notions of ideal and 
culpable victimhood. Early related cases and legislation also created a split between federal 
and state jurisdiction that respectively circumscribes prostitution and sex trafficking. In other 
words, they established “prostitution” as an issue reserved for the states, while “sex 
trafficking” fell within federal jurisdiction. This has deterred federal will to intervene on 
behalf of potential victims of sex trafficking where cases are deemed to involve “prostitution,” 
reserved for states’ jurisdiction.61 “Prostitution” not only establishes the culpability of 
“prostitutes,” but also negates a major means of constructing minors as victims of “sex 
trafficking,” thereby denying victimization and victimhood in the child prostitution context. 
Legal discourse on prostitution—with reference to child prostitution—is traceable to 
an early, nationally significant case, State of Iowa v. Ruhl (1859). Ruhl is key to early 
establishment of the structure of criminal culpability for prostitution, age of consent and 
                                                
61 This has important implications since local law enforcement is too often complicit in local CSEC, whereas 
federal law enforcement is often more detached from local crime or criminal networks and politics, and thus 
capable of more effective intervention. 
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statutory rape.62 Decided during the antebellum era and well before the Progressive Era 
reforms with which the development of modern age of consent, statutory rape and sex 
trafficking laws are typically associated, the written opinion in Ruhl centered on debating the 
definition of “prostitution,” mentioning the word 23 times in an 8-page decision. Though 
important to understanding the origins of the legal conceptualization of prostitution generally, 
Ruhl involved child prostitution, of a 15 year-old girl, and determining whether the defendant 
had lured her away from her family for purposes of prostitution. The court designated the girl 
as lacking capacity to consent to sex due to her age. Judge Wright wrote, “Under the age of 
fifteen, the child is legally incapable of giving consent.” The language of statutory rape 
figures into this early legal text that predates its Progressive Era codification. 
“The question hinges on the meaning of the word prostitution,” the decision reads 
with regard to the defendant’s guilt. In defining “prostitution,” the decision refers to an Iowa 
statute—“§2584 of the Code”—to interpret the meaning of the word.63 The case decision 
defines prostitution as “common, indiscriminate, illicit, intercourse, and not merely seduction, 
or sexual intercourse confined exclusively with one man.” In debating the definition of 
prostitution, the court cites what appears to be a combination of authors of legal treatises, an 
English dictionary, and a judge: 
Mr. Bouvier says that prostitution means, “the common lewdness of a woman, for 
gain.” A prostitute, according to Webster, is a “female given to indiscriminate 
lewdness; a strumpet;” and prostitution is defined as “the act, or practice, of offering 
the body to an indiscriminate intercourse with men; common lewdness of a female.” 
Walker's definition is, “the act of setting to sale; the life of a public strumpet.” 
                                                
62 It is also important for understanding culpability and victimhood in American criminal jurisprudence 
generally, particularly with regard to “strict liability” for sexual offenses against minors, where offenders are 
criminally liable based solely on the age of the victim (Leonard 2003). 
63 This reference means that “prostitution” had been defined by the state’s legislature even earlier than 1859, the 
year this case came before the court on appeal, as an example of prostitution prohibition before the Progressive 
Era officiated it nationally. 
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For purposes of ascertaining the guilt of the luring offender, it goes on to distinguish 
prostitution from seduction, with indiscriminate sexual intercourse being the primary 
distinction between the two. 
[S]he must be enticed away with the view, and for the purpose, of placing her in a 
house of ill-fame, place of assignation, or elsewhere, to become a prostitute in the 
more full and exact sense of the term; she must be placed there, for common and 
indiscriminate sexual intercourse with men, or, at least, she must be enticed away for 
the purpose of sexual intercourse by others than the party who thus enticed her; and a 
mere enticing away of a female for a personal sexual intercourse, will not subject the 
offender to the penalties of the statute. 
The decision concludes by remarking that to place a minor girl in a brothel, a “house of ill-
fame…where she would be in the society alone of the lewd and lascivious,” is to place her in 
conditions which “her prostitution might be regarded as almost necessarily to follow.” The 
inevitability of the girl’s prostitution in such a context was enough to hold liable a man who 
lures her there.  
The court insisted on the defendant’s guilt because the statute intended to criminalize 
“taking and enticing away an unmarried female, under the age of fifteen years, from and 
without the consent of the person having the legal charge of her person, for the purpose of 
prostitution.” The judge reasoned that if the court were to not hold an adult man liable who 
lures away an orphaned child like this 15 year-old girl entrusted to the care of her uncle’s 
family, it would mean that “the most defenseless would be, so far as this offense is concerned, 
completely at the mercy of the base and selfish debaucher.” Thus the offender in this early, 
foundational ruling on prostitution, is an adult male so motivated. The decision makes clear 
that this is regardless of whether he knew the age of the female. Therefore, a debaucher 
assumes the risk of procuring girls who are underage, and will be held liable for doing so 
regardless of lacking actual knowledge of their age. In contrast, the victim is a girl child who 
is 15 years of age or younger, living in unfortunate circumstances (in this case, orphaned), 
and rather vulnerable.  
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Although age of consent and statutory rape law is often attributed to and associated 
with Progressive Era reforms that raised the age of majority to modern levels, the American 
legal record in various states reveals such earlier efforts to establish an age of consent, quite 
often motivated by criminalizing or deterring child prostitution.64 These decisions focused on 
adult males luring minor girls into prostitution. Thus, both Progressive Era reforms leading to 
modern age of consent and statutory rape laws as well as earlier nineteenth century statutes 
and cases that established 10-12 years old (and above) as ages of majority were significantly 
motivated by preventing child prostitution.65 These efforts, broadly, have also established the 
concept of “strict liability” in American criminal jurisprudence (Leonard 2003), which 
represents the principle of punishing more strictly and establishing bright lines of age for 
culpability when the offender’s actions are deemed sufficiently severe and immoral, and the 
victim class is deemed sufficiently vulnerable, defenseless or disempowered. Ruhl was the 
first of such cases holding strict liability along lines of age, and establishing age of consent as 
central to the issue of child prostitution, and of course, statutory rape. These constructs and 
principles were established under a broader judicial motive for maintaining the social 
contract, social cohesion and protection of the child, expressed in a statutory rape ruling from 
1896 as “[t]he protection of society, of the family, and of the infant” (People v. Ratz, 46 P. 
915, 916). Thus early legal ruling on child prostitution structured culpability by defining 
prostitution as female culpability and distinguishing seduction as adult male perpetration 
against girls, particularly against their abduction from their family and placement into 
circumstances that would certainly lead to their prostitution. Personal knowledge of girls’ age 
of minority was irrelevant. As an early watershed case, preventing child prostitution and 
punishing adult male perpetrators for it motivated Ruhl. Thus, victim/offender boundaries 
                                                
64 Other landmark cases include People v. Fowler (1891) from California, involving child prostitution, and 
statutory rape cases of State v. Newton (1876) from Iowa and People v. Lewellyn (1924) from Illinois, the latter 
of which occurred after Progressive Era reforms. 
65 Previously, this area of law seemed primarily guided by the English sixteenth century statute that designated 
as a felony sex with girls under 10 years of age. 
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were relatively clear with regard to child prostitution in the dominant American legal 
discourse. 
4.1.2 Physical and cognitive boundaries 
The end of Reconstruction and dawn of the Gilded Age brought racialized 
immigration law regarding sex trafficking that excluded foreign children from even the 
tentative child protection afforded US citizen children. By the Progressive Era the key case of 
L’Hote (1900) determined that the regulation of prostitution falls within the jurisdiction of 
states. By defining it as an issue of public health and morals, its regulation was delegated to 
the “police power” of the states. 
[O]ne of the difficult social problems of the day is what shall be done in respect to 
those vocations which minister to and feed upon human weaknesses, appetites, and 
passions. The management of these vocations comes directly within the scope of what 
is known as the police power. They affect directly the public health and morals. 
L’Hote represents the longstanding construction of prostitution in American legal discourse, 
originating in the Progressive Era and the end of the Gilded Age, during which time criminal 
prohibition specifically against “prostitution” solidified. An early legal articulation of 
prostitution criminality during this era, it attributes voracity and ravenousness to prostitutes, 
as those who prey upon the presumed sexual weakness and appetite of men.  
 In 1910, a decade after L’Hote established the regulation of prostitution as the 
jurisdiction of states, the sixty-first US Congress passed the White Slave Traffic Act (WSTA) 
or Mann Act, which reinterpreted prostitution as an issue of sex trafficking. WSTA 
established the lineage of modern DMST law. It defined sex trafficking as falling under 
federal jurisdiction. Its rationale was that the federal government has plenary power over all 
matters affecting interstate and foreign commerce, and since sex traff
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commerce, Congress can regulate it.66 Thus, prostitution would only be interpreted as sex 
trafficking if it involved the cross-border movement of females, like commodities/chattel, 
whether across state lines or international borders. WSTA was described in the legislation as 
“An Act to further regulate interstate and foreign commerce by prohibiting the transportation 
therein for immoral purposes of women and girls.” This effectively prevented federal 
intervention into domestic child sex trafficking unless it involved the cross-border movement 
of girls. It designated as a felony the crime of 
any person who shall knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce any woman or 
girl under the age of eighteen years from any State or Territory or the District of 
Columbia to any other…with the purpose and intent to induce or coerce her, or that 
she shall be induced or coerced to engage in prostitution or debauchery, or any other 
immoral practice,  
 
and “in furtherance of such purpose” causes the girl to be transported across such borders 
(Sixty-First Congress. Sess. II. Chs. 393-395, 18 USC §§2421-2424).  
Three years after passage of the WSTA, the case of Hoke v. United States (1913) 
reinforced the states’ rights stance of L’Hote by ensuring that despite federal anti-prostitution 
laws in the realm of sex trafficking, the power to prohibit prostitution was preserved for the 
individual states. Although Hoke was adjudicated at the height of White Slavery hysteria, and 
upheld the Mann Act as constitutional, it preserved “unquestionably” the control of the states 
“over the morals of their citizens…[which] extends to making prostitution a crime” under 
states’ ‘police powers.’” Today, although the TVPA protects minors as victims of “severe 
forms of trafficking,” implying their exculpation from prostitution liability, it effectively 
                                                
66 Dating back to 1824, the Commerce Clause of the US Constitution bestows vast power over federal regulation 
of interstate commerce—the exchange of goods or services involving transportation between cities, states and 
nations, including the traffic in goods and travel of people over state boundaries (Garner 2006: 114). Congress 
has complete and exclusive power to regulate what is considered to be commerce among the states, with foreign 
countries and Native American tribes (Id.). It has expanded and contracted at various times in history, mainly 
expanding up to the 1930s but shrinking significantly under the Rehnquist Court, often as part of the struggle 
over state sovereignty.  
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continues the states’ rights tradition associated with Jim Crow of leaving it to the states 
whether to criminalize minors, under the rationale that prostitution is a crime, and crimes and 
the regulation of “morals” are the domain of states. Vacillation between state jurisdiction 
over prostitution and federal jurisdiction over sex trafficking marks the construction of the 
two concepts in American jurisprudence, from which flows the illegibility of prostitution as 
sex trafficking. The bifurcation of prostitution and sex trafficking and their jurisdictional 
circumscription, respectively, into state and federal domains, combined with the culpability 
associated with prostitution in legal discourse explain much of how and why minors in 
prostitution continue to be criminalized despite the existence of sex trafficking discourse. 
Within particular state-level criminal codes, the major means by which the law 
differentiates between the age-of-consent based protective regime against the sexual 
predation of children (child rape, child sex abuse, statutory rape and DMST) and the punitive 
regime of prostitution law is by making commercialization the dividing line between minors’ 
victimhood and culpability. Today’s prostitution laws, still mostly regulated under the 
heading of “morality” in criminal codes identify commercialization as their defining criminal 
element. Despite a temporal distance of over one hundred years mediating the two texts, the 
secondary authority of Wharton’s Treatise on Prostitution from 2014 reflects remarkably 
similar language and tone to L’Hote (1900). Though arguably less moralistic, the modern 
Treatise similarly invokes prostitution as a “vocation,” and places perhaps greater emphasis 
on this by highlighting commercialization as the dividing line between mere “illicit sex” or 
“promiscuity,” versus “prostitution.” Prostitution law is unconcerned with illicit sex and 
promiscuity, whereas it explicitly proscribes prostitution.  
The criminal law is not concerned with the prevention of illicit sexual intercourse; 
presumably, the crimes of fornication and adultery are adequate for that task. This is 
true even where the woman is promiscuous in her sexual activity. It is the commercial 
aspect of prostitution, entailing the concomitant evils of professional vice, which 
attracts the attention of the criminal law. Accordingly, prostitution statutes require the 
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element of ‘price.’ The requirement is commonly phrased in terms of a ‘fee,’ or 
‘money or its equivalent,’ or as under the Model Penal Code, the accused is a 
prostitute if he or she engages in sexual activity ‘as a business.’ (2 Wharton’s 
Criminal Law §264, 15th edition). 
This specifically refers to “woman” as the subject, but then attempts to appear gender neutral 
through reference to “he or she.” Historical constructions of prostitution in terms of “evil,” 
“vice,” and immorality—as opposed to gendered socio-economic strain or commercial-sexual 
exploitation—extend to the present context as well as how the law equates the commercial 
aspect of prostitution with criminality, thus establishing the boundary between “legal 
promiscuity” and “illegal promiscuity.” The attribution of the “evil” of prostitution to females 
and the construction of prostitution as an issue of commercialized female sexuality informs 
the dominant legal construction of prostitution as gendered commercialized vice. By 
constructing their role as offenders—the solicitors of sex for material gain—it renders minors 
in prostitution similar to adult women in prostitution, as temptresses or seductresses of adult 
males. The legal interpretation of their acts as “prostitution” labels them as sex offenders, 
placing them in the same category as pedophiles, abusers and exploiters who attempt or 
commit sexual violations against minors. “Prostitution” serves in opposition to the 
victimization/perpetration narrative of White Slavery and age of consent-based laws by 
shifting the blame for prostitution away from adult males and onto minor females. Thus the 
legal discourse of prostitution suggests a kind of malice on the part of children that is 
contrary to the definition of commercial-sexual exploitation of children embedded in the 
language of DMST statutes and international law against child sex trafficking. Emphasizing 
the commercial aspect of acts that would otherwise be considered child rape, child sex abuse 
or statutory rape functions to retain the culpability of children for acts of exploitation, abuse 
and sexual assault, and to divert it from adults, or actual child perpetrators (e.g. “juvenile 
pimps”). 
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Even though the explicit language of the WSTA aimed to protect women and girls 
from sex trafficking per its legislative history, legislative debates and reports that informed its 
construction of victimhood and perpetration, it would increasingly become utilized in ways 
that reflected the culpability of prostitutes. The cases of United States v. Holte (1915) and 
Gebardi v. United States (1932) demonstrate this trend over decades after its passage. Both of 
these cases held that women (who would otherwise be viewed as sex trafficking victims) can 
be held liable for conspiracy of their own prostitution under the WSTA. This suggests the 
enduring strength of the concept of “prostitution” and the trope of culpable “prostitutes,” 
which have very often overpowered notions of “sex trafficking,” even given the moral panic, 
hysteria and sensationalized popular media representation that sex workers rights feminists 
attribute to white slavery and modern sex trafficking.  
4.2 Utah’s State level bifurcation of prostitution and sex trafficking 
4.2.1 Breaking with retributivism? 
The bifurcation of prostitution and sex trafficking is reflected on both the federal and 
state levels. With regard to prostitution, both Utah and Illinois, like other states since the 
Progressive Era, have a history of retributivism toward those labeled prostitutes. Similar to 
other states’ prohibitions, Utah’s statute proscribed vaguely all moral violations of a sexual 
nature. Such broad parameters have historically served as a prelude for the kind of discretion 
used to target females and sexual minorities, according to its major precedent Salt Lake City v. 
Allred (1967). This case shows how prostitution was constructed in ways that target 
prostitutes for punishment as a means to promote and improve prosperity, morals, peace, 
order, comfort and convenience, since prostitutes were considered antithetical to these aims. 
Its socially conservative stance on non-marital sex and deference to police foreshadows its 
contemporary counterparts in legislative debates, which are replete with deferential 
statements toward law enforcement and the state’s commitment to law and order. 
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Wharton’s Treatise on White Slavery (2013) describes the Wheeler case hailing from 
Utah as establishing that the WSTA’s “original purpose...was (and presumably still is) to 
protect women and girls who were weak from men who were bad.” However, it contravenes 
this by citing another case, United States v. Garrett (1975), which holds that “women who 
were bad could also be guilty of violating the Act.” This characterization of the holdings of 
Utah-based WSTA cases suggests that when potential victims are perceived as “bad women,” 
it counteracts the trope of “bad men” as sexual predators, and thus negates female 
victimization. The national discourse regarding sex trafficking, as it has played out in the 
state of Utah, certainly establishes the ways in which “prostitution” (via invoking the “bad 
woman”) hedges against “sex trafficking” committed by “bad men.” This creates a discursive 
omnipresence of the possibility and likelihood of female complicity in sex trafficking, when 
female behavior is perceived to be more in line with that of a “prostitute.” 
When examining Utah through the lens of its own discursive framework on child 
prostitution law (on an “intrastate” level), the construction of prostitution and DMST also 
materializes and takes similarly bifurcated form, but through its own localized politics and 
particular articulations. With the exception of Nevada all states of the US have enacted 
statutory prohibitions against prostitution (Miller and Haltiwanger 2004: 208). The 
criminalization of prostitution in Utah predates its establishment as a state, but it first codified 
“sexual solicitation” as recently as 1993.  
Utah’s current statute on “prostitution,” which was passed in 1992 defines prostitution 
as follows:  
An individual is guilty of prostitution when the individual: (a) engages in any sexual 
activity with another individual for a fee, or the functional equivalent of a fee; (b) is 
an inmate of a house of prostitution; or (c) loiters in or within view of any public 
place for the purpose of being hired to engage in sexual activity.  
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In the next section it designates prostitution a “class B misdemeanor,” but contains a repeat 
offender provision that makes a subsequent conviction a “class A misdemeanor.”67 
Immediately noticeable are the gender neutrality, diminished moralistic language, emphasis 
on commercialization, and decreased penalty in the modern statute compared to previous 
language from just a few decades before. The statute nonetheless remains focused on 
prostitutes as offenders, and finds repeat offenses increasingly reprehensible.  
Utah legislative debates regarding prostitution demonstrate that the culpable identity 
of the “prostitute” is most salient in its legal discourse, ultimately overshadowing the victim 
status of minors or of those impacted by sex trafficking. In constructing the issue of 
prostitution, lawmakers exhibit a combination of law-and-order rationale, religious and 
sexual conservatism, dubious conceptions of “human trafficking,” and contrived gender 
neutrality. With regard to law and order, just as with the 2011 amendments to Utah’s sexual 
solicitation statutes, promoted by Utah’s champion of human trafficking law Representative 
Jennifer Seelig, the prostitution debate (HB 92) demonstrates that the state is adamantly 
committed to facilitating arrests, protecting officers and bolstering prosecution. These 
constitute the modus operandi of law and order responses to child prostitution, in a retributive 
framework particularly in light of the dearth of resources for impacted minors.  
Selective sympathies and articulations of the unspeakable:  
Law and order, religiosity, and conservatism 
One of only two legislative debates of substance regarding prostitution available 
publicly on record is regarding HB 92. The legislative purpose of the prostitution statute was 
                                                
67 Throughout US jurisdictions the distinction between and significance of a misdemeanor and felony charge is 
that the former entails the serving of jail sentences of one year or less, whereas a felony charge entails serving a 
prison sentence of greater than one year (Garner 2006: 460, 288). Employment and public and private aid 
applications most often also require disclosure of felony convictions on one’s record, thereby creating a legal 
barrier to employment and aid (see, generally, Alexander 2012). Socio-economic exclusion associated with the 
status of felons locks them into a cycle of marginalization and recidivism, which in both the adult and juvenile 
justice systems results in racialized patterns disproportionately impacting African Americans in particular but 
also Latinos (Id.). 
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to facilitate the more expedient prosecution of repeat offenders of prostitution, and does not 
mention pimping or patronizing. While prostitution is discussed as a problem that the bill 
intends to deal with, prostitutes themselves are referred to directly only at one time—with a 
mixture of discomfort and in a tone that makes light of the subject matter. The prime 
concerns of the bill, however, seem to be unkempt streets and the drainage of state resources. 
Representative Wharton, concerned about overcrowding jails with potentially increased 
prostitution arrests, states “Having a large…having a district that…as you know…heh…has a 
problem with this thing, I’m all for getting them off the streets and doing something” (HB 92). 
The bill passed unanimously and the only statements referring directly or indirectly to 
prostitutes encase them as a problem to be managed, burdens on the county courts and local 
justice systems, as well as potential burdens to correctional facilities. The aim of keeping 
prostitutes off the streets—out of public space and view—is a classic hallmark of the law-
and-order criminology of Broken Windows Theory that focuses on the targeting of low-level 
offenders. Applied to prostitution, it casts a punitive net over those in street prostitution, in 
which poor females of color and those with mental illness and drug addictions tend to be 
concentrated. 
Notably, similar to the refusal of other legislators to articulate the sexual acts being 
proscribed in the legislation they debate (even as sponsors), Representative Wharton also 
refused to refer to prostitution or prostitutes aloud, instead referring to them as “this thing” 
and “them.” The refusal to properly articulate the subject matter and subjects leads the 
legislator to adopt objectifying language. The acts that are the subjects of statutory rape and 
prostitution laws are “unspeakable” for some legislators in this way, whereas others do not 
hesitate to speak of atrocities. For example, in a separate but arguably related legislative 
debate, one Utah lawmaker argues strongly for enhanced sentences for child rape, reciting 
horrific details of injuries that a father caused through sexual assault of his infants (SB 2). 
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Utah legislators will passionately articulate condemnations with religious fervor and 
invocation of graphic imagery when it serves punitive ends against those clearly recognized 
as pedophiles under child rape statutes, similar, for instance, to the utilization of similar 
techniques in anti-abortion campaigns. This suggests lawmakers’ selectivity with regard to 
prudence in discussing sexual acts and sexual violence. Legislators’ statements and 
omissions—the illustrative examples as well that deemed “unspeakable”—demonstrate a 
willingness to discuss sexual violence against children openly, to highlight their victimization 
with a view towards retribution, but a reluctance to discuss commercial-sexual exploitation 
candidly. This signifies their ambivalence regarding victimization in this context. 
4.2.2 “I guess, the prostitutes” 
The next debate of record in Utah regarding prostitution does not appear for another 
two decades (February 2012). It comprises a brief and rather incoherent monologue from the 
sponsor of House Bill 276, Representative Ray, followed by no questions or discussion and a 
unanimous pass from lawmakers. HB 276 is specifically regarding “aiding sexual solicitation.” 
Since there is no specific reference to an exemption of minors as victims, the prostitution 
statute may be applied to minors and adults alike.  
Representative Ray’s speech merits quotation in its entirety for several reasons. First, 
it is one of only two “debates” on record regarding prostitution specifically. Second, its 
confusing and incoherent representation of the subject matter conveys a dubious 
understanding of prostitution and human trafficking that is attributable to the Legislature as a 
whole for having passed the bill unanimously and without further discussion after the 
Representative’s speech. Third, it is one major example among several of Utah legislators’ 
convoluted and ultimately impressionistic speech with regard to matters related to child 
prostitution. 
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Representatives, this bill comes off as…during the summer I did some…ride-alongs 
with Salt Lake City and one of the things we did was some vice work. What we found 
out is when…if you look on—it used to be Craigslist, but they’ve done away with 
that—but there’s a few other internet sites that you look on—you can find sites where 
they’re talking about…massages and a lot of covers for prostitution. What happens is 
you generally—and we’re talking more human trafficking here than anything else—
but you have…the person—male or female—who’s in charge of the…I won’t use the 
word ‘escorts’ because of the…they think they’re not doing prostitution, but—I guess, 
the prostitutes—and they’re coming into the hotels, and these are the guys that are 
driving them there, and a lot of times forcing them into this type of a situation. They 
walk in, they set up the massage table, or they set up the room or do whatever they’re 
gonna do, and they wait in the vehicle. The gal in the room is arrested 
for…prostitution. The guy that set up the appointment who drove over there and set 
up the table and whatever else it was he set up walks away scot-free. So what we’re 
doing in this bill is we’re just simply saying that if…that person is involved…if they 
provide any service or commit any act that permits a person to commit any violation 
of that act, if it facilitates—aiding and abetting basically—prostitution. With that I’m 
open to any questions, Madam Speaker.  
Reading the monologue in its totality conveys the level of confoundedness that Utah 
lawmakers possess and are willing to base legislation upon. The convoluted speech indicates 
lack of clear ideas, logic and rationale for the bases of law in this area, demonstrating that the 
Legislature is willing to pass laws based on the stringing together of phrases, fragmented 
thoughts and incomplete sentences that create ostensibly sufficient association and 
impression of “good law.” This is especially problematic given that several legislators 
express throughout various debates that most of them—often none of them other than the 
sponsor—may have read the bill prior to voting on them or passing them. Though the 
Representative implies in the next-to-last statement that he is about to explain what the bill 
does, “simply,” he does not actually complete his thought. Rather, he implies that a person 
who aids, abets or facilitates prostitution according to statute or in such a scenario as that 
described ought to be the target of law enforcement, prosecution and punishment.  
Representative Ray’s speech not only impresses an idea of the victim and offender in 
the scenario he describes as well as provides an example of the problematic discourse 
regarding laws related to child prostitution, but also gives insight regarding the source of 
“knowledge” and “authority” upon which his and others’ constructions rely to pass laws and 
 175 
justify punishments, namely “some ride-alongs” in police cars during vice operations. The 
rationale for this law was formulated based on one legislator’s experience from inside a 
police car, from a law enforcement perspective that is reflected in his monologue and 
ultimately in the statute. His statement is also an admission that law and law enforcement 
target prostitutes and that pimps and traffickers have not been targeted. He acknowledges and 
endorses routine arrests of prostitutes in the context of ramping up efforts to also arrest pimps 
as facilitators. Utah’s law and its rationale provide a clear example of Broken Windows 
Theory and its targeting of low-level “offenders” who are constructed as victims in the same 
breath—embedded in and articulated through the “commonsense” of criminal lawmaking. 
Representative Ray makes no reference to the age of the persons whom he describes. 
However, he uses other means of describing “prostitutes.” First, he refers to prostitutes as 
persons who operate through websites similar to Craigslist.org, especially those that advertise 
“massages and a lot of covers for prostitution.” Second, he states, “I won’t use the word 
‘escorts,’” but is also reluctant to use the word “prostitutes,” a word which he is audibly 
uncomfortable with uttering. In actuality, however, he uses both and these are the official 
designations of the offender class in the legal record. He expresses a belief that “doing 
prostitution” is a better description of the criminal conduct that this class of persons engages 
in. The confusion over prostitution and sex trafficking—and victim/offender status—is 
perhaps most obviously displayed in his hesitant reference to “I guess, the prostitutes.” This 
label is attached despite his earlier interjection that “we’re talking more human trafficking 
here than anything else,” and he references “force” in the prostitution context. Third, the 
Representative speaks of “the gal in the room,” in reference to the person whom “the guy”—
an aider and abettor of prostitution—“sets up” or forces in a hotel room. Thus, he establishes 
the gender of the “prostitute” as female and of the offender (aider and abettor of prostitution) 
as male, even though at one stage he purposefully interjects—however awkwardly—the 
 176 
gender-neutralizing phrase “male or female” into his speech in a sentence about essentially 
pimps and how they facilitate prostitution. The prostitution law is admittedly deeply gendered 
in terms of victims and offenders, who are not necessarily two distinct classes, with the law 
viewing “prostitutes” more as offenders than victims. This demonstrates the objectification 
and instrumental construction of the prostitute—she is a victim for purposes of vilifying the 
facilitator (pimp/trafficker) so that the law can ensnare him, but she is a criminal committing 
vice whose arrest is presumed righteous, despite characterizing her situation as “human 
trafficking” and potentially involving “force.” In listening to this monologue, one observes 
that despite the overall fragmentary nature of the speech, the statements referencing “human 
trafficking” and the phrase “male or female” distinctly convey the character of talking points 
equivocatingly inserted for some politically sanctioned but ineffectual purpose. Utilization of 
the increasingly re-popularized phraseology of variant forms of “trafficking” and formal 
gender egalitarianism produce an irresolute intervention, leaving the trope of prostitution 
culpability undisrupted.  
Unlike in other legislative debates and statutes discussed, it is difficult to discern the 
prostitute as the victim in the scenario that Representative Ray recounts. He states that “the 
guys that are driving [the prostitutes to the hotels]” are “a lot of times forcing them into this 
type of situation,” which implies that if there is no force then there might not be a victim. 
However, he also states that oftentimes “The gal in the room is arrested for…prostitution,” 
while “the guy” “walks away scot-free.” This can be viewed as implying that the law’s 
refusal to target pimps victimizes the prostitute, but since prostitution is illegal and therefore 
merits arrest, and the focus of the legislation is the punishment of pimps, how the prostitute is 
treated is a non-issue and is more reasonably viewed as bolstering the case for arresting 
pimps in conjunction with arresting the prostitute, rather than not arresting the prostitute. It is 
certainly not an argument for decriminalization of prostitutes. 
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Based on the available legislative debates regarding prostitution as well as statutory 
language, a victim and offender profile emerges that is more ambiguous than the ones that 
form through the discourse of child and statutory rape and laws that criminalize DMST. Only 
with the implication of “force” from a male pimp toward a female prostitute can any class of 
victims be imagined. However, absent “force” against a prostitute and despite the sponsor’s 
reference to “human trafficking” as the proper term for what he is “really” talking about, the 
class of offenders includes both prostitutes and pimps, since both of their actions are criminal 
and arrest-worthy. In a retributive framework that subscribes to legal liberalism, this move 
blurs the line between victims and offenders—rendering both parties offenders—while 
appearing to have sympathy for victims of human trafficking and to promote egalitarianism 
through equal punishment of prostitution “offenders.” Meanwhile, there is no mention of 
“johns,” the class of persons that has largely escaped legal scrutiny and law enforcement 
targeting, despite their indispensable role in prostitution, as its “demand side.” The 
Representative argues that the purpose of the bill is to rectify the commonplace targeting of 
prostitutes but not pimps, but the omission of buyers/johns/abusers from prostitution 
culpability is particularly tenacious and undisturbed by the Representative’s characterization 
of prostitution. 
Utah’s legislative debate regarding prostitution is thus marked by a convoluted, 
impressionistic discourse, little or no discussion, dialogue or debate regarding prostitution 
and sex trafficking, and a dubious conception of the phenomena. The mere use of buzzwords 
cannot indicate a deep understanding of sex trafficking and prostitution, victimhood and 
perpetration. This lack of cognitive clarity on the part of lawmakers is what allows 
“prostitution” to trump even the force, fraud and coercion associated with human trafficking, 
and to render those who are ultimately “prostitutes” the targets of law enforcement, as has 
historically been the case. In the aggregate the rationale supporting Utah’s prostitution statute 
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is not an argument for decriminalization of prostitutes or victims of sex trafficking , but rather 
for expanding the punitive remit of the law over facilitators (pimps), while leaving the 
culpability of prostitutes and impunity of “johns” intact. 
4.2.3 Culpable victimhood 
By the year Utah passed its own sex trafficking law (2008), the TVPA had been in 
effect for eight years. By then, despite Salt Lake City being identified as a major national and 
western regional area for sex trafficking, there had been no federal TVPA charge brought in 
Utah (Snow 2008: 48). The federal government’s refusal to take jurisdiction over Utah’s 
most publicized case to date, Zarif (2006), can be viewed as a result of the bifurcation 
between prostitution and sex trafficking stemming from the division of the two constructs 
along state/federal lines, wherein prostitution is viewed as a states’ issue and sex trafficking 
as a federal one. Although that case, involving minor girls paid to have sex with adult males, 
was construed to have risen to the level of sex trafficking, the federal government refused to 
intervene on grounds of its intrastate geography. The high-profile anti-trafficking NGO 
Shared Hope International reported in 2008 that an interviewee at the US Attorneys Office 
(USAO) explained that the TVPA did not apply in Zarif because of lack of evidence that the 
defendant benefited financially or induced the girls to cross a state line (Snow 2008: 48). 
However, the facts of the case indicate Zarif’s “facilitator” role, as a pimp, and interstate 
movement is not required under the TVPA. Instead, it may simply be that the USAO has 
adopted its own internal requirement or institutional rule for accepting a case that it will 
charge under federal jurisdiction (Id.). Decisions of criminal justice institutions such as the 
USAO are almost always guided by political considerations and resource allocation. It 
appears that federal reluctance to intervene based on the political worry of violating states’ 
rights embedded in the state/federal split guided this decision, and other similar instances of 
non-intervention. 
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The construction of victim and offender in Zarif is noteworthy. In his case before the 
Court of Appeals, the decision finds that “Zarif had transported two minor females to his 
house for the purpose of engaging in prostitution.” This alone meets the definition of DMST, 
and the state recognized it as such by charging him under its human trafficking provisions, 
specifically for “three counts of enticing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for 
the purpose of producing visual depictions of such conduct; one count of possession of child 
pornography; two counts of enticing a minor to engage in prostitution; one count of 
possession of a firearm by a prohibited person; and one count of possession of 
methamphetamine.” He had also told the girls that he runs a “brothel” or “escort service,” and 
once the girls agreed to perform sex acts with men, he made arrangements for this at his 
residence, and the girls subsequently performed what they had agreed to. However, Zarif was 
ultimately found guilty solely of producing child pornography, per facts of the case showing 
that he supplied “V1 and V2,” the two minor girls with alcohol then filmed “lewd and 
lascivious acts” involving them. The decision also suggests that he possessed other similar 
footage of "young girls, maybe only 14 years old, performing sex acts." Overall, Zarif is 
described as luring or enticing minor girls into prostitution by offering them substantial 
amounts of money (claiming to offer up to $300) for performing sex acts with adult men. 
Since Zarif was tried under the state’s own DMST statute, which was brought against 
him as a trafficker, the girls were not implicated as prostitutes. The “V1 and V2” designation 
of the girls stands for “victim 1 and victim 2,” a common abbreviation in criminal law. The 
victim label sets the tone for how the minors are constructed—definitively as victims rather 
than as prostitute-offenders. At least one of the girls, V2, is also identified in the decision as a 
runaway. Several legislatures across the US and certainly anti-trafficking NGOs demonstrate 
awareness of the decades-long research citing that minors’ running away from home is a 
major precipitating factor for child prostitution. Running away is often prompted by physical 
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or sexual abuse—a risk factor for minors’ entry into prostitution—one that legislatures rarely 
articulate (Kramer and Berg 2003). It is possible that this general knowledge in some way 
informed the court’s understanding of V1 and V2 as victims, but in any case comports with 
victimization studies. The girls’ parents had also discovered the crime, and then contacted 
law enforcement. The girls were then cooperative with the law enforcement investigation of 
Zarif, providing material information in their interviews with police, positively identifying 
Zarif in a photo lineup, and generally behaving as good witnesses for the state. All of these 
conditions comport with Halter’s (2008) scheme for the likelihood of law enforcement to 
label minors in prostitution as victims rather than offenders, thereby influencing their 
treatment throughout the rest of criminal procedure. Had the girls been arrested as prostitutes 
or as part of busting a prostitution ring, they would very likely have been swept up with adult 
offenders and subject to detention. They would then need to clear themselves of prostitution 
charges, whether in adult or juvenile justice or family court (see Brown 2007). Though some 
effort is made to prevent this by allowing minors to expunge prostitution charges, this 
neglects the time, energy, resources and trauma associated with criminalizing practices for 
those ensnared by justice systems. It is also nonetheless part of the DMC cycle that catalyzes 
socio-economic marginalization (Alexander 2012). Even in state-level cases in Utah where 
the state equivalent of DMST charges were brought against adults (under UCA 76-10-1305, 
1306, “aggravated exploitation of prostitution”), minors swept up in raids or arrests of 
perpetrators are often first detained and criminally investigated, then if they are deemed good, 
cooperative, useful witnesses and/or categorized as DMST victims, they will later be 
described by law enforcement and by media in terms of victimhood (see, e.g. The People of 
the State of Utah v. Uhrhan 2013).  
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In 2008 Utah passed its own law designating human trafficking, including DMST, as 
felonies.68 As discussed in the previous chapter, despite adoption of several seemingly child 
protective measures that year, just three years later, the House amended Utah’s sexual 
solicitation statutes, intending to get prostitutes, including minors, “off the streets.” This law 
and order stance heralded the intent expressed in legislative debates leading to its passage—
to handle minors in prostitution through criminalization or quasi-criminalization, with the 
greater aim of protecting police officers. The bill was advanced as a means of expanding 
officers’ ability to arrest minors in prostitution by formally removing any need for “proving 
techniques” involving physical touching to demonstrate proof of the suspect’s agreement to 
prostitution activity (see Babb 2012: 286). Though Representative Seelig expressed 
awareness that many of the prostitutes she referred to were minors, “the zeal to protect police 
officers and allow for the arrest of more prostitutes prevailed” (Id.: 287). The vice units and 
operations of Utah police have been scandalized due to several officers essentially indulging 
in sexual encounters or even sexually assaulting females during prostitution operations 
(stings, raids, and searches). The timing and purpose of this bill supports the view that the 
bill’s aim is to expand law enforcement power and to counteract the public relations problem 
of police corruption in handling vice, including raping suspects. As found in many states, 
Utah’s prostitution laws and its anti-trafficking laws are sometimes compartmentalized in 
ways that make them seem unconnected when the two phenomena are intertwined. At the 
same time, however, the legislature has ostensibly attempted to reconcile the two by injecting 
the phrase “human trafficking” into its debate on prostitution, and including a child 
prostitution provision in its modern prostitution statute. If we view law regarding child 
prostitution on a continuum, DMST intercedes between the protective end of the spectrum 
(laws related to child rape, child sex abuse and statutory rape) and the punitive end 
                                                
68 Utah codes that directly outlaw DMST include laws against human trafficking, aggravated human trafficking, 
and aggravated exploitation of prostitution involving a child. Utah established the crime of human trafficking by 
passing its first related bill in 2008 (UCA 76-5-308). 
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(prostitution) in an apparent attempt to neutralize the commercial aspect that serves to 
criminalize prostitutes, but never quite prevails. While DMST or any synonym do not appear 
in the text of its provisions related to children, it should be analyzed as part of the texts 
defining the issue of sex trafficking and DMST in Utah, particularly since the Bill proposing 
the changes made direct reference to “human trafficking.” HB 254 was titled “Human 
Trafficking Victim Amendments,” and once passed in 2014, it made statutory modifications 
that define child prostitution and ostensibly distinguish it from adult prostitution.  
Moreover, the discursive imbrication of prostitution and sex trafficking leads to 
equating the two, while the cooptation of human trafficking language into a law-and-order 
framework equates victim protection with offender punishment. In 2011 Utah passed 
amendments to its sexual solicitation law that rendered legal language regarding prostitution 
gender-neutral. Remarkably, despite appearing to be an attempt to reconceptualize minors as 
victims and child prostitution as DMST, lawmakers actually mimic the same language they 
used regarding prostitutes and prostitution. At the same time, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
Representative Jennifer Seelig, the legislator who proposed the bill, made it clear that the 
point of the law is to help police arrest women and girls for prostitution, in order to get them 
“off the streets,” ostensibly for their own protection. Utah demonstrates ambivalence, at best, 
regarding the status of minors in prostitution, using quasi-criminalizing language that gives a 
veneer of protection to the women and girls it targets. Legal discourse in Utah regarding sex 
trafficking, including DMST, combines sympathy, child protective language, and 
consciousness regarding debt peonage and abuse of the legal process in trafficking with 
retributivism and law-and-order rhetoric. The net result is that it renders victim protection 
synonymous with offender punishments in a context that equates victims and offenders.  
In this process, child segregation and offender punishment are spun as “special 
protections” for children. While lawmakers recognize the criminalization of children 
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incidental to their involvement in prostitution, they do not address child decriminalization but 
rather remain focused on the punishment of perpetrators. Also as discussed in Chapter 3, 
Utah’s 2013 aggravated human trafficking law regarding unaccompanied children in the 
“smuggling” context was preceded by legislative debate on HB 163 in which its chief 
sponsor Representative Seelig claims that attaching “aggravated” to crimes against children 
confers special protection to children. The law also protects victims of any age from sexual 
offenses committed against them in the course of smuggling or human trafficking for labor or 
sexual exploitation. This apparently expresses a strong concern with punishing transgressions 
against children and redressing sexual offenses against human trafficking victims of all ages, 
and does not directly address victim protection. The only other Representative to comment on 
it substantively, a supporter of the bill, Representative Red, discussed the victims in this way: 
“Unfortunately…I’ve had to deal with victims of trafficking…most of the time way after the 
event…sometimes when they’re…suffering from mental illness…sometimes when they’ve 
gotten involved in other problems and end up in jail...and I just think this is a step in the right 
direction to try and limit this grievous offense to humankind” (HB 163). This understanding 
of human trafficking victims—as persons often entangled in related criminal activity and 
inferably requiring treatment and rehabilitation for mental health problems—contrasts quite 
heavily with the legislature’s construction of “prostitutes,” even though it declared prostitutes 
as the victims of human trafficking. However, viewing the issue through an orientation of 
retributivism, the legislature primarily addresses the issue through enhanced punishments of 
pimps or traffickers. Though this may seem as simply par for the course in addressing social 
problems through criminal law, it is not merely so. Decriminalization of minors or persons in 
prostitution is one means available to criminal legislators that this particular legislature is 
demonstrably uncommitted to or passionate about relative to criminalization and retribution. 
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Utah’s sex trafficking laws construct offenders in terms of specific behaviors outlined 
in the code. It appears that the law constructs offenders as criminal agents, whereas victims 
are passive and acted upon. This is certainly salient in the requirement that victims be ideal 
victims. However, upon closer examination, we see how minors in prostitution are made 
culpable and adult males, especially “johns” are shielded in various ways.69 An interesting 
feature of the offender construct is that it is far more defined by behaviors and actions, as 
opposed to the victim construct, which is defined by victimization or a state of victimhood, a 
much more passive role of being acted upon. This has normative implications for how 
victims are expected to behave—passive but cooperative—with the demands of law 
enforcement and the circumstances in which they should be found. Though the statute 
demonstrates some awareness regarding traffickers’ modus operandi, overall, Utah’s legal 
discourse appears far less informed by oft-cited research related to sex trafficking victims, 
leading one legal commentator from Utah to argue—regarding states in general, including 
Utah—that “investigations, laws, and prosecutions should reflect these realities” (Jeffs 2013: 
224). These realities include the extreme socio-economic constraints animating those in 
prostitution and the childhood abuses that the majority of them have experienced. Even 
though force is technically not a requirement of “sex trafficking” where minors are concerned, 
the fraught boundaries between adult and child, prostitution and sex trafficking, victim and 
offender, and consent/non-consent (discussed in the next chapter) nonetheless require 
                                                
69 The human trafficking offender is “an actor” who “recruits, harbors, transports, or obtains a person through 
use of force, fraud or coercion” (UCA 76-5-308(1)). The statute then lists the means by which an offender can 
achieve force, fraud or coercion, describing the modus operandi of traffickers, including debt bondage (UCA 
76-5-308(1)(a)-(d)). These actions include: (a) threatening serious harm or physical restraint against the person 
or a third person; (b) tampering with (destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating or possessing) government 
identification document such as passport or immigration document; (c) abusing or threatening abuse of the law 
or legal process against the person or third person; (d) using a person’s condition of being a debtor who has 
pledged his/her personal services (or that of another person’s in his control) as security for debt where the 
reasonable value of the services is not applied toward the liquidation of the debt, or the length and nature of 
those services are not respectively limited or defined. The behaviors listed in this portion of the law are ones that 
are typically included, in some form and with some variation, in international and federal law regarding 
trafficking, and thus have become standard behaviors associated with traffickers. They demonstrate an 
awareness regarding the modus operandi of traffickers outlined in the bulk of research related to human 
trafficking, much of which informs national and international law. 
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consideration of these in how legal discourse constructs child prostitution and minors in 
prostitution.  
The latter half of Utah’s modern prostitution statute, effective as of May 2015, defines 
“child engaged in prostitution” as one who “offers or agrees to commit or engage in any 
sexual activity with another person for a fee” (UCA 76-10-1302(3)(iii)). This is the same 
definition as applied to adults, which uses the language of contracts (the subject of Chapter 5). 
In the next section it delineates the protocol for law enforcement officers when encountering 
a minor in prostitution. Police must conduct an investigation, refer the child to a special 
division, and “if arrest is made, bring the child to a receiving center, if available; and contact 
the child’s parent or guardian, if practicable.” The “if available” language indicates the 
importance of resources (the availability of child receiving centers in the jurisdiction), while 
the arrest provision explicitly authorizes arrest as a means of handling minors in prostitution. 
This establishes the pathway for criminalization or quasi-criminalization, particularly should 
the state or jurisdiction have no other facilities available.  
Strikingly, the child prostitution provision does not refer to children as victims in this 
context. This is in stark contrast to Utah’s legislative debates, statutes and cases categorized 
under DMST. The prostitution statute then applies the same retributive logic behind the 
repeat offender provision of the adult prostitution section to child prostitution. It states that 
police are required to check with the division that is supposed to receive minors for whether 
the minor has been referred to them “on at least one prior occasion,” and if not, she will be 
provided with child protective services. If, however, she was previously referred to the 
division—meaning that she had previously encountered or been arrested by law enforcement 
for prostitution—she “may be subject to delinquency proceedings.” Such a response to child 
prostitution marks the dubious understanding of the phenomenon that underpins punitive 
responses to it, does not distinguish between prostitution and sex trafficking, and 
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demonstrates confoundedness regarding victimization and perpetration. The incremental 
increase of retributivism with each “offense” demonstrates ambivalence regarding the 
victimhood of minors, which is at odds with an understanding of child prostitution as a form 
of sex trafficking or commercial-sexual exploitation. If we follow the logic of age of consent-
based laws such as statutory rape, and even employ the earliest (sexist and moralistic) 
definitions of prostitution in cases involving children, a minor is legally incapable of 
consenting to sex, and therefore, strictly to be considered a victim of commercial-sexual 
exploitation. How does a second incident of commercial-sexual exploitation automatically 
become an offense of prostitution on the part of the minor merely due to its repetition? Upon 
first arrest, a minor in prostitution is a victim. Upon subsequent arrest, she is an offender. The 
legal fiction of the culpable victim translates to detrimental material realities for minors in 
prostitution. 
Although it appears that Utah amended its statute to create greater leniency and 
protection for minors, in reality it created a first-time offender rule. In constructing what 
would be designated the “victim” in a DMST statute, by including the child in a prostitution 
statute in a manner that makes their protection contingent on never having come into law 
enforcement contact for prostitution, Utah actually designated the child as an offender on par 
with adult prostitutes through subjecting them to a repeat offender provision, while appearing 
chivalrous by separating them into a category of their own. This is particularly stark when 
juxtaposed against the fact that patronizing a prostitute always remains a Class B 
misdemeanor regardless of the number of convictions of the offender (Jeffs 2013: 237, legal 
commentary explaining UCA 76-10-1302). The sole exception to this is if the patron is 
knowingly HIV-positive (UCA 76-10-1309). There is no escalation of penalties applied to 
buyers who offend more than once, though they almost always do. The operative 
presumption is that once minors in prostitution are “rescued” by law enforcement, they will 
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not end up back in prostitution unless they are not victims but simply offenders, i.e. they 
intend to be in prostitution. Therefore, the logic goes, there should be no second encounter 
with law enforcement and second referral to the division.  
Empirical research on child prostitution, whose findings even conservative lawmakers 
have relied upon, suggests that this is an unrealistic presumption for several reasons. First, the 
dearth of resources for the rescue and rehabilitation of victims of sex trafficking nationally, 
but especially in the state of Utah, create greater likelihood that victims will not receive the 
kind of intensive material support and services necessary for such a successful program. 
Second, system-involved girls—those referred to special “divisions” for children and entered 
into the child protective apparatus such as foster care—often end up in prostitution, in a 
feedback cycle driven by coercive and often grim or desperate material circumstances. 
Finally, sanctions against potential or actual trafficking victims are ineffective, whether the 
aim is to protect minors from exploitation and trauma or to deter involvement in prostitution. 
The rationale of criminal sanctions is to deter criminal offenders against a particular 
offending behavior, and therefore sanctions would only—theoretically—be effective against 
a class that the law designates as criminal offenders. Furthermore, the de facto first-time 
offender rule implies that minors must meet a requirement of innocence that would seem to 
hinge on their being forced into prostitution by an individual or network of individuals, rather 
than coerced into prostitution by dire circumstances, even though force is not a requirement 
for minors to be recognized as victims of sex trafficking under federal or even Utah DMST 
law. As one Utah-area lawyer observed in her 2012 commentary on the state’s solicitation 
statutes, “A traditional punitive attitude of moral disapproval aimed at prostitutes of all ages” 
permeates Utah’s legal discourse (Babb 2012: 282). Listening to and observing lawmakers in 
the Utah Legislature debate these matters provides insight into how retributivism is generated 
and how Utah’s particular brand of it constructs the issue and its subjects. By mid-2016 Utah 
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removed the repeat offender provision, to clarify that children arrested for prostitution are not 
to be processed as delinquents. However, the general shakiness of reconceptualizing minors 
as victims demonstrates that the various means and language of criminalization have ways of 
creeping into the discourse. 
While injecting the phrase “human trafficking” into its discourse on prostitution, Utah 
conflates adult and child prostitution, authorizes the arrest of minors for prostitution, and 
subjects them to escalating penalties as juvenile delinquents. It renders their protection 
conditional upon unrealistic standards of innocence, when it is already jeopardized by lack of 
resources. The retributive framework prioritizes law enforcement aims at the sacrifice of 
child welfare. The compartmentalization of children into a separate category from adults does 
not translate to “special” or increased protection of children in a law and order structure. It 
renders children the target of law enforcement efforts geared toward “low-level offenders,” 
which at least quasi-criminalizes minors, particularly in the absence of adequate resource 
allocation for their diversion into alternative systems. Though victims of DMST are 
constructed in stark contrast to culpable prostitutes, the legislature’s greater concern seems to 
be prosecuting pimps/traffickers and enhancing their punishment, and this renders minors in 
prostitution as prosecutorial tools. In an apparent attempt to reconcile “child” and “prostitute,” 
the Utah legislature allows the culpable prostitute identity to subsume that of the non-
consenting child victim.    
4.2.4 Comparing prostitution and DMST within the retributive framework of Utah 
In Utah adultification and criminalization (or at least quasi-criminalization) mark both 
approaches to child prostitution—whether constructed through “prostitution” or “sex 
trafficking,” including “DMST.” The prostitution framing of child prostitution entails arrest 
and punishment, but the DMST framing also embraces this, particularly insofar as child 
prostitution is incorporated into the prostitution statute, even if it is distinguished from adult 
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prostitution. In light of neoliberal law-and-order thinking, which emphasizes personal 
responsibility and the punishment of low level “offenders,” the criminalization response 
adultifies and blurs the boundaries between adult and child prostitution with the same 
responses and incremental punishment.70 It operates under the mistaken presumption that 
primarily economically motivated crimes can be deterred with punishment, as opposed to 
preventive resource allocation via distributive justice upstream (addressing risk or 
precipitating factors of child prostitution), or at least rehabilitation resources downstream 
(palliative, remedial or restorative measures after commercial-sexual exploitation has 
occurred). In a neoliberal law-and-order framework, the quasi/criminalization response of 
arrest is viewed as an essential tool of the downstream “rescue” apparatus of the state, after 
the state has failed families and once families and the state have failed children. Thus when 
child prostitution is interpreted through the lens of prostitution, even when adult/child 
distinctions are explicitly made, the primary response is quasi/criminalization.  
Since the DMST debates, statutes and cases make no other provision for how to 
handle minors in prostitution. However, the prostitution statute does, by specifying their 
arrest and application of a first-time offender rule, and the prostitution statute would guide 
protocol. This would trump the finding of the report of Shared Hope International (2008) on 
Salt Lake City, which explains that law enforcement in Utah are aware of the victim status of 
minors in prostitution and treat them accordingly, but are limited by extra-legal factors (lack 
of resources and federal/state cooperation). Moreover, SHI’s report was issued in 2008, 
several years prior to the 2014-2015 rewriting and amendment of Utah’s prostitution statute 
to include child prostitution and how to handle the issue and its subjects. Even though at first 
glance it may appear an act of chivalry toward juveniles, we can see how it actually 
                                                
70 Note, however, that even though “johns” are “low-level offenders” similar to “prostitutes,” law-and-order 
policing has not targeted them, carrying forth the practice of pre-neoliberal era law enforcement. This denotes a 
specific gendered dimension to policing in this area that is particularly tenacious, even through paradigmatic 
shifts in policing. 
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implicates them in prostitution through adultification and inequitable “equalization” through 
the same punitive crescendo applied to adults.  
The phrase “off the streets,” used by the Utah legislature in both the prostitution and 
DMST contexts, is a signal of law and order and broken windows theory. It is deployed in 
both discourses alongside acknowledgement of the existence of child prostitution, and that 
the bills will impact minors. Where minors’ profiles and circumstances meet ideal 
victimhood, as in the Zarif case—deemed good, cooperative witnesses capable of advancing 
the state’s prosecutorial imperatives against pimps and traffickers—they are constructed as 
innocent, exploited victims. There is no evidence of the arrest or quasi/criminalization of V1 
or V2 in Zarif. 
 Utah’s religiosity (conservative Christianity) contributes to its retributivism in distinct 
ways. Once the legislature determines that a particular class of persons constitutes criminally 
blameworthy offenders, its rhetoric becomes poignantly retributive, often encased in Biblical 
terms and parables (SB 2). The blurring of victim and offender in the child/prostitution 
context and use of a retributivist framework exacerbates this, as the treatment of minors in 
prostitution, too, becomes suffused with carceral and quasi-criminalizing techniques of law 
and order. The inclination for punishment eclipses the child protectiveness conveyed in some 
of the speeches. Child and victim protectionism are rendered a pretext for the enhanced 
punishment of offenders, allowing the legislature and public to focus on incarcerating 
offenders rather than on protecting minors. There is no discussion of socio-economic roots or 
distributive justice in debates that most explicitly address prostitution and sex trafficking in 
the criminal context. This is particularly troubling in a state that allocates virtually no 
resources for sex trafficking victims generally, or minors in prostitution specifically.71 Like 
                                                
71 Utah’s only organization serving sex trafficking victims, the federally funded Utah Health & Human Rights 
Project, was compelled to terminate such services in 2011 due to escalating and increasingly hostile threats 
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all other states, Utah exhibits extremely low levels of arrest and prosecution for pimps, 
traffickers and johns compared to “prostitutes,” including minors.  
This emphasis on retributivism not only avoids the upstream matters of addressing 
root causes of and preventing risk factors to child prostitution—whether conceived of as 
prostitution or sex trafficking—but even certainly avoids the downstream rehabilitative focus. 
It creates a rather insurmountable barrier of carceral politics between the state’s response to a 
social problem it seems concerned with and reaching even the downstream of the river 
parable. It can appear to be targeting the culprits at the upper reaches of the stream, but this is 
only made possible through an individualized focus on offenders rather than a systemic 
understanding of the problem of commercial-sexual exploitation. Lawmakers’ statements that 
declare the purpose of bills to be child protectionism, particularly in the context of 
commercial-sexual exploitation, provide their proposals with a powerful veneer of legitimacy, 
as do most efforts that appear to benefit children in need. However, that purpose is 
undermined by retributivism, especially when minors are not decriminalized, but rather 
continue to be criminalized or quasi-criminalized in insidious ways. The offender is the 
central figure of such efforts, not the victim. Yet this retributivism and discursive targeting 
does not translate materially to the greater prosecution of pimps/traffickers, and certainly not 
of buyer/abusers (“johns”).  
Utah’s approach to prostitution is productive of race, class, gender and childhood 
normativities. Ideal victimhood requires that girls whose circumstances have led them to 
CSEC fit an unrealistic standard of ingénue, an ideal based on the norm of White, bourgeois 
girlhood. At the same time, the other possibility—victim blaming (via culpable 
                                                                                                                                                  
against its staff. This should be understood in the broader context of domestic terror threats against clinics and 
institutions that primarily serve women and girls, such as abortion clinics, as well as anti-feminism and anti-
LGBT politics fostered by conservative political and intellectual elites in the US, including in Utah, which have  
a stronghold in areas across the country in which such threats take place. [Website of Salt Lake City Weekly; 
Website of Salt Lake Tribune 2011].  
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victimhood)—for prostitution imputes responsibility for sexual violation on females as part 
of the gender socialization of girls via sexual relations, and is a strong feature of retributivism 
despite its seeming focus on punishing offenders. Both demonstrate different ways in which 
law facilitates girls’ socialization into the role of sexual subordinate. Child prostitution itself 
does this by subjecting girls’ bodies, sexuality and sexual development to external, 
overwhelmingly masculine “market” demands. It also does this by failing to acknowledge the 
exploitation of boys and gender non-conforming children, thus rendering these children 
illegible as subjects of CSEC. This is despite the fact that African American males and 
gender non-conforming persons in prostitution are at greatest risk for contracting HIV 
(Schepel 2011). To the extent that the law upholds these dynamics, it participates in the 
production of race, class, gender and childhood, using race- and gender-neutral language. At 
the same time, they largely ignore issues of class. The purchasing power of johns never 
figures into policies that may otherwise appear equitable because they dispense “equal 
punishment” to all parties regardless of the power differentials that make the exploitation 
undergirding “human trafficking” possible to begin with. 
4.3 Illinois’ state level bifurcation of prostitution and DMST 
4.3.1 “These are not nice girls”: Illinois on prostitution 
Although Illinois pioneers the rehabilitative model and reconceptualization of minors 
as victims, it finds other ways to employ a good girl/bad girl dichotomy. Similar to Utah, 
Illinois bifurcates prostitution from DMST, perhaps even more strongly than Utah because of 
its state-level leadership on the issue, for which it enjoys a reputation for “progressive” 
legislation in this area, in legal scholarship, popular media and NGO reports. Also similar to 
Utah, Illinois began with gender-specific statutes on prostitution, but its modern statute 
reflects the gender-neutral turn typical of other states’ statutes on prostitution. However, one 
major distinction noticeable between Utah’s and Illinois’ statutes is that, despite its reputation 
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for progressivism on sex trafficking, Illinois escalates the penalty for prostitution offenses to 
a felony after a certain number of repeat offenses. Based on the treatment of “prostitutes” as 
offenders, this means that Illinois makes an even stronger distinction between prostitution 
and sex trafficking than Utah. Illinois’ criminal code regarding prostitution reads as follows: 
Sec. 11-14. Prostitution.  
 
(a) Any person who performs, offers or agrees to perform any act of sexual 
penetration as defined in Section 12-12 of this Code for any money, property, token, 
object, or article or anything of value, or any touching or fondling of the sex organs of 
one person by another person, for any money, property, token, object, or article or 
anything of value, for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification commits an act of 
prostitution.  
(b) Sentence.  
Prostitution is a Class A misdemeanor. A person convicted of a second or subsequent 
violation of this Section, or of any combination of such number of convictions under 
this Section and Sections 11-15, 11-17, 11-18, 11-18.1 and 11-19 of this Code is 
guilty of a Class 4 felony. When a person has one or more prior convictions, the 
information or indictment charging that person shall state such prior conviction so as 
to give notice of the State's intention to treat the charge as a felony… 
The gravity of charging prostitution as a felony requires emphasis. As mentioned earlier, the 
distinction makes a major difference in terms of sentence length (including the “three strikes” 
rule that leads to a lifetime sentence), facility in which time is served (jail versus prison), and 
criminal record. The retributivism exhibited in Illinois’ prostitution law through the 
misdemeanor-to-felony escalation is particularly grave given that Illinois also has a harsh 
repeat offender law that can further escalate felony convictions to lifetime sentences should a 
person be repeatedly convicted (a third time, per “three strikes” laws).72 This may suggest 
that in the Illinois victim-protective model, the stronger protection of victims of sex 
trafficking seems to rely upon the greater vilification of “prostitutes” as offenders, in order to 
                                                
72 See Illinois’ “General Recidivism Provision,” on the website of the Illinois Legislature 
[http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/fulltext.asp?DocName=073000050K5-4.5-95]. Under this provision, 
criminal transmission of HIV in Illinois is a Class 2 felony, and therefore two or greater convictions could lead 
to the defendant being sentenced as a “Class X” offender, a designation typically reserved for the most serious 
crimes such as first degree murder, sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping. Such schemes illustrated the 
facility with which prostitution criminalization can escalate in a retributive framework for those most mired in 
“the life” and entangled in the prostitution/criminalization cycle. 
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contrast them from “sex trafficking victims.” This bifurcation polarizes prostitution and sex 
trafficking into the kind of stark binaries historically observed between constructions of 
prostitutes and victims of White slavery. But, as we also see, both historically and now, the 
culpability associated with prostitution survives the polarization process and continues to 
inform the construction of sex trafficking and sex trafficking victims.   
 On the other hand, a significant portion of the legal discourse of Illinois on 
prostitution is dedicated to discussing rehabilitation for those convicted of prostitution (not 
only persons identified as sex trafficking victims), though with the limitation of a first-time 
offender rule and considerable language suggesting “responsibilization” of offenders in a law 
and order framework. In debating House Bill 1319, Representative Delgado explained that it 
“seeks to rehabilitate people that are convicted of felony prostitution for the first time,” 
allowing a one-time sentence of probation rather than serving a prison sentence. This bill 
passed contentiously with 66 votes in favor and 50 votes against it. Discussion between 
various legislators established that the rehabilitation scheme would be similar to other 
diversion programs—those available for diverting juveniles and drug offenders out of 
criminalization in the justice systems, and decriminalized (and often medicalized) into 
treatment, services and/or benefits. The bill’s sponsor, Representative Delgado, began 
arguing for his bill by summarizing his understanding of the problem.  
The vast majority of persons in prostitution suffer from a long-term physical and 
emotional pain often resulting in mental illness, physical disabilities, post traumatic 
stress disorder. This is self-victimization for many reasons. They’ve been abused. 
They’ve had... they’ve been... there’s low... their self-esteem has been on... put on the 
ground. And this is pretty much they’re doing it to themselves. To give them an 
opportunity to... to really give them some real services is one of the best reasons I can 
give you for why this is important. 
This conception of the issue comports with the physical and psychological suffering 
of prostitutes that decades of research have confirmed, but laced with culpable victimhood. 
Every other thought articulates a presumption of “self victimization” on the part of persons in 
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prostitution, likening prostitution to a cycle similar to substance addiction. Yes, prostitutes 
suffer, but at their own hands.  State intervention is required only to save them from 
themselves. And they only deserve one chance at that.  
Reinforcing culpable victimhood, after more discussion ensuring a first-time offender 
rule and expressing reservation about helping repeat offenders,73 Representative Stephens 
states, “Okay. So, we’ve established that these are not quote ‘nice’ girls…” Before quoting 
the rest of his statement, it is important to pause here. What this statement unequivocally 
establishes is that a good girl/bad girl dichotomy is at work in the legislators’ 
conceptualization of prostitutes, a dichotomy consistently rearticulated in legal texts from the 
earliest prostitution cases to the 2014 Treatise on prostitution. I cite legislators in plural 
because although his opposition to the bill is defeated (since the bill passed), no one 
challenged or objected to Representative Stephens’ statement throughout the rest of the 
debate. Rather, the repeat offender status of the “girls” sufficed to classify them as not “nice.” 
To continue, the meaning of “not nice” can be inferred from the full statement, and the 
concurrence with the characterization can be gleaned from the ensuing dialogue:   
(Rep. Stephens) …these are not quote ‘nice’ girls who just made a mistake because 
they just got out of high school, or they became homeless one day, or because they... a 
pimp just grabbed them off the street. These are... these are prostitutes that have been 
out on the street, probably for some time, because you don’t get arrested and 
convicted on your first incident of prostitution, do you? 
Rep. Delgado: Right. Rarely, if it’s misdemeanor, it’s rarely. You’re absolutely right. 
It’s the second time. 
Rep. Stephens: Okay. So, you... so, we got a prostitute who’s been plying the streets, 
plying her trade, she finally gets caught. She might have been caught more than once, 
but finally got a conviction and then she went back out on the street. I don’t get it, 
Representative. 
                                                
73 “First-time offender rule” may be confusing in this context. The bill actually proposes diverting persons 
convicted of felony prostitution. This means that they have already been convicted of misdemeanor prostitution 
more than once, and thus can now be charged with felony prostitution. Therefore, once they are considered for 
this diversion/rehabilitation scheme, they are not technically first-time offenders of prostitution, per se, but 
rather charged with felony prostitution for the first time. 
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The implication is that ideal victimhood entails young girls of about high school age 
(teenagers), whom short of making a “mistake,” becoming homeless, or being kidnapped by a 
pimp, are culpable self-victimizers. Use of the word “mistake” is important here because it 
implies a first-time offense, the realization of one’s action as a self-made error, and 
subsequent redemption—never to return to the misbehavior—if one is sincerely and 
adequately sorrowful. The last statement, regarding the rarity of being convicted for an actual 
first-time offense, insinuates that no “first-time offender” is really a first-time offender. Even 
those labeled as such have probably offended multiple times in actuality. This creates an air 
of benevolence on the part of the state, in its intervention of rescuing those who may not even 
deserve it, but whom the state is nonetheless generous enough to assist.  
Rep. Stephens continues to implore with an implicit warning of a slippery slope: 
“…why prostitutes? Why don’t we do this with all crime?...Well, let me tell you why we 
don’t, because it’s a bad idea…I think this bill…does everything except punish lawbreaking 
prostitutes.” The bill ultimately passes, with the sponsor, Rep. Delgado, closing his argument 
with statements regarding the multiple needs of prostitutes as “women who are self 
victimizing and young men,” with their family dysfunctions and drug and mental health 
problems. “…[W]e have to leave room for people to make their mistakes…and be able to 
give them justice…we need to be there for them as a state.” Despite the benevolent language 
of rescue and rehabilitation, the responsibility remains squarely on the person in prostitution, 
both for the condition of being in prostitution as well as for the success of diversion. Though 
Illinois is reputed for its progressivism with regard to sex trafficking, its retributivism with 
regard to prostitution comes through clearly in its construction of the issue. Similar to Utah, it 
establishes “prostitution” and “prostitutes” as issues and subjects that can easily hedge 
against the protectionism embedded in the sex trafficking context.  
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4.3.2 Illinois on DMST 
The Illinois Safe Children Act (2010) has been widely celebrated, along with New 
York’s Safe Harbor law, as the nation’s most progressive legislation regarding child 
prostitution. The Illinois General Assembly unanimously passed the bill proposing the Act, 
with no opposition expressed against it. The emphasis of the act on decriminalizing minors in 
prostitution and its child-protective orientation in terms of diversion and rehabilitation 
support this view. The 2010 legislative debate on the bill explicitly stated its purpose as “it 
deals with child sex trafficking…it decriminalizes the…crime of juvenile prostitution…the 
idea is to link these young people with the appropriate child protective services.” However, it 
is important to pay close attention to the ways in which the Legislature constructs the issue 
and its subjects in ways that subtly bifurcate but also obfuscate prostitution and sex 
trafficking.  
One of the main features of legal discourse and statutes on sex trafficking has been to 
subtract the requirement of “force, fraud and coercion” from the definition of “child sex 
trafficking.” A person being under the age of majority (eighteen years of age under federal 
law) is automatically classified a “victim of a severe form of trafficking,” not requiring the 
minor to demonstrate force, fraud or coercion. The fact of her being in prostitution is enough 
to be considered a victim of DMST, or so statutes state. However, in debating and passing its 
safe harbor law,74 the Illinois Legislature repeatedly injected force, fraud and coercion into 
the discussion, despite explicitly addressing child sex trafficking. Its sponsor, Representative 
Burns, described the “reason” for the bill as “these young people have been exploited by 
pimps and adults and forced into a life of prostitution.” This has implications for how 
victimhood is constructed.  
                                                
74 As a reminder, Safe harbor legislation in the CSEC context intends to provide child protection to minors in 
prostitution rather than to criminalize them. 
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The perhaps unconscious insertion of the word “force” in this context nonetheless 
implies minors’ culpability should law enforcement, the judiciary, and legal administrators be 
confronted with cases in which they perceive minors’ lack of being “forced” into prostitution 
in the ways that sex trafficking discourse outlines, e.g. being forced to participate through 
physical violence or threats thereof. At one point in the debate, Representative Burns admits, 
in reference to minors in prostitution, that “it’s hard to get them to work against their…the 
pimps,” implying their lack of cooperativeness with law enforcement and prosecutorial 
efforts. Most research confirms this claim, particularly social policy and NGO research 
concerned with assisting justice institutions. Thus the emphasis on force in discussing child 
sex trafficking works against the child protective framing of the issue. Though Rep. Burns 
later describes minors in prostitution as a protected class “because of the age of the 
prostitutes, and they’re juveniles…,” he continues with qualifying language that implies 
forms of coercion, “…they’ve been confused…manipulated…pimped.” Though much 
research substantiates the presence of coercion in child prostitution, minors often do not fit 
the profile of confused, manipulated and pimped children. For example, the case of In re D, 
discussed further below, exposes that legal authorities’ perception of minors as independent, 
or any findings that do not comport with the ideal-typical victim profile often count against 
minors’ victimhood in the prostitution context (see also Halter 2008).  
In explaining their understanding of the problem of juvenile prostitution, Illinois 
legislators list causes of increased trafficking in the state. They mention that Chicago is a 
hotspot for sex trafficking, and cite “our tourism industry” as well as being a “transportation 
hub” with regular conventions. “[P]rostitution is big business and especially juvenile 
prostitution. A pimp can make $500 thousand off of one young person a year. It’s… it’s truly 
a crime,” explains the bill’s sponsor. Child prostitution is discussed as a criminal industry 
thriving in particular due to Chicago’s geography, as well as a problem perpetrated by 
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“violent gangs.” The industrial characterization of child prostitution is typical of nearly all 
research discussing the issue, and the estimate of pimps’ ability to make $500,000 per annum 
is also commonly cited in relevant research. It is unclear, however, to what extent child 
prostitution is a problem of organized crime, as the reference to violent gangs suggests. 
Though girls, especially those in street prostitution, are often under the control of a pimp, the 
connection to organized criminal activity of the scale suggested by “gangs” is not necessarily 
substantiated. This, too, has implications for ideal victimhood, because to understand child 
prostitution as entirely or even mostly perpetrated by gangs creates the perception that minors 
are coerced or forced into prostitution by evil and powerful criminal perpetrators rather than, 
as so often is the case, by coercive socio-economic circumstances. In such a framework the 
absence of such individualized criminal forces to whom can be directly traced the causes of 
child prostitution creates an impression of “choice” and culpability on the part of minors.75  
The Legislature also specifically characterized child prostitution as a significant 
domestic and localized problem with reference to national economic strain and trafficking 
elsewhere. Representative Durkin, in support of the bill, argued  
[T]his type of practice is not something which is strictly unique to Asia or other parts 
of the world, it’s in the city of Chicago, it’s in the State of Illinois and we have to treat 
it accordingly. It’s more pervasive than people think…it’s a terrible problem which is 
gaining in… in strength because of the economy.  
Within this framing, the Representative squarely framed minors as victims, despite their 
constituting part of a troubling social problem.  
…[B]ut it’s also important because we’re now going to saw [sic] that the juvenile 
who has been involved in this is no longer going to be the criminal, they’re going to 
be the…they’re a victim. And we are going to treat them and we’re going to get them 
back on a right road to recovery. 
The sponsor of the bill, Rep. Burns, concluded his argument by restating its purpose: “This 
Bill is about protecting victims.” The decriminalizing language of victimization, child 
                                                
75 The issue of “choice” and its illusory nature are discussed in Chapter 5. 
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protection, treatment and rehabilitation, however, is hedged by the prioritization of law-and-
order and retributivism, similar to the legal discourse of Utah. After Burns’ concluding 
remark, he iterated, “This is about giving our law enforcement officers the tools to crack 
down on this growing industry.” Coupled with the peril of making the decriminalization of 
minors implicitly dependent on notions of force that are technically not required for juveniles, 
the Legislature’s focus on punishing pimps (but not buyers) became a requisite part of its 
argument for decriminalization. Based on the final statement of the sponsor’s closing 
argument, the decriminalization of minors is a prosecutorial tool. Despite the bill’s stated 
purpose of rehabilitating commercially-sexually exploited children, from which it draws its 
legitimacy and unanimous consensus, decriminalization is a technical utility of law 
enforcement and prosecution.  
Turning to offenders after proposing decriminalization of victims, the sponsor 
explained, “On the other end of the spectrum, what we do is we increase criminal penalties 
for those pimps, for those who would abuse and exploit sexually these young people. This is 
an important initiative to Cook County State’s Attorney, Anita Alvarez.” Representative 
Reboletti echoed with the necessity of implementing mandatory minimum sentences for 
pimps and of “moving [pimping] up one felony level,” to which Burns agreed to make the 
“pimping of juveniles…a nonprobational offense.” In a child protective framing of 
prostitution as essentially sex trafficking and of minors in prostitution as sex trafficking 
victims, commitment to the decriminalization of minors and criminalization of abusers is 
important. However, this debate never mentioned buyers—the average male drivers of 
demand for prostitution—as exploiters, abusers, or otherwise. The existence of buyers can be 
read into the legislators’ discussion of “conventions” in Chicago causing a spike in 
trafficking, but they are never salient subjects of this discourse the way pimps are.  
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The Sawyer case, based out of Chicago and tried in its federal court, developed over 
the course of this research and the debate and passage of the Illinois Safe Children Act, from 
2010-2015. On 9 September 2010 the FBI publicly announced in a press release the arrest of 
defendant Datqunn Sawyer, an African-American man, for child sex trafficking. 
Governmental and media reports explain that the case was brought against the notorious West 
Side Chicago area pimp and former rapper. The FBI’s press release (hereinafter, “FBI Press 
Release 2010”) stated that this was the culmination of “a two-year joint federal/state 
investigation into a child prostitution ring” (FBI Press Release 2010, Appendix A).  
Child prostitution in this case was described as “sexual trafficking of minors and 
sexual trafficking by force, fraud, and coercion in interstate commerce, which is a felony 
offense” (Id.). It was also referred to as “the horrific trade of sex trafficking.” Furthermore, 
the FBI specified that the case involved street prostitution as well as online solicitation. 
“Sawyer is alleged to have forced his prostitutes to ‘work the track,’ a term used to refer to 
girls walking the streets or standing on street corners to solicit customers for sex acts for 
money” (Id.). The FBI continued that Sawyer also  
…advertised his business through the Internet, making extensive use of Craigslist and 
similar online media, charging anywhere from $150 to $350 for sexual services. 
Sawyer is alleged to have kept all of the proceeds from the sexual encounters, 
providing his prostitutes with only minimal subsistence. 
He was also accused of employing two other adult males “as drivers and enforcers,” who 
were subsequently charged under state statutes at Cook County Circuit Court related to 
pandering, a Class 4 felony, to transport and monitor the activities of the girls “to ensure they 
were not pocketing money they earned from their sexual encounters.”  
Sawyer was described primarily in terms of his actions, as someone who “recruited as 
many as nine minor females,” and “operated a child prostitution ring from his residence and 
his mother’s residence,” both in the West Side of Chicago, and forced minors into 
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prostitution through brute means. The Department of Justice (DOJ) explained, “Sawyer was a 
pimp who chose vulnerable victims, including girls who were young, homeless, or runaways, 
and used violence and threats of violence to exploit them sexually, knowing that they were 
minors.” The DOJ also spent one-third of its press release highlighting the force, fraud and 
coercion aspect of Sawyer’s actions, again, despite these not being required in a case of child 
sex trafficking. In the framework of the issue as “exploit[ing] children through prostitution,” 
the DOJ emphasized the level of control that the offender exerted over the victims, through 
force, fraud, fear and coercion: 
The evidence showed that Sawyer recruited and groomed his victims, frequently 
deceiving them by initially concealing that he was a pimp and promising them riches 
and glamour if they stayed with him. He convinced victims that he loved them and 
wanted to be in a long-term romantic relationship with them. Sawyer also used threats 
and physical beatings to enforce a rigid set of rules that left him with a high degree of 
control over all his victims. Sawyer required the victims to commit commercial sex 
acts, and to give him the money they made. To maintain his control, he had sex with 
many of the victims, and impregnated three of them. 
Sawyer gave his victims names beginning with a “P”—Precious, Paradise, Pooh, 
Peaches, Princess, Passion, Pebbles (Bubbles), and Perfect—based on his own 
nickname of “P-Child,” and had his victims call him “Daddy.” He also had many 
victims tattooed with his nicknames, and he prohibited his victims from looking at or 
speaking to other men (other than customers), and from talking back to or 
disrespecting him. When his victims broke the rules, he threatened or beat them. (Id.). 
The court decisions against Sawyer that followed these initial public announcements 
reiterated this characterization of him and co-offenders. The DOJ ended its press release by 
praising its Innocence Lost initiative of targeting minors in prostitution for “rescue,” and 
“pimps, madams, and their associates” for prosecution. However, in line with the historical 
omission from legal texts regarding prostitution culpability, they failed to mention buyers and 
their indispensable role in maintaining child prostitution. Sawyer’s sentence has been 
reported as the longest sentence ever received by a pimp in the federal court of Chicago.76 
                                                
76 The Chicago Tribune reported in 2012 that Sawyer’s was “the harshest sentence ever for a federal sex 
trafficking case in the Chicago area.” (Website of the Chicago Tribune, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-
05-17/news/ct-met-human-trafficking-0517-20120517_1_trafficking-ring-trafficking-case-datqunn-sawyer.) 
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Notably, its harshness was not due to mandatory minimum sentencing, but rather based on 
the court’s discretion. Sawyer was charged under a federal sentencing provision for crimes of 
“peonage, slavery and trafficking in persons” (18 USC §1594(c)). The judge handing down 
the fifty-year sentence emphasized the power Sawyer wielded over his victims and his 
impliedly perverse motivation of personal enrichment. 
[Y]ou used every device at your opportunity to subjugate [the victims] to your power, 
your will and to bring you treasure...And that is why I have the god-awful obligation 
to put you in jail for a long, long time...Because we have to put an end to this kind of 
conduct. 
In contrast to the offender construct of the DMST case, even prior to adjudication of 
the cases, FBI and US Department of Justice press releases repeatedly refer to “victims,” 
“girls,” and “minors” to configure victimization. The FBI’s depiction of the victims was as 
“vulnerable girls” and “the female victims of this sex trafficking operation.” The rescue and 
rehabilitation response to the girls is also specified, that the victims were being “provided 
with counseling and related assistance by the FBI, Cook County State’s Attorney’s office and 
private social services providers.” The Department of Justice highlighted the age of the girls, 
“at least nine victims, eight of whom were between the ages of 13 and 17.” The victims meet 
the ideal victimhood requirement of cooperativeness with law enforcement, as most of them, 
“testified as government witnesses during the trial.”  
The subsequent case decisions at various levels of the district court system also echo 
the law enforcement characterization of the minors in prostitution. In the 2015 case denying 
Sawyer’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, the court recounted the detailed misery of the 
girls’ lives contained in previous case decisions. Two in particular, named Corrieana and 
Tatianna, exemplified the sympathy of the courts toward the victims, which is wholly absent 
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in the cases in which girls were tried for prostitution. To illustrate, the court recited 
Corrieana’s testimony containing background facts regarding her childhood and home life:  
Corrieana testified that her biological mother was a prostitute who did drugs every 
day, engaging in both activities in Corrieana's presence. Corrieana lived with her 
paternal grandmother until she passed away and then moved in her with her biological 
father when she was twelve or thirteen years of age. Her father would physically 
abuse her, causing her to run away after one year of living with him. Corrieana moved 
back in with her biological mother and her maternal grandmother sharing a two 
bedroom apartment with ten other people. 
Similarly, the court recalled Tatianna’s description of her life when she first met Sawyer:  
At that time, her relationship with her mother was dysfunctional and her stepfather 
physically abused her mother. Tatianna's biological father was incarcerated, she had 
recently been assaulted by a group of men, she was skipping school and failing her 
classes, and she was so depressed that she was cutting herself because she “didn't feel 
like [she] needed to be alive.” 
It is important to bear in mind that in light of decades of research regarding minors in 
prostitution, the descriptions of Corrieana and Tatianna’s childhoods are typical of most 
minors in prostitution in the US (Kramer and Berg 2003). They form such a strong pattern 
that research on child prostitution routinely refers to them as risk factors for the commercial-
sexual exploitation of children, including entry into prostitution. Legal discourse is selective 
with regard to whether it includes or excludes these aspects of girls’ lives. As this chapter 
finds, the classification of girls as “prostitutes” (when tried for prostitution) or as sex 
trafficking victims (particularly when serving as witnesses) is a reliable indicator for the 
inclusion or exclusion of such facts—in essence, of humanizing language.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, when cases involving minors are tried as DMST, they 
become publicly available since they typically involve adult perpetrators. However, when 
charges are brought against minors for prostitution, their cases are sealed and do not become 
part of the public discourse unless they reach higher courts. Three cases of minors tried as 
prostitutes from the 1970s connect these earlier iterations to the historical present. These 
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cases appear in a contemporary legal treatise on prostitution law in the US designed to give 
legal scholars, practitioners and judges expertise on the issue. Wharton’s Treatise on 
Prostitution, titled Wharton's Criminal Law, Part III. Offenses Against Morals, Chapter 16. 
Prostitution and Related Offenses (hereinafter “Treatise”) (Torcia 2014) serves as a 
secondary authority of prostitution law and thus forms a major part of contemporary 
American legal discourse on prostitution. As mentioned previously in discussing L’Hote v. 
City of New Orleans (1900), there is no federal law regarding prostitution per se, as 
prostitution is regulated by the states. However, Wharton’s Treatise (2014) assesses statutes 
and cases from across the country to generate an authoritative text and authoritative 
statements regarding what is general US law related to prostitution, and therefore equally 
applicable in Utah and Illinois, or any other state. It cites several foundational cases to 
support its explanations of the various determinative issues that come into play in 
adjudicating a prostitution case. Of these, three cases are of minors, all of whom were girls 
between the ages of 14 to 16 years old at the time of their arrest, which occurred in “high vice 
areas,” neighborhoods known to be socio-economically marginalized. These are the cases of 
In re Appeal No. 180 (Maryland, 1976), In re Dora P (New York, 1979), and In the Matter of 
D (Oregon, 1976). Though these cases were decided in the 1970s they are still controlling 
law in prostitution cases, as their presence in this Treatise affirms.  
 Examining the treatment of these girls reveals ways in which children are constructed 
in the context of prostitution at the dawn of what we now understand to be the age of 
globalization and neoliberalism. The Treatise conflates adult and child prostitution by citing 
to the cases of minors as run of the mill “prostitution” cases, hardly noticeable in a sea of 
many more adult prostitution cases. The only distinguishing mark of these cases is the “in re” 
prefix and abbreviations or initials of names, denoting the prosecution of a person under 18 
years of age. The Treatise reflects US law generally by treating the cases of minors in 
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prostitution the same as those of adults. The cases themselves, adjudicated in juvenile courts 
(with the exception of Dora P in the Supreme Court of New York), establish the legal status 
of the respondents as minors, and establish that “child” is a person under 18 years of age. 
They refer to the girls as “juvenile,” “the juvenile,” “delinquent child” (In re Appeal no. 180), 
“a person alleged to be a juvenile delinquent,” “fourteen year old child” (In re Dora P), “16-
year-old child,” and “the child” (In re D). The courts clearly recognize the minors’ age of 
minority through child/juvenile status. At the same time, once they are adjudicated delinquent 
and tried for the crime of “prostitution,” their age does not mitigate the prostitution charge or 
their identity as “prostitutes.” The trials proceed as though the minors are adults, and, in fact, 
each judge clarifies that that is how the case will proceed, per the rules of juvenile justice. For 
example, Judge Bloom in Dora P affirms that had an adult committed the same acts as Dora, 
they would constitute second degree robbery, second degree assault and prostitution, and 
Dora’s case proceeds on those exact charges.  
 In contrast, the adult males who showed willingness to purchase sex from the minors 
are characterized rather differently, despite their behavior also qualifying as criminal conduct. 
There is no reference to their ages, but implicitly, they are above the age of majority. With 
the focus being on the offending behavior of girls, the “patron” males are largely absent from 
the narratives of each case. However, where they do appear, they are inculpable. The case 
decision of Appeal no. 180 explains that the fifteen-year-old girl approached a “Baltimore 
City police officer then on duty in plain clothes…in a private car” and “offered to perform 
normal sexual intercourse for $25.00.” The man is simply described as an undercover officer 
performing his duty, and does not figure into the narrative elsewhere. In contrast to the 
passive authoritative role of the undercover cop, in Dora P the adult male “customer” is 
presented as an “accosted” victim of robbery, assault and prostitution. In D the two arresting 
(male) officers observe D as several men slow down in their cars and engage her in 
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conversation before arresting her for prostitution, and making no arrests of men for 
patronizing.  
In the latter case, one observes the line at which the narrative in the judge’s opinion 
shifts from “child” to adultified non-child: “Following this period of observation, the officers 
drove up to the child and questioned her.” Here, as a single statement, one imagines a “child” 
on the street, rather vulnerable compared to two adult male officers in a police car. However, 
next, the case reads: “During the course of the conversation she admitted that she was a 
prostitute…” D is no longer a “child,” but a “prostitute.” The opinion continues: 
…that she had been in the area for seven and one-half months, and that during that 
period she had made between four and five thousand dollars. When asked, ‘Who are 
you working for?,’ she replied ‘I don’t have a pimp. It’s all for myself. 
This also brings to mind Halter’s (2008) study regarding police characterization of child 
prostitution. Halter observes that minors in prostitution who seem somehow “independent” or 
who are not under some kind of directly observable control are more likely to be labeled 
offenders, i.e. juvenile delinquents, in the parlance of juvenile courts, rather than 
“dependents,” Persons in Need of Supervision (PINS), and so on.  
Thus we can see from these cases that while the judges acknowledge the age of the 
minor, they nonetheless continued to try girls based on the same elements and merits as one 
would in an adult prostitution case. Minor status does not seem to play a significant role in 
protecting minors from prosecution for prostitution in any of these cases. Their age of 
minority only determined the type of court that tried them, but not the substance of the trial. 
Not only did age of minority fail to protect these girls from criminal prosecution, but the fact 
patterns and dispositions of their cases have continued for decades as cornerstones of 
prostitution laws used to prosecute children and adults alike. Though their age and status as a 
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“child” or “juvenile” are formally acknowledged, this does not preclude their liability, does 
not recognize any unique victimization of minors nor their legal incapacity to consent to sex. 
Through these important cases that continue to guide prostitution law for adults and 
children alike, the neoliberal era is marked by minors’ ongoing liability for prostitution and 
denying any unique vulnerability or criminal incapacity that prompted Gilded Age or 
Progressive Era reforms regarding childhood and child protectionism. It must be emphasized 
that although these cases were adjudicated in the 1970s, they remain relevant, as reflected in 
their inclusion in the 2014 Treatise. The 1970s cases demonstrate the erosion of childhood in 
child prostitution legal discourse by the time of their adjudication. They omit race but 
racialize and adultify girls via the culpable “prostitution” identity, neglect class issues such as 
child poverty and focus on delinquency, and use minors in prostitution to bolster the notion 
that no sexism exists in the construction or enforcement of prostitution law. 
 
Unlike in prostitution cases, the Sawyer case explains many of the tragic 
circumstances of the minors’ lives he exploited, having met one of the girls when she was 13 
years old. Recall Tatianna, the girl who carried her teddy bear, and the way her image evoked 
innocent youth, though both of these girls were technically “prostitutes” by the same 
definitions applied to girls who were convicted of prostitution, such as Dora P, D and No. 
180. Sawyer is portrayed as a domineering adult male figure, who controlled his “girls” by 
threat of harm or actual battery. Similarly, the Zarif case in Utah, brought against the Utah 
pimp and child pornographer, explains deceptive ways in which he enticed teenage girls to 
perform sex acts for adult men for money.  
Illinois’ commitment to child protectionism is cracked and partial. Even its celebrated 
brand of progressivism is deeply dedicated to the priorities of law and order enforcement and 
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prosecutorial efforts that are at odds with child advocacy, particularly for minors in conflict 
with the law, even within well-established child protectionist frameworks. Reliance upon a 
strong ideal-victim identity and the emphasis on force, even subsequent to striking such a 
requirement for minors, also counteract notions of minors’ victimization. The proclivity of 
the legal community is to embrace the criminal justice apparatus as an indispensable tool for 
resolving social problems. As those social problems are legally constructed in such a 
framework, lawmakers offer what they purport are tools of greater precision and 
technological advancement in service of reforming and improving but ultimately advancing 
the existing apparatus.  
4.4 Emergent forms of penalization under a protective cover 
Quasi/criminalization of minors in prostitution is not only reproductive of existing 
inequalities but also productive of race, class, gender and childhood. More than behavior and 
respectability, these are the constitutive elements of ideal or culpable victimhood and 
offender status. The victim/offender binary produces gender by making the prostitute identity 
synonymous with femaleness and non-citizenship, as persons whose presence threatens 
public health and denies municipalities of the peace, order and prosperity they aspire to. On 
the other hand, johns’ identities continue to be defined by consumption, as the consumer 
identity remains hegemonic under neoliberal citizenship. Additionally, class and childhood 
are produced through inclusion of children in the criminal “underclass” to be managed and 
often put to profitable use.77 
Prostitution discourse blurs the boundaries between adult and child as well as victim 
and offender by collapsing the concept of age and subsuming the child identity and 
victimhood into the culpable identity of “prostitute.” DMST discourse appears to reinforce 
                                                
77 This is not necessarily the same as the “productive” use to which children were put in traditional institutions 
such as children’s homes, workhouses or asylums designed to maximize the extraction of children’s labor. 
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boundaries between adult and child. DMST emphasizes child status and non-culpability due 
to incapacity to consent to commercial sex. It restores, re-contextualizes and extends the 
language of “age of consent” and “statutory rape”—the idea that minors cannot consent to 
sex—in the context of commercial sex, in order to conceptualize child prostitution as “DMST” 
rather than “prostitution.” However, the notion of DMST, created ostensibly to reconcile the 
contradiction and resolve the paradox of “child prostitute,” nonetheless competes on a 
continuum of criminal laws that allows for a range of labels to apply to minors in prostitution. 
This includes various forms of sex abuse (child rape, child sex abuse and statutory rape), sex 
trafficking and/or as sex offenders. This is addressed in greater detail in Chapter 5, but is 
worth mentioning here because despite the bifurcated and dichotomized yet selective blurring 
of prostitution and DMST, other long-standing conceptualizations of child victimization 
necessarily inform the official discourse of lawmakers on these matters. 
Because of the power of law and order rhetoric in the American legal and political 
context, it is important to highlight that child protective discourse is deployable as a 
legitimizing tool for a law enforcement and criminal justice apparatus that has, particularly 
recently, been threatened with a crisis of legitimacy due to public exposure of and civil rights 
movement against police violence, particularly against African American youth. Child 
protectionism provides strong justification for state action, but a criminal justice intervention 
fashioned in a law-and-order framework—particularly one that focuses on targeting “low-
level offenders” per the Broken Window theory of the neoliberal criminology that has 
dominated American (and American-style) law enforcement and lawmaking—threatens to 
criminalize or at least quasi-criminalize the very “victims” that it identifies as in need of 
rescue. 
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4.5 Quasi-criminalization: “Protective Custody” 
Neither of the legal conceptualizations of “prostitution” nor “DMST” precludes the 
possibility of criminalizing minors. Both normalize at least the quasi-criminalization of 
minors as a “necessary” practice under auspices of benevolent, paternalistic child 
protection.78 All states codify and practice some version of detaining minors, including those 
in prostitution, even if they have not been criminalized by being formally charged with a 
crime. Statutes, policy documents and legislative debates refer to this as “protective custody” 
or as “material witness” or “courtesy” holds. Legal authorities often argue for this necessity 
as advancing the protection of the minor (to protect her from pimps or traffickers), or “from 
herself” (to protect her from continuing prostitution and its attendant behaviors), but also to 
protect society from the minor. I also find that this practice is directly tied to the retributive 
law-and-order framing of the issue of child sex trafficking, which prioritizes securing the 
prosecution of pimps over child welfare. In order to extract material testimony from minors, 
police routinely arrest and detain minors in prostitution, often until the adjudication of cases 
against pimps or traffickers, but even beyond. All states codify and practice this form of 
confinement, but no state seems to have adequate and appropriate resources for minors in 
prostitution. This leads to what amounts to the indefinite, discretionary and arbitrary 
incarceration of persons whom the state designates as victims of child sex trafficking. My 
argument is that this is at the very least a form of quasi-criminalization of minors in 
prostitution, which forges their status as offenders or culpable victims (as co-conspirators in 
their own exploitation), re-victimizes girls through re-traumatization of criminal procedure 
and incarceration, and reasserts the disposability of minors in prostitution.  
                                                
78 This is not to pathologize the notion of fatherly protection or care for a child generally, but rather to cast 
doubt on whether such benevolence is possible via parens patriae within the framework of law and order and 
prosecutorial prioritization that largely comprises of heavily politicized competition between authoritative and 
criminal men within culturally masculinist institutional contexts of pimping, trafficking and criminal justice. 
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In human trafficking scholarship, the term “disposability” has been employed as a 
defining feature of the operation of modern day slavery, i.e. forced labor in the global 
capitalist economy (see e.g. Bales 2004). Whereas “old slavery” was legal and entailed legal 
ownership over persons, “new slavery” is marked by universal illegality, and lack of legally 
enforceable rights of ownership over persons. Although extremely exploitive, under formal 
slavery, owners viewed enslaved persons as long-term investments, which arguably served to 
curb severe forms of abuse that could jeopardize the ability of the enslaved person to perform 
the requisite labor or to produce offspring and reproduce the labor force. However, the 
current mode of [informal] slavery in a globalizing capitalist economic system is marked by 
lack of legal responsibility or long-term investment, and exposes millions of persons to 
precarious conditions and risk factors of human trafficking.79 These include dispossession, 
conflict, environmental impact, and migration—whether forced, coerced or “voluntary,” as in 
smuggling. The large pool of persons to draw from, temporary relations and 
interchangeability of persons in contractual chains render forced labor disposable. I argue that 
the retributive return of neoliberal criminal justice also renders minors in prostitution 
disposable; those whom it otherwise identifies as hyper-vulnerable and super-exploited for 
purposes of legitimizing legal intervention serve an often unarticulated but more prioritized 
function of providing material witness testimony in service of enhancing prosecutorial efforts. 
Thus minors in prostitution become prosecutorial tools, valued, used and discarded 
instrumentally in accordance with law enforcement needs and criminal justice agendas. This 
is clarified by the lack of resources allocated to the rehabilitation and socio-economic justice 
for minors in prostitution, in contrast to the relative abundance of law enforcement and 
prosecutorial resources. The interlocking of socio-economically-driven disposability in the 
                                                
79 International legal discourse considers child prostitution a form of commercial-sexual exploitation of children, 
sexual slavery and one of the most hazardous forms of “labor.” 
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commercial-sexual exploitation of children is mirrored by the quasi-criminalization of minors 
in prostitution whom the criminal justice system continues to treat as expendable.  
Most media coverage of child sex trafficking in the US either omits or cursorily 
mentions the arrest and especially the detention of minors in prostitution. This pattern is also 
found in legal commentary, with the exception of a handful of law review articles, which 
represent a small minority of scholarship, serves as a “secondary authority” at most, and most 
certainly a minority voice on the matter in the legal community (see, e.g. Brown 2007). 
Where it is mentioned, legally authoritative commentary glosses over it or, echoing law 
enforcement, and touts it as a necessary tool in the fight against sex trafficking.  
The federal government, in the TVPA, prohibits what would include the incarceration 
of minors in prostitution as criminal sex offenders. It specifically states:  
Victims of severe forms of trafficking should not be inappropriately incarcerated, 
fined, or otherwise penalized solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of 
being trafficked, such as using false documents, entering the country without 
documentation, or working without documentation (22 USC 7107(19)). 
If minors in prostitution are viewed as commercially-sexually exploited, i.e. as sex trafficking 
victims, the way the TVPA construes them, then they are considered “victims of severe forms 
of trafficking.” Information regarding protective custody of minors in prostitution is limited, 
but based on available information, most minors who are not charged with prostitution are 
held in custody in order to secure their cooperation with law enforcement and prosecution, to 
gain knowledge of the sex industry, and/or to extract testimony helpful to prosecuting pimps 
or traffickers. Apart from emergency medical aid, no other resources are typically available 
to minors while in detention, whether in adult jails or juvenile justice facilities (Snow 2008).  
Both Utah and Illinois allow incarceration of minors in prostitution even where they 
are identified as victims and not offenders. Utah, whose legal discourse overall demonstrates 
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strong commitment to retributivism, does not have a specific provision in its 
criminal/juvenile code regarding custody of minors in prostitution. However, Illinois, known 
for its child protective framework, has protective custody provisions in its criminal code to 
specifically justify the incarceration of minors in prostitution. The greatly celebrated Illinois 
Safe Children Act, Illinois’ model DMST law, amended various sections of Illinois’ Juvenile 
Court Act of 1987 and its prostitution statute to codify the practice. The Act defines 
“temporary custody,” “temporary protective custody” and “shelter care” for abused, 
neglected or dependent minors, which encompasses minors in prostitution (705 ILCS 405/2-
7). It states that police may take into custody abused, neglected or dependent minors without 
a warrant (705 ILCS 405/2-5(2)), while maintaining decriminalizing language: “the taking of 
a minor into temporary custody under this Section is not an arrest nor does it constitute a 
police record” (705 ILCS 405/2-5(3)). Illinois’ prostitution statute states that minors, who are 
immune from prosecution for prostitution, shall be subject to temporary protective custody as 
specified in the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Prostitution, 720 ILCS 5/11-14(d)). It is 
important to note that legal commentators and anti-trafficking NGOs continue to laud these 
amendments and similar provisions across the country as “decriminalizing” to minors in 
prostitution. My point, however, is that it heralds a formally sanctioned form of quasi-
criminalization and incarceration that specifically targets minors in prostitution who are 
otherwise constructed as victims of commercial-sexual exploitation.  
Utah’s code does not specify this practice, but this does not translate to 
decriminalization and the lack of targeting minors in prostitution. It simply means that minors 
are subject to routine rules of child custody, which have historically targeted minors in 
prostitution, and led to their criminalization and quasi-criminalization. Despite the legal 
reconceptualization of minors in prostitution as victims of sex trafficking rather than as 
juvenile delinquents, “the absence of appropriate shelter for DMST victims results in the 
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continued practice of detaining DMST victims with the general population of offenders in the 
juvenile justice facility” (Snow 2008: 2).  
Utah has an overall retributive reputation, particularly when measured by laws of 
capital punishment such as its anachronistic death penalty method of execution by firing 
squad. At the same time, legal commentators praise its relatively successful rehabilitative 
juvenile justice policy of providing community-based programs. However, this is in the 
context of Utah’s extremely retributive initiatives against juveniles, such as allowing 14 year-
olds to waive their right to an attorney or parent’s presence in adjudications. This occurs in 
the context of juveniles’ already diminished due process rights relative to adults and the 
criminalization of juvenile courts to the point that little remains to distinguish it from 
criminal court (Davis and Dent 2001). In studying the various states of the US beyond Utah 
and Illinois, reportage is unanimous regarding the lack of sufficient and appropriate resources 
for serving minors in prostitution. Criminal justice, including juvenile justice, captures 
minors when other resources are unavailable, or makes their qualification for resources 
contingent on their first being criminalized or quasi-criminalized, as much juvenile justice 
literature finds. This becomes a form of managing the “dark side” of the global capitalist 
economy—its predictable and increasing socio-economic inequalities—and those most 
impacted by them, through law and order; through law enforcement, criminal justice and the 
prison-industrial complex. The quasi-criminalization of minors in prostitution provides a 
relatively unexplored inlet into this process that economic sociologists and urban sociologists 
such as Loic Wacquant (2002, 2007, 2009) have exposed. In the case of minors in 
prostitution, however, even when they are constructed as vulnerable and abused victims of 
the worst aspects of society and its worst social actors, rather than as a despised “underclass,” 
the strength of law and order, retributivism and the culpable prostitute identity overpower the 
protective construct.  
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Very little legal discourse is devoted to the issue of indefinite detention of minors in 
prostitution as material witnesses against pimps and traffickers, and the same is reflected in 
media coverage of child sex trafficking. Arrest information reveals an odd pattern. In Utah, 
arrests of minors in prostitution since 2000 are as follows: from 2000-2007, the number of 
arrests fluctuated between 0 to 7 (Snow 2008: 18). After passage of Utah’s DMST law in 
2008, arrests doubled from the previously highest number, to 14, in 2009, and increased to 17 
in 2010, then dropped to 11 in 2011, and down to 7 by 2012 (Utah Department of Public 
Safety, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, Appendix A). Since the passage of its DMST law, Utah 
saw an overall increase in arrests of minors in prostitution. The decline since 2010 does not 
necessarily signify increasing leniency. It could simply reflect the lack of charges against 
minors in prostitution for the actual crime of prostitution or any crime, but it does not 
preclude or necessarily reflect decrease in their detention as material witnesses or for 
“protective custody.” Similar to other jurisdictions, minors could also be, and often are, 
charged with offenses other than prostitution, for example “disorderly conduct.” The point is 
that regardless of the specific legal citations, means of penalization are always available for 
those who do not fit the normative victim identity contingent upon normative race, class, 
gender and childhood in the process of criminalization. Legal commentary regarding Utah 
reports, “Prosecutors have reported charging the victims with misdemeanors to make sure 
they will be held in the juvenile detention facility and then available to testify” (Snow 2008, 
in Jeffs 2013: 251). For example in the Uhrhan (2013) case in Utah, a 17 year-old girl in 
prostitution was swept up and arrested along with a 20 year-old woman charged as a sex 
trafficker and a pimp in his thirties. The minor was characterized by law enforcement as a 
victim but was nonetheless arrested along with other targets in the sting. Her fate is publicly 
unknown, but looking at Utah and other states, she was likely incarcerated for some time. 
Anti-trafficking NGOs often agree with law enforcement justification of this practice. For 
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example, Shared Hope International laments that “DMST victims are saddled with a dual 
status of victim and delinquent,” but in the same paragraph endorses jailing minors in 
prostitution. 
In order to secure a conviction of their trafficker/pimp, the victim must be available to 
testify at the preliminary hearing. If law enforcement does not charge the victim with 
three misdemeanors or place a material witness order on the DMST victim to hold her 
in detention, it is likely that she will abscond from Utah or be placed by CPS back 
with her family, which often makes her unavailable to testify. To prevent the 
unavailability, the DMST victim is held in the juvenile detention facility for 30-90 
days awaiting the hearing to secure her testimony against her trafficker/pimp. (Snow 
2008: 3) 
This leads to self-contradictory follow-up statements such as: “The District Attorney 
who was criminally prosecuting the girl’s trafficker/pimp offered a deal to the DMST victim 
in which he would drop all charges against the victim (the 17 year-old) if she promised to 
come back and testify against her trafficker/pimp” (Id.: 29). This begs the question of why 
the “victim” is being “charged” as an offender in the first place.   
Nevada and New York serve as further examples of the effect of this incarceration. In 
Nevada, one family court judge reported in 2010 that she would receive between three and 
five new cases of child prostitution per week, involving girls between the ages of twelve and 
seventeen, with greater than half from out of state (Goldman 2010, Website of Las Vegas 
Sun). A 14 year-old girl arrested there was kept in custody in a juvenile detention facility for 
38 days in order to provide testimony against her pimp. The pimp entered a guilty plea such 
that the girl was never required to testify yet even after this, the state continued her 
incarceration due to her “criminal” conduct. Such detention of minors in prostitution is 
routine in Las Vegas (Brown 2007). Thus girls’ actual incarceration exceeds the purpose 
provided in rote arguments that the girls are being protected from dangerous pimps or that the 
detentions merely seek girls’ prosecutorial cooperation. What purpose it serves, apart from 
criminal punishment, is at best unclear. In the more widely publicized case of 12 year-old 
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Nicolette R (2004) in New York, the court rejected the young child’s claim of inability to 
consent to sex based on statutory rape law and her child protection arguments that would 
divert her from criminalization. Instead they tried her for prostitution for offering oral sex to 
an undercover police officer, and placed her in a secure detention facility, citing her “lack of 
remorse and tendency to carry weapons.” Echoing the construction of Dora P nearly thirty 
years earlier in that jurisdiction, a New York Times reporter wrote regarding the trial that 
prosecutors successfully argued that, “Nicolette was a hardened child who lacked remorse 
and who would return to her life on the streets unless she was imprisoned” (Kaufman 2004). 
A psychologist’s testimony supporting her incarceration for public safety characterized her as 
“still enough of a child to suck her thumb occasionally, [but] she was also dangerous enough 
to carry razors” (Id.). The judge sentenced her to secure detention, commenting that Nicolette 
should attain “proper moral principles.”  
On the national and international levels it has been important to observe these 
processes unfold with regard to the child migrants from Central America discussed in the 
previous chapter. “Protective custody” has taken on a new dimension in the context of mass 
detention at immigration centers. These facilities increasingly resemble permanent 
borderlands for child migrants and their mothers. As we see with regard to how 
criminalization and child protection are becoming conflated in the domestic context, there are 
attempts at false equivalence between prison and “child care” (Libal 2016, Website of 
Grassroots Leadership). A Texas court recently refused to allow licensing immigration 
detention centers as “child care facilities,” stating that such prisons counter the purpose and 
standards of child care facilities, including prohibition against children having to share 
bedrooms with non-relative adults. Licensing was admittedly meant to legitimize federal 
government detention of migrants, not to aid children, and would serve to lengthen their 
detention in a facility that re-traumatizes children fleeing from violence. The treatment of 
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Central American child migrants exemplifies the blurring of boundaries between child 
criminalization and child protection in the neoliberal age of austerity and refugee crises.  
There is no punishment theory that justifies retribution against those constructed as 
victims. The construction of minors in prostitution as criminalized or quasi-criminalized 
individuals can only be legible in punishment theory if they are deemed offenders 
(prostitutes) or culpable victims (co-conspirators in their own trafficking). Both of these 
conform to historical constructions of prostitution and sex trafficking, which have 
traditionally been utilized to criminalize females in grossly disproportionate numbers. Minors 
in prostitution, despite the increasing popularity of legally reconceptualizing them as victims 
of child sex trafficking, are not ever completely viewed as victims. The legal-discursive 
framework that constructs the issue of child prostitution and its subjects never quite commits 
to straightforward child protectionism. It vacillates and equivocates between the prostitution 
and sex trafficking constructs, revealing its indeterminacy with regard to minors in 
prostitution as non-consenting child victims, under the surface of what appears a sympathetic 
and decriminalizing discourse. During the Gilded Age and Progressive Era we saw the 
emergence of modern notions of age of consent and statutory rape as the protective regime 
against CSEC, and the criminalization of prostitution as the punitive regime against 
“prostitutes.” The bifurcated construction of the two plays into the findings of Chapter 3 
regarding the impossibility of White bourgeois girls being “prostitutes” and the working class 
girl or girl of color being constructed as bad girls and negative influences, fulfilling the role 
they have historically been relegated to in this context: the unrapeable seductress. 
International human rights and federal law both prohibit incarcerating minors in 
prostitution for prostitution-related crimes. However, the state/federal split that places 
prostitution in the jurisdiction of states and sex trafficking in that of the federal government 
combined with the strength of the culpable prostitute identity and lack of resources create a 
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formidable barrier for child protectionism. Witness detention, a form of quasi-criminalization 
and incarceration, is due to the over-emphasis on retributivism rather than child protection. 
The zeal to prosecute pimps or traffickers impels law enforcement and prosecutors to extract 
witness testimony from minors at the sacrifice of child welfare. Pimps and traffickers’ zeal to 
compete economically and attain personal enrichment also sacrifices child welfare in any 
way necessary. The consistent message from adults (whether criminal actors or legal 
authorities) to minors in prostitution is that they are disposable—from the intrafamilial or 
intracommunal abuses typically suffered in childhood, to the exploitation they experience in 
prostitution, to their treatment in institutions and criminal justice systems. Disposability is the 
common condition and outcome of the intertwining of socio-economic inequalities and legal-
criminal injustice in the criminalization or quasi-criminalization of minors in prostitution.  
To reiterate and to link the victim/offender binary to the adult/child binary, 
criminalization is the process of rendering certain behaviors punishable under criminal law. It 
is also a process of othering, strongly indicating the out-group status of those whom states 
perceive to be most threatening at a given time (Ellis 2012: 2). Police arrest and custody, 
detention and being adjudicated delinquent are considered criminalizing practices. The 
process of criminalization works against the view of children in normative childhood that 
presumes their innocence and attends to their protection. Along with prior criminal record 
and the gravity of current offense(s), pre-adjudication detention is considered among the best 
predictors of criminalization in models that account for demographics and other extralegal 
factors (Guevara, Herz et al. 2006: 262). Current DMST laws in both retributive and 
rehabilitative contexts use protective language but adopt quasi/criminalizing techniques such 
as arrest, temporary protective custody, witness detention, charging juveniles with crimes as a 
means of qualifying them for services, and threatening or bargaining with charges against 
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minors to induce their cooperation and to extract their testimony. These are barriers to the 
decriminalization of commercially-sexually exploited children.  
The construct of prostitution on the one hand, and DMST on the other compete and 
coexist uneasily in the same two-tiered manner that opposing tendencies of retribution and 
rehabilitation do generally regarding punishment. This is also reflected in adult/juvenile tiers 
in justice systems, the delinquency and dependency tiers of juvenile justice, as well as the 
deviant or normative childhoods through which children’s subjectivities are forged and that 
determine their identities as offenders or victims, and their punitive or protective treatments. 
These bifurcations mimic the chutes and ladders game of criminal procedure, but 
cumulatively form the criminalizing apparatus that exercises coercive control over exploited 
children who are suspended at such a crossroads. The indeterminacy of their status as victims 
or offenders reflects and reifies the child identity rendered malleable by adult power and 
available to fulfill adult demands, including prosecutorial imperatives above child 
protectionism, as well as the refusal to recognize child rights or full citizenship. Rather than 
preventing or protecting children from CSEC, the law corroborates with it and the 
victim/offender binary is deployed in ways that penalize minors. 
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CHAPTER 5: The Illusory Promise of Contract 
 
Chapter 5 turns to the consent/non-consent binary as the third key theme around 
which legal discourse on child prostitution is organized, this binary represents another 
important aspect of how the child prostitute is rendered the “bad subject” of criminalized 
multiplicity through the confluence of processes of marginalization that compound 
criminality and over-determine criminalization. This chapter discusses the ways in which 
“consent” is understood in contractual terms, and how this imputes consent and, therefore, 
criminal culpability upon children in ways that render them rather indistinguishable from 
“consenting adult offenders.” The three binaries are mutually shaping and interdependent in 
these ways—the issue of non/consent interlocks with determination of victim/offender, which 
in turn depends on perceptions of adult/child. The construction of prostitution as a contract 
for goods or services and the subjection of minors to such a definition works against the 
notion that child prostitution is commercial-sexual exploitation, that minors are victimized by 
it, and, ultimately, that minors are children requiring child protection.  
Despite the legal incapacitation of children from sex and commerce, they are rendered 
capable and culpable through the contractual interpretation of prostitution. This attests to the 
power of neoliberal market discourse over that of child protectionism, a dynamic that renders 
johns consumers rather than criminals in a context in which consumer identity is synonymous 
with citizenship, in contrast to the non-citizenship of the child identity and criminal identity. 
Through intertextual reading of prostitution in criminal exposure/transmission of HIV laws, 
we will see that the contractual imputation of consent combines powerfully with prostitution 
culpability to heighten the blameworthiness of prostitutes. This implicitly protects the 
consumer expectations of johns for STD-free sexual service while imposing a normative 
standard of childhood purity that is unrealistic for minors in prostitution. The measure of 
normative childhood purity burdens minors with the risk of being deemed even more 
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culpable than their adult counterparts because they not only violate commercial and sexual 
laws and norms that adults are subjected to, but also deviate from and fail to perform 
normative childhood. The contractual interpretation of prostitution survives the introduction 
of DMST into the vocabulary of child prostitution. Despite otherwise strong moral 
imperatives guarding against adult use of children’s bodies for sex—as evidenced by 
collective hatred of pedophiles—the will to protect against commercial access to children’s 
bodies is eroded once “consent” can be found in the contractual discourse of 
commercialization and commodification thereof. The issue of consent and its official 
verification or negation through contract has served as a key means of legitimizing capitalist 
order in post-slavery American society as a free and fair one. However, feminist and anti-
racist theories of contract counter the dominant legal understanding of contract based on 
formal egalitarianism. These help clarify how the notion of contract bolsters neoliberal ideas 
of “responsibilization” and its reduction of multi-systemic problems to blaming of the self 
and of victims, in support of pathologization and criminalization. At best, contractarianism 
only allows arguing that prostitution is a legitimate economic choice made by the rational, 
calculating and knowledgeable individual. With a return to Gilded Age levels of social 
inequalities on the material level, undergirded by Social Darwinian revival on the ideological 
level, we are also threatened with the reanimation of politics and policies of that otherwise 
bygone era.  
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section shows how legal 
discourse regarding prostitution, as the primary discursive means of criminalizing and quasi-
criminalizing minors in prostitution, constructs “prostitution,” and consequently, the issue of 
“consent” in contractual terms. The second section explains how the imputation of consent on 
minors combines powerfully with female prostitution culpability to heighten the 
blameworthiness of girls, especially when prostitution discourse is read intertextually with 
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that of criminal exposure or transmission of HIV. The third section discusses the racialized, 
classed and gendered aspects of the issue of consent, and how the adjudication of consent is 
socially and historically decontextualized. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of how 
the law imputes commercial and sexual consent on minors for purposes of criminalization 
and responsibilization. I argue that the compounding of structural inequalities, personal 
circumstances and punishment over-burdens minors while protecting the interests of male 
“consumers”—the hegemonic subjects of the social contract, and exonerating the state. This 
chapter is noticeably less focused on two-state comparison, as I argue that the identity of the 
child as a consenting seller of sex is common to both states because of their reliance on 
contractual language, which renders their political orientations of retributivism and 
rehabilitation with regard to punishment less relevant. Contractual discourse is powerful due 
to its subdued but pervasive nature for conveying “choice” and negating ideas of exploitation, 
and this tendency is noticeably present in Utah, Illinois and all states as well as federal law. 
5.1 Terms of contract 
 The prostitution statutes of states, including Utah and Illinois, reflect the contractual 
language with which it is defined. Utah’s statute defines sexual solicitation (and in large part 
“patronizing”) as “when the person (a) offers or agrees to commit any sexual activity with 
another person for a fee; (b) pays or offers or agrees to pay a fee to another person to commit 
any sexual activity” (UCA 1953 §76-10-1313; UCA 1953 §76-10-1303). Prostitution is when 
a person “engages in any sexual activity with another person for a fee” (UCA 1953 §76-10-
1302) Illinois’ prostitution statute states,  
Any person who knowingly performs, offers or agrees to perform any act of sexual 
penetration as defined in Section 11-0.1 of this Code for anything of value, or any 
touching or fondling of the sex organs of one person by another person, for anything 
of value, for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification commits an act of 
prostitution (720 ILCS 5/11-14(a)). 
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Thus the language of contracts thoroughly permeates the legal discourse of 
prostitution throughout the US and on both national and state levels. 
Legal discourse regarding prostitution, which is the primary discursive means of 
criminalizing and quasi-criminalizing minors in prostitution, constructs “prostitution,” and 
consequently, the issue of “consent” in contractual terms. As discussed previously, Pateman 
and Mills have shown how contract has been the key tool of formal egalitarianism in the 
social and legal realms during Western modernity through the dominant but false 
presumption of civil equality in social relations. However, a contractual interpretation of 
prostitution imputes consent to even the one group denied formal equality, children. The 
power of neoliberal capitalist discourse of contract for interpreting social relationships, 
including criminal ones, has the effect of rendering child prostitution “consensual” when it is 
simultaneously understood as the ontological dark side of modern life and legally constructed 
as the worst abuse of the most vulnerable. This means that the standard for what can be 
considered exploitation is set impossibly high—measuring non-consent against the clear use 
of individualized force requiring episodic causality. Relying on contract as our primary mode 
of sociality and jurisprudence fails to see that the rules governing society re/produce 
disposability as the root condition of modern slavery, which is premised on Othering and 
minoritization.  
Defining society, freedom and consent in contractual terms:  
early national efforts impacting exploitable children 
The early case of Ruhl (1859) clarified the adult/child and victim/offender dynamics 
of child prostitution in prohibiting the luring away of girl-children from paternal guardians 
and into prostitution. It also reasserted the social contract defining modern Western society, 
which established a fraternity of White men as equal public citizens and political subjects in 
negotiation with one another, but also as “kings” of their own domestic dominions—heads of 
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households—per the sexual contract embedded in it (Pateman 1988). As a case within which 
is ingrained language of the social contract, Ruhl defined girls as belonging to the family 
patriarch, requiring other men to ask for sexual access to and movement of children in their 
care. In defining normative, traditional children as chattel, it reasserted the terms of the social 
contract for non-enslaved children as apprentices or indentured servants.  
Historically and from the outset, prostitution itself was conceived of in contractual 
terms in legal discourse, in the first racialized national immigration restriction. Supporting 
Pateman’s (1988) argument that prostitution is (deceptively) conceived of in contractarian 
terms, the APIA defines it as a “contract of immigrant from China or Japan for service for 
immoral purposes.” The official purpose of the law was to deny certification to vessels 
carrying immigrants into the US where passengers were found to be imported for “immoral 
purposes” of prostitution (or polygamy). This entailed  
determining whether the immigration of any subject of China, Japan, or any Oriental 
country, to the United States, is free and voluntary…to ascertain whether such 
immigrant has entered into a contract or agreement for a term of service within the 
United States, for lewd and immoral purposes; and if there be such contract or 
agreement, the said consul-general or consul shall not deliver the required permit 
certificate. 
The language of freedom and voluntariness was key to conceptualizing contract generally 
and in the prostitution context, including in what would later become termed “sex trafficking.” 
Legal authorities could use “Oriental” women’s consent to a prostitution “contract or 
agreement” to prevent their entry into the US because it imputed prostitution culpability on 
the female immigrant, specifically East Asian women. It established that the federal 
government would not recognize females immigrants’ contracts for sex, conceptualizing 
prostitution as a sex contract while simultaneously criminalizing contracts for sex.  
“Free consent” becomes paramount in this context, and the first signs of “trafficking” 
come into view in American law. The Act importantly defined the meaning of free consent 
 227 
and contracts. It used notions of unfreedom, force and coercion to establish a violation of 
international sex trafficking and penalized with a fine of two thousand dollars and 
misdemeanor conviction (“imprisoned not exceeding one year”) the actions of “citizens of 
United States transporting subject of China or Japan without free consent,” i.e. those who 
“shall take, or cause to be taken or transported, to or from the United States any subject of 
China, Japan, or any Oriental country, without their free and voluntary consent,” and declared 
the resulting “contract for service void.” Specific to prostitution (or sex trafficking), the Act 
declares that, “the importation into the United States of women for the purposes of 
prostitution is hereby forbidden; and all contracts and agreements in relation thereto, made in 
advance or in pursuance of such illegal importation and purposes, are hereby declared void.” 
This contractual understanding of the sale of Asian women’s bodies is inextricably linked to 
the construction of Asian males as “coolies.” Viewed as cheap or slave labor, the prostitution 
of their female counterparts was also viewed as contractual, implicitly as labor, if illegitimate.  
The punishment for sex trafficking was also much heftier than for forced labor. The 
fine for importing an East Asian woman for purposes of prostitution was considered a felony 
punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment with a fine of up to five thousand dollars. The 
1875 APIA never defined the meanings of key words such as “consent,” “contract,” or “free,” 
as its progeny and contemporary law have attempted to do. Looking to the state-based case of 
Ah Fong (1874) from California, a precursor to the APIA, we see instead that the lack of 
consent of prostitutes might be inferred from the way in which the judge who drafted the 
decision characterized the Chinese immigrant woman and others detained. In that landmark 
case, Judge Fields defended the right of Ah Fong and the other Chinese women aboard the 
same ship as her to enter the US after embarking in San Francisco and being detained by state 
authorities who had determined that they were “lewd and debauched women,” i.e. prostitutes. 
In defending this right, Judge Fields described Ah Fong as a “frail child of China,” a 
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characterization not necessarily meant to remove culpability and will for evil but to allude to 
moral frailty—culpably weak and feeble—and thereby perhaps susceptible to prostitution.  
Ah Fong did not discuss the issue of consent of the prostitute. Rather, it discussed 
issues around consent—will, free will, freedom, voluntariness, agreement, accord and 
contract—in reference to cross-border movement of migrants and governance among nation-
states. Judge Fields first discussed “will” and “consent” to refer to forcible removal of 
Chinese women from the US through deportation, “against their will or consent.” The judge 
also referred to a governing treaty of the US with China (Burlingame Treaty) as an agreement 
to allow “free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects respectively from one 
country to another, for purposes of curiosity or trade, or as permanent residents.” Conversely, 
it was also an agreement to protect persons from their respective countries from forced 
migration, i.e. from being transported across international borders “without their free and 
voluntary consent.” The nation-states of China and the US, as “the high contracting 
parties…join in reprobating any other than an entirely voluntary emigration for these 
purposes.” The subjects of the two countries, through agreement between the two nations, are 
allowed “free ingress…and egress,” or international cross-border movement into and out of 
their respective countries under terms of treaty. Judge Fields also noted that interstate travel 
and movement were allowed—that once Chinese subjects were allowed to enter the US, they 
were able to “go and come of their own free will and accord.” 
Ah Fong was decided during the Reconstruction era and resistance to the 
retrenchment of slavery in regions outside the South. The case indirectly defined “freedom” 
in contrast to “slavery” in its denouncement of Southern legislators’ attempts in California to 
influence immigration law and exclude the Chinese by exercising states’ rights. At a time 
when Southern elites and politicians representing them adamantly disfavored federal 
intervention in order to regain “the Southern way” (slave economy and culture) to the extent 
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possible, Judge Fields asserted that the regulation of immigration is reserved for the federal 
government. He criticized former Southern legislators now operating in the California 
legislature for trying to exclude the Chinese in the same way that, under slavery, they 
excluded “free negroes from their [state] limits” out of fear that the presence of free Black 
people in slave states was “deem[ed] dangerous or injurious to their interests.” In shaping the 
relatively new post-slavery order—just around a decade after the Emancipation Proclamation 
(1863) that formally freed enslaved persons and end of the Civil War (1865)—the decision 
declared from the furthermost point of the western frontier in California, that such exclusions 
cannot be allowed, especially because this would be tantamount to individual states making 
foreign policy, in violation of foreign treaties. “[A]t this day,” Judge Fields wrote, “no such 
power would be asserted, or if asserted, allowed, in any federal court.” As a case with far-
reaching authority that helped federalize immigration law, Ah Fong defined “consent” in the 
international context of prostitution, which would eventually develop into “sex trafficking,” 
but here was expressed without explicitly requiring proof of force or other specific coercive 
means. In the international context, it contrasted “consent” to forced migration and forceful 
removal (deportation).  
In the domestic post-slavery order, “freedom” was defined in contrast to enslavement 
and primarily as the freedom of movement across international and state borders. This case 
and the APIA also established an important contrast between the position of racialized 
immigrants and African Americans—the power of international law and foreign relations to 
trump states’ rights and a particular exercise of localized racial politics (“home rule”) over 
minoritized subjects—a power unavailable to African Americans. Immigrants could be 
shielded from certain detrimental impacts of racialization based on national origin 
discrimination in particular ways that African Americans could not with regard to racial 
discrimination. In this way, these early laws regulating sex and gender, aimed at East Asian 
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females, were productive of race itself, nuancing the concept with distinctions of immigration 
and national origin. Ah Fong and APIA represented efforts of nation re/building on the 
national and international levels through federal integrity and national unification in the face 
of ongoing domestic tensions around race and the exploitation of sexualized and racialized 
bodies. As pointed out in Chapter 3, no distinction was made between adult/child in the APIA. 
Therefore, nothing suggests a barrier to assessing East Asian minors based on the same 
criteria of contract and consent, thus subjecting them to the same presumptions of moral 
“frailty” and forcefully deporting them. 
Contracting the reproduction of the White nation: 
Non-consent as kidnapping across international borders, and the irrelevance of child status 
During the Gilded Age and Progressive Era when key legislation was written, there 
was a decided focus on forging international relations through “contracting” among nation-
states of the world, which would then translate to the domestic context. The International 
Agreement for the Suppression of the “White Slave Traffic” of 1904 (“White Slave Traffic 
Agreement”) served as a compact among the European states and the US to protect women 
and girls from “White slavery.” It focused far less on issues of consent of trafficked females, 
and almost exclusively on agreement between the “Contracting Governments” (and territories 
under their control through colonial rule or otherwise). The Agreement referred only 
singularly to the issue of non-consent of the trafficked female, in stating the purpose of the 
Agreement as “desirous of securing to women of full age who have suffered abuse or 
compulsion, as also to women and girls under age, effective protection against the criminal 
traffic known as the ‘White Slave Traffic.’” The words “compulsion” and “abuse” as well as 
“under age” were used to conceive of female non-consent to prostitution through an emergent 
concept of sex trafficking.  
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More indirectly, the 1904 Agreement refers to an offender against sex-trafficked 
females as he “who has caused them to leave their country,” which constructs the female as 
the victim of kidnapping, having been moved or transported across international borders 
without her consent. Here we see the formation of the concept of “sex trafficking,” as 
conceived in its legal origins. A very high bar was being set for establishing victimhood via 
non-consent and regardless of adult/child status—one must be the victim of kidnapping and 
forced migration—as “trafficking” was conceived of as forced movement across international 
borders. These dynamics endure in contemporary sex trafficking law through requirements of 
“force” to indicate non-consent and thereby trigger the state’s protection. Conditioning state 
protection on the finding of non-consent implies that a consenting person assumes the risk of 
what the contracting party may require of her, and thus responsibilizes the individual by 
understanding harmful outcomes as deserved consequences of the choices she made. 
In contrast to the paucity of defining individual consent, the language of contract, 
agreement and consent were repeatedly referenced regarding the formation of the agreement 
among the world powers, through their “plenipotentiaries.” The 1904 Agreement forms 
among “contracting countries,” “contracting states” or “contracting parties,” wherein inter-
governmental powers are “exchanged,” and in which each government “undertakes” watch 
over “women and girls destined for an immoral life.” Contractual discourse among colonial 
and imperial powers is significant for reasons of deciphering the sexual and racial dimensions 
of the “social contract” of modern Western civil society in the “White slavery” and “modern 
slavery” contexts, discussed below. Thus contractual discourse, including in prostitution and 
sex trafficking law, played a significant role in US nation re/building and in establishing 
international relations with other world powers.  
The regulation of sex and gender and the criminalization of sex trafficking bolstered 
and legitimized the forging of such an agreement among hegemonic world powers. By way 
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of protecting White female sexual purity and exclusion of debauched foreign women, it 
helped define the ideal American citizen (as White) and define American females in contrast 
to corrupted and corrupting foreign women and non-White women domestically. Viewed as 
vessels of White national and cultural reproduction, the protection of White women from sex 
trafficking was analogous to the protection of Western societies in general, and thus provided 
justification for international agreement among its representative powers to surveil White 
females likely to enter prostitution. Girls were bound up in this process along with adult 
women, and no specifically child-protective rationale was offered. In the context of sex 
trafficking, the Agreement constructed “consent” as anything falling short of kidnapping and 
forced crossing of international borders, which continues to be the ideal scenario for 
successful prosecutions today. Unlike today, however, the same standard of non/consent was 
applied to women and girls alike, and thus went from federalizing the irrelevance of child 
status to the issue of consent, to internationalizing it. 
The racialization of consent and equivalence of adult and child capacity 
 The APIA had viewed prostitution as contracts for sexual service when it involved 
foreign East Asian females, which the law merely declared void and a deportable offense. 
The 1904 Agreement that turned the attention of the law to White foreign females and the 
WSTA that applied to White American females viewed prostitution as trafficking and slavery. 
The prostitution of White females was constructed in distinctly non-contractual terms that 
rendered consent immaterial and expanded the definition of traffickers’ actions that produce 
non-consent. This distinction reinscribed racialized foreign females in the trope of 
“unrapeability” stemming from American slavery against African American females, and that 
which is generally ascribed to prostitutes, subjecting these groups to similar conditions with 
regard to their sexual integrity.  
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The Mann Act elevated the importance of the actions of traffickers, a characteristic 
that endures in modern trafficking law worldwide.80 It invoked the power of the federal 
government to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, and focused on “knowingly 
transporting, etc…women or girls…for immoral purposes,” or “immoral practices,” including 
“prostitution” and “debauchery” (White Slave Trafficking Act). Then it proscribed “inducing” 
women and girls through interstate transportation “whether with or without her consent.” 
This is the single reference to female consent in the statute, which effectively rendered it 
moot. If the actions of the trafficker(s) met the legal standard for White slavery, the female 
was exonerated from prostitution due to her presumed non-consent. These sections use the 
language of coercion to describe the criminal actions of traffickers to negate female consent:  
[A]ny person who shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported, or aid or assist 
in obtaining transportation for…any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or 
debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent to induce, entice, or 
compel such woman or girl to become a prostitute or to give herself up to debauchery, 
or to engage in any other immoral practice…” (Section 2); “persuade, induce, entice, 
or coerce, or cause…or aid or assist [to be such]” (Section 3).  
Even though it seems female consent was rendered immaterial in the sex trafficking 
context, the relatively great focus on inducing and coercion by traffickers suggests that 
legislators equivocated on this issue by leaving open the possibility of children consenting to 
prostitution in the absence of a criminal wrongdoer. Lack of consent seems to depend on the 
extent to which traffickers coerced cross-border movement for prostitution, debauchery or 
immoral purposes. The motivation of the Act became clearer through its enforcement, as 
women would become liable for conspiracy under the Act, girls would continue to be arrested 
for prostitution, and racially and politically motivated prosecutions would unfold.  
Thus by the Progressive Era we see a changing definition of consent as the race and 
national origin of the female subject changed. Persuade, induce, entice, compel and coerce 
                                                
80 The Act was amended as recently as 2000, at the same time the TVPA was passed. The TVPA also focuses on 
the criminal actions of traffickers, but its protections depend greatly on victims’ consent or non-consent. 
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were specified as other means of causing a (White) female to enter prostitution, not solely 
through force or kidnap as in the international Agreement, nor as contract in the APIA. 
However, it cannot be said that it specified special protections for girls over adult women 
when it comes to the issue of consent, since it, too, applies the same standard to both women 
and girls, making no distinction regarding sexual capacity on the basis of age. Thus the 
notion of consent was modified through racialization of prostitution as non-White and sex 
trafficking or slavery as White, on a kind of “reverse slavery” premise of foreign or non-
White males’ exploitation of White females (Chapter 3). Emphasis on traffickers’ 
wrongdoing and the negation of White female consent reinforced the protective ethos toward 
White cultural reproducers expressed in its international counterpart, but with reservations 
expressed through requiring individual wrongdoing and providing no child protective 
distinctions.   
Reading consent into child prostitution in the neoliberal era 
 
 Sex trafficking law had been justified under auspices of protecting White females, and 
its motives and usages often served patriarchal, racist and politically hegemonic ends that 
were not particularly child-protective and would prove selective regarding which children 
would be protected (see generally Pliley 2014). At the same time, prostitution was always 
kept separate from sex trafficking, and always deployable against those to whom consent 
could be ascribed. Cornerstone prostitution cases involving minors at the dawn of the 
neoliberal era in the 1970s reveal a contractarian construction of child prostitution seems to 
have solidified, with no meaningful distinction on the issue of consent between adult and 
child. Again, even though they were tried in the 1970s, these cases are cited in a current 
Treatise designed for lawmakers and practitioners. Wharton’s 2014 Treatise on Prostitution 
makes clear that the law reads “consent” to prostitution into the behavior of minors for acts 
that would otherwise be construed as crimes committed against minors. The commercial 
 235 
mediation of behaviors otherwise deemed sex crimes against children rendered minors’ legal 
incapacity to consent to sex irrelevant. The opinion of Judge Smith in the 1976 case of In re 
Appeal no. 180 regarding a 15 year-old girl in Baltimore, Maryland demonstrates the 
construction of prostitution in contractual terms and its application even where minors are 
concerned. The judge conveys the commercializing and commodifying terms used to define 
prostitution as “the offering or receiving of the body for sexual intercourse for hire.” He 
comments, “Whatever else one might say about the act of accosting and soliciting, it is 
doubtlessly intended to sell a product.”81 
Most “solicitation” is conceived of in contractual terms of “selling” (and in terms of 
female culpability (Chapter 4). Where “patronizing” is also outlawed, the law typically 
imagines a male “customer,” which also conceives of the crime in contractual terms. A 
Detroit, Michigan ordinance regarding patronizing a prostitute cited in this case further 
solidifies the contractual nature attributed to prostitution. It reads, “It shall be unlawful for 
any male person to engage or offer to engage the sexual services of a female person for the 
purposes of prostitution, lewdness or assignation, by the payment in money or other forms of 
consideration.” Thus, prostitution, including solicitation and patronizing, is conceptualized as 
involving a contract for “services,” specifically “sexual services.” Having taken the character 
of a service contract, the court explains that “accosting and soliciting” are “essentially 
commercial in nature,” before referring to the male party to the crime as the “customer.”  
The court in In re D (1976) involving a 16 year-old girl in Portland, Oregon, bolsters 
the legal view of prostitution as the formation of an illegal contract for commercial sex, and 
solicitation as the attempt to do so. In prosecuting D for “loitering to solicit prostitution,” the 
decision defines “prostitution” as meaning “an act of sexual intercourse or sodomy between 
                                                
81 The interpretation of prostitution in the Page Law was as a contract for services, whereas here, it is interpreted 
as a contract for goods—that the child accosts adult men with intent to sell the “product” of sex. Contractual 
interpretation of prostitution has vacillated between referring to commercialized sex as goods or services. 
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two persons, not married to each other, in return for the payment of money or other valuable 
consideration by one of them.” The conduct of the fourteen-year-old Dora P (1979) is 
similarly characterized as a combination of aggressive sale (“accosting”) and contractual 
agreement. However, in her case, her act was felonized as a robbery because she failed to 
perform the sex act she promised to in “soliciting” the “customer.” If prostitution was merely 
and solely a contract, however, the legal response would be to provide restitution—to return 
payment plus “damages” to the injured party. But the criminalization of minors means that 
not only is the language of civil contracts deployed against her—by charging her not just with 
robbery and viewing solicitation as part of the robbery scheme—but also charging her with a 
prostitution offense. This means that Dora was penalized for failure to perform a sexual act as 
well as for committing two crimes, even though it appears that she was merely punished for 
performing two illegal crimes. As pointed out earlier, had she performed the sexual act, she 
would only have been charged with a misdemeanor prostitution offense. In this way the law 
implicitly enforces a contract for child prostitution by making its performance a misdemeanor 
and its failure to perform both a misdemeanor and a felony (robbery). 
Thus, during the 1970s and the dawn of the neoliberal era, child prostitution was 
constructed in commercial-contractual terms that criminalized girls so long as they were 
identified as a “prostitute,” and in these cases adjudicated “delinquent.” This is contrary to 
the view of adult males having sex with underage girls as a crime against sexually incapable 
children. So far, in the prostitution context, we have not seen particularly child-protective 
priorities in these key sites of discursive formation regarding child prostitution and the issue 
of consent. The same standards of criminal and moral responsibilization seem operative in 
determining children’s capacity and culpability in prostitution. 
TVPA and the establishment of DMST 
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Contemporary federal language in the TVPA, which continues to conceive of 
“trafficking” at the intersection of immigration and crime defines prostitution contractually as 
well, as “promiscuous sexual intercourse for hire” (22 CFR 40.24(b)). As discussed 
previously, federal law requires “force, fraud and coercion” in cases of adults. We have seen 
this requirement applied to minors who are “adultified” and/or deemed culpable victims or 
offenders in prostitution. Despite federal language referring to children’s incapacity to 
consent to sex trafficking (but not necessarily to prostitution). In defining the “minimum 
standards” that countries with significant levels of sex trafficking must adopt, the TVPA 
states:  
For the knowing commission of any act of sex trafficking involving force, fraud, 
coercion, or in which the victim of sex trafficking is a child incapable of giving 
meaningful consent, or of trafficking which includes rape or kidnapping or which 
causes a death, the government of the country should prescribe punishment 
commensurate with that for grave crimes, such as forcible sexual assault. (22 USC 
7106 §108(a)(2)). 
This language suggests that sex trafficking should be punishable on par with rape. The TVPA 
has specified children as “incapable of giving meaningful consent” to prostitution since its 
passage, first in the international sex trafficking context, then more recently in the domestic 
sex trafficking context. However, the “prostitution” context remains designated as the domain 
of states, and so compromises this presumption of minors’ non-consent. Federal level 
bifurcation of prostitution and DMST sustains this as well. DMST construes minors as 
incapable of consenting and does not contain contractual language the way legal texts 
regarding prostitution do. Assessing the impact of the TVPA on its tenth anniversary, a US 
Department of Justice report from 2010 describes minors as “a population so inherently 
vulnerable that the law requires no proof of their coercion” (DOJ Civil Rights Division 2010). 
In 2008 the language of US federal law was modified again, invoking key framing 
concepts on the issue of child prostitution: prostitution, demand, consent, force, and state 
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sovereignty. Examining the TVPRA 2008 and its legal analysis by Monasky (2011), which 
compares sex trafficking laws of the US and Sweden, clarifies official US discourse and the 
government’s position regarding prostitution. The law focused attention on addressing 
demand for prostitution, and explained that prostitution is not simply a “victimless enterprise” 
nor to be considered legitimate employment (Public Law 110-457, Title II, section 225(a)(1) 
and (a)(2); Monasky 2011: 2026). Therefore, it reinforces the longstanding US prohibition of 
prostitution.  
Congress adopted language that seems to accord with an abolitionist position 
regarding prostitution, or at least a prohibitionist one.82 The naming of the TVPRA 2008 after 
British abolitionist William Wilberforce alludes at least to symbolic reverence of 
abolitionism, applied to the issues of sex trafficking and child prostitution as forms of modern 
day slavery. However, simultaneous developments that year and around DMST in 2010 
demonstrate that, contrary to the abolitionist position that one cannot give meaningful 
consent to one’s own exploitation, the government prefers maintaining a distinction between 
“forced” prostitution and prostitution by “choice.” Upon closer examination of the 
Congressional debate we see the reification of bifurcated concepts of prostitution and sex 
trafficking through the discourse of prostitution as sex work and the invocation of state 
sovereignty. Congress demonstrated its deference to states’ anti-prostitution laws by rejecting 
a US House of Representatives bill prior to passage of TVPRA 2008 (HR 3887). The 
language of this bill practically equated prostitution and sex trafficking. It replaced the 
                                                
82 Although the two are often conflated, there are important differences between abolitionism and 
prohibitionism with regard to prostitution. Abolitionists recognize prostitution and its overconcentration among 
women and children as exploitive and problematic, whereas prohibitionists object to prostitution on moral 
grounds. Modern abolitionism does not blame persons in prostitution nor argues on grounds of sexual morality, 
and is associated with progressive movements, whereas the latter is a conservative, religious-based objection 
that focuses on the immorality that persons in prostitution engage in. Abolitionists advocate decriminalization of 
prostitutes but not of pimps or “clients,” recognizing power differentials between persons able to purchase sex 
over those compelled to sell sex for economic reasons, and so as not to blame the victim; whereas prohibitionist 
efforts, viewing prostitutes as culpable victims, tend to lead to criminalization of prostitutes. Apart from some 
rural counties in Nevada, the US has adopted a prohibition model against prostitution since at least the 
Progressive Era. 
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requirement that a trafficker uses “force, fraud, or coercion” to induce a person into 
prostitution, with simply “persuades, induces, or entices” (Id.). The bill was defeated, but 
attempted to streamline federal law by consolidating the language of the WSTA (“persuades, 
induces, entices”) into the TVPA (Id.). State laws’ standards vary (Id.), but elimination of the 
“force” requirement tends to signal a more victim-centered approach. Conversely, 
maintaining the “force” requirement to prove victimization was a conscious decision to keep 
definitions of sex trafficking and prostitution from merging and hence to maintain two 
separate classes of persons who meet the definition of both. This outcome was based on 
“intense debate over whether prostitution is a choice and whether all persons in prostitution 
should be considered ‘trafficked’” (Id.: 2027). It appears that the conception of prostitution as 
“sex work,” as a choice and a profession, figured heavily in debates that ultimately 
disfavored the bill. Opponents of HR 3887 “believed it conflated prostitution with sex 
trafficking …impermissibly affect[ing] women who chose to engage in prostitution as a 
profession” (Id.). Sex work discourse and its conceptualization of prostitution as sexual 
employment were utilized to maintain the bifurcation of prostitution and sex trafficking, 
undergirded by the neoliberal discourse of free choice and, essentially, the principle of 
freedom of contract.83 
Whether to modify or maintain this language was negotiated utilizing the principle of 
state sovereignty, which maintains separation of power between federal and state 
governments. To promote state-level enforcement of federal sex trafficking and child 
prostitution-related law, the TVPRA 2008 uses deferential language in addressing states and 
already existing criminal laws. It states that the language of the statute cannot be construed to 
“preempt, supplant, or limit the effect of any State or Federal criminal law” (Public Law 110-
                                                
83 Freedom of contract is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “The doctrine that people have the right to bind 
themselves legally; a judicial decision that contracts are based on mutual agreement and free choice, and thus 
should not be hampered by external control such as governmental interference” (Garner 2006: 302). 
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457, Title II, section 225 (a)(1) and (a)(2)). However, it recognizes at the same that states’ 
laws that criminalize sex trafficking victims as prostitutes limits the effectiveness of federal 
DMST law. Therefore, the TVPRA orders the Attorney General to construct a model state 
statute for the states to emulate “via an overhaul of state or local government prostitution and 
pandering laws,” help states requesting federal assistance to modernize their local prostitution 
and pandering statutes, and to adopt a comprehensive approach to investigation and 
prosecution (Monasky 2011: 2026; TVPRA 2008 (b)(1)). Apart from this non-binding 
encouragement of states to comply with federal standards, the TVPRA 2008 contains no 
language challenging existing child prostitution law in any authoritative, binding way.  
Giving such deference to states’ criminal laws despite forceful language in federal 
law regarding the abuses and exploitation that women and children suffer, the law negotiates 
the key determinative issues of “consent” and “force” and limits its own effectiveness by 
invoking state sovereignty. As discussed previously, despite its appearance as a neutral legal 
principle, “state sovereignty” (alternatively, “states’ rights”) is historically, politically, 
economically and racially loaded, primarily used to prevent federal intervention in localized 
discriminatory practices (Cho 2009; Haney-Lopez 2014). The state sovereignty principle 
continues to be a powerful and popular tool of conservative politics in the US to argue 
against federal governmental “interference” in state and local affairs, and can be interpreted 
as a “code” or “dog whistle” for racialized, anti-feminist, and anti-child rights conservative 
politics. Language that alludes to the need for strong separation between state and federal 
jurisdiction and reassertions that prostitution falls within the domain of “police powers” of 
the individual states and their criminal laws needs to be understood in the context of its 
highly politicized use. State and local law enforcement have too often been found involved in 
localized child prostitution rings, and just as with localized civil rights violations in the past, 
federal law enforcement is more likely to be detached from local contexts and interests, and 
 241 
therefore, at least theoretically more capable of successful intervention. Therefore, the 
abolition of what is legally defined as “modern slavery” or “sexual slavery” in the present 
day suffers from limitations placed on abolishing slavery in the past.  
The use of sex work discourse of “choice” and “profession” suggests an emergent 
radical redefinition of prostitution from the seemingly abolitionist (but practically 
prohibitionist) position of the US government. Though legal commentators who advocate sex 
work feminism such as Berman (2006) identify troubling political alliances and co-
authorships of sex trafficking laws among conservative, liberal and radical feminists, the 
statutory language modifications of 2008 and 2010 demonstrate the use of sex work discourse 
to disengage from federal law and retrench reliance on states’ criminal laws and police power. 
This remains unexplored and under-scrutinized for its impact on child/prostitution, which 
seems particularly urgent considering that it has historically functioned as a hallmark of 
neoconservative, neoliberal and libertarian positions favoring deference to market forces as 
well as laissez-faire or relativist approaches to regulation of health, welfare, safety and 
morals.  
Had these discussed or centered children in their analyses, there may have been 
greater reluctance to separate prostitution and sex trafficking along lines of “choice.” Instead, 
child prostitution was subsumed in the bifurcation debate around consent/non-consent that 
determined to continue emphasizing choice. Another point of disconnect in these discussions 
is an apparent unawareness or unconcern for the criminalizing effect of maintaining this 
distinction, i.e. not working out the powerful ways in which non/consent and victim/offender 
mutually reinforce one another in criminalizing ways. Without addressing how the consent-
culpability connection can be ruptured, it could only suggest an (implicit, subdued) argument 
for the legalization of child prostitution. Sex work feminists decry the “carceral state” and 
feminist utilization of “carceral politics” to support anti-prostitution and anti-sex-trafficking 
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efforts. However, the use of statutory modification to bifurcate the two can also reinforce the 
criminalization apparatus, particularly for minors. A child-centered analysis of carceral 
politics and a girl-centered feminism indicates that most DMST prosecutions occur in state 
courts, under state laws, and that more than half of all states fail to address and prevent 
DMST (Fahy 2016: 49), including that they overwhelmingly continue to criminalize minors 
in prostitution. For this to come into view requires particular attention to aspects of American 
law and political structure impacting children, particularly girls, which the political 
prioritization of individualized notions of consent, contract and market-based concepts of 
agency are unlikely to capture, at the risk of reinforcing some of the most insidious and 
pernicious structural foundations of the carceral state through problematic binaries and 
conflations. 
Contemporary cases of minors: prostitution vs. DMST 
Contemporary cases of minors in prostitution that have found their way to the public 
domain are ones that have received greater public attention. These include the cases of 
Nicolette R, Bobby P, and Samatha R. Like their 1970s counterparts, above, these girls were 
arrested and appeared before the courts on charges of prostitution. However, the origins of 
the contemporary cases are geographically concentrated, having been tried in New York City 
during the course of this research. This is unsurprising since New York City has been 
pioneering legislation in this area. One of the most influential cases in this area is the case of 
Nicolette R (2004), who was twelve years old at the time of her arrest for prostitution. Judge 
Lynch at the Bronx County Family Court explained that Nicolette had indeed violated the 
prostitution law of New York, “which involves charging a fee for sexual activity.” This was 
the same penal code and language involved in the other two cases. However, by the time 
Bobby P (2010) and Samatha R (2011) were adjudicated, New York had formally introduced 
the concept of DMST into law. The decision in Samatha R explains, “The Safe Harbour Act 
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added to the protections put in place by New York’s Anti-Human Trafficking Act of 
2006…which created the new offense of sex trafficking...” The statute appears to attempt to 
rewrite “the contract”—from a prostitution contract for sexual services with the minor as the 
offeror to a contract for services from the state to the minor as a victim of commercial-sexual 
exploitation. This shift is reflected elsewhere in the US where DMST laws have been adopted. 
The language of contract has not necessarily disappeared, but the place of offeror and offeree 
are often switched. For example, in the case of Zarif (2006) from Utah, the defendant accused 
of sex trafficking of minors is described as having offered the two minor girls a substantial 
amount of money (up to $300) to perform sex acts with adult men. The acts that Sawyer 
(2015) from Illinois more forcefully required of minors are still explained as the exchange of 
sex for money.  
The contemporary cases have served as a testing ground for the issue of consent and 
non-consent in child prostitution, much more directly than Dora P before them. The decision 
in the case of 16 year-old Samatha R (2011) grapples with the contradiction between 
statutory rape and minors’ culpability for prostitution.  
Another inconsistency that arises from prosecuting a 16-year-old child, such as 
defendant here, lies within the Penal Law itself, which provides that a 16-year-old 
cannot legally consent to engage in sexual intercourse (see Penal Law 130.05 [3]), 
and is a rape victim if she engages in intercourse with someone who is 21 or older 
(see Penal Law 130.25 [2]; 130.40 [2]); yet at the same time she is a criminal if she 
consents to have intercourse for money.84 
DMST appears to neutralize contractual language. The Department of Justice press release 
regarding Sawyer refers to the issue as “exploit[ing] children through prostitution” and as 
exerting “a high degree of control over all his victims,” including by confiscating money they 
earned from commercial sex acts, and “impregnat[ing] three of them.”  
                                                
84 This demonstrates that the legal system is aware of this inconsistency, as does the legal attempt to reconcile 
sexual crimes against children, statutory rape in particular, with prostitution through DMST laws. Each of the 
key binaries discussed in this research show various means through which they are deployed to sustain these 
contradictions regarding minors in prostitution, and thereby to penalize minors while promising protection. 
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Prostitution v. DMST on the state level 
DMST enters the foray of contractual discourse on prostitution and the language of 
abuse and exploitation on the other hand, seemingly as an antidote to the criminal culpability 
that a contractual reading of child prostitution entails through its imputation of consent on 
minors as “prostitutes,” or “solicitors” of prostitution. But does the reversal of offeree and 
offeror from child to pimp/trafficker, or the more direct negation of minors’ “consent” with 
the language of force, fraud or coercion do away with the contractual conception of the issue? 
Or recast minors in prostitution as non-consenting child victims, as “DMST” is claimed to 
do? What we do see at this stage is that “consent” has been a key issue regarding human 
trafficking, prostitution and sex trafficking from their conceptual inception and 
terminological origins in western legal discourse, which has constructed the phenomena and 
responses to it in contractual terms.  
Contractual language of “offer” and “acceptance” and “assent” are prevalent in legal 
discourse constructing child prostitution. Prostitution is presented as an implicit contract in 
which “prostitutes” are sellers (solicitors) of sex, (which is disproportionately punished and 
presumes the “individual” of contract theory, even though children are incapable of 
consenting to commercial contracts or sex, and contracts for sex are illegal. Buyers of sex are 
constructed as consumers rather than criminals, despite their having committed the crime of 
patronizing. The role or identity of the “consumer” is one of the “central ideological 
mechanisms [shaping] citizenship in advanced capitalism” (Alexander and Mohanty 1997: 
xxxii). The identification of the adult male as a “consumer” defines the social relationship 
between the “john” and “prostitute” in advanced economies, defining “patronizing” as an act 
of consumption. This formulation contributes to the lack of culpability underlying the under-
prosecution of johns, but also, as will be discussed, their protection and legal posturing, 
which over-burdens minors and over-punishes “prostitutes.” 
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5.2 Contractarian consequences 
Chapter 4 showed that legal discourse defines “prostitution” as an act of female 
culpability, which bolsters the over-criminalization of females, despite the counter-construct 
of “DMST” that constructs minors as victims of sex trafficking. Examining the issue of 
“consent,” as constructed legally (and politically) through contractual discourse shows how 
consent is imputed to minors. Particularly when read intertextually with legal discourse of 
criminal exposure and transmission of HIV in prostitution, the imputation of consent on 
minors combines powerfully with female prostitution culpability to heighten the 
blameworthiness of girls. This intertextual reading of prostitution and “consent” through the 
criminal-legal discourse of HIV/AIDS is more revealing of lawmakers’ punitive stance 
against “prostitutes” and leniency toward “johns” than legal discourse directly addressing 
prostitution. Prostitution sex is treated as an illegal service or contraband (but a “good” or 
“service” nonetheless), and CE-HIV treats it as the sale of damaged goods to the consumer 
(“john”), sanctioning prostitutes for unfulfilled consumer expectations. This counteracts an 
understanding of the practice of child/prostitution as abuse or exploitation, or more broadly, 
as the exercise of inequalities of power or expression of social hierarchy.  
Perhaps nowhere else is the consumer identity of johns stronger and contractual 
conceptualization of prostitution more evident than in the legal discourse of criminal 
exposure and criminal transmission of HIV laws. These laws are used to amplify punishment 
for prostitution on the grounds that prostitution activity contributes to the spread of 
HIV/AIDS. It is important to note, however, that prostitution and these types of HIV laws, as 
criminal laws, proscribe the behavior of individuals as harms against “the public,” which 
statutory language identifies as the aggrieved, or “the people,” which criminal cases identify 
as whom prosecutors are meant to represent when they prosecute criminals. This is 
significant because, as Chapter 4 demonstrated, legislators formulate a misleading 
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configuration of blameworthiness and culpability with regard to who is responsible for 
exposing or transmitting HIV through prostitution to “the public.” They often rely on hetero-
normative nuclear family models of social relationships that tend to exonerate patrons while 
condemning prostitutes, while using images of the innocent wife or child to legitimize 
punitive laws. Even though cases against minors under these types of statutes appear to be 
rare to non-existent, it says a great deal about how “prostitution” and “prostitutes” are 
constructed at law.85 Prostitutes are deemed even more culpable in the HIV context, and the 
way that they are constructed through these laws reveals a great deal about how legislators 
actually view them. As previously discussed, when minors in prostitution are criminalized, it 
is because their behavior is viewed as “prostitution” and they themselves are viewed as 
“prostitutes.” HIV laws reveal more clearly the greater extent to which prostitutes are vilified 
and blamed for the public threats that prostitution is deemed to pose.  
Current law (TVPA) expresses worry for the spread of HIV in the sex trafficking 
context, but has little else to say regarding the criminal exposure or transmission of HIV 
through prostitution. However, beginning in 1990, federal law “prompted many states to 
enact laws to criminally punish individuals who knowingly transmit or expose others to the 
virus” (Niemeier 2001). A framework was established conditioning the disbursement of 
federal funds for AIDS services to states that have enacted criminal exposure/transmission of 
                                                
85 It may be that our knowledge of such cases is impacted by the compounding of confidentiality in juvenile 
cases and testing for sexually transmitted diseases. In my own research as well as in reaching out to other 
researchers of child prostitution cases such as Stephanie Halter, I have not found specific cases of minors being 
prosecuted for exposing or transmitting HIV to others through prostitution. I have, however, found such cases of 
young women who are technically adults for having reached age of majority. For example, in Utah, a young 
woman in her early twenties was condemned in the media for her HIV-positive prostitution activity. Given that 
most prostitution begins in childhood and the research that confirms that minors in prostitution do very often 
contract HIV and are actually more susceptible to contracting it than adults, it is reasonable to discuss the HIV 
exposure laws in the child prostitution context. Minors suspected of prostitution have also historically been 
targeted, quarantined and punished for STDs, for example during the syphilis scare of the early twentieth 
century (Kahn-Chamberlain Act), for which girls were actually detained for much longer than women (Ditmore 
2011: 53). Moreover, the apparent rarity of HIV convictions of minors is likely a reflection of the low numbers 
of convictions overall. Though HIV laws are ubiquitous, the number of actual charges are quite low (Lazzarini, 
Bray et al. 2002). However, 36 states total had any convictions, and where charges are brought and convictions 
secured, they are mostly in the context of sex crimes and prostitution (Id.). 
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HIV statutes (Howlett 1997). However, it is primarily on the state level that these laws are 
debated and passed. Both Utah and Illinois have such statutes and their approach to the issue 
and punitive rationale are similar, as across all other states that adopt such laws. Moreover, 
discussions of HIV/AIDS in legal discourse of DMST are also rare to non-existent despite the 
fact that compared to their adult counterparts, minors are more susceptible to contracting HIV 
and other sexually transmitted diseases, and minors have been demonstrably less efficacious 
with regard to adult male “customers” use of protection during sex acts (Klain 1999). An 
examination of both Utah and Illinois’ legal discourse regarding HIV laws reinforces the 
construction of patronizing as consumption, johns as consumers and the consent and 
attendant culpability imputed on prostitutes generally, which is then transferred to minors in 
prostitution, particularly when they are criminalized. 
“Armed with Knowledge”: prostitution while knowingly HIV-positive 
 Prostitution in the HIV/AIDS context provides the clearest expression of the Utah 
Legislature’s conception of prostitutes as criminal sex offenders and the threat they pose to 
public health, safety, and morality. In 1993 (long before any reference to prostitutes as 
victims in 2012) the Utah House of Representatives debated HB 24, regarding “mandatory 
testing for HIV infection of convicted prostitutes and convicted patrons of prostitutes” (HB 
24). Persons who commit prostitution while knowingly HIV+ are unequivocally referred to 
as sex offenders who commit criminal transmission or exposure of a deadly, communicable 
disease. Even though HB 24 refers to “prostitutes” and “patrons of prostitutes” on its face, the 
content of the legislative debate reveals that the House’s legislators are primarily focused on 
prostitutes. The bill is facially neutral regarding victim and offender, but the debate helps 
bring the criminal parties to light. 
 248 
The sponsor of the bill, Representative Oscarson, explains that he proposes the bill in 
response to the County Sheriff, County Health and a “number of other groups” urging him to 
place it before the House. He continues that the problem is one that these persons of authority, 
institutions and “groups” believe needs specific attention—“and that is the…area of 
prostitution when those prostitutes are HIV carriers.” He refers to offenders as prostitutes as 
well as “customer or client” of a prostitute. The sponsor explains the behavior of offenders 
that the bill proscribes as conduct that “caus[es] reckless endangerment, such as an assault 
with intent to infect or deliberately transmit the virus” or to “willfully and wantonly go out 
and spread” a “criminal disease.”86 Representative Oscarson describes offenders, “These 
people have already been arrested, they’ve already been charged with solicitation…and so, 
they’re a criminal…We also do a number of things with habitual criminals and repeat 
offenders. We give them heightened penalties all the time.” He then analogizes these 
offenders with persons who “sell drugs close to schools,” for whom the Legislature also 
enhances sentences. This suggests a moral equivalence between selling drugs to 
schoolchildren, and places the vulnerability of children to drugs on par with that of the class 
of persons whom HIV+ prostitution harms. 
Representative Oscarson paints HIV+ prostitutes as offenders who are not only 
habitual but also incorrigible. Because convicted prostitutes are subject to mandatory HIV 
testing by the state, he argues, a prostitute who is later arrested after being informed that s/he 
is HIV+ should be considered a repeat offender. To further drive this point, he encases HIV+ 
prostitutes in an analogy regarding armed robbery, for which he claims that, “most cases are 
repeat offenders.” Representative Oscarson goes on to admit that HIV-related education and 
treatment programs in his state are inadequate, but implies nonetheless that the problem is the 
prostitutes’ incorrigibility. In a jumbled statement, the Representative attempts to persuade 
                                                
86 Listening to this speech, it is unclear whether use of the word “criminal” here is intentional or accidental. 
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his colleagues that HIV+ prostitutes are rather hopeless, and thus enhanced sentences are just 
deserts. 
I probably need to…bring up the idea…we do have a few treatment programs—yes, 
we need more treatment programs—we need better education. But the people—
according to County Health Department—tell me that they’ve talked and brought in 
prostitutes and they know many of them who are HIV [sic], have begged them—
everything to get into treatment programs—but it has a less than a ten-percent cure 
rate in some of these programs.    
From what is discernable, the County Health Department has access to and contact with 
prostitutes who have tested positive for HIV and is unsuccessful in convincing them to enter 
treatment programs. On the other hand, too few programs are available and the ones that exist 
are largely failures with a “less than ten-percent cure rate,” though it is unclear what “cure 
rate” means in the context of HIV since it is incurable, only treatable. Although the emphasis 
is on the futility of attempting to modify the behavior of HIV+ prostitutes, the fact remains 
that if treatments and programs are largely unavailable or inadequate (with inferably dismal 
success rates), then there is nothing for them to adhere or respond to or be measured by. Thus 
although resources are inadequate or non-existent, HIV+, drug-addicted prostitutes are 
expected to essentially self-manage once they are informed of being positive. Again, the 
ambiguity and incoherence of these thoughts makes it difficult to decipher a clear meaning 
and intent. However, vacillating between the claims of prostitutes’ incurability, 
unreasonableness and incorrigibility and glossing over the inadequacy of state programs 
leaves the impression that HIV+ prostitutes are blameworthy and deserving of the enhanced 
penalties outlined in the bill.  
 Just after he completes his thought regarding the less-than-ten-percent cure rate, 
Representative Oscarson makes several statements referring to prostitutes. He quickly 
comments on and wraps up the issue of ineffective state programs. Then he makes certain 
remarks that are rather inarticulate and incoherent, and others that reveal his lack of 
 250 
knowledge on the matter. At the same time he conflates prostitutes and HIV+ prostitutes in 
his speech so as to construct an identity of both that is intertwined and indistinguishable. This 
part of his speech merits lengthy quotation for the same reason that necessitated doing so for 
Representative Ray’s speech on prostitution, above. It is another major example of the 
Legislature’s disjointed articulation and at times erroneous understanding of the issue. 
Continuing from his admission to the state’s failed programs regarding HIV+ prostitutes, 
Representative Oscarson states: 
We need to do a better job. I’m not gonna argue that point at all. We don’t have 
those…and because of the cost…I [doubt] this Legislature would…permit 
those…when they’re allowed put them on any of those programs right now. Maybe 
this [bill] is not the best alternative, but it’s the best one right now we can come up 
with for a small segment of our population…who, in many cases, the prostitutes 
themselves are…feeding the habit, dealing in drugs and stuff like that, and so they 
have to work. And [unintelligible]…told me that a prostitute always does 10 to 15 
tricks a night. Based on a year, that’s about 86,000 [sic] tricks. Yeah…uh…we don’t 
know exactly the number that could be infected with sexual transmission [sic]…and I 
could probably get into all kinds of different ways, we have…what they do without 
that, but it’s important to understand that for safety issues, for our citizens, if John is 
sleeping at home, his family and offspring…there’s a ninety percent chance his 
offspring will be contract [sic] with AIDS…and that is—that’s murder…b/c right now 
we have no way of dealing with AIDS and the cure of it. With that introduction, I’ll 
just open up to questions. 
Again, this sort of unclear and inarticulate speech is impressionistic and suggestive. It is able 
to get away with not clearly expressing its meaning or making logical connections by tapping 
into the audience’s presumptive notions about the subject matter of the speech and having the 
audience do the work of making connections between the intermittently coherent phrases. At 
best, the Utah House has accepted the sponsor’s argument based on legislators having made 
some kind of logical sense of it for themselves, or without active, critical listening. At worst, 
they have passed a bill for other practical or pragmatic reasons such as expediency, likely 
without having reviewed the text or reflected on its consequences.  
 Though Representative Oscarson admits that, “we need to do a better job,” he 
simultaneously refuses to confront the state’s failure to address the public health of the spread 
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of HIV from HIV+ prostitutes and patrons to the broader population. As quickly as he admits 
to the state’s ineffective programs, he firmly closes the issue with a refusal to debate it—“I’m 
not gonna argue that point at all.” He not only concedes the deficiency of the state’s public 
health response, but divulges the likely inadequacy of the bill that he is proposing, “Maybe 
this is not the best alternative, but it’s the best one right now we can come up with for a small 
segment of our population…” (emphasis added). This latter phrase about the smallness of the 
population, which is hastily tacked onto the pragmatic argument for an unsatisfactory bill, 
suggests that even if the bill may have undesirable consequences, it only pertains to an 
insignificant minority of the population.  
This diminishing of the population in terms of numerosity and significance is 
immediately followed by claims of HIV+ prostitutes’ motives. “The prostitutes”—
presumably HIV+ prostitutes who continue “to work” despite their diagnosis and illness—
feeding their drug habit, “dealing in drugs,”87 and “stuff like that.” Both comments—
regarding the smallness of the population and their dishonorable motives—have the effect of 
diminishing HIV+ prostitutes as a group. At first the phrase that Representative Oscarson 
adds afterward—“and so they have to work”—seems sympathetic or at least pitying. 
However, he proceeds with a disjointed interjection of how many “tricks” he has heard 
prostitutes “always” do per night, followed by a gross miscalculation that 10-15 “tricks” an 
evening equals 86,000 per year. This imparts an insensitivity toward what persons in the 
situation he describes must endure—drug addicted, HIV-infected, and having to exchange 
sex for money with several men a night. It is also seemingly meant to convey the 
magnitude—again, grossly miscalculated—of the potential risk of exposure and transmission 
that HIV+ prostitutes present to uninfected persons. It is unclear what the Representative 
means in the next few lines of fragments, but by bringing up “safety” as the issue “important 
                                                
87 Another reference associating HIV+ prostitutes with drugs and drug dealers is encased in this speech, though 
the Representative possibly meant that the prostitutes are drug users. 
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to understand” regardless of whether we know the actual number of what he might be 
referring to when he says “we don’t know exactly the number that could be infected with 
sexual transmission,” he states its purpose as “for safety issues, for our citizens” (HB 24). 
This effectively excludes HIV+ prostitutes from the definition of “citizen,” instead 
classifying them as diseased, deadly outsiders.   
Despite the bill’s naming prostitutes and patrons as offenders, the Legislature 
continues to be decidedly focused on prostitutes as the problematic vectors of HIV except for 
Representative Oscarson’s brief but significant mention of “John,” a hypothetical HIV+ 
buyer of sex who is also a husband, since he has a “family” and potential or actual offspring. 
The example of John makes the otherwise missing link between “our citizens” and a 
seemingly insular group—HIV+ prostitutes and buyers who expose or transmit the virus 
through their criminal activities to one another. Here, “our citizens” refers to law-abiding 
citizens who are uninfected with HIV—a sexual partner and their offspring. The danger to 
these citizens’ safety is that the HIV+ buyer infects his unwitting sexual partner, who is 
normatively a wife in this context given that she is “family.” For John’s offspring to be 
infected in this context means that his infected wife passes it to their offspring through 
gestation or breastfeeding.88 Not citing any data or studies, Representative Oscarson claims 
that “there’s a ninety percent chance” that the child will contract “AIDS.” Though it is HIV 
that is contracted, which later develops into AIDS, this mistake is easily lost and rendered 
insignificant amidst other errors and problematic issues dogging this speech. But his main 
point is that “that’s murder” because there is no cure for AIDS. In this equation, it is 
ultimately HIV+ prostitutes who are murderers. In keeping with the history of STD laws 
intersecting with prostitution law, and the way in which gender and heterosexuality have 
been policed through the discourse of disease, the public health threat is not constructed as 
                                                
88 The Center for Disease Control (CDC) in the United States recommends that HIV/AIDS-infected women do 
not breastfeed babies (Website of Center for Disease Control 2016). 
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one in which HIV+ buyers infect prostitutes or as reciprocation between buyers and 
prostitutes, but rather that the buyer contracts HIV from a prostitute that he transmits to his 
wife, the upstanding feminine subject. Such understandings in a retributive context create an 
even greater impetus for ascribing consent to prostitution behavior. As pointed out, these 
laws exist in both Utah and Illinois (and many other states), such that a retributive or 
rehabilitative orientation of the state’s criminal politics does not necessarily prevent the 
passage of such punitive laws against some of the most vulnerable bodies.  
There are both gendered and hetero-normative presumptions regarding the identities 
of the parties to this crime. Barring child sex abuse or other ways that the legislature imagines 
HIV is transmitted (e.g. Utah still outlaws spitting by HIV+ persons), the public health threat 
relies on the following chain of transmission: prostitute → buyer → wife → child. This is the 
implied order, which is also reflected in the order in which they are discussed in the sponsor’s 
speech. In this context the 86,000 sex acts that the prostitute supposedly engages in per year 
is meant to highlight how much of a risk she poses to others by doing so, not how much she 
is put at risk by others, even though the operation of prostitution requires that there be 
substantially more “buyers” than prostitutes. This debate has already established the 
recklessness, incorrigibility and wantonness that mark the HIV+ prostitute, and none of the 
Representatives henceforth discuss prostitutes in terms of being at-risk or as victims in this 
debate.  
In support of the bill, Representative Hunter states the following:  
Since AIDS has become a political issue rather than a medical issue, the problem is as 
though we give HIV a right or a civil right to exist, indirectly, in protecting people’s 
civil rights. This bill applies to people who know—who’ve been informed—that they 
have HIV. And as such, they—armed with that knowledge—if they go out into the 
community and—either in the act of prostitution or in soliciting or becoming a 
customer of a prostitute—then they help to spread the AIDS virus. If they do that with 
knowledge, then I think they are guilty of a crime. And I think that this bill addresses 
that issue. No one has the right to give another person the HIV virus. That is not a 
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civil right and should not be protected by our laws. I want to stand with 
Representative Oscarson on this bill. I commend him for—I know he’s taken a lot of 
heat on it—and I commend him for still standing and still pushing it forward. And I 
want you to know that I stand with him on this issue and I urge my colleagues here in 
the House to support this bill and let’s do something about wiping out the HIV threat 
that is so prevalent in our society today and is gaining ground. We are not winning at 
this point. 
Because no Representatives make the argument at any point in this debate that spreading HIV 
is a civil right, Representative Hunter is setting up a straw man argument that he then attacks 
in support of the bill. An outlandish position such as the one he describes is easily attacked, 
but no Representative challenges his characterization of the opposition. Furthermore, he ends 
his presentation of the HIV/AIDS public health issues with a war analogy—a war that “we” 
are losing. Inferably, the enemies in this war are HIV+ prostitutes and those who “become a 
customer of a prostitute,” the former—active and blameworthy, the latter—passive and 
perhaps not as much to blame.   
It is also important to note the ways in which the legislature expands and collapses the 
scope of this issue, enlarges and diminishes the significance of HIV+ prostitutes. It 
diminishes them as a population, as discussed above, but highlights and even aggrandizes the 
threat that they pose to the public. Thus they are a small and rather disadvantaged minority 
group, but likely at their own behest and a great peril nonetheless. Representative Oscarson 
diminishes the bill when necessary (to downplay its potentially detrimental impact), but 
inflates its importance to argue for its necessity and to pass it. 
Also in support of the bill, Representative Kilpack makes a forceful speech that 
emphasizes the dangerous and murderous aspects of the proscribed behavior and also cites a 
rather bizarre example: 
I feel that I must rise and speak in [sic] behalf of this bill. I think for some reason in 
this country we’re terribly afraid of identifying those with HIV. I think that’s sad. 
This is a serious medical problem. If a prostitute is arrested, she is automatically 
tested. Then she is required to divulge as much as possible her last contact or contacts 
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and make every attempt to find them and to cure this, and to stop this disease before it 
spreads. This is a fatal disease, and there is no protection to protect either the 
prostitute or her partners. It is exactly the same as firing a bullet at an individual only 
the reaction is delayed. The bullet may not explode for ten years. The bullet is fired. It 
will be fatal. That person will die. If I were HIV+ and I took a 2PC syringe and I put it 
in my vein and I withdrew 2 PCs of blood and I turned to my unsuspecting friend next 
to me, who is on the phone, and I quickly gave him a drop of HIV+ blood, would I be 
guilty of murder? Even though he isn’t going to die for ten years? I’ve only disrupted 
his life. He can’t have a normal relationship with any member of his family. 
Everyone’ll be afraid to play golf with him b/c he gets violent when he misses, and he 
may hurt himself and bleed all over us. It is disgusting to me that we cannot take 
some measure to identify the people who have the HIV. If we are approaching 2 
million people in this country who are carrying the HIV virus, who are either active or 
carrying that virus—you realize that’s 1 in 125 people? I think we need to start 
somewhere. We’re not imprisoning these prostitutes because they have HIV; they’re 
being imprisoned because they’re breaking the law. We’re taking the opportunity to 
identify a person with HIV and protect those who may be subjected to her at some 
future time…be subjected to him or her…at some future time. I stand strongly in 
favor of this bill (emphases in speech).89 
The statement “protect those who may be subject to her in the future” is the most 
explicit purpose of the statute. It clarifies whom the law intends to protect: buyers. Buyers are 
typically the persons who “may be subjected to her at some future time.” Legislators express 
a desire to protect buyers despite the facts that: 1) by patronizing a prostitute buyers break the 
law and are therefore a criminal class, just the same as the prostitutes, and 2) prostitutes are 
for the most part at far greater risk of HIV contraction from others than are buyers as a result 
of having multiple, relatively indiscriminate sexual partners.  
Several other things occur in this speech. First, there is a claim that there is a 
disallowance of being able to “identify” HIV carriers in the United States. Secondly, there is 
an implication that, as Representative Hunter suggested, civil rights is to blame for the lack of 
frank discussion regarding how to deal with and curb HIV/AIDS. Third, there is a suggestion 
                                                
89 It should be noted that the “him or her,” albeit belatedly injected, is important, as there are particular issues 
for men and boys in prostitution who sell sex to men, and thus are subjected to these punishments. Research on 
HIV prevalence shows the particular risks LGBT persons in prostitution face. Among gender non-conforming 
persons, particularly male-to-female transgender prostitutes, an estimated 27.7% are HIV-positive (Herbst, 
Jacobs et al. 2008), with infection rates highest among African-Americans (56.3%). Greatest risk is associated 
with unprotected anal intercourse with multiple sexual partners (Herbst, Jacobs et al. 2008), which is 
particularly common in prostitution (see also Schepel 2011). 
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that disclosure of an HIV+ prostitute’s sexual history will help cure AIDS. Fourth, there is a 
characterization of those who contract HIV when purchasing sex as unsuspecting murder 
victims. Fifth, the example of the golf players may signify the legislator’s lack of connection 
to communities of HIV/AIDS carriers and how the virus is transmitted. Apart from not 
explaining why exactly an angry golf-miss leads to self-harm and how that leads to “bleeding 
all over us,” which in turn infects the golf-mates, the analogy does not work on another level. 
The syringed attacker in the example intended to infect his “unsuspecting friend,” which not 
only casts a negative light of betrayal on the act, but also implicates the moral character of 
this hypothetical person for betraying a friendship and attacking an unsuspecting individual, 
whereas no special relationship or friendship necessarily exists between prostitutes and 
patrons. Moreover, patrons cannot be viewed as “unsuspecting” because the bill recognizes 
that patrons assume the risk of exposure to HIV, and prostitution is not motivated by the 
intent to spread HIV.  
Representative Webber argues for treating the prostitute and patron equally in terms 
of punishment, by motioning to change the degree classification for a violation from either 
group of offenders to “Class B misdemeanor” because the bill currently holds patrons liable 
for the lesser Class C misdemeanor. In arguing for this “equal” treatment, the Representative 
condemns the “supposed good men” who “merely gets a slap on the wrist.” Though he 
acknowledges that “the prostitute is trying to earn a living and…sometimes is driven there 
because of difficult circumstances” and that “the customer is not driven there because of 
hardship,” he concludes that “we ought to at least treat the customer with the same severity as 
we treat the prostitute.” The bill sponsor, Representative Oscarson, agrees to the change in 
degree classification to be the same for both groups of offenders. He then concludes the 
debate with the following statement: 
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This is a very narrow bill looking at a narrow segment of our population who have 
been told repeatedly of the problems they have—that they’re illegally doing 
something to begin with—but who—after their own—will continue to do that—it 
becomes a health threat to our citizens—the unsuspecting citizens.    
He again refers to the target offenders as “a narrow segment” of the population and their 
incorrigibility. His statement implies that being repeatedly reminded of their problems should 
be an effective method of preventing HIV+ prostitutes from engaging in prostitution and that 
“the problems that they have” are the same for both prostitutes and patrons. He also implies 
that both groups are merely “after their own,” or selfishly motivated, which is the reason they 
refuse to stop engaging in sex while HIV-positive.  
Eighteen years later, in 2011, the Utah Senate debated Senate Bill 50 (SB 50), which 
enhanced the penalties for these crimes further—from a Class B misdemeanor to a third-
degree felony—and was brought forth with the assistance of the Prosecutors’ Association. 
The debate was brief as only the sponsor, Senator Stephenson, made a short statement in 
which he referred to offenders as an “HIV-positive offender that repeatedly engages in 
prostitution or sexual solicitation, who knows or should know they had a positive test result.” 
The phrase “should know” signifies that the intent of the law is not only to hold criminally 
liable HIV+ prostitutes who actually know that they are HIV+, but also to impute 
“constructive knowledge” to them, allowing for their criminal liability even when they do not 
actually know whether they are infected.   
Illinois’ HIV laws 
 Along with Colorado, Utah is one of two states whose “provision for prostitution 
and/or solicitation is the state’s only legislation related to HIV exposure through consensual 
sex” (Galletly and Pinkerton 2004). In 1990, health officials in Salt Lake City, “proposed that 
if individuals who had been convicted of prostitution and informed of their HIV-positive 
status were later convicted of prostitution or solicitation, they should be placed in a 
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‘mandatory treatment facility’ for ‘recalcitrant’ offenders” (Dalrymple-Blackburn 1995). As 
demonstrated in the Utah legislative debate, “(A)mong many legislators…prostitutes…as 
archetypal ‘incorrigible’ disease transmitters, have been regarded as a major public health 
threat” (Id.).  
Illinois, despite its progressive reputation, paved the way for such laws. In The People 
of the State of Illinois v. Henrietta Adams, et al. (1992), a case from Cook County in which 
Chicago is situated, defendants Henrietta Adams and Peggy Madison were convicted of 
prostitution and ordered to undergo medical examinations to determine whether they were 
HIV-positive. Both defendants refused, arguing that the court-ordered test was an “illegal 
search and seizure” that denied their equal protection rights. The court of appeals declared 
that the statute regulating prostitutes to undergo HIV testing is constitutional, and that the 
state has the right to order such tests for public health reasons. Illinois law regarding 
mandatory HIV testing of persons convicted of prostitution claims to act on behalf of “the 
victim” and “the public” when the configuration of HIV exposure and transmission is 
confounded in legal discourse: if the prostitute is the exposer or transmitter, then the john is 
“the victim” or “the public.”  
Acting in accordance with the best interests of the victim and the public, the judge 
shall have the discretion to determine to whom, if anyone, the results of the testing 
may be revealed. The court shall order the cost of any such test shall be paid by the 
county and may be taxed as costs against the convicted defendant (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, 
ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3(g)).  
Illinois punishes the “criminal transmission of HIV [which happens when a 
person]…knowing that he or she is infected with HIV…engages in intimate conduct with 
another,” continuing to detail “intimate conduct” that risks exposure and transmission. Even 
during the relatively early years of passage, legal commentary on these laws reported that,  
The motivation for such legislation is the concern that prostitutes will act as a ‘bridge’ 
for the transfer of HIV into the heterosexual community. There is no evidence that 
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widespread transmission of the virus is occurring through infected prostitutes. Sex 
workers are more likely to receive infection through shared needles or from infected 
sex partners, than they are to infect their clients. Indeed, the evidence shows that 
female prostitutes are at risk of being infected by their clients, but not the reverse. 
(Howlett 1997) 
Nonetheless, illustrating the amplified culpability that attends such laws, enhanced penalties 
for HIV-positive prostitution can convert prostitution charges to homicide, and raise 
misdemeanors to felonies. Because prostitutes are considered to be in a high risk group, “A 
prosecutor could even argue that presence in a high risk group amounted to a constructive 
knowledge sufficient for a manslaughter or murder prosecution” (Closen, Bobinski et al. 
1994: footnote 26). As mentioned, minors are most at risk for the demand of unprotected sex 
from “customers,” due to customer expectation of their disease-free bodies, which is wrongly 
presumed due to their young age, “partly in hopes of minimizing their risk of exposure to 
HIV” (Boonstra and Cohen 2006). In this way child prostitution is a major contributor to the 
problem of HIV/AIDS, and also fuels demand for it while additionally encouraging demand 
for increasingly younger children (Boonstra and Cohen 2006). Minors are also the least likely 
to be able to resist such demand (Klain 1999). Moreover, girl children are at greatest risk of 
contracting HIV due to both their young age and their female gender. International legal 
discourse in the early 1990s had identified that “A most pressing challenge is the prevention 
of the spread of the HIV virus and the present and future care of thousands of prostituted 
minors who have contracted AIDS” (Healy 1995). As mentioned, girls have also historically 
been criminalized and over-punished in detention as prostitutes quarantined for STDs, 
especially syphilis (Ditmore 2011: 53).  
Legal commentators point out that the function of crackdowns on prostitutes for 
ostensible public health reasons is to legitimize the prostitution market. HIV laws, as the 
progeny of past STD laws, have functioned as a basis for the protection of johns, and to 
legitimize the regulated prostitution market. “Creating the illusion of controlling venereal 
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disease in order to promote the prostitution market was the original basis of regulated 
prostitution” (Barry 1996). Indeed, in legal markets, prostitutes are the ones subjected to 
regular and constant invasive testing (Bingham 1998), which comports with this history. Not 
only does HIV testing legitimize the prostitution industry and its legalization, but it also 
encourages and increases the demand for unsafe sex. Arguing generally regarding the myth 
that legalization decreases economic exploitation by pimps and brothel owners, Giobbe 
(1993) reported a global pattern of women in prostitution being subjected to mandatory HIV 
testing, including in Nevada brothels. “This policy has actually increased the risks of 
transmitting the virus. Johns assume the prostituted woman is HIV negative, and therefore 
refuse to use condoms, increasing the risk of infection, particularly to the woman” (Id.).   
Thus we can see many forces at work that encourage child prostitution and demand 
for it, particularly when we examine HIV laws, which are constructed in ways that bolster a 
contractual view of child prostitution, impute consent to minors and protect the “consumption” 
of their commercial-sexual exploitation. When there is a “consumer” expectation embedded 
in HIV laws, consumers expect children to be free of STDs, and the law tends to uphold the 
interests of johns, the law subjects minors to a normative standard of childhood purity that is 
unrealistic for minors in prostitution. This normativity burdens minors with the risk of being 
deemed even more culpable than their adult counterparts should they be involved in 
prostitution with “reckless disregard” for their being at high risk of HIV contraction and 
transmission. Legal discourse of HIV exposure and transmission, even if rarely applied, 
creates a hostile social and legal environment for “prostitutes,” including minors. Along with 
the inversion of victim/offender, implicit contractual consent points to the hyper-culpability 
of minors in prostitution. Johns are persons least in need of protection due to their under-
targeting and under-prosecution as well as their greater structural power and individual 
bargaining power (as purchasers of sex with those who need the money), and those most 
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likely to subject minors to unprotected sex from which they risk contraction of deadly 
diseases.  
A faulty configuration underpins the current structure of culpability in HIV law that 
prescribes the same punishment for johns and prostitutes for criminal exposure or 
transmission of HIV, when johns are the ones who spread HIV to “innocent” (non-criminal) 
partners, typically conceived of as wives. Prostitutes solely or almost only spread to another 
criminal party, johns. These laws also very strongly presume individual rational choice, and 
therefore the possibility of deterring HIV-positive prostitution behavior through greater 
retributivism. The implication is that prostitutes, even HIV-positive prostitutes merely choose 
not to do something else to earn money or survive; that they maliciously or recklessly 
prostitute themselves and spread HIV. The fallacious rationale of prostitution culpability 
expressed in criminal exposure/transmission of HIV laws identify “prostitutes” as a “high-
risk” underclass that deserves greater targeting and increased punishment, and over-burden 
them with greater and highly unrealistic standards of morality and responsibility. Revealing 
lawmakers’ amplified retributivism toward “prostitutes” and leniency toward “johns” than 
legal discourse regarding prostitution itself, the criminalization of HIV in this context 
solidifies the problematic conception of prostitution as an illegal service or contraband. It 
treats HIV+ prostitution as the sale of damaged goods or unsatisfactory service to the 
consumer, even though johns have no such right because they are not consumers but 
criminals at law. Contra the concept of DMST, such laws counteract the idea of child 
prostitution as abuse or exploitation. Rather than acknowledge the material realities and 
power differentials between the parties. They represent the inverse of child protection. The 
dynamics that HIV law exposes demonstrate that DMST has much greater hurdles to 
overcome in the face of such strong prostitution culpability, especially when DMST 
discourse omits the issue of HIV. 
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5.3 Race, class and gender: decontextualized consent 
The use of contractual language in the international compact of the White Slave 
Traffic Agreement of 1904 is significant because understandings of civil society in western 
nations during modernity and late modernity have relied heavily on a contractual notion of 
social relations in which the “social contract” conveys the accord struck among free and 
equal citizens. Pateman and Mills as well as intersectional theorists have pointed out that the 
social contract is a political fiction better described as an accord among White western males 
with regard to the reconfiguration of their own post-feudal nation-states around male 
fraternity and citizenship (patriarchy), as well as organization of the world through 
colonialism, slavery and expropriation (Pateman 1988; Mills 1997; Pateman and Mills 2007).  
 Any notion of “consent” is contingent on this historical and social context. Grahn-
Farley’s and O’Connell-Davidson’s discussions of freedom and unfreedom are useful for 
understanding how the contradiction between the fundamental human rights principle that 
“everyone is born free” is reconciled with the reality that “some are less free than others” 
(Grahn-Farley 2003). Though declaratively universal, the liberal definition of freedom relies 
upon the unfreedom of others because freedom is often defined as and measured by the 
exercise of power over others (Grahn-Farley 2003). The social contract of liberal humanism 
and its ideal subject—rational, Western, masculine, adult—developed in tandem with market 
relations underpinned by contract theory90 (Pateman 1988). Liberal political thought has 
generalized contractual relations to become the “guiding and universal principle of human 
sociality” and “social and political relations” in contemporary Western societies, forming the 
“dominant conceptual framework used to make sense of power relations and dependency” 
                                                
90 See also Glenn (2002) regarding the concept of “unequal freedom,” explaining how feudalism and slavery 
have been maintained after their formal abolition through contracts maintaining conditions of quasi-slavery. 
Contract obscures unfreedom when contractual interpretations are interpreted as free and fair exchange. In 
reference to rights discourse and the reallocation of resources, both positive freedom (“freedom of”) and 
negative freedom (“freedom from”) are useful concepts for understanding and struggling against deprivation 
and relative powerlessness (Cheek 2000: 60, in Sye 2008).  
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(O’Connell-Davidson 2005: 2, 11). Contract underwrote the transformation of hegemonic 
power relations in the shift from feudalism to capitalism using commercial and labor 
contracts and the “reordering of patriarchy” that constructed the social contract of liberal 
humanism. The commodification of labor, which views the body as an individual’s personal 
property to sell for labor (not for sex), has been the lifeblood of capitalism particularly since 
industrialization (Pateman 1988). The social contract constructed the “public sphere,” which 
included the market, in a binary dualism of public-versus-private life resulting from the 
“reordering of patriarchy”—from one type (monarchical rule under a king) to a male 
fraternity of governance and commerce amongst themselves “while ruling over their women” 
in the private sphere under the sexual contract (O’Connell-Davidson 2005: 12, discussing 
Pateman 1988). In nineteenth century Britain, wives were not independent legal subjects, 
their civil position “resembled that of a slave,” husbands could legally enforce their wives’ 
labor and obedience through violence and be “sold by husbands at public auction” (Pateman 
1988: 191; O’Connell-Davidson 2005: 12). At the same time, a racial contract instituted the 
enslavement of Africans “based on the very opposite of equal rights between buyers and 
sellers” (Mills 1997; Harman 2008: 249).  
The common theme of slavery and unfreedom in the lives of non-ideal humanist 
subjects, or minorities, has extended to children who were deemed paternal property (Munro 
2008; Grahn-Farley 2003: 923). However, in late modernity the subordination of all minority 
groups except children is “concealed behind the fiction of the contract and civil equality” 
(O’Connell-Davidson 2005: 19). Though “husbands can no longer demand obedience from 
wives, and white people can no longer demand that black people show them deference and 
respect, adults still generally expect that children will obey them, defer to them and respect 
them simply on the basis of their status as adults” (Id.). In this context, the experience of 
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what is merely subordinating another group often masquerades as the exercise of “freedom” 
(Grahn-Farley 2003). 
 In Ah Fong (1874) San Francisco’s Judge Fields refused to discriminate against 
Chinese women immigrants deemed prostitutes on the basis of their race. However, in 
denouncing discriminatory Chinese exclusion, he ascribed the Chinese woman in language 
suggesting her lack of feminine virtue, similar other foreign prostitutes in his city.  
I have little respect for that discriminating virtue which is shocked when a frail child 
of China is landed on our shores, and yet allows the bedizened and painted harlot of 
other countries to parade our streets and open her hells in broad day, without 
molestation and without censure.  
The phrase “child of China” refers to persons of Chinese national origins. However, when 
prefixed with “frail” (“frail child of China”) and juxtaposed against the showy display of 
daytime harlotry, it suggests infantile femininity and, in its archaic sense, a woman of weak 
character and morality, but one whose presence and weakness are no less desirable than the 
brazen commercial sexuality of other foreign prostitutes tolerated in San Francisco.  
The somewhat girlish characterization of Chinese women seemed to negate the 
“consent” of prostitutes embedded in the contractual language of the APIA passed the 
following year. The APIA defined the meanings of freedom, contract and, by implication, 
“consent” in a racialized context. The specification and targeting for exclusion of East Asian 
women as prostitutes and “forbidden immigrants” took place in a social and historical context 
of tension created by business and political interests against Chinese labor (“coolies”), who 
were exploited through quasi-slavery to build the Transcontinental/Pacific Railroad during 
US westward expansion in the post-slavery economy (Calavita 2010; Glenn 2002). Language 
of the Act linked racialization, criminalization and non-citizenship. A header declared, 
“Immigration of alien convicts, and of women for purposes of prostitution, forbidden.” 
Section 5 of the Act then reads, “[I]t shall be unlawful for aliens of the following classes to 
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immigrate into the United States…[convicted felons] in their own country…and ‘women 
imported for the purposes of prostitution.” It simultaneously prohibited “contracting to 
supply labor of cooly…to supply to another the labor of any cooly…in violation of…laws 
prohibiting the cooly-trade,” with a fine of five hundred dollars and imprisonment for up to 
one year. In lumping the criminal class with Chinese men as coolies and Chinese women as 
prostitutes, racialization and criminalization intertwined. At the time Chinese immigrants, 
laborers and their female partners were viewed as slave-like and lacking the liberated 
faculties of political subjectivity appropriate for citizenship in American democracy (Abrams 
2005). At the same time, they were viewed as slave-masters for their practice of polygamy as 
well as stereotyped as “Oriental brothel keepers” in legal, political and popular discourse. 
The law bolstered this in its early anti-sex trafficking efforts by constructing the Chinese as 
fit for quasi-slave labor, while requiring regulation of their presence to prevent a slave-like 
(and non-Christian) people from US citizenship. In the context of such exclusion, any 
language suggesting the legal incapacitation of Chinese women was less for purposes of their 
exoneration from the consent required to criminalize and deport for prostitution, and 
functioned more to exclude them from citizenship because their men (and they themselves, as 
both pre-suffrage women and Chinese) had insufficient comprehension of “freedom.” The 
Act targeted precisely the demographic of Chinese that the state, its private partners, citizens 
and residents were content to commercially and/or sexually exploit in the new, expanding 
economy, while refusing to perform the American end of the bargain to extend full 
citizenship and formal equality.  
As previously discussed, despite Illinois’ historical reputation for progressivism and 
child protection, its pioneering efforts in the area of sex trafficking led to passage of the 
White Slave Traffic Act (1910). Ernest Bell, the leader of the Illinois Vigilance Association 
and US District Attorney for Chicago was greatly influential in drafting the Act. Bell clearly 
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identified in his writings the race, ethnicity and nationality of those whom he held responsible 
for the White slave traffic in the US, referring to “Oriental brothel slavery,” Parisian/French 
and Jewish brothel keepers. However, he was careful to quickly follow this with the claim 
that it is not their nationality but their “crimes” that compels White slavery law. The Page 
Law (1875) racialized immigration via anti-prostitution, and the Mann Act (1910) continued 
the racialization of immigrants but against additional groups and in the more domestically 
focused criminal sphere, via anti-trafficking regulation.  
As mentioned, by the time the WSTA was drafted, the focus of culpability had 
already shifted away from adult male perpetrators to female delinquents due to a second 
wave of White purity reform during the Progressive Era (Odem 1995). Thus it is unsurprising 
that even though the Act says “whether with or without her consent,” it came to be used 
against women themselves. The history of the Act’s racist and politically motivated 
enforcement coupled with its disuse for the protection of girls suggests that the statute’s 
conflation of “women and girls” had the effect of infantilizing adult women in order to justify 
greater scrutiny of their behavior and to police the racial boundaries per anti-miscegenation, 
under the pretext of protecting females from sex trafficking. The advent of this law occurred 
at a time when women were not formally full citizens, since they did not yet have the right to 
vote. The stated purpose of the statute was the protection of White females, formally denying 
male perpetrators the defense of the woman’s “consent” to being “transported for immoral 
purposes,” but ultimately holding women liable as conspirators in their own trafficking. 
Importantly, it constructed women through the legally and politically necessary language of 
interstate commerce, as this was the only means through which the federal government could 
justify its intervention into crime occurring in state jurisdictions, particularly during Jim 
Crow hyper-vigilance for states’ rights.  
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However, the regulation of sex trafficking as the regulation of commerce had the 
effect of objectifying trafficked female bodies, by combining its characterization of 
commerce with the language of chattel slavery and the movement of women across state lines, 
as though it were the interstate transportation of commodities. Objectification and 
commodification is a general effect of the term “trafficking,” doing little to contest the notion 
of people and female sexuality as the objects of contracts, which undergirds the legal 
construction of prostitution.  
The emphasis on consent as an element of sex crimes in general has been problematic. 
The adjudication of consent is often used to hedge against perceived or potential abuses of 
laws protecting females from sexual assault and sexual abuse. US rape laws express worry 
regarding the potential for malicious prosecution of men and having to rely on female 
testimony as evidence for crimes occurring in private, citing severe reputational damage to 
males through rape allegations and convictions. For instance, in Utah, the standard language 
used in contemporary rape cases derives from State v. Howard (1975), under Utah’s statute 
used to determine the circumstances of “sexual offenses against the victim without consent of 
victim.” Howard essentially “balances the interests” of rape victims and the interests of men 
accused of rape: “In serving ends of justice and protecting public interest in rape prosecution, 
it is important that utmost care be exercised to protect not only woman who claims to have 
been outraged, but also man who is so accused.” This is an inequitable “balancing of interests” 
that can only occur because of its seeming egalitarianism, radically decontextualized from 
material conditions regarding the gendered power imbalances of sexual victimization. Apart 
from statistics that consistently show that perpetrators of rape are disproportionately male, 
only two percent of rape accusations are ever proven false, while it is estimated that forty 
percent of rapes go completely unreported (Website of Stanford University, Men Against 
Abuse Now 2016). This de-legitimizes the fears expressed in law regarding false accusations 
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of rape and statutory rape, which historically animated resistance to such statutes, and which 
continue to inform notions of consent and what counts as evidence thereof. The ability of 
males to implement law based on their largely unfounded fears (to protect themselves at 
others’ expense) attests to their privilege as a master class under the law that determines the 
meaning of consent in sexual contexts. This dynamic replicates in the contractarian 
understanding of child/prostitution, including in the HIV laws discussed above. 
 The commercial mediation of the issue of sexual exploitation combined with 
equivocation regarding the issue of consent renders the involvement of commercial 
transaction the equivalent of “consent.” It places undue significance on the act of commercial 
exchange as well as consent for understanding commercial-sexual exploitation, particularly in 
the context of great structural inequalities, including of bargaining power, which legitimizes 
responsibilization, victim blaming and criminal culpability.  
Class, economic and neoliberal dimensions 
From the outset, with the Alien Prostitution Importation Act (1875), the issue of 
“consent” and its official verification or denial was key to establishing the new industrial 
capitalist economic order of the US at the time. The moral authority of the emergent 
system—as the most recent revision of the social contract regarding economics, class and 
social order—depended on the legitimacy of the contract, i.e. as a valid contract that 
represents freedom and fairness. In place of structural notions of freedom brought about by 
an equitable and just “social contract,” law has focused on finding freedom (“consent”) in 
individual contracts (on the individual level), from which it requires extrapolating that 
“freedom” is the aggregate effect of consensual (freely entered) contracts. “Free entry” into 
contracts is equated with “consent,” which signifies the operation of a free society under just 
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law. Formal egalitarianism makes law appear as though its role in society is the legal 
enforcement of the terms of actual contracts and, thereby, the social contract.   
Individualized notions of consent underwriting individual contracts bolsters neoliberal 
ideas of “responsibilization,” the reduction of multi-systemic problems to self-blaming and 
victim-blaming, which supports pathologization and criminalization. These processes impute 
“choice” on the individual—that the individual’s circumstances are the sum result of one’s 
more-or-less freely determined personal choices—burdening the individual with what are 
more accurately structural problems that routinely produce such results.  
The 1970s cases of minors arrested and adjudicated for prostitution omit individual or 
structural circumstances of the girls. One can only infer the circumstances of the arrested and 
prosecuted girls from a combination of related scholarship and contextual clues, such as the 
“high vice” area in which the 15 year-old of In re Appeal No. 180 was observed by police and 
arrested for solicitation. By all accounts, including other prostitution cases available from the 
jurisdiction, the high vice area of Portland is 82nd Avenue, which as recently as the 1990s has 
been legally documented as a socially and economically marginalized neighborhood. This is 
similar to the neighborhood of Times Square and Evans Motel in Manhattan in the 1970s, 
where Dora P was arrested, and, more recently, Sutphin Boulevard in Jamaica, Queens 
County, New York, where Nicolette R was arrested in 2004. These have all been areas 
reputed for street prostitution and identified as such by law enforcement and the judiciary in 
legal texts. They are also communities of color and impoverished neighborhoods. When case 
decisions amend locations of arrest with “an area known for prostitution,” they are often 
supporting law enforcement’s reasonable suspicion of girls in the area. But they are also 
ascribing the race, class and gender of geographical areas known for street prostitution and 
the demographics most disproportionately represented in its population, namely girls of color 
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in settings of “urban decay.” Today, such areas are often undergoing processes of 
gentrification, and experiencing the attendant increase of law enforcement presence that leads 
to hyper-policing and DMYC (Hudson 2015, Sacta (2016).  
The personal circumstances of the girls can also be inferred by, for example, their 
absences from judicial proceedings, which judges count against them. Procedural 
absenteeism is often due to running away from foster homes or escaping from detention or 
residential facilities pending adjudication, often prompted by the same circumstances that led 
girls into prostitution to begin with. In the case of Dora P, “By the time the appeal was heard, 
[she] had been placed in a foster home and had then disappeared” (Ball 1993: 176). This 
attests to persistently inadequate resources for commercially-sexually exploited minors 
sufficient for stabilizing their lives, allowing them to become reliable or punctual. Foster care 
is identified a “feeder” institution for child prostitution, and Dora’s disappearance may well 
reflect such systemic failures.  
On the other hand, DMST cases, as discussed in Chapter 4, highlight the personal 
circumstances of girls, particularly those circumstances attributable to direct force, fraud or 
coercion by the defendant, to seemingly neutralize the materiality of the issue of girls’ 
consent/non-consent. However, as previously noted, this is a strategic emphasis—to amplify 
the state’s prosecution case against defendant-pimps, usually men of color, and especially 
African-Americans. Where girls are themselves on trial for prostitution, their minoritarian 
status and personal circumstances have only recently entered the discourse of case decisions, 
particularly after passage of Safe Harbor laws. For example, in Bobby P (2010), the case 
decision mentions 16 year-old Bobby’s entry into prostitution at the age of 12, her childhood 
neglect, being in the child welfare system and conflicts with the law. However, her history, 
particularly conflicts with the law, her child being taken away from her, and patterns of 
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behavior suggesting “self-destruction” and “immaturity” were actually used to justify the 
court’s classification of her as a delinquent rather than a person in need of supervision 
(“PINS”). Like other prostitution cases, it also echoes “police communications” used to make 
such arrests, using the language of contracts to explain Bobby’s behavior—that she “had 
agreed to engage in sexual activity with an undercover police officer in exchange for 
money”—even where police initiate the “transaction” by soliciting the minor. Moreover, 
while sometimes appearing to render the issue of consent irrelevant, mention of girls’ 
circumstances and hardships even in DMST cases do nothing to counteract the New York 
requirement of first criminalizing the girl—finding her guilty of prostitution because it would 
be a crime if committed by an adult, usually for purposes of establishing juvenile court 
jurisdiction—before providing her with “safe harbor” resources. 
The concept of contract underwrote the very first anti-trafficking law in 1875 (APIA), 
which enshrined notions of freedom of contract and constructed them as oppositional to 
prostitution, but with the actual intent of preventing females from East Asia entering the US 
during a time of widespread anti-Chinese sentiment. East Asians, particularly the Chinese, 
were derided as slave-like, and therefore unfit to be American citizens, and deemed perfectly 
suited for quasi-slavery in the post-slavery American economy. This demonstrates 
foreign/international and economic policy used to manage the domestic socio-economic order. 
“Choice” and “consent” (and the notion of contracts underlying them) can be seen as 
inherently classed concepts, both historically (Glenn 2002) and presently under neoliberal 
ideology that attributes a persons’ economic conditions to the aggregate consequences of 
choices made by the “individual,” i.e. by the “rational economic man.” The ways in which 
the issues and subjects (potential victims) of “prostitution” and “trafficking” are 
compartmentalized (and over-compartmentalized) have discursive (terminological) and 
material (political and social-hierarchical) roots. Orthodox economic theory, including 
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contractarian theory and the “Law and Economics” school—which, according to Pateman 
(1988), has a particularly strong grip on American legal and political discourse—has no real 
conception of exploitation (Scott and Marshall 2009). Trafficking discourse (and Anglo-
American law generally) reflects this by viewing exploitation (like abuse) as an aberration 
committed by pathological individuals against other individuals. This detracts from the 
reality that exploitation is diffuse in the global capitalist economy and its localized operations. 
It fails to recognize that in modernity and late modernity, this has always over-burdened 
“minorities,” despite statistically confirmed global, national and state patterns, including in 
Utah and Illinois, which suggest structural inequality/subordination. Discussing the racial 
contract Mills (1997: 3-5) explains contract “has become just a normative tool, a conceptual 
device to elicit our intuitions about justice,” but critical examination of the way in which this 
discourse is deployed can “help us to see through the theories and moral justifications offered 
in defense of them.”  
This suggests that there are both legal and extralegal ramifications for conceptualizing 
prostitution as contract, namely viewing children as consenting and culpable agents of 
prostitution as a crime against the public. Pateman (1988) points out the sexual (“gender”) 
dimension. The prostitution contract is not simply an employment contract between a 
capitalist and a worker. Rather, the prostitution contract retains the same oppressive character 
of an employment contract—relation of domination and subordination in a structural sense; 
unequal bargaining power in an individual sense—but also exercises patriarchal sex-right 
(right to access female sexuality). Thus prostitutes in the capitalist market are not only 
subordinate to capitalists but also to masculine workers. Glenn (2002) points out how race 
and gender inequalities are legitimized through contracts that reproduce de facto slavery in 
new ways. These critiques help illuminate how contractual discourse is problematic with 
regard to conceptualizing prostitution—child prostitution in particular—especially for the 
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ways in which it imputes consent upon its subjects in a context in which prostitutes are over-
criminalized and children are targeted for criminalization. What these critical takes on 
contract demonstrate is that there is always something more at work than individual 
contracts—that society is made up of more than their aggregate result, and law also does 
much more than merely enforce freely entered agreements between equal citizens. The 
cumulative social effect with regard to race, gender and class, and certainly childhood, might 
be better understood as “the natural outcome of a systematic disparity in power” (Mills 1997: 
139). The power to impute consent via contract, I find, is starkly revealed in attributing 
consent via criminal capacity for prostitution to children, the sole group that does not enjoy 
formal equality in American law and society. 
5.4 Imputing commercial and sexual consent to minors 
Prostitution has always required reading “consent” into the behavior of those who 
commit it, which is done via contract. It is striking, however, that this is read into the 
behavior of minors as well, since those below the age of majority are considered legally 
incapable of consenting to contracts and sex in the “civil” realm, but once the behavior is 
criminalized, as “commercial sex,” they are deemed as having the capacity for both. This 
comports with antiquated legal discourse regarding the interpretation of the criminal behavior 
of children, such as “malice supplies the age” wherein age, child status and childhood 
protections are abruptly negated upon criminal action, as though a child suddenly becomes an 
adult, and as though the demonstration of criminal capacity demonstrates adulthood. 
Childhood becomes synonymous with innocence in this way. 
Passage of the WSTA occurred during a great spike in immigration to the US at the 
turn of the last century, in response to which Congress became zealous regarding addressing 
moral issues such as prostitution (Chacon 2006: 3013-14). This led to “renewed attention to 
and revisions of the Alien Prostitution Importation Act, and ultimately, the enactment of the 
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Mann Act,” which included incorporation of “girls” into the APIA in 1903 and the Mann Act 
in 1910 (Id.: 3014). A century later the TVPA would focus even more so on minors. However, 
the TVPA only absorbs Mann Act provisions into itself without any substantive revisions, 
simply amplifying the harshness of criminal punishment for pre-existing and previously 
defined crimes, while leaving intact the state-based criminalizing apparatus that imputes 
consent to minors. Even the designated age of minority in those earlier laws that appeared to 
make perpetrators strictly liable based on the victim’s age nonetheless used the language of 
“induce or coerce” on the part of the trafficker of a girl, suggesting that even though consent 
is a moot point in such a case, it still depends on the victim being induced or coerced, 
demonstrating equivocation regarding the issue of “consent” even where the victim was a 
minor. 
The irresolute issue of consent is especially perplexing given co-development of child 
sex trafficking laws with age-of-consent-based laws such as statutory rape during first wave 
feminism and child sex abuse during second wave feminism. To the feminist mind—then and 
now, Black and White—these have always been interrelated matters (see e.g. Odem 1995). 
The rare discourse regarding Black females’ sexual victimization in the context of child 
prostitution and sex trafficking discusses these matters together. Illustrating this in the 
contemporary Black feminist context is a talk titled “Passionate Presence,” between feminist 
theorist bell hooks and Salamishah Tillet, founder of a Chicago-based non-profit organization 
that mobilizes youth to end violence against girls. The dialogue between hooks and Tillet 
regards Black feminist survivorship of attempted and actual sexual assault as girl children. 
Hooks and Tillet discuss this in the context of Black girls comprising forty percent of the 
victims of DMST in the US, suggesting the interrelationship of these crimes with regard to 
race, gender and sexual violence. However, cases like Nicolette R (2004) show how these 
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laws are compartmentalized and how that is used to deny relevance between them simply 
because they are separated in the code, as well as to deny the relevance of age and consent. 
Although appellant was 12 years old at the time of her arrest and thus would have 
been deemed, pursuant to Penal Law § 130.05 (3)(a), incapable of consenting to any 
sexual act rendered unlawful by Penal Law article 130, this circumstance was 
irrelevant to the issue of whether she was properly found to have committed an act, 
which if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of prostitution. The statute 
defining prostitution, Penal Law § 230.00, contains no age requirement. Penal Law § 
130.05 (3)(a) provides that underage status is a type of incapacity to consent that 
would constitute "[l]ack of consent" under section 130.05 (2)(b), an essential element 
of every offense defined in Penal Law article 130. There is nothing in the Penal Law 
to support the conclusion that section 130.05 (3)(a) was intended to bear any 
relationship to Penal Law § 230.00, which involves charging a fee for sexual activity. 
Accordingly, the court properly denied appellant's motion to dismiss the petition. 
Coupled with the compartmentalization of “solicitation” from “patronizing,” which Chapter 4 
discussed as legally unrecognized sex discrimination, the refusal to apply age-of-consent to 
child prostitution similarly guarantees the over-punishment of girls and under-prosecution of 
men.  
In Anglo-American law minors are generally deemed incapable of consenting to 
commercial contracts under what is termed the “infancy doctrine,” and cannot bind 
themselves to a contract (Goodfellow 2005: 135, 139). However, the fear of minors taking 
advantage of adults who contract with minors has created a conflict of interest between adults 
and children in terms of the law of actual contracts. The commercial-sexual context is 
susceptible to the interlocking of worries of children acting in bad faith in the commercial 
marketplace with similar preoccupation regarding their acting criminally with impunity. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, the Anglo-American legal doctrine of “malice supplies the age” was 
animated by the worry that not executing a ten-year-old boy for a crime he was found guilty 
of committing would signal to other children that they can act criminally with “impunity.” 
The process of criminalization erodes the dominant notion of modern childhood that 
promises special protections on the basis of children’s lack of capacity. Thus age of majority 
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and culpability spring into being and childhood abruptly ends when a minor demonstrates 
criminal capacity, the end of innocence. Normative childhood ends and deviant childhood 
begins, wherein age of minority becomes irrelevant. Similarly, contract has led to the 
reduction of the age of majority, and the erosion of childhood insofar as childhood is 
dependent on age. Substantial marketplace participation of minors as consumers, those who 
enter commercial contracts, has led to legal reduction of the age of majority in order to 
prevent minors from taking advantage of adults by avoiding their own performance under the 
contract (Id.: 136).  
Minors have been legally bestowed with commercial capacity under popular 
presumptions that modern youth are “more sophisticated” about commerce and, therefore, the 
current legal trajectory is that minors must be held accountable for their commercial actions 
and that contracts with minors must be enforced (Id.). Otherwise they will be too disruptive 
of the efficient workings of the market, which relies heavily on forming and performing 
contracts. Apart from contracts for “necessaries,” contracts with minors are voidable by the 
minor (Id.: 139). The rationale for this exception was conceived at the dawn of first wave 
feminism and White purity reform establishing age-of-consent based laws, in 1880 in the 
case of Turner v. Gaither. The concern guiding the allowance of a contract for necessaries 
was that children may starve if they are unable to purchase necessary goods when adults are 
deterred from entering contracts with them for fear of their reneging (Goodfellow 2005: 140). 
By the neoliberal era, specifically during the 1980s, the definition of “necessaries” expanded 
significantly and the age of majority for commercial contracts, including service contracts, 
had been reduced from twenty-one to eighteen (Id.: 140, 136). Thus, generally, minors 
legally lack the capacity to enter commercial contracts, and are void or voidable. 
The contractual conception of prostitution—and by extension, child prostitution—
renders these practices as the formation of sexual-service contracts, wherein the minor is the 
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offeror and the adult male the offeree. “Solicitation” is punished as an inchoate crime of 
attempting to form such an illegal contract by “offering sexual services.” Wharton’s 2014 
Treatise on Prostitution, which incorporates the 1970s cases of minors in prostitution as 
cornerstones of prostitution law, bears reiteration to illustrate that the law constructs the issue 
of prostitution, including child prostitution, in contractual and commercial terms, which it 
identifies as the primary reason for its criminalization.  
It is the commercial aspect of prostitution, entailing the concomitant evils of 
professional vice, which attracts the attention of the criminal law. Accordingly, 
prostitution statutes require the element of ‘price.’ The requirement is commonly 
phrased in terms of a ‘fee,’ or ‘money or its equivalent,’ or as under the Model Penal 
Code, the accused is a prostitute if he or she engages in sexual activity ‘as a business.’ 
(2 Wharton’s Criminal Law §264, 15th edition). 
The cornerstone prostitution cases of minors in prostitution from the 1970s do not 
grapple with the issue of “consent” on the part of the minor, but rather ascribe it to the girls’ 
behavior, which is characterized as criminal and contractual. In the case of 14 year-old Dora 
P, the judge described the “undisputed facts” of the case of Dora and the adult male as her 
having “offered to engage in sexual acts with him for a fee of $10; he agreed.” The rest of the 
case reads as a bait-and-switch scenario in which Dora P is luring, deceptive, and culpable. 
At the same time Dora P comes closest to engaging the issue of minors’ consent by 
contesting her ability to consent to prostitution for purposes of establishing criminal liability. 
Her law guardian moved to dismiss the prostitution charge against her by arguing that Dora 
could not have legally consented to sex at the age of fourteen, and therefore, could not be 
convicted of prostitution. The judge recounted the ground for her dismissal argument, 
“inasmuch as the respondent was under the age of seventeen years she was deemed incapable 
of consenting to a sexual act.” However, the court refused to engage “the defense that 
respondent was incapable of consent because of her age” for procedural reasons, that it “was 
abandoned in Family Court” (the lower court) so that it is not required to be adjudicated on 
appeal, and therefore, it was never worked out. Moreover, an insidious facet of Dora P’s case 
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is that the implicit contract read into child prostitution actually punishes minors for not 
performing sex with the adult male. Even though Dora was formally charged with 
prostitution and robbery, she committed a specific crime that feminist criminologists have 
identified as “viccing” (Maher and Curtis 1998). Viccing is a common “act of resistance” by 
prostitutes that is “intimately linked with women’s collective sense of the devaluation of their 
bodies and their work…as a way of contesting this devaluation” (Id.: 126). It is also a 
response to the “deteriorating conditions” of street-level prostitution to avoid the increasing 
risks associated with going through with the sex act and increasing dangers that have 
rendered females “more vulnerable and more victimized” (Id.: 128). The irony that the all-
male panel of judges and legal commentators henceforth seem to have missed is that had 14 
year-old Dora performed the sex act she solicited to lure the man she ultimately “robbed” of 
$40, she would have been charged at most with the misdemeanor of prostitution rather than 
the felony of robbery. Charging and prosecuting her with both prostitution and robbery when 
she clearly did not intend to perform any sex act but rather intended to commit robbery has 
the effect of encouraging or even coercing girls to be sexually abused by adult males, or else 
they risk being charged with a felony rather than a misdemeanor. Punishment that is 
compounded in this manner when prosecutors and judges could have viewed Dora’s false 
pretense of prostitution behavior as simply part of her robbery scheme, which is a sufficiently 
serious charge, suggests the enforcement of the male’s expectation as a consumer of sex from 
the minor. This is regardless of how reviled, fearful or betrayed children may feel of being in 
prostitution to adult men, or resentful of the adult world in general, to prompt them to resist 
such acts through viccing would-be “customers” who are certainly no less morally 
condemnable or criminally culpable.  
Historically, the law has had little sympathy for disempowered females who find 
themselves in abusive conditions, particularly when “contracted” into those conditions. US 
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law has enforced contracts against women in situations of quasi-slavery (Glenn 2002: 199-
200). The compounded punishment of minors who engage in “viccing,” or the increased 
perception of culpability based on the presumption of greater commercial capacity and 
sophistication for minors who are deemed “independent,” for instance, because they do not 
work for a pimp (In re D (1976) are means of “bringing down the full force of the law” 
against minors in prostitution. This reverberates historically with the way unwitting 
immigrant women coerced into “quasi-slavery” labor contracts circa the 1860s-1870s in the 
US were punished physically or through imprisonment when they would find means to “resist 
abusive treatment” and “miserable living conditions” (Glenn 2002: 199-200). Thus although 
contracts for sex are formally illegal, as slavery was formally illegal when quasi-slave 
contracts were being effected, the law tacitly enforces them through punishments and 
leniencies unevenly meted out between female contractual subjects and consumers or 
contractors.  
The presumption of minors’ commercial capacity erodes age of majority protections 
in the criminal context, i.e. where contractual behavior is read into criminal behavior, and 
vice versa. Commercial capacity becomes equated with consent, which is then used to 
criminalize minors, or hold them criminally liable in the same way that they would be 
commercially liable under an un-voidable contract for goods or services. If “commercial” is 
the only difference between “prostitution” and what the law typically understands as child 
rape, child sex abuse or statutory rape, then this demonstrates the power of commercial 
mediation to impute consent on minors. Reading “consent” into “sexual” activity that minors 
do not have the legal capacity to consent to demonstrates equivocation on “sexual 
exploitation.” The law reads commercial transactions as consensual because it reads into the 
conduct the formation of a contract—the “exchange” of money or something of value for 
“sex.” In this formulation, a minor’s dire economic circumstances, e.g. child poverty, which 
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prompt her to prostitute herself, somehow translate to greater capacity to consent to a sexual 
act.  
The case of Bobby P (2010) exemplifies the imputation of commercial and sexual 
capacity to minors and how this renders them personally responsible for their commercial-
sexual exploitation and justifies their punishment. The court in Bobby P justifies its election 
of a more punitive disposition against the minor (denying her PINS petition and adjudicating 
her “delinquent”)—even after detailing her troubled history and hardships—through a two-
step process typical of cases that criminalize or quasi-criminalize minors. First, the court 
establishes her implicit consent to illegal commercial-sexual activity through the contractual 
language of prostitution, and second, makes the issue of personal “choice” paramount using 
the language of responsibilization. The first is established despite the undercover policeman 
being the “solicitor.” In his deposition the officer who arrested Bobby recalled the incident: 
[She] said to me in sum and substance, 'what do you want?' I replied, in sum and 
substance, 'a quickie', which I intended to mean oral sex, and made a hand gesture 
[which] indicated oral sex'. The respondent then said to me, in sum and substance, 
'you want a blowjob?', which I understood to mean oral sex. I asked the respondent 
how much for the blowjob and she replied, in sum and substance, 'fifty dollars'. The 
respondent then got inside of my vehicle. 
The court interpreted this as the formation of the contract implicit in the legal construction of 
prostitution. Again, this is despite the fact that Bobby was not the solicitor or “accosting” 
party in this scenario. By imputing commercial consent, the decision also imputes sexual 
consent, to complete the commercial-sexual equation of “prostitution.” Then, the court 
detailed Bobby’s personal history and troubles.  
Although the respondent is only 15 years old, she has suffered deprivation at the 
hands of her own parents who have previously neglected her and whose parental 
rights have long been terminated. Notwithstanding the demonstrated inability of her 
own parents to care for her, the state through its courts and public and private social 
service agencies have attempted to provide the respondent with stability and the 
necessities required to become a healthy and well-adjusted adult. However, there is no 
indication that these efforts have proved successful. According to the supervisor at 
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New York Foundling, respondent has been involved in prostitution since the age of 
twelve, and attempts to correct this self-destructive and dangerous behavior have 
failed. Respondent has regularly run away from her foster home for long periods of 
time when her whereabouts have been unknown to those charged with caring for her. 
Despite the extreme constraints and hardships of her young life, the court held that 
prostitution was Bobby’s personal choice. Rather than the commercial-sexual exploitation of 
a girl child by adult males, prostitution is rendered “self-destructive behavior,” and Bobby’s 
involvement in it is presented as evidence of her incorrigibility. The state nonetheless 
exonerates itself of responsibility despite its unsuccessful “attempt” to rehabilitate Bobby. 
This outcome is not interpreted as the failure of its rehabilitation programs or inadequacy of 
resources to meet the complex needs of multi-problem youth victimized by child neglect and 
commercial-sexual exploitation, but rather attributed to the personal choices of the girl. 
Therefore, Bobby should be held responsible for her personal failings and deficiencies. 
...giving proper consideration to the respondent’s extensive history, her behavioral 
pattern, her choice to engage in the ‘street life,’ even at the cost of temporarily losing 
custody of her own infant child, and her demonstrated lack of sound judgment and 
maturity, the Court finds it would be unwise to and inappropriate [to adjudicate her as 
a PINS]. 
The court extracts “choice” from these circumstances of extreme constraint and hardship to 
achieve personal responsibilization and deny that a child who entered prostitution at age 
twelve and continued through age sixteen (at the time of the case) is commercially-sexually 
exploited.  
The commercial consent presumed of prostitution compounds what the law perceives 
as immoral juvenile sexuality. In juvenile justice prostitution has historically had a 
“compounding effect…on the already conflicted moralistic relationship that juvenile courts 
have to sexuality…‘The commercial context is regarded as compounding the stigma of 
behavior that might ordinarily be regarded as merely immoral’” (Schwartz 2008: 251, 
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the 1970s and the more recent twenty-first century cases hailing from New York, despite the 
competing discourse of DMST, the law continues its historic tradition of victim blaming in 
the sense that it constructs girls as non-consenting victims of sex trafficking, but does not 
hesitate to criminalize them through the discourse of prostitution, which constructs their 
behavior in illegal-contractual terms. Nor does the law hesitate to quasi-criminalize minors 
through DMST law that first requires their legal incapacitation on the basis of their “natural” 
vulnerability. Continuous with its historical construction as White slavery, the interpretation 
of child prostitution in the 1970s and contemporary cases as an attempt on the part of the 
minor to form a contract for goods or services is objectifying, and diminishes harms 
associated with the practice. This is despite legal recognition of such harms and the use of 
those harms to justify the passage of legislation for as long as prostitution statutes have been 
in place. Unlike some nuances in the construction of victim/offender and its relevance to 
retributivism, the contractual construction of consent/non-consent is consistent across state 
regimes, defining “consent” and “choice” in similar ways.  
Most scholarship and legal battles focus on sexual consent of minors and their 
in/capacity for such, not commercial (civil) capacity, but examining both exposes the 
contortionism of imputing consent on minors and rendering them criminally culpable. 
Notions of consent and non-consent have been defined through three major discourses: age of 
consent/statutory rape, prostitution and sex trafficking (now including DMST). However, the 
law keeps these separated. Statutory rape was conceived of as a “strict liability” crime that 
based consent on strict standards of age, prostitution required consent to commercial sex, and 
sex trafficking requires force, fraud or coercion, or, in the case of DMST, simply age of 
minority of the victim. Differentiation between and among age-of-consent-based laws and 
prostitution compartmentalizes them into different crimes, refusing to acknowledge their 
similarity in order to uphold contractarian notions of consent and responsibility, in order to 
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maintain the possibility of minors’ consent and, therefore, criminal capacity/culpability. This 
has the effect of coercing minors in prostitution to perform as prostitutes (see, e.g. Dora P). 
Commercial consent of minors shows that “childhood” requires criminal “innocence,” while 
the sexual consent of minors shows that it requires sexual innocence. Legal discourse 
regarding child prostitution traffics in cultural fantasies of childhood innocence, adding 
another normative layer of expectation and conformity to ideal type and performance, which 
further burden the child. This can be understood as “multiplicity” in the sense of compounded 
inequalities and injustices—the raced, classed and gendered normativities and inequalities 
that interact with normative childhood and punishment to over-burden minors in prostitution 
under regimes of criminalization and quasi-criminalization. 
5.5 Multiplicity: incorporating childhood and punishment 
“Consent” has served as a tool of legitimizing governance rather than meaningful 
conceptualization of minors’ behavior, circumstance or broader structural forces. Consent 
(the lack thereof) is used to legitimize the passage of laws and the creation of international 
civil society through instruments such as the White Slave Traffic Agreement (1904), but the 
historical trajectory has been that the non-consenting female victim class becomes the 
targeted and criminalized class, as demonstrated in WSTA cases that held women liable for 
conspiracy to traffic themselves (Holte 1915; Gebardi 1932, holding that the woman 
conspired to traffic herself by providing active assistance in her own transportation). As we 
have seen, consent to a crime is also used to negate the protection of minors in prostitution, to 
renege on the social contract promise to protect citizens.  
Beginning in the Progressive Era, girls were brought more explicitly into the purview 
of legal discourse on prostitution and sex trafficking. In 1903, the APIA was amended to 
include “girls” (Chacón 2006), and in 1910 the Mann Act furthered APIA 1875 in 
referencing “alien women and girls engaged in prostitution or debauchery in this country.” 
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However, even minors identified as sex trafficking victims have historically been (and are 
now) arrested for “prostitution.” In re Carey (1922), the case of a minor prosecuted for 
prostitution in San Francisco as well as the high profile case of rock-n-roll star Chuck Berry 
evidence the ongoing practice of quasi/criminalizing minors for prostitution from early to 
mid-century. Carey was defined as a “fallen woman” and depicted in terms of feminine 
culpability for prostitution as criminal offerors through solicitation. Berry was convicted of 
violating the WSTA and served twenty months for interstate transportation of an “underage 
Apache girl who was weeks later arrested on a prostitution charge” (Website of Public 
Broadcasting Service). As mentioned, such prosecutions were politically and racially 
motivated, most prominently in the case of Jack Johnson, the famous African-American 
boxer. In that case, the court found Johnson guilty of trafficking even though the woman he 
transported was an adult prostitute who would normally be characterized as a “fallen woman” 
from whom society requires protection. Johnson was aggressively prosecuted in 1913 
“motivated by public outrage over his marriages to white women” (Id.). Thus international 
trafficking was defined by racialized immigration, while domestic interstate trafficking was 
highly racialized, with men of color, particularly African-American men targeted by law 
enforcement and prosecutors. This is a dynamic that continues to play out in current DMST 
cases in which girls of color are targeted and quasi-criminalized as “witnesses,” while men of 
color receive historically unprecedented sentences for pimping, now referred to as trafficking.  
The neoliberal era has seen ostensibly greater emphasis on implementing the 
protection of minors and amending the WSTA. In 1978 Congress made the protection of 
minors gender-neutral, and in 1986 it added increased protection for minors but also included 
adult males to the class of potential victims. This neutralization of gender and age and 
seemingly increased “inclusiveness” of legal discourse creates an air of legitimacy, while 
merely increasing punishments. Increased retributivism and the expansion of the scope of 
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such laws also entails expansion of state prosecutorial power and the increased allocation of 
resources toward prosecution and the criminal justice system, including law enforcement and 
the public and private facilities of detention and incarceration that comprise the prison-
industrial complex. This co-occurs with the neoliberal erosion of childhood protections 
through social spending cuts and divestment from human development such as education and 
health care, while increasing benchmarking, accountability and the burdens of greater 
performance on children in an era of educational and economic hyper-competition. The social 
contract, and its embedded subsidiary contracts—the sexual contract (including the 
prostitution contract), racial contract and domination contract—have been rewritten in such 
terms. The exclusionary non-citizenship of “minorities,” including people of color, women 
and children, continues to haunt American legal discourse that adjudicates those whom it 
identifies as the least powerful and most vulnerable of all—children who suffer abuse and/or 
commercial-sexual exploitation. It either omits entirely or admits and translates to culpability 
the structural and personal circumstances of minors in prostitution that come before the 
courts and stand in conflict with the law. Legal discourse achieves this through equivocation 
and selective deployment of “consent” and “non-consent,” the boundaries of which it blurs in 
selective ways that guarantee the over-punishment of girls, particularly girls of color. The 
legitimacy of the social contract derives from the freedom and fairness that it ostensibly 
represents, along with guaranteed protections from the state. This legitimacy is also required 
for punishment. The social contract and punishment are mutually reinforcing in this way. 
Contract principles that impute consent on the minor in prostitution for purposes of 
criminalizing her but protect the “john,” including via HIV laws that overlap with prostitution 
laws, construct him as a consumer and clarify that the consumer is paramount, as well as who 
is being protected from whom.  
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Contemporary cases like Bobby P (2010) exemplify the way in which commercial and 
sexual consent are imputed on minors with the effect of holding them personally responsible 
for failures and deficiencies “downstream” at the point of legal conflict, while absolving the 
state of its “upstream” role of ensuring at the very least the childhood protections it promises 
a class of persons it constructs as vulnerable, incapable and in need of special protection. 
Under a criminal framework and in the context of great inequalities, the state never entertains 
the crucial element of socio-economic or distributive justice. In the US it never has to even 
consider child rights as understood internationally.  
While prostitution discourse focuses on agency, capacity, and the evil-doing of minors, 
DMST negates consent by focusing on age, or force, fraud and coercion. Legal discourse 
does not incorporate a conception of constrained agency or understanding of exploitation as 
diffuse. Instead, despite the historical and contemporary onus of race, class, gender and age-
based relations and the constraints these produce, minors carry the burden and responsibility 
of child prostitution rather than (highly under-prosecuted) adult buyers, exploiters or the state. 
Because legal discourse conceives of “choice” as individualized and rational, neoliberal 
notions of “responsibilization” guide interpretations of minors’ behavior. Minors are over-
burdened with the amplified inequalities and precipitating factors that coerce people into 
prostitution. Minors in prostitution are also over-burdened with (unhelpful) responses to child 
prostitution. The sex workers’ rights approach to prostitution, which is increasingly being 
applied to child prostitution, interprets what are structural relations of domination and 
subordination as mere “constraints” that are insufficient to negate “consent.” It also conflates 
“agency” with “consent” to child/prostitution. These are extensions of the sexual, racial and 
domination contracts to children. The commodification of sex through prostitution renders it 
merely a contract for sexual services, which begs the question of whether rape of a person in 
prostitution should be reconceptualized as merely the theft of services. Sex workers’ rights, 
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which relies so heavily on liberal legal regimes for “protection” of the alleged “sexual 
freedom” of prostitution, largely fails to address how this formulation would empower or 
maintain the integrity of the female body. Three decades later the question remains of how 
females can achieve equal standing to male workers or capitalists when the sexual contract 
(and “patriarchal sex-right” embedded in it) render females subordinate to both capitalists 
and male workers (Pateman 1988). 
The interpretation of child prostitution through contractual understandings of social 
relations yields an illusory promise of protection to minors and justifies criminalizing or 
quasi-criminalizing responses to minors in prostitution. This mirrors the legal liberalism of 
the social contract, and the assumption that actual contracts mirror the (more or less) freely 
entered social contract, notwithstanding “the lottery of birth” and childhood dependency. 
Law and society provide the illusory promise of the social contract (formal egalitarianism), 
which does not provide protection in exchange for freedom. Sex workers’ rights, as an 
alleged alternative view of prostitution that is increasingly extending its framework to include 
what is agreed to be child prostitution on international, national and state levels, relies 
heavily on contractarian principles and is, therefore, limited in the same ways. Dominant 
approaches to prostitution, child prostitution, and sex trafficking ignore social hierarchy and 
structural, interactive power dynamics of race, class, gender, childhood and punishment. 
Legal discourse obscures and discursively neutralizes these relations, while socially, 
politically and historically decontextualizing them. This allows for the individualization of 
responsibility, even of children. Without addressing distributive justice or the im/possibility 
of children being full and equal citizens, the interpretation of child prostitution through 
contractual understandings of social relations yields an illusory promise of child protection, 
while denying children’s “civil freedom,” and justifies their quasi/criminalization. 
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Prostitution is almost universally understood in contractual terms, even if the object of 
the contract (commercialized sex) is illegal. This chapter has shown the implications this has 
for imputing commercial, sexual and criminal capacity to minors, which ensures that the 
binary of consent/non-consent is deployed in ways that penalize minors in prostitution 
otherwise understood as non-consenting child victims of commercial-sexual exploitation. 
Despite apparent attempts to resolve them, the child becomes marked by contradictions and 
inconsistencies of which the legal system is aware but leaves indeterminate. Contractual 
discourse enables equivocation on the issue of consent, which sustains this indeterminacy. 
Particular attention should be paid to the ways in which constructing the issue in contractual 
and consumerist terms renders minors culpable and “johns,” who are overwhelmingly adult 
and male, as mere “consumers.” Moreover, the citizenship and masculinity of johns remain 
intact, unlike the non-citizenship and denial of normative childhood to minors in prostitution, 
in no small part due to the lack of blameworthiness of the “customer” in this context. In these 
ways a multiplicity of criminality over-burdens minors with the likelihood of being deemed 
even more culpable than their adult counterparts. These dynamics reify children’s capacity 
for “consent” and criminal culpability, while heightening their non-citizenship status through 
the socio-economic lockout process of criminalization. 
  
 289 
CHAPTER 6: Conclusion 
 
“In my own work, the reason for describing forms of racialization is that once identified, their 
normative outcomes can hopefully be disrupted and dismantled.” 
- Suki Ali, “Racializing research: Managing power and politics?” 
6.1 Racialization, Criminalization and Non-Childhood 
Racialization is a social process, “a set of discursive practices which continually 
produce and regulate ‘race’ as a concept and social category,” and which “has real meaning 
and effect,” including its facilitation of mapping inequalities onto forms of racialized 
difference (Ali 2006: 473). Understanding racialization requires investigating “how it is that 
discourses of ‘race’ operate to produce an understanding of people, things, cultures and 
places” (Id). It is a particularly important line of enquiry in light of the prevalence of race-
neutral language that is racially impactful. Racialization is reproduced through legal 
discourse, including legislative, statutory and judicial discourse on child prostitution. The 
legislative debates, statutes and cases discussed throughout previous chapters have used both 
explicitly racial and race-neutral language to racialize commercially-sexually exploited 
minors. Facially neutral language requires greater social, historical, legal and political 
contextualization to expose its power to racialize subjects. The legal discourse analyzed in 
previous chapters reveals several race-neutral means through which this is achieved, 
including racial coding, the criminalization, adultification and hyper-sexualization of subjects, 
and the use of legal formal egalitarianism. Racial “codes” (or “dog whistles” in the political 
context) are one of the major means through which facially neutral language can be deployed 
in ways that are racializing. This includes the splitting of international and domestic sex 
trafficking, the split between federal and state jurisdiction, references to geographical 
locations (regions, nations, neighborhoods, residence, streets and suites) in which incidents of 
child prostitution occur, and law-and-order ideas of responding to child prostitution.  
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Although anti-trafficking law is facially neutral, it retains inequalities through 
omission and silence by severing its continuities with chattel slavery. Features of the “White 
slavery” narrative also survive in the TVPA in various forms, to perpetuate terms that can 
operate to produce racialized identities, such as “international” versus “domestic” and 
“federal” versus “state.” In particular, leaving it to state discretion whether to criminalize 
minors in prostitution and excluding domestically “trafficked” minors from federal schemes 
pertaining to international trafficking has had the effect of reinforcing the historical barrier 
between children and their national government that is charged with their civil rights. With 
law enforcement action spatial racialization through jurisdiction, residence and borders 
becomes particularly important for the issue of child sex trafficking. Sociological theories of 
childhood urge attention to the neighborhood context as “a very important factor in the 
socialization of poor black children,” (Handel, Cahill, et al. 2007: 271) to which I would add 
understanding the over-policing and criminalization of children in these spaces as a 
childhood hazard.  
6.2 Neoliberalism and the Erosion of Childhood 
That the key difference at law between “prostitution” and “child rape” or “statutory 
rape” is the exchange of money or something of value tells us that economics and class are of 
utmost importance to the issue of child sex trafficking. The elemental difference that creates 
this tension between child prostitution and other forms of sexual exploitation is “commercial,” 
and commercial exchange evokes commodification, contract and the consent implicit in these. 
This is a capitalist market reading of human action and agency; one that is always most 
interested in preserving the privilege of the consumer—the late capitalist re-embodiment of 
the ideal humanist subject. Law confounds whether prostitution is an issue of contracts or 
crime. At present, it draws selectively from both notions in ways that detrimentally impact 
minors.  
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American legal discourse regarding child prostitution is largely characterized by the 
omission of class rather than substantive class-based or class-conscious formulation. At the 
same time it is classing in the sense that it creates class conditions such as the ascription of 
class status and socio-economic assessment of juvenile delinquency in the courts. The 
particular types and patterns of omission do not suggest an absence of economic theory, 
however, but rather evidence the type of class and economic theory that American legal 
discourse on child prostitution espouses—the dominant, US-originated neoliberal 
jurisprudence of Law and Economics. This is evident in the tendency of legal discourse to 
avoid characterizing or teasing out the concept of “exploitation,” and primarily viewing 
exploitation as episodic, individualized and pathological aberration in accord with the 
uncritical economic approach of law and economics theory. The way in which “choice” acts 
as neoliberal class-related code in the distinctly ideological dimension of the legal-discursive 
classing process demonstrates law-and-economics thinking. “Choice” also underwrites 
neoliberal responsibilization—imputing individualized responsibility for the effects of 
macro-structural phenomena. This can be connected to law-and-order thinking and its brand 
of criminal responsibilization that increasingly manages these effects through the carceral 
state and its private partners. This encompasses emergent forms of penalization meted out in 
the blurred boundaries of adult/child, victim/offender, consent/non-consent, 
incarceration/temporary protective custody.  
6.3 Multidimensional Gender and Feminist Multiplicity 
My critique of sex work theory after engaging with this research for years revolves 
around what I find is its radical departure from an aim that seems to me the common 
denominator of feminisms—sexual autonomy and integrity. The in/ability to possess and 
maintain sexual autonomy and integrity has been one of the major identifying markers of 
female status across the life course under the modern Western social contract, and thus the 
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fulcrum of feminist struggles across race and class, though to varying degrees and with 
qualitative differences in historical treatment.91 By sexual autonomy and integrity I mean the 
ability of persons to engage in sex motivated by their own sexual desire; to maintain sexual 
relations on their own terms and based on mutual affirmation. This notion may seem vague, 
but conceptualizing it may start with the question of to what extent the sexual mind, will and 
affect have been colonized by forces disciplining us to “desire” the very things hegemonic 
values require of us, including the need and/or desire for commercial gain. This can help 
move beyond a contractual notion of “consent.” Any inability to refuse unwanted sex falls 
along the continuum of sexual violence, and the commodification, industrialization or 
privatization of and contractual consent to sex do not eschew this continuum but rather can be 
plotted along it. Implicit or explicit claims that the act of simply earning money—regardless 
of how it is generated—is empowering requires an uncritical view of capitalism, patriarchy, 
racism and the particular ways in which children are not only affected by but central to the 
re/production of these, including through prostitution in its legal or illegal forms.  
Prostitution has profound implications for all women and for the social construction of 
gender. I interpret the valid sex work theory claim that “when prostitute women aren’t safe, 
no woman is safe” (Ditmore 2011: 158) as an important admission that prostitution has great 
social significance and is representative of gender relations throughout society. This 
resonates with de Beauvoir’s theory that prostitution represents the quintessential role that 
women are to be relegated to, but also echoes decades of feminist attention to and activity 
around the issue based on a realization that the fate of all females is bound up with that of the 
prostitute. However, because sex work theory does less to problematize the role and broader 
consequences of prostitution itself, in order to focus more on arguing its merits of 
                                                
91 The social bond imagined and implemented by the social contract has worked to detach the female body from 
its soul and keep them apart, and female subjects have been inscribed into the broader community as persons 
whose sexuality is controlled by patriarchs or patriarchal figures. 
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empowerment, it contradicts itself by claiming on the one hand that prostitution implicates all 
women, while arguing on the other that, essentially, it is none of our business because 
“consent” and the prostitute’s individual “choice” are paramount. 
Although sex work theory attempts to render prostitution as merely “work”—as 
problematic or unproblematic as any other kind of work—this characterization diminishes the 
importance of sex, sexual relations and gender that is core to prostitution. Not only does sex 
work theory diminish the fact that prostitutes do not pursue or welcome the sex of 
prostitution (primarily or at all) due to their own sexual desire, but it also inadequately 
addresses the Marxist feminist critique that prostitution does not merely entail the 
subordination of [sex] workers to capitalists, as wage slaves or employees; rather, prostitutes 
are also subordinated to male wage slaves or employees who purchase their bodies for sexual 
use. This implies a double subordination—both on the grounds of class and gender. 
Capitalism requires the commodification of bodies, to “contract” the use of our physical and 
cognitive labor, which arguably detracts from one’s physical and cognitive integrity and 
autonomy, but prostitution additionally requires the sexual use of bodies, which detracts from 
one’s physical, cognitive and sexual integrity and autonomy.  
Since lack of control for one’s sexual integrity and autonomy has been a key marker 
of females and feminized bodies as well as the distinction between female and male social 
position, it is crucial to emphasize its importance. The sexual contract embedded in the social 
contract has been about compromising female sexual autonomy and integrity. The inability to 
refuse sexual access to one’s body—whether through forensically identifiable acts of 
criminally culpable individuals or through potential or actual starvation or poverty, or forces 
of relative deprivation—is at the core of the sexual contract that compromised and requires 
compromising female sexual autonomy and integrity. Though sex work theory points to the 
ability of prostitutes to “refuse service” to clients under legalization schemes, it is clear that 
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there are severe limits to exercising this kind of discretion, particularly if the agreement to 
have sex is to be based on mutual sexual attraction. If this is even possible, it would only be 
for the most popular and privileged (the exception to the rule); a person in prostitution would 
simply not earn adequate income by rejecting clients but for those s/he is sexually attracted to. 
For women of color and children (and especially children of color) who must sell sex for 
survival or material well-being, this is particularly stark given their social and economic 
devaluation in prostitution hierarchy, which requires them to sell themselves more often or to 
take greater risks in order to generate the same income as their White, adult counterparts. 
Thus to the class- and gender-based Marxist feminist critique of prostitution I add the critique 
of race and childhood, to emphasize the inadequacy of “sex work” for theorizing prostitution, 
but especially child prostitution.  
This is precisely what places “voluntary” prostitution (especially child prostitution) 
on the same continuum as sex abuse, sex trafficking and rape. That it is “agreed to” (or 
“offered” or “solicited”) does not mean that the acts or their nature change; the same acts are 
still required, and not for the purpose of female sexual desire or fulfillment. In terms of sex 
work, prostitution is sex abuse and rape constructed in contractual terms—driven by material 
necessity. This is not to stigmatize those labeled as prostitutes for committing acts that fall 
short of feminist sex, to shame those in prostitution for not acting on their sexual desire or 
blame them for our inability to cultivate this in and through a pro-female social ecosystem. 
Rather it is to take a critical stance against the practices and institution of prostitution and the 
claim that it is actually or potentially a tool of liberation “for women,” as it traffics in the 
reproduction of social hierarchy along every empirical dimension explored in this study. If it 
is simply commercial gain that is the “empowering” part of prostitution, then an argument 
needs to be made for how wage work is empowering and/or transcendent of racist, patriarchal 
capitalism. If it is the “sex” part of prostitution that is empowering, then an argument needs 
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to be made for how the commodification of sex is any more empowering than sex tied to 
familial or relational patriarchy. If it is the combination of generating money through sex that 
is meant to be empowering, particularly for “women,” then the Marxist feminist question 
remains of how the subordination of the wage worker combined with the sexual 
subordination of the sex worker add up to female empowerment, particularly when 
considering childhood, race and immigration. 
To view commodification as sexual autonomy has required sex work theorists to 
argue for the merits of financial independence that “sex work” presumably promises, and to 
premise the merits of such independence on breaking from the often abusive or patriarchal 
family structures and values that women and children find themselves in. But this is to 
substitute one set of patriarchal relations for another—claiming that commodification and 
objectification on the market are somehow less harmful (and even helpful) to women than 
patriarchy of the familial, relational and social domain. Some sex work theorists even 
concede that the sex industry is patriarchal and sexist, but that capitalizing on this is 
liberating for women, at least financially. Prostitution violates female sexual integrity in 
similar ways as legislatures and judiciaries are thought to according to feminist legal critiques 
(e.g. Pether 1999). Like law, prostitution values some females and their sexuality above 
others. What difference if that valuation occurs through a pricing menu based on age, race 
and appearance, all of which have mattered a great deal in both contexts?92  
                                                
92 I have not focused on the role of “beauty” in this research, but one only need read Angela McRobbie’s (2009) 
critique of post-feminism and substitute the oppressive nature of neoliberal marketing for female consumption 
with that of prostitution to reveal how the two operate alike in evaluating women’s worth through oppressive 
(unattainable and/or unsustainable) beauty standards, with the sex industry certainly bolstering the beauty 
industry. In the case of prostitution, the beauty standard is more directly commodified but interlocks with the 
complex social significance of beauty and the elusive fulfillment of such standards through consumption. 
Prostitution upholds oppressive beauty standards that feminists critique elsewhere, as in McRobbie’s work, 
which also critiques the sex industry and sex work theory, though more cursorily. 
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6.4 The adult/child binary and sex work theory 
Childhood and child prostitution have historically presented a great challenge to sex 
work theory, which, I argue, they have not managed to overcome. Sex work theory has at 
least two main tendencies with regard to the adult/child binary: separatism or conflation. The 
former, like the law, maintains the adult/child boundary along lines of age, based on 
legal/arbitrary age boundaries from the perspective of strictly interpreting prostitution as an 
employment or service contract from which minors are legally excluded. The latter is 
achieved through extension of sex work theory to minors, through encroachment. Sex work 
theory collapses the boundary and extends adulthood or adult age/status to those otherwise 
defined as minors by law, especially to 16-17 year-olds—the largest age group of minors in 
prostitution—by claiming that they have adult capacity for prostitution (see, e.g. Shanahan 
2013). Like the law that waives minors into the adult justice system, sex work theory engages 
in selective adultification for the purposes of inscribing minors into adult structures in which 
they could easily be fitted but for their age. This requires categorizing minors—who have 
structurally less social, economic, political and civil power and resources than their adult 
counterparts—with adults, even though minors as a social group are unable to dominate 
adults as a social group in either the realm of law or prostitution.93 In this way sex work 
theory engages in the retroactive application of adult prostitution and adult-based sex work 
theory to minors. This is despite the possibility of building an argument for the opposite, 
since many studies show that prostitution often begins in childhood.94 The retroactive 
application of the adult-based framework of sex work to child prostitution goes against an 
                                                
93 Here, I have specifically in mind Grahn-Farley’s (2002) discussion of boys waived into adult prisons being 
rendered sex slaves to adult men, and O’Connell-Davidson’s (2005) finding that in her examination of 
prostitution around the world, she has found that children occupy the lowest rungs, endure the worst conditions, 
and materially gain the least compared to their adult counterparts. Since prostitution in the US often begins at 
the ages of 12-14, if there is any “advantage” to being in prostitution longer, then minors beginning at that age 
are markedly disadvantaged from those who are much older but have not yet “aged out” of prostitution. 
94 And when it is not the prostitution itself that begins during childhood, then the contributing factors to 
prostitution certainly most often do in the US. 
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inter-generational, life-course perspective on prostitution that follows the subject along the 
sequential trajectory of the life course, and effectively erases or diminishes the significance 
of childhood to prostitution. The extension and retroactive application of sex work theory—
premised upon the consenting adult agent—to children is especially troubling given that 
some children are more vulnerable to prostitution than others, particularly children in poverty 
or at risk of poverty. By omitting or inadequately addressing structural inequalities, sex work 
theory concedes that some women simply must be prostitutes, and thus the role of the 
feminist is to strive to merely improve this status, experience and condition for women.95 By 
extension, it argues the same for children. Given that child/prostitution thrives on and 
reproduces social inequalities of race, class, gender and childhood (and age, generally), this 
framework is acquiescent to social hierarchy, in which is ensconced prostitution hierarchy—
mutually reflective in the socio-economic distance between girls of color in street prostitution 
and White adult “high-end call girls.” 
Law and sex work theory have maintained the boundary between child and adult 
prostitution for the common purpose of maintaining their legitimacy. Law exempting 
children from criminal culpability for prostitution is premised upon the idea that children are 
naturally, developmentally incapable of willingly engaging in prostitution, and/or that they 
cannot appreciate the consequence of their actions the way adults do or should do.96 
Therefore, it draws age-based boundaries in order to appear just, while simultaneously 
blurring those boundaries as its commitment to retributivism increases. Similarly, sex work 
theory that separates child and adult prostitution specifically in order to legitimize adult 
prostitution while denouncing child prostitution relies upon contractual and criminal 
boundaries of age. Child prostitution is inconvenient and disruptive to the protagonist and 
                                                
95  In effect, the sex work framework quashes any challenge to the institution or practice itself, and often 
interprets this as an attack on the practitioners, specifically prostitutes. 
96 Our laws do not acknowledge that the vulnerabilities that mark children as a social category are socially and 
legally constructed. 
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core narrative of sex work theory, and threatens its conceptual and political legitimacy, 
through its very existence but particularly when child prostitution is understood as integral to 
prostitution generally. However, as sex work theory has gained popularity and acceptance—
evidenced by the common, generic usage of the term “sex work” as a neutral term despite its 
specific social and political genealogy—its proponents have become less diffident about 
encroaching this formerly preserved boundary and applying their framework to children. 
What is integral and foundational is then rendered in more passive terms, “the presence of 
children in the sex trade” (O’Connell-Davidson 2005).   
The extension of sex work theory into child prostitution is problematic and is not 
multi-conscious, much like most sex work theory. Sex workers rights critiques are not 
necessarily useful for child prostitution. The problem facing minors in prostitution is not the 
lack of recognition of their sexuality or sexual agency. Their greatest problem is not the 
obstruction of their ability to freely prostitute themselves, such as being forcibly rescued and 
coddled as innocent victims. In fact, minors in prostitution are more prone to over-
sexualization and being rendered non-innocent by virtue of their involvement in prostitution 
as well as the race- and class-based biases and disproportionalities that render minors “non-
children.” Minors, particularly children of color and those in conflict with the law, are quite 
often treated as presumptively guilty, particularly when criminological theories such as 
“super predator” theory are in vogue, circulated in legal and political discourse, and have 
lasting impact through codification. The lack of recognition of victimization for children of 
color and those in conflict with the law comports with that which Black feminism has pointed 
out for women of color. The urgency of problematizing the over-sexualization of women of 
color and sexualization of children of color is clear against a backdrop in which the denial of 
sexual victimization of females of color has contrasted with the guarding, preservation and, 
ultimately, control of White feminine sexuality through tropes of innocence.  
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Overall, sex work theory exhibits problematic constructions of adult/child relations. 
Feminist and feminist-criminological critique have centered on problematizing paternalism 
and maternalism (e.g. Doezema 2010). In these, paternalism represents the ideological 
dimension of state interference in individual lives and decisions, while maternalism marks the 
relationship between social workers, “moral crusaders” and the girls they “rescue.” However, 
the negative reiteration of these terms or notions has the concerning effect of transgressing 
the valid critique of punitive or rehabilitative child protection agencies, to construct the 
family or parent-child relations in general as intrinsically problematic. Parental protection of 
children is not itself problematic, and rather necessary in the current social structure. 
Feminists of color have also interjected in predominantly White feminist arguments that 
family is not necessarily the greatest site of oppression for women and children of color, 
particularly given that historical forces have often worked against and denied them family 
integrity and unity, and kinship has often provided sanctuary from racism outside the home or 
immediate community. Thus, a non-specific critique of paternalism can disservice feminist 
and pro-child policy by unwittingly bolstering general anti-statism of the neoliberal, 
libertarian or laissez-faire varieties. Broad anti-maternalism similarly threatens to undermine 
any importance, necessity or desirability of intergenerational female relations, e.g. by 
disparaging anti-trafficking activists for simply replicating mother-daughter dynamics with 
girls under their care. Emerging research on girlhood can be helpful for understanding the 
particularities of this social position, but requires theorizing multiplicities within it in order to 
avoid the default subjectivity of White, bourgeois femininity common to the expansion of 
feminist theory into new theoretical terrain and subjecthoods.   
Sex work theory and the victim/offender binary: the im/possibilities of victimization 
 Sex work theory has a problematic conception of victim/offender. When theorizing 
sex work, White, Transnational, Third World and postcolonial feminisms have primarily 
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been concerned with resisting the “victim” label on their respective subjects. This is an 
important effort, particularly in light of the way ideal and culpable victimhoods routinely cast 
suspicion upon and deny victimization to potential and actual victims of sex trafficking. 
However, the anti-victimhood of sex work theory has been remiss regarding the Black 
feminist critique of the denial of their sexual victimization. Perhaps this is due to a perception 
that White and subaltern women are idealized victims of sex trafficking, and therefore the 
primary task of feminists is to resist the victim label because it is stigmatizing and 
disempowering, in favor of narratives of survivorship. However, this does not reconcile the 
fact that the denial of victimization in the sex trafficking and prostitution contexts is 
commonplace and systemically routine. This is evident in police policy of “keeping closed 
doors closed” with regard to prostitution (Halter 2008: 15), the extremely rare granting of T 
visas, the law’s denial or selective granting of victim status to females of color, as well as the 
ways in which this denial is built into institutional codes regarding governmental benefits and 
welfare generally. Like law and governments, sex work theory casts severe doubt on 
narratives of victimization. In doing so, it throws the proverbial baby out with the bathwater. 
Transnational sex work theory helpfully identifies and critiques the ways in which subaltern 
and Third World women’s victimization, including through sex trafficking and prostitution, is 
manipulated to serve racist, imperialist ends often under the auspices of benevolent (White, 
western) feminist intervention (e.g. Kempadoo, Augustin). This also often implicates 
subaltern males as the prime perpetrators of savageries and barbarisms against subaltern 
females as passive non-agents to justify such interventionism. However, casting doubt on 
victimization narratives for the sake of restituting discursive agency to females rendered 
passive through them has the undesirable effect—within liberal legal regimes—of denying 
material benefits to those detrimentally impacted by sex trafficking and/or prostitution.  
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This exposes the particularly hazardous enterprise of sex work theory. On the one 
hand, proponents of the sex work paradigm argue for extreme reliance on the law—through 
legalization and regulation of prostitution, which requires enforcement of human and civil 
rights of prostitutes. At the same time, it vehemently opposes the very tool that subjects and 
rights bearers in liberal legal regimes are expected to utilize to make claims—legal 
victimhood. Rights are the concessions that liberal legal regimes make to minorities—those 
who are detrimentally impacted by social hierarchy. Rights are the tools with which 
minorities (the structurally injured) and individual claims-makers (the episodically injured) 
can reclaim their losses, remedy their pain and suffering and/or bring perpetrators to justice. 
Under rights-based liberal schemes, proof of victimization (and perpetration) is indispensable.  
Sex work theory is unable to reconcile the contradiction of its anti-victimhood 
rhetoric with its heavy reliance on the law for protection of sex workers. This stems from sex 
work theory’s uncritical and/or equivocal approach to the law. Under prohibition, the state 
and police are identified as the prime enemies of sex workers, more so than “clients” or 
pimps and traffickers, euphemistically referred to as “market facilitators” in recent research 
on child prostitution (Shanahan 2013). Under legalization, sex work theory imagines the law 
as the apparatus through which the human rights of sex workers are asserted and empowering 
schemes of prostitution are implemented and maintained. However, the assertion of rights 
under liberal law requires claims of victimization, and fitting fact patterns into “standard and 
coherent narrative frameworks…[that get] matched with the narrative pattern of the legal rule” 
(Douzinas and Gearey 2005: 68). Sex work theory adopts many legal standards and notions 
of individualized, pathological or aberrational injury in the prostitution context. Anything 
short of “sex trafficking”—prostitution achieved through force, fraud or coercion, committed 
by identifiable perpetrators against identifiable victims—is consensual, voluntary, agentic 
and a matter of personal choice.  
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This diminishes the structural injuries of minoritized persons that place them at 
greater risk for being “trafficked” or entering prostitution, which then requires any claimant 
to adopt the legally constructed victim narrative. The sex work framework replaces one 
stigma for another; it replaces the stigma of “prostitution” (that “sex work” supposedly 
eradicates) with the stigma of “victim,” yet would require the aggrieved to claim the legally 
prescribed victim narrative. It creates a contradictory and prohibitive scheme upon which 
legalization of sex work is founded and within which claims-makers are to operate. Moreover, 
it loses sight of the fact that the claims-making process and the ability to articulate one’s 
injuries and claims in pursuit of justice need not act as branding an identity or status upon an 
individual, and instead can be empowering—whether on the individual or collective level—
and does not have to be at odds with survivorship. The liberal legal framework renders 
complicated victim narratives illegible, requiring that the landscape of harm be made to fit its 
prescriptive map. The resistance of sex work theory to the intrinsic quality of legal liberalism 
and its prescribed victimization narratives that construct victimhood as a status or identity is 
futile due to its reliance on this framework for legitimacy and enforcement.  
At the same time that sex work theory corroborates with law and governments 
regarding victimization, it neutralizes “offenders” and renders them relatively inculpable 
through similar means that the law deploys. The requirement of intentional, individualized 
misbehavior that underwrites sex trafficking law renders anything less innocuous. For 
example, O’Connell-Davidson (2005) argues that not all child sex tourists are pedophilic 
“penis wielding colonizers”; some are merely “opportunistic” purchasers of sex who happen 
to do so from a minor merely due to her availability—since minors are “present in the sex 
trade”—not because the sex tourist purposely set out to have sex with a minor. The 
perspective of the adult male purchaser is privileged here. Similar to how discrimination law 
assesses wrongs, de facto child sex tourism is rendered harmless because it is the action of an 
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“opportunistic” john, as opposed to de jure child sex tourism by an intentional child abuser—
even though the harm to the child is the same.  
6.5 Sex work theory and non/consent 
 The critical legal discourse analysis of Pether (1999) is greatly concerned with issues 
of consent and gendered violence. Her analysis of the legal discourse of rape yielded a 
pattern of “normalization of what feminists would see as forced sex, a pervading assumption 
that women ‘consent’ to forced sex, and a criminal sanctioning of forced sex of kinds 
perceived as inconsistent with chaste femininity, such as that involving violence or 
‘deviance’” (Pether 1999: 85). Sex work theory does little to counteract this, as it relies on 
the same consent/non-consent dichotomy used to differentiate “sex trafficking” from 
“prostitution.” Even after in-depth, critical and historical analysis of laws from a sex workers’ 
rights framework, the theory comes to an “impasse” on this issue, hardly distinguishable from 
legal discourse.  
 With regard to the non/consent binary, sex work theory has three problematic effects 
when applied to adult or child prostitution. First, it diminishes the objectification inherent in 
commodification by characterizing prostitution as the subject of a “service” contract. The 
contractual construction of prostitution in sex work theory that renders prostitution a contract 
for sexual “services” makes consent the most important finding for its legitimacy and 
enforceability. Once consent is found, it diminishes “the terrifying instability between people 
and things” that not only the personification of objects such as dolls entails (Bernstein 2011: 
222), but also that the objectification of persons achieves, including through the sexual 
objectification that prostitution engenders. Moreover, although sex work theory emphasizes 
“service,” prostitutes sell (or “rent”) their body parts (goods) as well as sex (service), 
suggesting a form of chatterlization. Second, the logical conclusion of the commodification 
inherent in and the contractual construction of prostitution is to reinforce the “unrapeability” 
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of its subjects by rendering rape merely the theft of services and/or property damage. 
Historically, from the Antebellum period up to the criminalization of prostitution during the 
Progressive Era, (primarily White, adult) prostitutes used the (private) criminal justice system 
to sue men for assault and/or theft, claims which were based in property law that treated the 
body as one’s private property. Sex work theory has largely taken an uncritical view of this 
era while focusing on the Progressive Era as repressive, and has failed to demonstrate how its 
proposals of legalization would differ. For example, Linehan (2014) idealizes the child 
prostitutes of the Gilded Age by repeatedly emphasizing their “choices” and “agency,” and 
arguing that Progressive Era reforms destroyed these. She omits the property-based legal 
model of prostitution at the time and the inability of children to exercise it, while 
downplaying that a common defense of persons accused of prostituting children was to argue 
the child’s knowledge, choice and free will in prostitution. Third, sex work theory diminishes 
sex and sexual subordination by emphasizing “pleasure” and “sexuality,” which respectively 
privileges the viewpoint of male clients as “the demanding consumer,” and makes 
prostitution seem an orientation rather than sexual commodification driven by socio-
economic inequalities. The contractual construction of prostitution in both law and sex work 
theory—in which the exchange of money is proof of “consent” and mutuality—diminishes 
the unilateralism of the sexuality and pleasure supposedly transpiring in the transaction. It 
projects an illusion of more or less even power dynamics between individually-bargaining, 
economically rational parties.  
 The legal-discursive opposition of “prostitution” to “sex trafficking” has its corollary 
in sex work theory, which views the latter with skepticism because anti-trafficking efforts are 
“seen to entail increasing the power of the state over the sex industry” (Doezema 2010: 26-
27). Yet increasing the power of the state (and its private counterparts) is precisely what 
legalization and the social normalization of prostitution entails, but sex work theory 
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anticipates that this will lead to a less repressive form of protection for women. This is 
despite legalization in Nevada and other non-US jurisdictions leading to the expectation that 
women “work” in licensed brothels as part of workfare programs that require welfare 
recipients to transition to “work.” Legal liberalism, rights and neoliberal law-and-economics 
are unable to dispel this sort of coercion—the raced, classed, gendered and sexualized 
coercion endemic to characterizing prostitution as consensual work based on a contract for 
sexual services. Contracts require enforcement, and enforcement involves the state and 
private power structures.  
6.6 The Importance and Significance of Childhood 
The child and childhood challenge us to rethink the sociology of sex work, to take a 
multidimensional approach to the focus on gender by integrating race, class and age, and to 
understand how the issue of child prostitution has reflected as well as shaped the construction 
or erosion of modern American childhood. The focus on genealogical legal construction of 
the child and the social process of infantilization expose parallels in the treatment of children 
and enslaved or quasi-enslaved persons. Elements of their treatment as chattel/property and 
as socially excluded non-citizens survive in the contemporary construction of childhood. 
Child status and infantilization are intimately connected with disciplinarian modes of 
governance. Legal responses to child prostitution that seemingly manage the harms of social 
inequality and the confluence of contributing factors to CSEC employ essentialist 
understandings of childhood. They do not recognize the socio-legally constructed nature of 
childhood vulnerability, and therefore cannot recognize the role of law in reproducing those 
very inequalities.  
The legal-discursive construction of child prostitution points to the social, cultural and 
political significance of childhood as shaped by and shaping race, class and gender. The 
binaries of adult/child, victim/offender and consent/non-consent are the emergent themes of 
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legal discourse regarding child prostitution. However, the multiplicities of race, class, gender 
and childhood construct and blur the boundaries between each side of the binary in ways that 
overburden children with the contributing factors of child prostitution and over-determine the 
quasi/criminalization of children for prostitution. 
Although there is clearly much to be said on this issue, I conclude with a few select 
recommendations that stand out at this juncture in the research. The US should ratify the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. It is in line with “American values,” it is post-colonial 
and can be considered “neutral” law for its unique balance of social, economic, civil and 
political rights, and considers children to be “full humans” and rights-bearing subjects 
(Grahn-Farley 2013, 2008, 2011). However, I urge a critical approach to child rights that 
recognizes the multidimensionality of identities constructed through legal and social 
processes, and the ways in which these are structured by White, adult-centric masculine 
norms best addressed through equitable distributive justice of human, organizational and 
material resources away from national and global elites and toward those who have less 
(Grahn-Farley 2003).  
With specific reference to the issue of child sex trafficking we must recognize the 
commercial-sexual exploitation of slavery and work to dismantle the processes of 
institutionalized racism, sexism, classism and childism identified in this research. Adopting a 
framework of multiplicity whose objective is the methodical examination of salient 
dimensions of the issue helps to see these processes at work and to identify their roots. We 
cannot assume that the language of victimization (or survivorship), diversion or welfare are 
sufficient, or to presume that the “special” status of children in society signifies chivalry and 
adequate protection. Systems built on notions of child protection, rights, empowerment or 
equity can only be as successful as the human, organizational and economic resources 
allocated them. Extricating the notion of freedom from “contract,” dispensing with legal 
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liberalism (and conservatism), disentangling “trafficking” from its association with cross-
border movement, to focus on exploitation and developing an effective language with which 
to convey these issues should be seen as parts of the bigger social project for equity in which 
legislation and rights are not the aims but the tools. 
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